PREFACE TO VOLUMES ON CORDELL HULL

THERE will never be another Secretary of State like Cordell Hull of Tennessee. He possessed a rural simplicity and American idealism that tempered his political sophistication. In the House of Representatives he had been caretaker of an exhausted Democratic Party in the period of the Republican Restoration. After the victory of 1932, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him Secretary of State in order to bind the radical Democracy of the North to the conservative Democracy of the South. The Tennessean had no experience in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nobody in 1933 expected there would be any great problems of diplomacy; it was enough to be a good neighbor to all nations. "In the field of world policy," said the new President, "I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." The Great Depression called for a "New Deal" at home, not abroad. Yet Cordell Hull was to be Secretary of State during nearly twelve years—longer than any one man has held that great office. Those years bridged American diplomacy during the depths of the Great Depression and the breakdown of American neutrality during the greatest war of modern history.

Hull was an old Wilsonian and League of Nations man. An expert on the tariff, he believed that wars were due to economic friction between nations and that once issues were adjusted by general tariff agreements a new dispensation of peace and good will among nations would prevail. Soon he was to find he was wrong: Adolf Hitler took over the dictatorship of Germany in Berlin a few weeks before Roosevelt took the oath of office on the steps of the Capitol in Washington. The great problems of the New Deal proved to be political and international, overshadowing the petty issues of the American tariff.

Despite difficulties, Hull accomplished a great deal at the Department. His record as Secretary rises brightly above the dismal international scene of 1933-44. Hull failed at the London Economic Conference of 1933, thanks to undercutting by the President. But that same year he achieved a personal triumph at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo. Next year, 1934, he maneuvered through Congress the first Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, providing for administrative lowering of the tariff, perhaps one of the most enduring changes of policy in American foreign relations of the twentieth century. In subsequent years, down to 1939, he never hesitated to show both his developing pessimism about the world scene and his faith that with American participation in world affairs the democratic nations would manage things somehow. As an old Wilsonian, he reiterated the views of the Great Covenanter of the First World War, and with a tenacity not observable among most of the Old Wilsonians. It is true that during the collapse of American neutrality in 1939-41, and the difficult war years of 1941-44 in the uphill fight for Allied victory, Hull watched his Department go into eclipse. He had to force the retirement of his Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, before he could be master even in his own office. He found it impossible to control the many Government agencies other than the State Department, including necessarily the military Departments, which dealt in foreign affairs. Through all the difficulties, including such unwise proposals as the Morgenthau Plan for Germany in 1944 (almost foisted off on the Government by the Secretary of the Treasury, and accepted momentarily by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill), Hull looked forward to the approaching peace, when he hoped to see a reincarnation of the League of Nations. He set the cumbrous State Department machinery to work planning for the future world organization, and it was an honor richly deserved when President Roosevelt referred to him as "the Father of the United Nations."

Professor Julius W. Pratt is in every way worthy to be the biographer of this "broad-gauged" statesman—to use a favorite phrase of Cordell Hull. Himself a broad-gauged scholar, he is author of many volumes on the diplomatic history of his country, including the sketches of James Monroe and Robert Lansing in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*. These new volumes by Pratt constitute a major work: the first assessment of Hull's career (apart from *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* [2 vols., New York, 1948]) to use the Secretary's personal papers, not to mention other sources, manuscript and published, most of which were not available to the Secretary when he composed his memoirs after the Second World War. Professor Pratt measures Secretary Hull in the warmth of Hull's attractive personality; puts the Secretarial duties in proper detail; places the Secretary in his own era; and judges him with the perspective of twenty years of calamitous world affairs in which many of the causes for which the Secretary fought have had their trials in the test of time.

In Secretary Hull's old age, I had the privilege of knowing him personally and well. To the end he remained a believer in the new League of Nations—the United Nations. Mr. Hull, I like to think, would appreciate Professor Pratt's masterly analysis of his career.

Samuel Flagg Bemis
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June 15, 1963

Julius W. Pratt

CORDELL HULL

1933-44

CHAPTER ONE

BEGINNINGS

THE HANDSOME and distinguished ex-Congressman and ex-Senator who was sworn in as Secretary of State on March 4, 1933, was in his sixty-second year.

Born October 2, 1871, in a rented log cabin in Overton (later Pickett) County, Tennessee, in the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains, Cordell Hull was the third of five sons of William and Elizabeth Riley Hull. The father, beginning independent life as a small farmer, found more profit in cutting timber and floating it down the Cumberland River to Nashville and in merchandising. So successful was he that at his death in 1923 he left an estate of $200,000. Elizabeth Riley Hull was described by her distinguished son as belonging to "the pure Anglo Saxon people" whose ancestors had settled the Cumberland Mountains area in the late eighteenth century. A Baptist and a regular church attendant, she was also "a humanitarian, and did her full part in ministering to the suffering and distressed of her community." Having only a common school education herself, she took a great interest in helping her children with their school and Sunday school lessons.[1]

William Hull, ambitious for his children, saw to it that they got such education as was available in that time and locality, at times even employing a private tutor for them. After Cordell, aged fourteen, had shown talent as a debater, he and his two older brothers were sent to Montvale Institute at Celina, Tennessee. Cordell later attended a normal school at Bowling Green, Kentucky (1886-1887), and the National Normal University at Lebanon, Ohio (1888-1889). An attack of grippe in 1889 ended his attendance at the latter school and also what he termed his literary education. Returning to Tennessee, he "read law" for a time and thereafter enrolled in the Cumberland Law School at Lebanon, Tennessee, where he was able to complete the ten-months course in five months.

Much of his vacation time during these years of schooling he had spent in working for his father, occasionally in rafting logs down river to Nashville—an employment of which he was fond of telling in later years.

Cordell Hull's political activity began early. He was elected chairman of the Democratic Committee of his county at nineteen and a member of the State Legislature at twenty-one. He served for several terms, meanwhile practicing law.

In 1898 he volunteered for service in the war with Spain, but the company which he commanded did not reach Cuba until the fighting was over. His several months of duty in the island gave him an opportunity to learn some Spanish and may perhaps have contributed to the sympathetic attitude to the Latin American people which he was to show as Secretary of State.

Hull resumed his law practice upon his return from Cuba. In 1903 he was appointed to fill an unexpired term as judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State. Elected to the same post in 1904, he left it two years later for a seat in the National House of Representatives, thus beginning a career in Congress which except for two years, 1921-23, was to last until he resigned his Senate seat to become Secretary of State in 1933.[2] In the meantime he had made the town of Carthage, Tennessee, his permanent home.

Hull relates that upon first becoming active in politics he began to formulate a system of political philosophy based upon the principles of Thomas Jefferson. His support, in 1896, of the policies of William Jennings Bryan against those of Grover Cleveland showed him aligned with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, though in support of a monetary policy which in his more mature years he would have rejected. He undoubtedly considered himself a true liberal and could unquestionably be so regarded until the leftward swing of the party under Franklin D. Roosevelt left him occupying a position which had become conservative. He was never a New Dealer or a favorite of New Dealers.

In Congress, the 36-year-old Tennessean began at once to specialize in the field of finance and taxation, taking particular interest in the tariff and in the question of a Federal income tax, which the Supreme Court some years before had held to be unconstitutional. After the Democratic congressional victory of 1910, Hull won the coveted seat on the Ways and Means Committee, where he could give his ideas practical application. Believing that the Supreme Court must reverse itself on the income tax question, he introduced a bill to levy taxes on individual incomes. This passed the House, but got no farther in that form. Congress however passed, and the States ratified, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, empowering Congress to tax incomes. Thereupon, at the request of the committee chairman, Oscar Underwood, Congressman Hull authored the income tax section of the Underwood Tariff of 1913.

During World War I, Hull was an advocate of a pay-as-you-fight policy, so far as that was feasible. To that end he urged expansion of the income tax. A letter that he wrote to President Wilson in 1918, he believed, was partly responsible for keeping Congress in session until it had enacted a drastic tax on excess profits. In 1916, he records, he arrived at what was to be one of his most basic and persistent articles of faith: the belief that excessive barriers to international trade bred war, while, conversely, reduction of trade barriers and the freeing of international commerce were conducive to world peace.

A firm admirer of Woodrow Wilson and a supporter of Wilson's League of Nations, Hull was not blind to Wilson's mistakes. He advised against the President's ill-starred appeal for a Democratic Congress in the 1918 election. Asked by Joseph P. Tumulty, the President's secretary, for his opinion of

Wilson's plan to attend the Peace Conference, Hull said frankly that he thought it would be a mistake. The spirit of his suggestion that a prominent Republican, such as Taft or Root, should share in treaty-making, ignored by Wilson, was carefully followed by Hull himself and his chief, President Roosevelt, a quarter-century later, in laying the groundwork for a new postwar settlement.

Wilson attested his high opinion of the Tennessean by proposing to appoint him Chief Justice of the Court of Customs and by suggesting him as the nominee for Vice President in 1920. Neither prospect appealed to Hull.[3]

Hull had readily made friends in Congress. Earnest and dignified, friendly though somewhat taciturn, democratic and easily accessible, he seems from the first to have won a reputation for complete straightforwardness and reliability. He had a charm of manner, a courtliness that might have led one to question his humble background. When thoroughly angered, however, he commanded a highly effective profane vocabulary. To such infrequent outbursts a certain piquancy was added by a soft Southern accent and a slight defect in his speech, which transformed r's into w's. This led President Roosevelt on occasion to inquire: "Was this one of Cordell's Chwist days?" From his early acquaintance with mules and log rafts and Tennessee mountaineers Hull had stored up a rich accumulation of homely anecdotes; he had a story for every occasion.

Such a combination of qualities made for popularity in Congress, which was later apparent in the great respect that Secretary Hull enjoyed "on the Hill." Much earlier, coupled with his political canniness, it led to his election to the Democratic National Committee, on which he served from 1914 to 1928 and as chairman from 1921 to 1924.

Upon his return to Congress after the election of 1922, Hull found the Government, and the Democratic Party as well, moving in directions that he could not approve. "I had become," he wrote later, "one of the voices whose notes, pleading for lower tariffs, international co-operation, and better national financing, shattered against a stone wall."[4] In particular, he deplored the trend in the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Al Smith and National Chairman John J. Raskob, away from its traditional low-tariff principles. He supported Smith in the campaign of 1928, but without enthusiasm. In the tariff fight that followed the Republican victory of that year, Hull alone of the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee engaged in serious cross-questioning of witnesses, and he alone signed a minority report opposing the bill that was to take final form in the Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. He liked to recall afterwards that in this report, written five months before the stock-market crash of 1929, he had, Cassandra-like, warned the country of impending disaster.

So discouraged was he by this time that he was thinking seriously of retiring from politics and resuming his law practice. From this course he was dissuaded when 1930 brought an opportunity to seek election to the Senate. "I felt so profoundly the suicidal course of events generally," he recorded in his *Memoirs*, "that I decided to make one more effort to be of service in helping to steer the national and international course in an entirely different and sound direction."[5] Easily elected over the opposition of the most powerful political machines in Tennessee, he continued during the next two years his attempt to cure the Democratic Party of its recent heresy on the tariff.

Such a conversion, or reconversion, of the party meant a fight with the dominant Smith-Raskob faction, and in this contest Hull found himself allied with New York's Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt. Hull had known Roosevelt pleasantly but not intimately when the latter was Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson, and Hull's position on the Democratic National Committee had resulted in further contacts. As Governor, with an eye on the Presidency, Roosevelt found it advantageous to consult the Tennessean frequently on his journeys between Albany and Warm Springs, Georgia. Their views were congenial on tariff and economic questions generally, and Hull quickly became committed to support of Roosevelt's candidacy for the nomination in 1932.

Hull took a prominent part in the preliminary maneuvers which broke the grip of Smith and Raskob on the party machinery. At the Chicago Convention in 1932, partly through his old friendship with William Gibbs McAdoo, he was instrumental in securing the crucial California vote for Roosevelt. He also, with A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General under Wilson, wrote most of the Democratic platform. It contained a tariff plank satisfactory to Hull, but against his wishes included also a declaration in favor of repeal of the Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment.[6]

Hull had suffered one disappointment early in 1932 when Roosevelt, under pressure from William Randolph Hearst, repudiated any idea of American membership in the League of Nations. Perhaps a more bitter one befell him on September 29, when Candidate Roosevelt, in a speech at Sioux City, Iowa, came close to repudiating Hull's views on the tariff. Upon request, Hull had sent to Roosevelt's headquarters suggestions for a speech proposing a ten percent horizontal cut in the existing tariff. This did not please some of Roosevelt's younger advisers, who were preaching the necessity of first raising commodity prices in the United States; nor did it please certain protectionist Senators from the Rocky Mountain area. A rewriting of the speech on the Roosevelt campaign train produced "a compromise between the free traders and the protectionists," which grieved Hull without satisfying his opponents. This was the first taste of the difficulty that Hull was to encounter in realizing his newly awakened tariff hopes.[7]

Hull himself took little part in the post-convention campaign. He made a few speeches, most of them in Tennessee. He received no acknowledgment from Roosevelt of his contributions to the nomination and to the platform. While he was naturally hurt at this neglect, there is no evidence that he expected any political preferment in return for his services. He was happy in his recently acquired Senatorship, and such had been his success in Tennessee politics that he was confident of retaining his seat as long as he might desire. He was apparently taken by surprise when, some time in January, 1933, he received the first offer of the Secretaryship of State.

The process by which Roosevelt made his choice is not clear. Several possible appointees had been discussed in the press and in Roosevelt's entourage. Norman H. Davis, like Hull a Tennessean, had had much experience in international conferences. He would undoubtedly have liked the job and was often mentioned for it, but Felix Frankfurter advised Roosevelt against his appointment, and apparently the President-elect did not consider it seriously. Of the three men to whom the choice narrowed down, Robert W. Bingham was little known to Roosevelt, while the competent Owen D. Young was too closely identified with the unpopular public utilities industry. That left Cordell Hull, who aside from his excellent public and party record and his services to Roosevelt, had the warm sponsorship of Louis McHenry Howe, Roosevelt's secretary. Undoubtedly Hull's popularity in the South and in Congress made his appointment politically expedient.

Hull, in his *Memoirs,* indicates clearly that he was first approached on the subject by Roosevelt himself, but both Raymond Moley and Louis B. Wehle tell of having been requested by Roosevelt to sound out the Tennessee Senator. Since only Moley gives an exact date, January 27, it seems impossible to determine the order of the interviews. Wehle tells a reasonably circumstantial story of visiting Hull some time in January and of finding him resentful at Roosevelt's neglect and initially not inclined to accept the offer. Wehle succeeded in mollifying his resentment and inducing him at least to think the matter over. He left him with some sound advice—that he make his acceptance conditional upon assurance from Roosevelt that he was to be master in his own house; that though the President might designate the Secretary's chief aides, the approach and the offer of each position should come from the Secretary himself. "It's true," said Wehle, "that unless you make your own appointments, you will never have a Department."[8]

Moley also reports talking to Hull at the President's instance. Soon thereafter he was approached by five Democratic Senators individually, all of them warning against the appointment of Hull as Secretary of State. The burden of their criticism was that, though they were all fond of Hull, he was too idealistic, knew little about foreign affairs save in the field of tariff, and could not handle men. "You tell the Senators," Roosevelt commented to Moley, "I'll be glad to have some fine idealism in the State Department."[9]

According to Hull's own account, he had, to his great surprise, been offered the position by the President-elect some time in January, when the latter passed through Washington on his way to Warm Springs. About February 1, Hull visited Roosevelt at the health resort, but left without having reached a decision. He was trying to resolve the question whether in the Senate or in the State Department he could best promote his ideas "for international economic peace and therefore political peace." With the question put thus, the State Department was an obvious winner. There he could concentrate on foreign affairs and "advance sound international views" to a degree that would not be possible in the Senate.

When Roosevelt returned from the South to New York in February, he requested that Hull meet his train at Richmond and ride with him to Washington. During that train ride, Hull gave Roosevelt a blueprint of what his responsibilities should be as Secretary of State, if and when he accepted that post. The essence of his analysis was that he expected to have a hand in "the formulation and conduct of foreign policy," not "a mere carrying on of correspondence with foreign governments." The President expressed his emphatic approval, whereupon, says Hull, I "accepted his offer, and we shook hands."[10]

Hull later confessed to Louis Wehle that he had neglected to make the condition that Wehle had suggested in regard to appointments in the State Department, and Wehle noticed that the more important appointments in the Department and in the Foreign Service were "publicly forecast or announced from Albany or Warm Springs or the White House."[11]

The President-elect announced his choice of Cordell Hull to be Secretary of State on February 21. The choice was generally hailed as a sound one by public men and by the press. Three days later Hull issued a statement outlining in a general way his thoughts on foreign policy. The United States, he said, should engage in "sane and realistic international co-operation . . . to aid in preserving the peace of the world," and should "play its full part in effecting the normal restoration of national economic relationships and in world commercial rehabilitation." The success of the new administration's principal foreign policies, he concluded, would "be determined by the extent of its aid in restoring world commerce, which would include our commerce at home; and its aid in maintaining world peace under the fundamental policy of right and justice."

"In this statement," Hull wrote later in his *Memoirs*, "I was reiterating the doctrines and policies contained in previous addresses and statements of mine. When I came to the State Department, I believed they offered much of the foundation for the most mutually desirable relationship among the nations of the world."[12]

CHAPTER TWO

SECRETARY AND DEPARTMENT

Retiring Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, though he was to become a warm friend of his successor in the Department, had serious reservations about the selection. Hull's appointment, he thought, did not betoken "a very vigorous administration from within the Department." It gave color to rumors that Roosevelt expected to be his own Secretary of State—a prospect which Stimson considered "lamentable."[1]

Some developments in the early months of the new Administration seemed to bear out the latter part of this forecast. Early in April, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, reported to a friend that "President Roosevelt is being his own Secretary of State in the best T.R. and Wilson tradition." The President, he noted a few days later, had received the new French Ambassador, M. de Laboulaye, and had issued an impromptu invitation to former Premier Edouard Herriot to visit Washington without troubling to notify the State Department, which did not hear of it till twelve hours later. Then the Secretary and Under Secretary had called at the White House and succeeded in convincing the President that he should keep memoranda of such informal but important interviews.[2]

These presidential irruptions into the normal channels of diplomacy, however, were not to become a habit, at least until the war years. Cordell Hull, in his *Memoirs,* spoke with great warmth about his cordial relations with the President and the high degree of independence which he enjoyed in conducting the nation's foreign policy. To his own later amusement, Hull for a short time harbored doubts as to the adequacy of the President-elect's "progressiveness." These were soon removed, and after a few months of trial and error, the Secretary found that he held the diplomatic reins quite firmly in his own hands, subject, of course, to the President's ultimate authority.

> During my tenure in the State Department [Hull wrote] I found that in the majority of cases I had to make my own decisions. Although a Secretary of State confers with the President on important matters of policy and is the President's agent in the field of foreign relations, in practice he acts largely on his own initiative and responsibility. . . . During his first term in office President Roosevelt was so immersed in an avalanche of domestic questions that he left me in almost full charge of foreign affairs. . . . Beginning with his second term, his interest and participation in foreign affairs greatly increased.[3]

Even in his second term Mr. Roosevelt confined his activity in the field of foreign relations for the most part to Europe, leaving Hull in almost undisputed command of policy toward Latin America and the Far East. After the outbreak of war in Europe in

1939, the President took more and more into his own hands the management of relations with Great Britain and Russia, and the Secretary of State was to find himself relegated gradually to the sidelines in the diplomacy of the war. But even then Hull was left in virtually complete control of planning for postwar international organization—planning that laid the groundwork for the United Nations.[4]

We may probably accept as accurate Hull's subsequent statement: "Never an unfriendly word passed between the President and me during my twelve years in the State Department." His further assertion that the President "could scarcely have been more considerate toward me," he himself qualified with the phrase, "with rare exceptions," and he mentions as such exceptions the President's conferences with Churchill and Stalin.[5] There was, in reality, more irritation in their relations than this language suggests. While the two men rarely disagreed on the substance of foreign policy, Hull was humiliated by his exclusion from the top-level conferences of wartime. Earlier he had been annoyed by Roosevelt's occasional direct dealing with politically appointed United States Ambassadors abroad and with certain of Hull's subordinates at home. He also disliked the President's habit of sending special envoys abroad as his personal representatives—a habit which, as Hull later complained, "tended in many instances to create havoc with our ambassadors and ministers in the capitals they visited."[6]

The State Department over which Hull was to preside was a sprawling organization of nearly 800 employees. It had grown by accretion rather than integration, and was to grow prodigiously during Hull's years, especially after 1939. It was a challenge to bureaucrats who craved clear lines of demarcation and of authority. Secretary Hull took little personal interest in problems of administrative organization. He left such matters to the Under Secretary or to an Assistant Secretary especially assigned that function. The result was occasional disorganization and intramural controversy which a firmer hand at the top might have prevented.

Hull brought to his new job the high-minded resolve that the Department should not become "the football of domestic politics." "The seasoned, experienced persons in key positions" he was determined to retain and did retain. "With the personnel of the State Department thus established on a non-partisan basis," he recorded later, "I never knew the politics of a dozen persons in the Department."[7]

It is unlikely that the Secretary expected to apply this principle to the uppermost levels in the Department—the Under Secretary and the four Assistant Secretaries. These offices were generally recognized as subject to political appointment. March 4 found them filled by Republicans, and within a few weeks all but one of these had been displaced. The exception was Wilbur J. Carr, Assistant Secretary in charge of administration and the budget. His expert knowledge was too valuable to be dispensed with. The new men were picked by Roosevelt with Hull's concurrence.

The new Under Secretary was William Phillips, a former Foreign Service officer with wide experience in the Department and abroad. A New Englander, a Harvard graduate, and a long-time friend of Roosevelt, he filled the position with distinction until 1936, when at his own request he was sent to Italy as Ambassador. Among his other services he had relieved the Secretary from many of the social responsibilities of the office for which Hull had no inclination. Hull had found him "thoroughly capable, loyal, and cooperative."[8]

Of the new Assistant Secretaries, the one first selected by Roosevelt was Professor Raymond Moley, a member of the "Brain Trust" group who had advised the new President on campaign strategy. Moley had been offered the position soon after the November election, and Mr. Roosevelt had defined his duties so loosely that they might ramify into almost any area of the Department.[9] His career in the Department was to be short and colorful. Another Assistant Secretary, Harry F. Payer, appointed at Moley's suggestion, resigned soon after Moley. By early fall, 1933, both were gone. Hull was then able to fill the vacancies with two men more to his taste: R. Walton Moore, an aging ex-Congressman and judge from Virginia, a personal friend of the Secretary; and Francis B. Sayre, son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson, international lawyer and Harvard professor, who was made responsible for developing the new reciprocal trade program.

The fourth Assistant Secretary was Sumner Welles. A Harvard graduate, an old friend of Roosevelt, he had entered the Foreign Service and had shown great competence, particularly as a specialist in Latin American affairs. A promising career was brought to a temporary halt when Welles incurred the wrath of a powerful Republican Senator by opposing the appointment of a henchman of the Senator's to a responsible post in the Dominican Republic. Welles had resigned his post, but had continued to hope for an opportunity to return to the diplomatic profession.[10] Franklin Roosevelt now provided that opportunity. Welles was named Assistant Secretary, April 6, 1933, and given oversight of Latin American affairs. After a brief interlude during which he served as Ambassador to Cuba,[11] May to December, 1933, he returned to the Department.

Whether Hull was cool to Welles's appointment at the time is not clear. Writing his *Memoirs* after many years of serious friction with Welles, he remarked laconically that the President had made the suggestion and he had agreed; that Welles "had good ability and experience, along with much ambition"; that sharp differences arose between himself and Welles in later years, whereas, in Hull's words, "In the earlier years I found myself in agreement with my other associates more often than with Welles on important questions of policy."[12]

By the end of 1933, then, the top-level team with which Hull was to work for some years had taken shape: Under Secretary Phillips, Assistant Secretaries Carr, Welles, Moore and Sayre. The personnel changed from time to time. Welles advanced to be Under Secretary in 1937 and was replaced in 1943 by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Among the Assistant Secretaries the turnover was rather rapid, partly because those who were Foreign Service officers were not permitted to remain in Washington for more than three consecutive years. Others who served in that rank in Hull's time were George Messersmith, Hugh R. Wilson, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Henry F. Grady, Breckinridge Long, G. Howland Shaw, and Dean G. Acheson.

With all of these officials except Moley, who soon departed, and Welles, who remained for ten years, Hull appears to have maintained relations of mutual friendship and esteem. With Moley and Welles, the basic trouble seemingly arose from their special relations with the President, by which they felt free to carry their ideas and problems to the White House without consulting the Secretary. In this practice, it must be admitted, the President gave them some encouragement, and Hull himself confessed to having been partly responsible for it. He had early formed a practice, he relates, of sending the Under Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries to talk with the President, usually on more or less technical matters. Thereby he saved his own time and gave prestige and useful experience to his subordinates.

> This practice worked very well in most instances

> [he continued]. Later on, however, instances occurred where an assistant badly abused his trust by going over my head to see the President without instructions from me and undertaking in one way or another virtually to act as Secretary of State. Sumner Welles was the principal offender.[13]

The Secretary undertook to end the abuse on the part of the Assistant Secretaries—"loose administration" William Phillips called it—by issuing an order, January 3, 1935, directing them not to go to the President without having made appointments through the office of the Secretary or the Under Secretary.[14] The order did not wholly end the practice, and when Welles became Under Secretary, he seems to have become bolder than ever in his direct approaches to the President. His behavior was a frequent subject of complaint by Hull in his weekly conferences with Secretaries Stimson and Knox during the war years.

Below the Assistant Secretaries were the geographical divisions. There were six of these in 1933, pertaining to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Near East, the Far East, Latin America, and Mexico. These were later reduced to four, when Mexico and the remainder of Latin America were combined to form the Division of American Republics, and Eastern and Western Europe were thrown together in a single Division of European Affairs. The Divisions of Far Eastern and Near Eastern Affairs remained intact. Each Division was headed by a Chief.

Space does not permit a full analysis of this complex Department, but other offices that should be mentioned were those of the Economic Adviser, the Legal Adviser, the Historical Adviser, various Political Advisers, and Special Assistants to the Secretary. Other divisions or offices were added to meet new needs: *e.g.*, the Division of Trade Agreements following enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934; the Office of Arms and Munitions Control (later Division of Controls) to administer features of the neutrality legislation of 1935-1937; an Office of Fiscal and Budget Affairs; and various agencies to meet wartime needs from 1939 onwards. Departmental personnel expanded from the less than 800 when Hull became Secretary to some 3,700 at the time of his resignation in 1944. No general reorganization was undertaken until January, 1944, when Stettinius, the new Under Secretary, tried his hand at it. So far from successful was this attempt that it was followed by another less than a year later, after Hull's resignation.[15]

Names of many of the key men in the divisions and offices of the Department will appear in the course of the narrative. They need not be mentioned here. To the quality of the Departmental personnel Hull paid high tribute in his *Memoirs.*

> I believe [he wrote] I am reasonably accurate in saying that I have not known during my time a more capable, experienced, and sound group of associates than those in the State Department during my twelve years as its head. They were unas-

> suming, and with very few exceptions were loyal, genuinely co-operative, and always on hand, especially when emergency tasks arose.[16]

In the selection of men to head the embassies and legations abroad, Hull suggested to the President something like a 50-50 division between career men and men from outside the Foreign Service. Certainly both types were represented, but as was to be expected, most of the prestige appointments went to outsiders, usually as rewards for one or another kind of political service. In this category were the appointments of Robert W. Bingham to London, Jesse Isadore Straus to Paris, Josephus Daniels to Mexico, and Claude G. Bowers to Madrid. The choice of William C. Bullitt for Moscow was in recognition of his earlier frustrating mission to that capital and his part in the negotiations that resulted in recognition of the Soviet Government. The selection of Professor William E. Dodd for Berlin could be explained partly by his acquaintance with Germany dating from his years there as a graduate student, partly, perhaps, by his earlier association with and admiration for Woodrow Wilson. These were Roosevelt's choices, not Hull's.

Among career diplomats retained at their posts were Joseph C. Grew in Japan, Nelson T. Johnson in China, and Hugh R. Wilson in Switzerland. A certain vindictiveness toward the outgoing Administration was apparent in the transfers of two other career diplomats. Francis White, Assistant Secretary for Latin

American Affairs and for years a specialist in that area, was sent as Minister to Czechoslovakia. Hugh S. Gibson, who as Ambassador to Belgium had served proficiently in a series of disarmament conferences in Europe, was given a new berth as Ambassador to Brazil. The "philosophy" of these transfers was explained to Pierrepont Moffat by a prominent Democrat, though not a member of the Administration.

> This is to the effect that whereas both men have the confidence of the President, they have both been too intimately tied up as exponents of the previous Administration in their particular fields. In other words [Moffat commented], I gather that the mere fact that Hugh had been the "handy man" for the last Administration made them desire to build up another "handy man" for this.[17]

The uncertainties of tenure arising from such quirks in Administration policy combined with economic factors to induce a low state of morale in the Foreign Service in the year 1933. Foreign Service officers, like other Federal employees, took a 15 percent salary cut under the Economy Act of March 20, 1933. Then their entertainment allowances were cancelled and their rent allowances cut by 65 percent. On top of all this came the departure of the United States from the gold standard and the consequent depreciation of the dollar abroad. All together, it was estimated that Americans serving their country in foreign lands had suffered a decline of at least fifty percent in the value of their official income and perquisites. The results were hardship, low morale, and in a few cases, loss of sanity and suicide. The efforts of Hull and Assistant Secretary Carr induced Congress to restore the losses a step at a time, but not for several years was the lost ground regained.[18]

Hull's unhappiness over what he considered the insubordinate behavior of Moley and Welles in the Department was aggravated by certain Cabinet colleagues whom he regarded as busybodies, incapable of keeping their fingers out of foreign affairs. From this charge he exempted the majority. In his *Memoirs* he had no unkind words for Jim Farley, Frances Perkins, Jesse Jones, Claude Swanson, Harry Woodring, or Frank Knox, and he remarked that he and Henry L. Stimson "worked together as double cousins." The colleagues who incurred Hull's resentment by their interference in what he considered State Department business were the group whom he liked to describe as "the extreme left-fringe people" or the "social welfarers"—Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Most persistent of these was Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury. Often, Hull complained, Morgenthau

> acted as if he were clothed with authority to project himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of foreign policy in given instances. . . . We sometimes found him conducting negotiations with foreign Governments which were the function of the State Department.[19]

Hull's anger at Morgenthau, smoldering for years, burst into flame in September, 1944, when the Secretary of the Treasury induced Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec to accept his plan for dismembering and "pastoralizing" defeated Germany.[20]

Probably the two most prominent characteristics of Hull's method of arriving at decisions on questions of foreign policy were hard work and searching consultation with his subordinates, or, as he invariably called them, "my associates." There seem to be no complaints from the men who worked under Hull that he was a driver, but he certainly drove himself. He lived for work. At his office daily at nine in the morning, he put in a long day and almost invariably carried documents to his apartment for "home work." There were many times, too, such as the period of crucial negotiations with Japan in the spring and summer of 1941, when, to avoid publicity, he met foreign diplomats in his apartment in the evening. For him Sunday was not a day of rest. From the beginning of his Secretaryship until his physician ordered otherwise in 1942, he spent Sunday mornings in his office, usually conferring with those of his "associates" best informed on the problems looming for the week ahead.

Hull's one form of recreation, so far as the records show, was croquet. On late afternoons, when weather and business permitted, he might be found on the croquet ground at Woodley, Henry L. Stimson's Washington home, which was occupied till Stimson's return in 1940 by Assistant Secretary Berle and his family. Joining in the game usually was Mrs. Hull (the former Rose Frances Witz Whitney of Virginia, whom he had married in 1917), and the foursome was as a rule completed by two of the younger men from the Department. Those croquet games, with their mild exercise in the open air, were a lifesaver for the elderly Secretary. They did not always mean escape from work and responsibility, however. He was often tracked down here by men from the Department when there was unanticipated need for a signature, a quick decision, or a crucial phone call to the White House.

If he had other forms of recreation, they have not impressed themselves on the record. There seems to be no mention in his *Memoirs* or in the memoirs, diaries, or letters of his contemporaries, of his attending the theatre, the opera, the concert hall, the cinema, or the ball park, or of his reading for pleasure or participating in card games.[21] He may have done any or several of these things, but certainly they occupied no significant place in his life. His dislike for formal dinners and receptions was well known; for the most part he avoided them. It was a narrow life, compared with that of a Roosevelt, a Stimson, a Dean Acheson, or a Winston Churchill, but to Cordell Hull it was a satisfactory life. Perhaps he would have said he did not care to fiddle while Rome burned.

Some Secretaries of State have been said to carry American foreign policy under their hats. Of Cordell Hull this was emphatically not true. No doubt aware of his own limited knowledge of foreign lands, he was avid of the knowledge and opinions of the experts. "In formulating a foreign policy," he wrote later, "I found no factor more indispensable as a rule than the long-experienced and patiently toiling, intelligent members of the geographic divisions of the State Department." It was these men who must make the appraisals of developments in their areas, "on which the higher officials, from the President down, must base any new policy."[22] Hence the Secretary's frequent consultations with the area people. Hence too his regular practice of holding Monday morning conferences with the higher Departmental officials and such of the area men as the day's problems called for. The informal Sunday conferences were mentioned above. It is revealing to find how often, in recording decisions, the Secretary wrote not "I decided," but "My associates and I decided." Mr. Hull was a democratic Secretary.

Mr. Hull as Secretary of State had his faults as well as his virtues. His reliance on consultation was perhaps an aspect of a reluctance to make decisions, or to make them quickly. He was deliberate where Sumner Welles was quick. In conferring with the President he was often prolix where Welles was concise and to the point. These contrasts go far to explain why Roosevelt did not discourage Welles from conferring with him even when Hull was in Washington. The Secretary was a cautious man. Cabinet colleagues Ickes and Morgenthau and members of the press, particularly of the liberal wing, thought him much too cautious. They complained of his neutral policy in the Spanish Civil War, of his delay in taking strong measures against Japan, of his maintenance of amicable relations with Vichy France and Franco Spain, of his prolonged coolness to the Free French. Some of these criticisms were perhaps justified, but in the majority of the instances mentioned, history may be said to have vindicated Mr. Hull.

Hull's caution in dealing with Congress, born of his twenty-four-years' membership in that body, may have been excessive at times, particularly in his care not to antagonize the isolationists; but in general he seems to have known the moods of Congress well and to have cannily avoided asking the unobtainable.

Hull lacked the Lincolnesque capacity for overlooking injuries. He never forgave General Charles de Gaulle his *coup de main* at St. Pierre-Miquelon, and American policy suffered thereby, though in this affair Roosevelt was quite as much to blame as Hull.[23] As the years passed, Hull developed a strain of self-pity and querulousness. This characteristic appeared conspicuously in his weekly conferences with Secretaries Stimson and Knox, 1940-44, recorded in Stimson's diary. Here his long-winded complaints against Sumner Welles or Charles de Gaulle or the gaps in his communication with the President often took time needed for discussion of practical issues. Hull was also, in Stimson's estimation, much too sensitive to press criticism.[24]

For his dealings with foreign diplomats Hull early laid down a few simple rules. In his first conversations with members of the diplomatic corps in Washington, he said to each individually: "I intend to be completely frank with you in all our conversations. I intend to tell you the exact truth. You will see that it is the truth." He expected his subordinates to follow the same practice. Other rules that he stressed were to make no threat without having the power and the will to back it up, and similarly to make no promise that could not be fulfilled.[25]

The main objectives of his foreign policy Hull forecast in a very general way in his statement of February 24, 1933, cited in the preceding chapter. They were, in brief, co-operation by the United States with other nations in restoring world commerce and similar co-operation in maintaining world peace with justice. The two were interconnected, for Hull was convinced that barriers to international trade bred war, while opening channels of commerce was conducive to peace. He worked consistently for American participation in measures for these ends. He was successful in launching the reciprocal trade program as a means of freeing world commerce. Through the Good Neighbor policy he assured the co-operation of the American Republics in preserving the internal peace of the Western Hemisphere, and presenting a nearly united front to the Axis powers. In preparing the way for the United Nations and American leadership in it, he committed the United States to a program of collective security.

This last achievement came only after war had engulfed the world and the United States with it. Hull's program for freeing commerce, so far as it was accomplished, had been quite ineffectual in stemming the currents that set toward conflict. Hull had tried to find other means to turn those currents back, in Europe and the Far East, but there was really little that he could do other than voice repeatedly the principles which, if adopted and adhered to, would mean the world's salvation. He engaged, therefore, in a vast amount of sermonizing in speeches, in diplomatic notes and interviews, in manifestoes to the nations of the world. He promulgated "Four Pillars of Peace," which later became "Eight Pillars of Peace," which again proliferated into a dozen or more. Among the "pillars" were the lowering of trade barriers, disarmament, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, peaceable settlement of controversies, observance of treaty obligations, and respect for international law. It seemed so clear to him that general observance of these simple rules of morality would assure peace and prosperity, that he could explain their widespread neglect only as the result of deficient education. Education, patiently and tactfully imparted, he believed, would bring even the Russian Communists to accept these principles of morality. The persistent sermonizing was an educational technique.

This continued exposition of idealistic principles, which had little relation to the way in which the world was being run, gave many of Hull's public documents an unrealistic flavor, which led the British economist, Sir Josiah Stamp, to write Roosevelt: "Mr. Cordell Hull is a Statesman either out of, or beyond, his time, and while his qualities are appreciated, his enthusiasms are not shared."[26] The remark had some validity, but it should be remembered that the isolationist mood of Congress and the country from 1933 to 1941 deprived the Secretary (and the President) of all deterrents against aggression except sermonizing. Furthermore, while it was true that Hull envisioned an international order perfect beyond human capability, he could and did at the same time work effectively for practical and attainable ends.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE AT LONDON

When Cordell Hull assumed office as Secretary of State, he found the Government committed to participation in two ambitious international conferences, one already in progress, the other soon to convene. The first, the General Disarmament Conference, first convened in Geneva in February, 1932, and reconvened a year later, had as yet failed to reach any agreement on the limitation of armaments. The Monetary and Economic Conference (often referred to as the World Economic Conference), was to meet in London at a date eventually set at June 12, 1933. The Disarmament Conference will be treated later; the World Economic Conference is the subject of this chapter.

The plan for a World Economic Conference, designed to find international remedies for the world-wide depression, was an outgrowth of the Lausanne Conference on debts and reparations of June and July, 1932. A Preparatory Commission of experts under League of Nations auspices, but including American economists John H. Williams and Edmund E. Day, had prepared an annotated agenda which was submitted in January, 1933. The experts listed four principal objectives for the Conference: (1) "restoration of an effective international monetary standard"; (2) "some increase in the level of world prices"; (3)

"abolition of exchange restrictions"; (4) "greater freedom of international trade." All of these ends, they thought, should be sought concurrently. The question of intergovernmental debts, not having been included in the "terms of reference" from the Lausanne Conference, was likewise omitted from the proposed program for London. But the experts made it clear that in their judgment settlement of the war debt question was essential to the solution of other problems. "Until there is such a settlement, or the definite prospect of such a settlement, these debts will remain an insuperable barrier to economic and financial reconstruction."[1]

President Hoover shared this view. While holding that the question of the debts should be excluded from the Conference agenda, he urged President-elect Roosevelt to join him in selecting representatives to negotiate on readjustment of the debts in the hope that progress in that direction would facilitate the work of the Conference on other matters. Roosevelt refused, and upon his insistence Secretary of State Stimson made it clear to the American representatives on the Organizing Committee for the Conference that the United States Government did not recognize any tie between the Conference and settlement of the debts.[2] Mr. Roosevelt and his closest advisers—men like Raymond Moley and Rexford G. Tugwell—were much more interested in promoting a program of domestic recovery than in settling international problems, like that of the war debts. Furthermore, Congress had, a year before, taken a firm position against any cancellation or reduction of the war debts, and any proposal now for reduction or readjustment was certain to meet strong opposition from both Congress and the public. The President-elect, therefore, held rigidly to the position that debts were not to be discussed at the London Conference. The debts, explained Roosevelt later, should "be considered on their merits and separate from other international economic questions."[3] So long as this was understood, he let it be known that after the fourth of March he would be glad to receive representatives of foreign governments to discuss separately the debts owing to the United States and the subjects designated to come before the Conference.

There is no evidence that Cordell Hull had any part in the making of these decisions. His acceptance of Roosevelt's offer of the Secretaryship was not given until after February 15, and though Roosevelt four weeks earlier had instructed Moley to keep "the gentleman from Tennessee" informed on activities in foreign affairs, there was apparently no request for his opinion.[4] Hull's position on the debts, however, was fairly clear. He had long maintained that if the United States had lowered instead of raising its tariff rates in the 1920s, the debts would have presented no problem. He had approved the plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 opposing "cancellation" of the war debts. But unlike Roosevelt and Moley, he would have considered readjustment of the debts in return for concessions to his favorite project, the lowering of tariff barriers.[5] He was not much interested in the debts, which he believed "were becoming a dead horse." He considered them a question more for the Treasury than for the State Department, and made no objection when the President, after himself perfunctorily discussing the debts with British Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald and other visiting statesmen, handed over the negotiations to Assistant Secretary Moley.[6]

To discuss plans for the Monetary and Economic Conference (and in some instances the debts), the President invited eleven governments to send special delegations to Washington during the spring of 1933. The first was to be headed by Prime Minister MacDonald and to arrive April 21. In preparation for the discussions with the British visitors, preliminary talks were held within the State Department and between the State Department and the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and his financial counselor. In these conferences Secretary Hull was flanked by Assistant Secretary Moley, Special Assistant William C. Bullitt, Economic Adviser Herbert Feis, the banker James P. Warburg (brought in by Moley as a volunteer), and others. Much of the talk concerned the lowering of trade barriers, and although this was mostly in generalities, the Secretary was described as looking forward enthusiastically to the World Economic Conference "as the nation's and the world's supreme opportunity." He was insufficiently aware of a fact that became increasingly apparent to his subordinates—the contradiction between his dream of lower tariffs and the inevitable demand of the New Deal recovery agencies, especially the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery Administration, for higher tariffs to offset higher costs at home.[7]

The procession of eleven special foreign missions through Washington began with the British on April 21 and ended with the Chileans on June 3. Each visit was followed by a communiqué signed by the President and the chief of the foreign delegation, setting forth in general terms the aims on which they had agreed. Meanwhile, the technical experts of these missions and the Washington representatives of nearly forty other nations exchanged views with the State Department on the proposed agenda for the Conference. There was general acceptance of the American statement of objectives as formulated in a series of resolutions by James P. Warburg. These embraced a tariff truce for the duration of the Conference; a co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policy to be pursued by the nations in co-operation for the purpose of stimulating economic activity and improving prices; removal of restrictions on foreign exchange; restoration of stability in the international monetary field as soon as practicable and re-establishment of gold as the international measure of exchange values; gradual removal of such barriers to trade as import quotas and export subsidies, and reduction of tariffs, control of production and distribution of certain basic commodities.[8]

One feature of this program took on special significance because of events in the United States. On

April 20, while the British and French missions were en route to America, President Roosevelt, by prohibiting the export of gold, had taken the country off the gold standard, and the dollar had begun to depreciate in relation to the pound and the franc. This was disturbing news to countries of the gold bloc, like France, and also to others like England, which had gone off gold but whose currencies had attained a fair degree of stability.[9] The depreciating dollar threw a new element of uncertainty into the already confused international monetary situation. Would the United States allow the dollar to come to rest in relation to the pound and the franc? And if so, when and at what ratio?

Up to the time of the meeting of the Conference on June 12, it appeared that an early stabilization of currencies was an important aim of United States policy. The State Department, in setting forth the views of the United States to other governments in the consultations during April and May, had stated: "The most pressing problem in connection with the Conference is that created by the present fluctuations in the value of various currencies."[10] President Roosevelt himself, in a radio address on May 7, included stabilization of currencies among four American objectives; and in a message of May 16, addressed to the heads of states participating in the Economic and Disarmament Conferences, he declared, speaking of the former: "The world cannot await deliberations long drawn out. The Conference must establish order in place of the present chaos by a stabilization of currencies, by freeing the flow of world trade, and by international action to raise price levels."[11] When, on May 30, he met the members of the delegation about to depart for London, he simply handed them as "instructions" the resolutions formulated several weeks before by James P. Warburg.[12] These, as summarized above, named as one American objective the restoration as soon as practicable of stability in the international monetary field and the re-establishment of gold as the international measure of exchange values.

The American delegation, as such, was not to negotiate on the temporary stabilization of dollar, pound, and franc, which was to be much in demand in London. That topic was to be left in the hands of a separate group under direction of the Treasury: Professor O. M. W. Sprague of Harvard, adviser to the Treasury and formerly adviser to the Bank of England, and George L. Harrison, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Warburg, who went as financial adviser to the delegation, might also participate in the negotiations on stabilization.

Secretary Hull headed the American delegation to the Conference. He was not consulted on the selection of his colleagues. If President Roosevelt was guided by any principle in choosing the six delegates, it would seem to have been regard for varying shades of American opinion rather than dedication to any single national policy. Secretary Hull was chairman. James M. Cox of Ohio (whose running mate Roosevelt had been in the 1920 presidential campaign) was vice-chairman. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada and Congressman Samuel D. McReynolds of Tennessee were chairmen respectively of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of Senate and House. The President had urged isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California to join the delegation, and when he declined had named Senator James M. Couzens of Michigan, a progressive Republican. The sixth mem- Couzens were protectionists and inflationists, and Pitt- ber, Ralph W. Morrison, was a Texas business man, whose principal qualification was substantial service to the Democratic party. Hull, Cox, and McReynolds stood for low tariff and sound money. Pittman and man felt a special compulsion to "do something for silver." Morrison's views on such subjects were obscure. The six were alike only in being wholly inexperienced in international conferences.[13] Chairman Hull, having had no part in picking his co-delegates, doubted his authority to control or discipline them, and for a time, at least, individual delegates felt free to voice their divergent views to the press. Pierrepont Moffat, of the State Department, bidding farewell to the delegation on May 31, found the Secretary looking "old and tired and worn." "I cannot help feeling," he added, "that he is pretty overwhelmed with the magnitude of the task he is undertaking, particularly as he will have as many difficulties within the Delegation as he will with foreign countries."[14]

Despite these discouraging features of the situation, the Secretary departed for London with a hopeful public statement. "There should," he told the press, "be an agreement as to the fundamentals of the situation in a few weeks, that should equally apply to currency stabilization as well as to trade barriers." That this was not merely putting on a brave face for the public is suggested by his later recollection: "I left for London with the highest of hopes."[15] Such hopes must have been built principally upon his conception of the prospects for reciprocal trade agreements, for on the other chief economic questions—debts and immediate stabilization of the currency—he realized that he had no authority to negotiate. "War debts," he records, "were ruled out completely. Stabilization of currencies was to be discussed at London, but only by Treasury and Federal Reserve experts apart from the conference, not by the American delegation. There still remained the reduction of trade barriers."[16]

But not for long. Hull had pinned his hopes for tariff reduction on the enactment by Congress of a measure which would permit the Executive to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements which would take effect without the necessity of approval by Senate or Congress (though with reservation by Congress of the right to veto such agreements). Such a bill had been drafted in the State Department during the spring and it was the Secretary's understanding that the President would submit it to Congress in time to strengthen his negotiating position at the Conference. For this program there had already been danger signals which Hull took too lightly. The AAA and NRA were beginning to press for higher tariff rates. On May 20

Assistant Secretary Raymond Moley delivered a radio address in which he not only warned that the Conference might achieve little, but emphasized the small importance—as he saw it—of foreign trade in the total American economic picture. This speech, deliberately designed to deflate what the author considered exaggerated expectations of what the Conference could achieve, had, almost certainly unknown to Hull, the President's approval. To the Secretary it was most annoying. Not only was his subordinate in the Department speaking without his approval; he was taking a position directly opposite to the Secretary's, "thereby," as Hull complained, "impairing the standing of the American delegation, especially myself."[17]

But worse was yet to come. While the delegation was en route across the Atlantic, Hull received word by wireless that the President would not submit the tariff bill to the current special session of Congress. To Hull's protest that postponement of this legislation would seriously handicap the delegation to the London Conference, the President replied that while he understood and approved the Secretary's anxiety for immediate tariff legislation, the situation in the closing days of the session was "so full of dynamite that immediate adjournment [was] necessary. . . . Therefore," he concluded, "tariff legislation seems not only highly inadvisable, but impossible of achievement." He sought in vain to cheer the Secretary with the assurance that he had full authority to negotiate commercial treaties based on reciprocal tariff concessions. "This message," wrote Hull later, "was a terrific blow.

It swept from under me one of the prime reasons for our going to London . . ." The Senate's consistent record of rejecting reciprocal trade treaties was well known not only to Hull but to foreign governments as well. The other delegations at London, therefore, as Hull recorded, "promptly shied away from any treaties that would be left indefinitely in the lap of Congress." Hull could urge upon the Conference the importance of lowering trade barriers, "but the other delegations considered this but little more than mere talk. Our inability to offer a practical program of tariff reduction," the Secretary added, "was one of the major reasons for the constant criticism heaped on the American delegation, especially by the London and Paris press."[18] Setting out on his adventure with high hopes, the Secretary arrived in London, as he lamented, "with empty hands."

So depressed was Hull over this new turn of events—there were even rumors that he would resign—that members of the delegation urged the President to send him a cheering message. "I am squarely behind you," the President wired, "and nothing said or done here will hamper your efforts." "But there was no hope here for me," commented Hull. "The President was behind me in words, but I needed actions, too, if I was to have any success in London."[19]

One small and transient success there was in the tariff field. On the initiative of the United States, sixty-one of the sixty-four states attending the Conference agreed to a tariff truce, promising that during the life of the Conference they would initiate no measures "which might increase the many varieties of difficulties now arresting international commerce." A later American proposal that the truce be prolonged for a reasonable period after adjournment was not acted upon but received favorable comment from the heads of several delegations. The truce was extended *de facto* until November. By that time enough nations had withdrawn to render it inoperative.[20] For a partial realization of his hopes for a significant lowering of tariff barriers the Secretary had to wait until after the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, exactly a year from the opening of the Monetary and Economic Conference in London.

The Conference, meeting at the Geological Museum in South Kensington, was formally opened on June 12 with a speech of welcome by King George V. The Prime Minister's speech, which followed, contained a disagreeable surprise for Hull and his American colleagues. "Into the World Economic Conference within an hour of its assembly this afternoon," wrote Frederick T. Birchall in the *New York Times*, "there crept like Banquo's ghost to the banquet the dreaded spectre of the international war debts." The debts had no place on the agenda, and the Americans had understood that they were not to be discussed at all. But MacDonald, after reviewing the subjects of the agenda, continued:

> Behind the subjects I have just mentioned is another in the front rank of importance. It cannot be dealt with here because obviously the conference

> is not constituted in such a way as to enable it to consider and settle the matter. I refer to the question of the war debts, which must be dealt with before every obstacle to general recovery has been removed, and it must be taken up without delay by the nations concerned. Lausanne has to be completed and this vexed question settled once for all in the light of present world conditions.[21]

This injection of the debts into the discussion, Hull records, "created among the delegates a commotion bordering on dismay." The other American delegates agreed, however, to his suggestion that they "ignore MacDonald's transgression." Hull's first speech in London was made on the evening of June 12 at a dinner given by the British Government in honor of the delegates to the Conference. Presumably this speech had been written and approved in advance, and in any event the occasion was not one for controversy. He made a gracious reference to the King's speech of welcome and expressed admiration "for the firmness with which the Prime Minister presided." To the Prime Minister's controversial address there was no reference. Hull's speech was essentially a plea for economic peace.[22]

Hull's opening address at the Conference had been scheduled for Tuesday, June 13. He had sent a draft to Washington on the tenth, for the President's approval or alteration, but the President, very much occupied with the closing days of Congress, did not get to it till Sunday, the eleventh. The President found the draft much too long and some of its attacks upon economic isolationism too bitter in tone. The suggested abridgement and alterations, which Hull received only Monday night, June 12, found him so tired and dispirited that he was unable to make the necessary revisions in time for delivery on the thirteenth. The postponement until the fourteenth was mistakenly interpreted in some quarters as a rebuke to MacDonald for his allusion to the taboo topic of the debts.[23]

Because of the shelving of Hull's proposed tariff legislation, says the Secretary in his *Memoirs,* "I no longer had much to offer concretely, but at least I could make an effort to inspire the delegates of the sixty-six [sixty-four] nations with the ideas of economics and peace for which I had fought, especially since 1916." The speech was, above all else, an attack upon the isolationist belief that, as Hull phrased it, "each nation singly can, by bootstrap methods, lift itself out of the troubles that surround it." He conceded that a nation could by itself "to a moderate extent restore conditions by suitable fiscal, financial, and economic steps," as the Administration of President Roosevelt had shown. But this diplomatic obeisance to the New Dealers was followed by the assertion: "The equal necessity for an equally important international economic program of remedies is clear." Currency stabilization and "the vexing problem of a permanent international monetary standard" received a modicum of attention, but, to no one's surprise, the Secretary placed most emphasis on the need for lowering barriers to trade. A broad program which should follow a middle course between extremes of economic internationalism and economic nationalism "would reciprocally supplement efficient home markets with capacious foreign markets." In no other way, he predicted, could "the present 30 millions of unemployed wage-earners be returned to work nor bankrupt agriculture be restored to solvency nor famished industry be brought back to normal."[24]

Hull's speech evoked little enthusiasm from the delegates of other lands. Europeans, who held the United States more responsible than Europe for the growth of economic nationalism, "disliked its evangelical tone," regretted its lack of concrete proposals, and excusably wondered whether Congress would support the Secretary's program. More stirring than Hull's generalities or the more concrete proposals of Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain was the speech of Soviet delegate Maxim Litvinov, "because it mentioned real money and envisaged for the delegates the prospect of getting some." Under suitable terms of credit, etc., said Litvinov, the Soviet Union might purchase foreign goods to the amount of one billion dollars.[25]

But the center of interest in London was shifting from the proceedings of the Conference to the parallel negotiations of the bankers and their advisers for temporary stabilization of currencies. The depreciation of the dollar since April 20 had alarmed both England and the gold bloc, especially France, and the spokesmen of their central banks were pressing for stabilization of the three currencies, at least for the duration of the Conference—an exchange truce to match the tariff truce. Up to the opening of the Conference, as remarked above, this objective seemed entirely in accord with the repeatedly stated purpose of the United States. Dispatches of June 11 to the *New York Times* placed "*de facto* stabilization of currencies" first among American aims and reported that the bankers were near agreement on temporary stabilization, as indeed they were.

But in Washington President Roosevelt, to whom a restoration of depressed prices to the "normal" levels of 1926 was a major goal, was being won over by the inflationists, who held that this could be accomplished simply by cheapening the dollar. On May 12 he had signed the Agricultural Adjustment Act with the Thomas Amendment, which empowered the President to expand the money supply by one or more of three methods: by issuing greenbacks, by remonetizing silver, or by reducing the gold content of the dollar. The President had as yet used none of these powers, but he undoubtedly was attracted by the monetary theory of Professor George F. Warren of Cornell, who contended that commodity prices could be raised or lowered simply by reducing or increasing the gold content of the dollar. Whatever his personal inclinations, he was under heavy pressure to do nothing that could halt the decline of the dollar, even temporarily. So alarmed were inflationist groups in Congress over rumors of impending stabilization that six Senators and fifty-nine Representatives petitioned the President to send to London as an adviser to the American Delegation the well-known inflationist, the Reverend Father Charles E. Coughlin, radio priest of Detroit.[26] Since Roosevelt ignored this plea, we can only speculate on the kind of welcome with which Chairman Hull would have greeted Adviser Coughlin.

It is clear from what followed that Roosevelt, since speeding the delegates on their way on May 30, and without informing them, had shifted to a strongly nationalist position. Raising commodity prices in the United States was now of first importance; any stabilization of currencies which might interfere with that aim must be avoided. On June 16, Sprague and Warburg reported a tentative agreement with the British and French upon a declaration by the three governments of their intention to limit exchange fluctuations during the period of the Conference and an accompanying statement by the three governments and their central banks "that the stabilization of their currencies on a gold basis under proper conditions forms the ultimate objective of their policy." Warburg commented to the President: "This statement goes no further than what we have said in all our preliminary conversations and goes no further than the Secretary of State's speech to the Conference."[27]

Receipt of this report from London led to what Raymond Moley described as a "council of war" at the White House, at which Secretary of the Treasury Woodin, Under Secretary Dean Acheson, and Moley sat in with the President. The President would have none of the proposed agreement. As Moley understood the rather fine distinctions voiced by Roosevelt, the President would accept "a tentative and flexible agreement" to calm the fears of the gold bloc countries that they might be forced off gold, but he opposed "close stabilization" at current rates of exchange, particularly with only three or four of the sixty-four countries at the Conference, and seemed to favor some assurance of unilateral action by the United States in preference to any stabilization agreement at all. The proposed agreement was therefore rejected, and according to Moley's account, it was agreed that Moley should go to London to make sure that Sprague, Harrison, and Warburg fully understood the President's position.[28]

Rejection of the proposed agreement, and of an amended form of it a few days later, created a storm in London and in the Paris press. Georges Bonnet, head of the French delegation, was furious, and there was talk of French withdrawal from the Conference. MacDonald was reported as gravely apprehensive. It appears that James M. Cox, who had been chosen chairman of the Conference's Monetary and Financial Committee, took the lead in pacifying the French delegation. With French consent, the Americans issued a statement explaining the President's position as necessitated by the importance of raising prices in the United States, and—in order to restore the waning prestige of the American delegation—emphasizing that the delegation as such had no part in the negotiations for stabilization. In a telegram to the President, June 22, Cox reported that MacDonald now believed the Conference had passed its worst crisis, but added: “If you love us at all don’t give us another week like this one.”[29]

Meanwhile the spotlight had shifted to Raymond Moley. Advised by friends in Washington to avoid the London trip, he sought another conference with Roosevelt, who was now cruising on the schooner *Amberjack* off the New England coast. His journey by navy plane to Nantucket and thence by destroyer to the *Amberjack* received inevitable publicity. The President, as Moley recalls, insisted that he should go. He announced that Moley would be acting “in a sense as a messenger or liaison officer.” The latter term, Moley explained later, was a technical one with which Roosevelt was familiar from his Navy experience. It meant that Moley was acting for the President as his principal, with the right to communicate with him directly. “I was not subject to the discipline, if any, of the delegation to which I was being sent.” Roosevelt, however, in a communication to Acting Secretary Phillips in Washington, described Moley as being “under the Secretary.”[30]

The exact purpose of Moley’s trip to London has never been made entirely clear. Before leaving Washington to meet Roosevelt on the *Amberjack* he told the press that he was going to confer with the American delegates as the President’s personal representative, to take them the latest information on the progress of the recovery program, and to receive from them confidential information for the President. “Mr. Moley made clear that he would not discuss war debts or stabilization with representatives of foreign governments."[31] This statement is in accord with Roosevelt's announcement of the mission and with Moley's later statements to the press. His book, published six years later, describes his talk with Roosevelt on the *Amberjack* as dealing almost entirely with the stabilization issue and as conveying Roosevelt's assent to a stabilization of the dollar at a mid-point of $4.15 to the pound with ten points leeway in either direction. In a letter published in the *New York Times*, February 2, 1948, Moley asserted: "I had authority to negotiate a stabilization agreement and I also had Secretary Woodin's full confidence. I had—and have—documentary proof of this which has never been published."[32] Until such documentary proof is published or made available, we must remain in some doubt as to just what and how much authority the President had conferred on Raymond Moley.

Moley's trip necessarily gave rise to great expectations in London. The work of the Conference had been all but brought to a standstill by the deadlock on currency between the gold bloc and the American President. It was assumed that Moley, coming directly from a dramatic and much publicized conference with the President, was bringing some message that might get the Conference machinery running again. Such, furthermore, had been the fumbling and exposure of cross-purposes in the American delegation that rumor assigned to Moley the role of straightening out and directing the delegation, if not supplanting Hull as head of it. "Whether it is true or not," wrote William Allen White from London, "Europe believes America has vacillated, that the American delegation is without status at home, . . . that . . . Raymond Moley is coming over to take charge . . ." But White found a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the coming of the New Dealer. "Fairly or unfairly," he continued, "Professor Moley has been badly stage-managed. His entrance is to be greeted by the jeers: 'Moley, Moley, Moley, Lord God Almighty,' a chant of gibing Britishers which roughly indicates opinion in Europe about the professor. . . ."[33]

Moley relates that he and Herbert Bayard Swope, a journalist who was his official associate on the trip, "were horrified" when radio brought to their steamer, the *Manhattan*, reports of the to-do that London was making over their mission. In statements (approved in advance by the President) issued at Cobh, Ireland, and at Plymouth, Moley attempted to emphasize his humble role as messenger to the American delegation and its chief. But the excitement did not subside. It grew, in fact, when Moley declined to use a plane which Ambassador Bingham had sent to Cobh to meet him.[34]

Moley and Swope landed at Plymouth late on Tuesday, June 27. Early next morning Moley called on Hull at Claridge's Hotel, expressed regret at the misconstruction that had been placed upon his mission, and proposed that he give the day to correcting the misapprehensions of the delegation and the press, a proposal at which, in Moley's words, "Hull's face had a look of unmistakable pleasure." Then followed a press conference at which Hull introduced Moley and at which, as reported by the *New York Times* correspondent, the comment evoked was "all favorable to the newcomer." Referring to the prepared statements that he had issued at Cobh and Plymouth, Moley disclaimed an intention of issuing more except, "following an appropriate custom, through my chief, Secretary Hull." He would answer questions within the scope of his mission. Beyond that he wished only to emphasize "the President's high confidence in the United States delegation to the conference and in the distinguished citizen who was Secretary of State and its head. For himself, he was here to render service to the Secretary in any way he could." After a period of questioning, in which debts and stabilization were ruled out, "the professor departed, leaving the general impression that he had emerged successfully from a rather trying ordeal."[35]

From this point on it is impossible to reconcile the descriptions of Moley's stay in London given by Moley himself and by Hull in their respective volumes of memoirs. Neither, obviously, is an unprejudiced witness. The Secretary was already in an almost impossible position, with an inharmonious and unruly delegation and with the ground cut from under his cherished program of tariff reduction. He was already unhappy, too, over Moley's anomalous position in the State Department and his confidential relations with the President. Now to have Moley appear as a sort of *deus ex machina,* the man who could save the Conference, the cynosure of all eyes, was more than the Secretary could bear with equanimity. In his meetings with Moley, except on one occasion, he restrained his anger. "I decided," he wrote later, "to give him all the rope he might want and see how long he would last in that London situation." But to sympathetic ears during the Conference and later he let off steam on the subject of Moley's allegedly highhanded behavior, and in his *Memoirs,* composed many years later, he wrote of Moley's mission with obvious exaggeration. "During the few days that followed," he recorded, "prime ministers and other top officials of governments flocked after Moley as if he were the Pied Piper," and again: "Moley, courted by prime ministers and other high dignitaries, appeared to act as if he were in entire charge for the United States Government, notwithstanding his transparent protests and denials as to his occupying such a status."[36]

Moley, on the other hand, pictures himself as having made repeated and apparently successful efforts to soothe Hull's irritation and to convince him that no attempt was being made to undermine his position as head of the delegation. At their final meeting in London he quotes the Secretary as saying he was "completely satisfied" as to the good faith of Moley's assurances.[37]

One may hazard a guess that up to a point Moley was right; that he had in truth succeeded in mollifying the Secretary's resentment until by a tactical error committed just before he left London he reopened the breach and made it irreparable. Having been instructed by Roosevelt on the *Amberjack* "to give him an evaluation of the delegation's performance," Moley was not one to shirk such a responsibility. Failing to get the President by telephone, Moley cabled him on July 4. "On personal side," ran the telegram, in part, "Pittman is only member of delegation able intellectually and aggressively to present your ideas. . . . Reconstituted delegation would be helpful in view of developments."[38] This seems a rather curious judgment, since Pittman during much of the Conference was in no condition to perform serious work, and in the end had nothing to his credit but a resolution and an agreement designed to promote the wider use of silver.[39] What Moley meant, presumably, was that Pittman alone of the delegates shared Roosevelt's current dedication to a program of inflation. At any rate, though Moley marked his cable from the Embassy "Urgent, Confidential, Secret from Moley to the President Alone and Exclusively," it soon became known to Hull and the other delegates. From that incident, understandably, seems to date Hull's extreme rancor against Moley.[40]

The more serious complaint that runs implicitly through Hull's narrative is that Moley went over his head to negotiate a temporary stabilization agreement with the British and French. The complaint seems groundless since, on the one hand, neither Hull nor the delegation had authority to negotiate on that subject, whereas, on the other, Moley had brought, or at least believed he had brought, Roosevelt's latest thought on stabilization for the guidance of Sprague and Warburg. These two, now that Harrison had gone home, represented the United States in regard to stabilization.

Moley's arrival in London found the gold bloc countries more than ever alarmed at what the *New York Times* called "the wild gyrations of the dollar," which oscillated on June 29 between $4.29½ and $4.41½ to the pound. The delegates from the gold bloc countries, fearing, or professing to fear, that their currencies would be driven off gold, had drawn up a new declaration which they hoped England and the United States would join them in signing.[41] Moley learned something of this on Wednesday, his first day in London, and on Thursday he saw the text. The declaration stated very simply that the signatory governments agreed on the desirability of re-establishing gold as a measure of international exchange but recognized that the time and the ratio for re-establishment were to be determined by each government individually. It pledged the same governments to co-operate in appropriate measures for the limiting of exchange speculation. "I was amazed as I examined it," Moley wrote. "It was brief, simple, and wholly innocuous. It consisted of a rephrasing of one of the 'instructions' given to our delegation by Roosevelt before the delegation sailed. . . . The most fanatical inflationist could not have objected to this statement. . . ."

There followed informal talks with financial experts from England, France, and Italy, with Chamberlain and with MacDonald, all of whom urged the importance of acceptance of the declaration by the United

States. To all Moley explained that he was "acting merely as a conduit," that he was willing to accept the document *ad referendum*, to transmit it to the President for his consideration. And so on Thursday afternoon, June 29, the declaration was sent off by Sprague for the President, Secretary Woodin, and Bernard Baruch, who was acting in an advisory capacity in Washington. Arrangements were made to talk by telephone next day with Woodin, who was ill in New York, and Baruch and Under Secretary Acheson, who were to meet at his bedside. In fact, there were two conversations, since the declaration had not been received in New York in time for the first one. During the second, Friday evening in London, Moley was pressed for his own opinion of the declaration and finally gave it, "wholly unofficially, . . . that by no stretch of the imagination, in my judgment, could it be construed as even a remote approach to stabilization. . . . I thought, I added, that there could be no doubt of Roosevelt's accepting it." Since Woodin, Acheson, and Baruch shared Moley's opinion, all of the President's advisers on the subject were agreed in advising him to approve the declaration.[42]

All now depended on Roosevelt's decision, and Roosevelt was at Campobello, where there was no telephone connection with the mainland. In London the hours of Friday night dragged by with Moley and Swope waiting breathlessly in the Embassy. Promises of an answer came from McIntyre, then from Phillips, but still no answer. Saturday morning, July 1, Moley, alarmed, cabled the President. The declaration, he pointed out, was in accordance with the instructions to the delegation and with the President's last talk with him. "Really believe," he added, "success even continuance of the Conference depends upon United States agreement."[43]

But the Saturday morning papers in the United States were already forecasting the President's rejection of the declaration. The *Times* correspondent at Campobello reported that Roosevelt held that the dollar had not dropped enough and was firmly opposed to pegging it now, though he would not object to action by the Federal Reserve designed to ease fluctuations during the Conference.[44] As a matter of fact, the President's initial reply had been transmitted to Phillips at 2:00 A.M. for forwarding to the delegation. At three o'clock Saturday afternoon in London the reply began coming through. Moley sitting with Swope in the delegation's code room, saw at once that it was negative. He rushed out to find Hull, who was just leaving the hotel to attend Lady Astor's garden party at Cliveden. Moley reports that Hull "received the news coldly" and requested that his secretary bring the message to Cliveden when it was fully decoded. Hull recalls that he told Moley: "You had better get back home. You had no business over here in the first place," and "elaborated along those lines."[45]

The President's reply, says Moley, was partly quoted, partly paraphrased from a memorandum by Swope, which Moley had left with him on the *Amberjack*. But the memorandum was an argument against "rigid and arbitrary stabilization," and the declaration left stabilization for the indefinite future in a highly elastic framework. It is difficult to disagree with Moley's complaint that "the declaration was therefore rejected in terms that had no relation to what the declaration was about."[46] The President's contentions that the declaration would erect probable barriers to United States fiscal policy and that it would unwisely subject American action to limitation by other nations were farfetched at best. His assertion, specifically aimed at France, that unbalanced budgets were incompatible with sound currencies, was a warning that he himself soon forgot.

The President had spoken, however, and his friends in London set about putting the best face they could upon his decision. The press was informed in a 38-word statement of the rejection of the declaration, and, with Hull's approval, Moley set to work with Swope and Walter Lippmann, who also was in London, on a statement explaining why the United States must keep its hands free to raise domestic prices but avowing its willingness "to join in any common effort looking to the betterment of world conditions," and urging that the Conference "go forward to a successful conclusion." The statement was approved by Roosevelt but never issued. Before receiving it Roosevelt had dispatched his "bombshell" message of July 2.[47]

The message of July 1, rejecting the currency declaration, was for the American delegates and their associates—Sprague, Warburg, and Moley—in London. That of July 2 was for the Conference, or rather, for the world. It amounted to a sweeping condemnation of the Conference for having turned aside from its task of bringing about "a more real and permanent financial stability and a greater prosperity to the masses of all nations," to the contriving of "a purely artificial and temporary expedient affecting the monetary exchange of a few nations only." This was a "specious fallacy" with which the world would not long be lulled. The "old fetishes of so-called international bankers," the President wrote, were being replaced by efforts to plan national currencies which should have a stable purchasing power in terms of commodities. The United States was seeking "the kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future. That objective means more to the good of other nations than a fixed ratio for a month or two in terms of the pound or franc." Let the nations work out concerted policies to live within their means, balance their budgets, service their debts, and restore world trade, and "the permanent stabilization of every nation's currency" might then be attained. "The Conference was called to better and perhaps to cure fundamental economic ills. It must not be diverted from that effort."[48]

If it is difficult to explain Roosevelt's rejection of the innocuous declaration on currency policy, it is much more difficult to explain the truculent tone of the "bombshell" manifesto. Himself a recent and still hesitant convert to the Warren theory of price manipulation, why should he have excoriated those who were attempting to accomplish what until a few days before he had publicly proclaimed as a prime American objective? There was an inconsistency here that defied explanation. "This doesn't sound like the man I spent so many hours with in Washington," Ramsay MacDonald lamented to Moley. "This sounds like a different man. I don't understand."[49] Moley found an explanation in the discovery that Roosevelt's only civilian companions on the cruiser *Indianapolis*, where he wrote the message, were Louis Howe and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., governor of the Farm Credit Administration. Morgenthau was at this time in full sympathy with the monetary theory of Professor George F. Warren. Both he and Howe feared that any measure of stabilization adopted in London would impede the raising of prices at home. There is no evidence that they influenced the writing of the message, but both must have licked their lips with satisfaction when Roosevelt read it to them in his quarters on the cruiser.[50] It has been suggested that Roosevelt was influenced by resentment at MacDonald's raising the issue of the debts, or that he was intent upon showing that America could hold its own in a confrontation with the powers of Europe.[51] The President cabled Hull that he had purposely made his language harsh because he felt the Conference "was getting into the stage of polite resolutions." Henry L. Stimson, visiting in England at the time, attributed the tone of the message to an impulsiveness which Franklin Roosevelt shared with his cousin Theodore. To a London acquaintance he remarked that he was now watching Franklin "to see whether his impulsiveness had behind it the thorough knowledge of his cousin, but was not quite satisfied that it had."[52]

Reaction to the message in England was less violent than in the gold bloc countries. Two such dissimilar Britishers as Winston Churchill and John Maynard Keynes applauded the President, but British officialdom from King George down was angry and bewildered, and the *Manchester Guardian* denounced the message as "a manifesto of anarchy." As to the American delegation, Clarence Streit reported to the *Times* "a tendency to discouragement, not to say despair, among the more internationalist side of the delegation," and added that while all the delegates wished to support the President, no one was "sure any more how to do it." What was particularly demoralizing to the delegation was the impression made on the Conference "that not merely the delegation but the President's closest advisers were not aware of his real attitude."[53]

While Secretary Hull presumably shared the discomfiture of the other delegates—all of whom except Pittman, says Moley, were "completely demoralized" —his chagrin must have been considerably tempered by the President's apparent repudiation of Moley. At any rate, he loyally cabled Roosevelt on July 3 that his "very able and courageous statement" was receiving "wide publicity." He then exerted all his ability in an effort to save something from the threatened wreck of the Conference.

It appeared on July 4 and 5 that the Conference would certainly adjourn at once, pinning the blame on the American President. All the subcommittees of the Conference refused to continue their work, on the ground that the message made continuance futile. Spokesmen for the gold bloc countries were calling for immediate adjournment. MacDonald was reported to have pleaded eloquently for continuation of the Conference, but then to have suggested two alternative roads to quick adjournment. A meeting of the Steering Committee was scheduled for 6:00 P.M. on Tuesday, July 4, a plenary session for Thursday morning. Birchall reported to the *Times* on July 5 that adjournment seemed certain.[54]

Meanwhile Hull had persuaded the Steering Committee (or Bureau, as it was officially called) to recess from its meeting on July 4 until the morning of the sixth. At the former meeting, as Hull describes it, MacDonald "launched into a terrific speech," in which he called for adjournment of the Conference and "boldly placed sole responsibility upon the American Government." Hull was "utterly astonished at MacDonald's bitter tone and sweeping condemnation." The Secretary, without arguing with MacDonald, proceeded to confront him with some "rather technical questions," which the Prime Minister failed to answer effectively. Hull's motion to recess the Steering Committee for two days was then, to his surprise, supported by Neville Chamberlain, who was understood to have in his pocket "the resolution denouncing Roosevelt and declaring the conference adjourned indefinitely." With the further support of Prime Minister Bennett of Canada, the motion for a recess was carried.[55]

Tuesday night Raymond Moley performed his last official act for the Conference. With the aid of Swope, Walter Lippmann and J. M. Keynes, he prepared a moderate and reasonable restatement of the President's position on stabilization, stressing the desire of the United States to co-operate in the further work of the Conference and urging that the Conference continue. Two telephone calls to the President on July 5 secured his approval, with minor changes. After approval of the statement by the American delegation, Hull, Pittman, and Moley called on MacDonald, and at Hull's request Moley read it to the Prime Minister. As Moley remembered the interview, MacDonald exclaimed: "Oh, Moley, tell me why this kind of message couldn't have been sent on Saturday. It would have saved the Conference. Maybe it will save it still. . . ." Hull reported that night to the President that the statement had been given out and had "made a good impression on the British"; it would do so, he believed, "on all except most of the so-called five gold standard countries. . . ."[56]

But the battle was not yet won. When the Steering Committee met again on Thursday, July 6, the chances of preventing adjournment, with an implicit condemnation of the American position, seemed slim. The French delegation had engaged in persistent lobbying and claimed to have lined up the votes of forty delegations of the sixty-four attending. Hull addressed the committee for some twenty minutes, arguing that to adjourn now would amount to seizing upon a comparatively minor incident to cover up failure to deal with the world's major problems. "Are we to confess," he asked, "that we are taking advantage of an incident limited in its scope and possible effects in order to break up the conference? Are the delegates then to scatter off in every direction carrying with them the puerile plea that they were not competent to proceed further? It will be an amazing spectacle if this incident causes the members, in a spirit of pique, suddenly to pick up their hats and disperse."[57]

Support for Hull came from Bennett of Canada, from Viscount Ishii of Japan, from the Swedish delegate, and even from Neville Chamberlain. Finally Prime Minister MacDonald "backed away from his original position and joined the movement in the opposite direction." When, after two hours of argument, the committee agreed that the Conference should continue in session, it was Hull's persuasive speech that received the credit. "A speech by Cordell Hull," wrote Birchall to the *Times*, ". . . turned the tide when it was full set for adjournment and futility, and headed the conference to a course that may perhaps yet bring it into the harbor of real accomplishment." Hull was perhaps aided by a less open form of persuasion. William C. Bullitt told later of how at a critical moment in the meeting he himself had confronted French Finance Minister Bonnet with a threat to reveal that Bonnet had in April rejected an offer from Roosevelt to stabilize the ratio of the dollar to the franc, whereupon Bonnet had withdrawn his support of the resolution for adjournment.[58]

There was no doubt, however, that it was Hull who had saved the Conference from an abrupt dissolution and President Roosevelt from a stinging public rebuke. His stature grew accordingly. Frederick T. Birchall, in the dispatch quoted above, remarked that the phrase, "that great American," which the President had recently applied to Hull, "was echoed tonight not only by the United States delegates, to whom its leader has become a hero, but throughout a conference that has been brought to realize the sincerity and earnestness of the man and to see what these can accomplish, for what he did was no little thing." "He did a really magnificent job here," wrote Ambassador Bingham later, "and emerged as the great figure of the Conference."[59]

The Conference continued in session, then, until July 27, but to little practical purpose. "From July 3d on," wrote Warburg, who resigned on the sixth, "the conference was as dead as a last year's popular song. For three weeks it went on twitching, before it finally rolled over and lay still on the 27th."[60] Hull, in his report to the President, could mention only one achievement of substance—and that one of dubious value—a resolution and an agreement on silver, the latter signed by delegations of the eight countries chiefly concerned. The Conference's Economic Commission had resolved unanimously "(1) that 'excessive' tariffs should be lowered, and (2) that, in principle, quotas . . . and exchange controls should be gradually abolished," but the conditions and reservations appended reduced these resolutions to pious platitudes. Hull found little encouragement for any real lowering of trade barriers. Every nation favored the lowering of all barriers except those which it found profitable to itself. Every nation wished "excessive" tariffs to be reduced, but no nation viewed its own tariffs as "excessive."

During the final days of the Conference the American delegation presented a proposal for a general agreement to reduce trade barriers gradually over a period of time, to make the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, with reasonable exceptions, the universal basis of commercial policy and to extend the tariff truce for a reasonable period beyond adjournment. The proposal received favorable comment from the heads of Dutch, British, French, and other delegations, but was not acted upon.

In his closing speech to the Conference, July 27, and in his report to the President, Hull refused to admit that the Conference had failed. The nations, he maintained, had learned more of the complexities of the world's economic problems, and the work of the Conference would be carried forward through committees and through, he hoped, a reconvened session of the Conference itself. In his *Memoirs*, however, he specifies "two tragic results" which arose from what he terms "the collapse" of the London Conference: "First, it greatly retarded the logical economic recovery of all nations. Secondly, it played into the hands of such dictator nations as Germany, Japan, and Italy." He expresses no opinion as to whether the Conference could have achieved useful results had it not been blasted by the President's "bombshell" message. The best opinion a quarter-century later held that even without Roosevelt's controversial manifesto, the Conference had little prospect of agreeing on a solution for any major problem.[61]

As a brief commentary upon the soundness of the President's stand against even a gesture friendly to stabilization and a return to gold, it may be mentioned that after experimenting unsuccessfully for a few months with the Warren theory of the elastic dollar, Roosevelt stabilized the dollar in terms of gold in January, 1934; and that two years later Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who had become Secretary of the Treasury, took great pride in having negotiated a tripartite agreement stabilizing the ratios of dollar, pound, and franc.[62]

Before leaving London for home, Hull received a message of warm congratulations from the President and an invitation for himself and Mrs. Hull to come to Hyde Park upon landing in New York. "You have admirably faced great difficulties," said the President, "and through your own courage and sincerity saved the principle of continued international discussion of perplexing world problems from a collapse which would have made further deliberations impossible." The President said nothing of his own responsibility for the threatened collapse, nor did he at Hyde Park give Hull any further explanation of the "bombshell" message. At a press conference at Hyde Park, with Hull sitting in, the President complained that American difficulties in London were largely attributable to "the continental and London press . . . The whole press just ganged us from the start to the finish. And their press were told what to say by their governments . . ." The Secretary chimed in: "I have never been accustomed to a really bad press but I did get a good dose of it over there."[63]

Hull returned to the State Department after a brief vacation. Pierrepont Moffat reported that he had "returned a different individual. His morale is very much better and I think that his first hand contact with the European statesmen has been an eye-opener to him. Furthermore," Moffat continued, "the general belief is that henceforth he will be master in his own house and that the discordant elements will little by little disappear."[64] One of the "discordant elements" was already in the process of disappearing from Hull's immediate ken. Moley records that the Secretary upon returning to Washington had treated him with apparent friendliness, though Hull had complained bitterly of Moley's conduct in London in a letter to the President and presumably in conversation at Hyde Park. In any event, a temporary assignment for Moley was found in the Department of Justice, though the President announced that he retained his title in, and would return to, the State Department. But Moley had already, with Roosevelt's knowledge, arranged with wealthy backers to found and edit a magazine to be called *Today*. Late in

August he wrote his letter of resignation and took it to the President at Hyde Park. Secretary Hull, when informed by telephone, issued a statement with which no diplomat could find fault. He had not known in advance, he said, of Professor Moley's plan to resign. He had never at any time "offered the slightest suggestion to the President or to Mr. Moley relative to any present or future change of the official status of the latter as Assistant Secretary of State." He wished the professor "every success in his new field" and would "at all times gladly cooperate with him in every feasible way . . . in all possible joint efforts in support of the President." He did not, be it noted, express regret.[65] On September 7, Moley bade his official farewell to the Secretary at the State Department with expressions of mutual good wishes.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DISARMAMENT FIASCO

THE COLLAPSE of the World Economic Conference in London preceded by a few months the virtual end of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. As an omen, the second event was more portentous than the first. The world economy did improve slowly in spite of the failure at London; failure at Geneva was the prelude to rearmament and war.

The work of the Preparatory Commission and the first phase of the Disarmament Conference (February to July, 1932) were described in the preceding volume. The Conference reconvened in February, 1933, but by March 4 had become all but deadlocked between the demands of Germany for equality and of France for security. The Germans contended, with considerable justification, that they had accepted the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles upon the understanding that the promise of general disarmament in Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant would actually be carried out. They demanded either that the other powers reduce their armaments to the German level or that Germany be freed from the Versailles limitations. They returned to the Conference in February, 1933, only when assured by the spokesmen of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy of "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations."[1] This had been the German position under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. Adolf Hitler, who became Chancellor in January, 1933, was not likely to prove less demanding.

France, on the other hand, with tragic memories of 1870 and 1914, was willing to disarm, or to consent to Germany's rearming, only if she could have assurance of military assistance against the renewed German aggression which she feared. France would not entrust her security to the uncertain machinery of the League of Nations. What she demanded was a pledge of military support from Great Britain, and that pledge Great Britain was as yet unwilling to give.

Secretary Hull had been in office only four days when an important dispatch arrived from Hugh S. Gibson, United States Ambassador to Belgium and acting chairman of the American delegation at the Conference. Arthur Henderson, British President of the Conference, had that day (March 8) outlined to Gibson and his fellow-delegate, Hugh Wilson, his idea as to how the United States "could satisfactorily supplement a European security scheme." He proposed a treaty in which the signatories would reaffirm the pledge of the Pact of Paris, renouncing the use of force as an instrument of national policy, and would declare that any such use of force would be regarded as affecting the vital interests and international rights of every party to the treaty. In the event of such a breach of the Pact of Paris, the parties would consult as to the best means of dealing with it, and any signatory that recognized that a violation of the Pact of Paris had occurred would not seek to exercise its rights of neutrality with respect to trade with the aggressor state, or to interfere with any measures of collective security designed to deprive the aggressor state of access to arms, munitions, or other war supplies. Finally, the parties would agree not to recognize any treaty agreement or *de facto* territorial arrangement brought about by action constituting a violation of international obligations.[2]

In a letter to the Secretary a few days later, Gibson expounded the importance of the Henderson proposal as it seemed to him and to Hugh Wilson. The Conference, they reported, was in a precarious state. Should it adjourn with nothing accomplished, Germany could be expected to repudiate the Versailles restrictions and begin rearmament. If such activity did not actually lead to armed conflict, it would certainly create a spirit of tension in which the nations of Europe could hardly work together for any common purpose. The success of the World Economic Conference would be jeopardized. The Henderson proposal offered at least a chance that the United States might save the Conference. France would not consent to disarm or to release Germany from the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty unless assured of British participation, if occasion arose, in measures of collective security. Great Britain would not commit herself to such measures without assurance that the United States would not obstruct them. To obtain such assurance was the purpose of the Henderson suggestion, though this assurance was to be conditional upon the United States agreeing with the European powers as to the existence of an act of aggression and the identity of the aggressor. Gibson and Wilson expressed the hope that the plan was being carefully considered in Washington, for they conceived it to be "the only step we could take which might materially promote the success of the Conference."[3]

The proposal from Paris confronted Mr. Hull and the President, in office only four days, with a difficult decision. They had every wish to see the Disarmament Conference succeed. Mr. Hull was, he writes, convinced that no peace could last unless "accompanied by disarmament under a world agreement."[4] But the Henderson proposal called for something new in American foreign policy. In a few treaties, notably the Four-Power and Nine-Power Treaties of 1921 and 1922, the United States had agreed to "consult" with other governments under certain circumstances. But the new proposal contemplated not only consultation, but also co-operation, though in a negative way, with nations that might be applying sanctions against an aggressor. Hull replied cautiously, remarking that it was "inadvisable for us to consider going so fast or so far until the Administration has had time to appraise the general situation in both its domestic and international aspects . . ." Tentatively, he pointed out that the proposed "no-force pact" seemed like a needless duplication of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty and that the nonrecognition principle was still "in a formative stage" and hardly ready for codification in treaty form. The suggestions of consultation and the waiving of neutral rights were, said the Secretary, still under study. Norman Davis, whom the President was about to name chairman of the American delegation at the Conference, was in consultation with the Department on the subject, and public discussion of the Henderson proposal might well be postponed till his arrival in Geneva.[5]

Before Washington could make up its mind on the Henderson plan, it was informed of another British proposal, this one offered officially on March 16 by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. The MacDonald Disarmament Plan proposed limitation of military personnel, abolition of mobile cannon of more than 105 mm. bore and tanks over 16 tons, prohibition of aerial bombing (with certain exceptions), prohibition of chemical, bacteriological, and incendiary warfare, and the gradual abolition of all military and naval aircraft. Naval limitation was to be in line with existing treaties. The new restrictions, when agreed upon, were to replace those imposed upon Germany and her allies by the peace settlement of 1919. Part I of the plan, labeled "Security," made the Pact of Paris the basis of the new arrangement. Signatories of that Pact were to agree to consult with one another in the event of its actual or threatened violation, to determine means of preventing the violation or fixing responsibility for it if it occurred. Decisions would require the concurrence of the United States, the

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, and a majority of other participants, parties to the dispute excluded.[6]

The receipt of the MacDonald Plan in Washington presented two distinct questions for decision. First, should the United States accept, in principle at any rate, the Prime Minister's proposals for reduction and limitation of armaments? Second, should it accept, with or without modification, the security provisions of Part I? Of the first question the President took entire charge. "The Secretary," Pierrepont Moffat wrote in June, "has given no time at all to disarmament. When you come down to it, it has been the President himself, with Bill Phillips and myself as understudies, with occasional help on specific problems from Bill Bullitt." Only the most perfunctory attention, in fact, was paid to the ideas and wishes of the armed services.[7] The decision here, as the President informed Norman Davis, April 25, was "that we regard the MacDonald Plan as a definite and excellent step towards the ultimate objective, but that it is a step only and must be followed by succeeding steps."[8] The President, as we shall see, was to elaborate on this theme in his message to heads of state of May 16, 1933.

The second question—what part the United States was willing to assume in a system of collective security—was left more in the hands of the State Department. The political clauses of the MacDonald Plan, Moffat noted on March 17, were being studied with special care. The Secretary, he said, was "afraid of going beyond the vague promises for consultation which were to be found in the Democratic platform." And he added the interesting observation: "Europe is so convinced that the Roosevelt Administration plans to bring us in toward the League of Nations, that the knowledge, when it comes, that our policy will probably be more cautious than under Mr. Stimson will come as a great shock."[9]

Caution was apparent in the Secretary's instructions, three days later, to Hugh Gibson in Geneva. If it should become necessary for Gibson to take part in the general discussion before the arrival of Norman Davis, he was to speak of the MacDonald Plan "in friendly but very general terms," avoiding any commitment by the United States but making sure at the same time "that the British do not feel that we are unsympathetic or working against them," since it was plain that Anglo-American accord was vital to any effective system of disarmament. The security features of the plan, it seemed to Mr. Hull, implied more than mere consultation. To agree in advance to "determine which party or parties to a dispute should be held responsible, would tend to tie us up not as an associate but as an actual member of a peace-enforcing machinery." For this reason the Secretary desired to avoid making any decision until Norman Davis should have had time to talk with Gibson "and to make a further diagnosis of the international situation in Europe."[10]

Norman Davis had been named chairman of the American delegation, with the rank of ambassador, on March 14. Though he had spent much time with the State Department since March 4, and though he lunched with the President on the 17th and saw him again that afternoon, he left Washington that night without definite instructions. "He is going over," wrote Moffat, "without any plans and with the prospect of using our influence to best advantage he can."[11] The initial purpose of his mission was evidently exploratory. Certainly the new administration needed all the light it could get on the critical developments at Geneva, and Norman Davis was a good man for the assignment.

A native Tennessean like Hull, Norman Davis had amassed a comfortable fortune in the business world and then, as Hull recorded, "dedicated his life primarily to the promotion of peace with disarmament and to the reduction of trade barriers and the increase of trade, consumption, and employment." He had held a post in the United States Treasury during the First World War and had served the Hoover Administration as a member of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference in 1932 and as a member of the Organizing Committee for the World Economic Conference. A fellow-member of the Disarmament delegation described Davis as "eager to go all the way, but realizing that it is a condition, not a theory, which confronts us, bringing all his international experience, which is great, to bear on these questions, caring only for accomplishment, not an iota for recognition."[12] Always ready to represent his government at international conferences, where his discretion and wisdom could always be relied upon, he was, while at home, a kind of semiofficial member of the State Department. "He would come in on any conference I was having," wrote Hull, "—unless it was a direct meeting between an ambassador and myself—and shed some light upon it. He came and went in that fashion. He would push open the door, see whether I was engaged, and in ordinary proceedings would always come in."[13] He was equally informal in dropping in on Under and Assistant Secretaries, sometimes to the disruption of routine work. "Norman Davis was in and out all day," was a common item in their chronicles, suggesting sometimes a shade of annoyance.

On his way to Geneva in the spring of 1933, Norman Davis found in Paris some reason to think that the French would agree to reduce armaments and to make some concessions to Germany provided they could count upon collective support if Germany should run amuck. On April 16 he cabled Hull his version of the political questions facing the United States. If a really significant disarmament treaty could be concluded, would the United States agree to consult with other signatories in case of a threat to the peace? More important, if the European powers agreed on collective action against a state responsible for a breach of the peace, would the United States, if it independently concurred in the verdict, "agree to refrain from any action, and to withhold protection from our citizens if engaged in action, which would tend to defeat the collective action" decided upon by the European States?[14] The question posed here was, obviously, the same that Arthur Henderson had propounded some weeks earlier: would the United States agree to waive its right as a neutral to trade with a nation which had been designated an aggressor and against which sanctions were being applied, provided the United States agreed with the designation of the aggressor? The body exercising collective security functions might be the League of Nations, or it might be, as Davis seems to have contemplated, a concert of European powers only.

Hull referred this important question of policy to the President, who was, for several days, too much occupied with other matters to give an answer. The same question arose, however, in the President's conferences during the next ten days with Prime Minister MacDonald and M. Herriot, who were in Washington to discuss plans for the World Economic Conference. To each of them Roosevelt gave what was in effect an affirmative reply.[15] Finally, on April 25, Hull was able to inform Davis of the official position of the United States Government. The President and the Secretary, in the first place, rejected Davis' suggestion that the disarmament treaty be confined to Europe. The United States should press for a universal disarmament treaty on the lines of the MacDonald Plan. The United States, however, could not sign a treaty embracing Part I—the security articles—of the MacDonald Plan, "because under it an American would sit in judgment in conference action to determine an aggressor and the remedy to be applied against such an aggressor." Instead, the United States would be willing to make such a declaratory statement as the following:

> Following a decision by conference of the powers in consultation in determining an aggressor,—a decision with which on the basis of our independent judgment we agreed,—we would undertake to refrain from any action and to withhold protection from our citizens if engaged in activities which would tend to defeat the collective effort which the States in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor.

This offer, Hull emphasized, was contingent upon the achievement by the powers concerned of a substantial degree of disarmament.[16] The preference for a declaratory statement rather than adherence to a treaty for consultation and co-operation Hull explained later as "partly for political reasons, partly to reserve to ourselves the right of an unchallengeable interpretation of its meaning, and partly to accentuate our complete independence of judgment and decision." The "political reasons," we may assume, consisted chiefly of the problem of getting such a treaty through the Senate.[17]

In his dispatch of April 16, posing the problem of the American relationship to a system of collective security, Norman Davis had raised the related question of when and by whom a new policy, if adopted, should be made known to the world. The distinction of making this announcement was left to Davis himself in his address to the Conference on May 22, 1933, but this followed a public appeal by President Roosevelt to the heads of all the participating states for co-operation in achieving success in both the Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference, which was soon to assemble in London. The President, as Hull explained to Davis, "had for several days felt the need of taking a new initiative in connection with both the Economic and Disarmament Conferences and developments over the weekend made it imperative for him to take action with the least possible delay." The development that caused this haste was the announcement from Berlin that Hitler would address the Reichstag on May 17. It was generally believed that Hitler's main topic would be the Disarmament Conference; some feared that he would announce Germany's intention to rearm in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles and of world opinion. Upon Norman Davis' advice, the President decided to make his plea on the 16th; thus he might "take the wind out of Hitler's sails."[18]

The President's letter of May 16, 1933, addressed to the heads of 54 states, began with a reference to the profound hope of the people of the United States for peace through practical measures of disarmament and for victory in "our common struggle against economic chaos." For these objects, said the President, two great international conferences had been called. After a brief reference to the tasks of the Economic Conference,[19] Mr. Roosevelt passed on to the problems of disarmament. Nations clung to their armaments at ruinous expense, he said, for two reasons: some few had designs on the territory of their neighbors; the great majority simply feared attack and hence feared to disarm. This fear could be removed, said the President, by the abolition of all offensive weapons. Such must be the ultimate objective of the Disarmament Conference. Its immediate objective was "a substantial reduction of some of these weapons and the elimination of many others."

The President endorsed the MacDonald Plan as an excellent first step. He proposed that the Conference adopt it at once; that it "agree upon time and procedure for taking the following steps"; and that it agree that while such steps were being taken, no nation should increase its existing armaments above treaty limitations. But in order that the peace of the world might be assured during the process of disarmament, the President proposed a fourth step: that all the nations of the world enter into a solemn nonaggression pact, reaffirm their obligation to limit and reduce their armaments, and "provided these obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory powers, individually agree that they will send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers." If any strong nation should block the efforts being made at Geneva or London, the President warned, "the civilized world . . . will know where the responsibility lies."[20]

The final warning was plainly aimed at Germany, as was the proposed agreement not to raise armaments above treaty limits. The United States stood squarely with France against permitting German rearmament while there was hope of a general reduction. A few days previously the President had told Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank, that he regarded Germany "as the only possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty." But Mr. Roosevelt had considered it advisable, as Hull explained to Davis, "to cast his proposal in general terms rather than to limit the message primarily to the European situation or to Germany in particular."[21]

Whether or not because of Roosevelt's appeal, Hitler's address on May 17 was relatively mild. Though Germany would sign no document perpetuating her inequality in armaments, she was willing to wait five years for the attainment of equality and would go as far as her neighbors in disarmament. In effect, Hitler endorsed Roosevelt's appeal, and a few days later the German delegate at the Conference, Herr Nadolny, announced that Germany accepted the MacDonald Plan as the basis for a disarmament treaty. Norman Davis, therefore, could speak with some optimism when he addressed the Conference on May 22, 1933. His address was partly historical, partly a warning of the consequences of failure, partly a forecast of the benefits of success. But the heart of it was his promise of co-operation by the United States. The United States would go as far as the others in arms reduction; it would, along with them, reduce its army and navy to the level of a domestic police force. It would assist in formulating and carrying out a system of supervision to assure that promises of reduction and limitation were carried out. Furthermore, if a substantial reduction of armaments were effected by general international agreement, the United States was

> prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular we are willing to consult the other states in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a state has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these states may thus make to restore peace.[22]

This passage from Davis' speech was the official and public answer of the United States to Arthur Henderson's proposal of the preceding March. The United States would agree to consult with other powers in the event of an actual or threatened breach of the peace. It would not, furthermore, by asserting its traditional claims to neutral rights, interfere with such sanctions as might be applied against an aggressor—provided that a general plan of disarmament was adopted, and provided that the United States concurred with the other powers as to the guilty party. This was, at best, a negative kind of collaboration, but not unimportant and the most that could be hoped for from a country so isolationist-minded as was the United States of 1933.

Secretary Hull had hoped to strengthen the capacity of the United States to collaborate in measures of collective security by obtaining for the President the authority to prohibit the exportation of arms and military supplies to such nations as he might designate. This authority—which President Hoover also had requested in the closing months of his Administration—would have enabled the President, with the co-operation of other arms-producing nations, to ban the export of arms and munitions to an aggressor in an international conflict while allowing their exportation to the innocent party. A measure for this purpose passed the House of Representatives on April 17, 1933, but met with opposition in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, especially from isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California. Hull sent the committee a long statement, giving assurance that the authority, if granted, would not be used against Japan in her current conflict with China and urging that the authorization was necessary to enable the United States Government to keep pace with other governments in the world movement for peace. The committee, however, adopted an amendment offered by Hiram Johnson requiring that the arms embargo, if imposed, must be applied to both parties to a conflict, the aggressor and the victim alike. The amendment clearly defeated the purpose for which the legislation had been requested. Though the President would have accepted the resolution in this mutilated form, Secretary Hull protested that it was "directly in conflict with our position at Geneva as expressed by Norman Davis." The State Department would not support the resolution with the amendment, nor the Foreign Relations Committee without it, with the result that no resolution was passed. The Secretary told his press conference, May 29, that the Administration would fight for the original proposal in the next session of Congress.[23]

Prospects for success at Geneva now seemed reasonably good, but in order to avoid conflict with the World Economic Conference in London, the Disarmament Conference recessed on June 8, after adopting a resolution which formally accepted the MacDonald Plan as the basis for the future disarmament treaty. The Conference was to resume its deliberations in the fall, and in the meantime it authorized its president, Arthur Henderson, to consult with representatives of the great powers in the hope of smoothing out remaining differences.

Before the Bureau, or Steering Committee, of the Conference reassembled early in October, 1933, the American, British, French, and Italian representatives had tentatively agreed on a plan to be submitted to Germany. They proposed a four-year trial period, during which a system of supervision was to be tested and German behavior observed. If results were satisfactory there would be a second four-year period during which the armaments of the former Allies would be gradually reduced along the lines of the

MacDonald Plan, eventually to reach the level permitted Germany. The plan provided for certain readjustments in the organization of the German army, or Reichswehr, but no German rearmament. On October 6, Germany made counterproposals, rejecting the trial period and demanding "samples" of all types of arms that were to be retained by the other powers.[24]

On October 9, Dr. Hans Luther, the German Ambassador, called to explain the German position to the Secretary of State. Hull made it plain to his visitor that the United States sought equality in armament through reduction of the arms of the "heavily armed nations," not through rearmament of the others. Germany could, he believed, "in the course of a few years, obtain parity of arms with other nations if she would be patient, cease the rearmament measures she was already undertaking in violation of the Versailles Treaty, and await the disarmament of other countries." These assurances made no impression on Dr. Luther, who insisted on Germany's right to equality in arms *at once*. As the interview was described to Pierrepont Moffat, Hull declined to argue with the German, "but would, after the closing of each Teutonic blast, quietly lift a newspaper off his desk and read to Luther some fresh instance of German provocation or glorification of war," as indicative of why France was still concerned for her security.[25]

That same afternoon Norman Davis telephoned from Geneva to discuss the situation with the President and the Secretary of State. In the briefing of the President before the call came in Hull deferred to Moffat, remarking, "You know more about this so I leave the answer to you." As to what stand the United States should take, Moffat advised that it should avoid "the Scylla of losing our independent position and the Charybdis of allowing a break in the solid front which had at last been welded between France, England, Italy and the United States." To Davis, when the call from Geneva came through, the President stressed the importance of preserving the solid front. As to the German demands, Davis was told to stand firm against any rearmament, even with "samples," but was authorized to work toward a compromise on the trial period, which he thought France might accept.[26]

But Hitler's Germany was now unwilling either to compromise or to exercise the patience that Hull had recommended. On October 14 the German Government announced that it was withdrawing from the Conference, charging that the Conference was failing to achieve its purpose, solely because of "the unwillingness on the part of the highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm."[27] On the same day Germany also served notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations. The news of these events reached the State Department on that Saturday morning through the press associations. The Secretary postponed his press conference from 10:30 to 12:30, hoping for further information, which was not, however, forthcoming. The Department had prepared for his use a background statement, not for attribution, saying, in substance, that the United

States was "in general agreement with France and Great Britain" on the disarmament question. The Secretary met the press flanked by Under Secretary Phillips, Assistant Secretaries Moore and Caffery, and Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Western European Division, described also as "disarmament expert of the State Department." Mr. Hull, according to Moffat, "embroidered extemporaneously" on the prepared statement, denouncing the German action as "a break-up of our team play." The *New York Times* interpreted the Secretary's remarks as indicating that as a consequence of German withdrawal from the Conference the United States had abandoned its former neutral position between the European camps and was now "aligned solidly with its wartime associates against the peril, imaginary or real, of German rearmament." The isolationst Hearst press went further, charging that the United States was "plunging headlong into the ominous imbroglio as the State Department aligned this country behind France and Great Britain in their split with Germany."[28]

These reckless charges from the isolationist press were coupled with French newspaper talk of American support in a preventive war against Germany. Both types of publicity had their effect in a State Department conference Monday morning, October 16, in preparation for another telephone conversation with Norman Davis. Hull, Phillips, and Moffat all reached the conclusion, as Moffat reported, that the time had come to make it clear that the united front with France, Great Britain, and Italy "related to disarmament matters solely and did not involve any political commitments." Hull and Phillips found the President in entire agreement with these conclusions. Furthermore, "his uncanny political instinct" made it clear to him that an indication of American aloofness from the political quarrels of Europe should come from Norman Davis, since criticism had taken the line that it was he who "was entangling us without our knowledge."[29]

When Davis called on the afternoon of the 16th, therefore, he was cautioned by both the President and the Secretary against getting drawn into political discussions with the great powers. Hull, in particular, warned him "to avoid the appearance of being in too many conferences with three or four—the big powers, as they say over here. That makes an impression over here that there is some plan to involve us. Instead of having three or four when you talk about disarmament, see if you cannot get a dozen or two."[30] There was safety in numbers, Mr. Hull believed.

To carry out the President's idea that Davis himself should proclaim the aloofness of the United States from Europe in political matters, the Secretary cabled him on this same day a "suggested statement" which he might give to the press, as he did on the same day. It read as follows:

> . . . We are in Geneva solely for disarmament purposes. While there is a possibility of successfully carrying on disarmament negotiations, we will gladly continue to do our part. We are not, however, inter-

> ested in the political element or any purely European aspect of the picture. We again make it clear that we are in no way politically aligned with any European Powers. Such unity of purpose as has existed has been entirely on world disarmament matters.
>
> Whether or not conditions are favorable to continuing the present disarmament effort is now a question for Europe, not the United States, to decide. During this week there will be consultations between the capitals of Europe. We do not wish to take an active part in these as the implications are purely political.
>
> The principles set forth last May by the President in his message to heads of States remain the policy of the United States.[31]

With the German withdrawal from the Conference, any real prospect of achieving general disarmament ended. The Steering Committee and several of its technical committees met from time to time, and the Conference itself, in the form of its General Commission, sat again from May 29 to June 11, 1934. On the opening day of this session, Norman Davis, recalling his offer of May 22, 1933, again expressed, on behalf of the President, the willingness of the United States, in connection with a general disarmament convention, "to negotiate a universal pact of nonaggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party." On the other hand, he again proclaimed the unwillingness of the United States to take part in "European political negotiations and settlements," adding that the United States would "not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute anywhere." The United States, said Davis, still believed in the elimination of offensive weapons as the best road to security. He pleaded for a return to the situation of June 8, 1933, when the Conference had accepted the MacDonald Plan as the basis for a treaty, and urged that Germany return and resume negotiations on the basis to which she had agreed a year before.[32]

Nothing came of this attempt to revivify the Conference, which never met again. The Secretary of State, however, once more suffered annoyance from malicious newspaper stories to the effect that the American delegation at Geneva, by consistently voting with the British, was antagonizing the continental powers and impairing American influence in Europe. These rumors Mr. Hull was at some pains to dispose of at his press conference on June 6, 1934. "We have no occasion," he told the reporters, "so far as political or other matters are concerned, to have any alignment with anybody at any time."[33]

The United States did undertake to make a contribution on a more modest scale to the control of armaments. On May 24, 1934, Secretary Hull informed Hugh Wilson at Geneva that if the negotiation of a general disarmament convention proved impossible, as seemed likely, the United States would be willing to agree to a convention for control of the private manufacture of arms and international trade therein. Public opinion, said Hull, had been aroused to the evils arising from the private manufacture of arms and the international trade in them, and that opinion was reflected in Congress. The United States would now be prepared to sign a convention for the control of such activities without the general disarmament convention which it had formerly viewed as a prerequisite.[34]

Hugh Wilson, to whom this responsibility was entrusted, presented to the Steering Committee of the Disarmament Conference in November an American proposal for control of the arms industry, coupled with a project for creation of a Permanent Disarmament Commission as the controlling body. The Steering Committee set up a special committee to study the proposal and make recommendations. The special committee began work early in 1935, adopting the American project as the basis of its discussions, but Wilson soon learned from Lord Stanhope, the British representative, that the British Cabinet had decided against accepting the proposed convention. "The British were in the first stages of their own rearmament program and explained that they could not permit such detailed control and publicity of their rearmament efforts." President Roosevelt, who had warmly supported Hull against the War Department in insisting that "supervision and inspection must be all-inclusive, including all plants in all nations," was angered by the British refusal to accept a plan which offered some hope of controlling German rearmament.

"Much discouraged," he wrote Hull to keep Wilson's report on the British attitude "for possible future need. . . . At some future time it may be advisable to pull this rabbit out of our hat as proof that the present British Government is not sincere in seeking limitation or reduction of present world armaments or present world trade in warlike weapons."[35] With no chance of reaching an agreement, the special committee ended its sessions in April, 1935, thus, as Hugh Wilson remarked, terminating "the last endeavor of the States of Europe to bring about an agreement with respect to arms."[36] Several weeks previously, on March 16, Hitler had repudiated the restrictions on German armaments in the Versailles Treaty and announced that Germany was resuming compulsory military service and expanding the Reichswehr to 500,000 men, five times the treaty limit. German rearmament was on in earnest. Germany's neighbors must perforce increase, not reduce or limit, their armed forces and equipment. American recognition of these facts of life was registered in October, 1935, when, at Hugh Wilson's suggestion, the United States relinquished the office in Geneva that had been occupied by the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference.[37]

A rather curious episode was occurring contemporaneously with the negotiations for control of private enterprise in the arms business. In 1925 the United States had signed at Geneva a Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, but the Senate had never approved it despite the advocacy of the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. On April 12, 1934, Secretary Hull wrote Senator Pittman urging Senate approval of the Convention; its ratification, he argued, would be "an important contribution which the American Government and people can make at this time to the cause of world peace." At this point the Persian Minister, Ghaffar Khan Djalal, entered the act. Without consulting the State Department, he persuaded Senator William H. King of Utah to introduce a reservation, which the Senate promptly adopted, declaring that adherence to the treaty by the United States should not be construed as denying any right of sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia might have in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

The State Department objected strongly to the reservation, which it was learned would prevent or delay ratification by other governments. It objected also to Djalal's procedure in bypassing the Department. But Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee paid no heed to the Department's remonstrances, nor was the Persian Minister impressed by lectures on his improprieties delivered by the Secretary and by Under Secretary Phillips. "Such remarks," Phillips recorded, "have no effect whatsoever on the Minister and go off him like water off a duck's back." The Secretary then undertook to dissuade the President from ratifying the convention, but the President, as Phillips complained, came back "with a memorandum which is wholly beside the point and which shows that he has not even read the correspondence." Further approaches to Mr. Roosevelt, however, eventually converted him to the State Department's view. He returned the convention to the Senate, which approved it without the King reservation. The President ratified it on June 21, 1935, but lacking the requisite number of ratifications, it never went into effect. We may, however, regard skeptically Mr. Hull's opinion that without the delay caused by the King reservation the necessary number of ratifications would have been forthcoming.[38]

The Disarmament Conference at Geneva concerned itself principally with ground and air forces. The limitation of navies was left to negotiation by the principal naval powers, which had already been successful in achieving temporary agreements. These were embodied in the Five-Power Treaty signed in Washington in 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930, entered into by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The Washington Treaty had set limits in the ratio of 5:5:3 for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan respectively, in battleships and aircraft carriers, with much smaller quotas for France and Italy. The London Treaty had limited cruisers, destroyers, and submarines of the three major naval powers, with ratios of approximately 10:10:7 for cruisers and destroyers, with Japan again on the short end, and parity in submarines. Sizes of ships and guns in all categories were also limited. The treaties had postponed a costly race in naval building but would expire on December 31, 1936. Thereafter any signatory, by giving two years' notice, could resume freedom of action.[39]

The naval aspect of the disarmament problem, therefore, was the question whether the existing treaties could be renewed, with or without modification, before they expired at the end of 1936. It was known that Japan was dissatisfied with her inferior quota and might insist on parity in any renewal of the treaties. President Roosevelt, in May, 1934, was hoping for an over-all reduction of 25 percent in the world's navies, preserving existing ratios. If that were not feasible, he would hope to preserve the *status quo*.[40] Roosevelt's intense interest in all things naval was well known and was apparent in the negotiations of 1934 and 1935-36. The Secretary of State had a hand in directing them, but the vital decisions were Roosevelt's.[41]

Preliminary Anglo-American negotiations were held in London from June 18 to July 19, 1934, with Norman Davis as chief representative of the United States and Prime Minister MacDonald taking an active part for Great Britain. These meetings revealed full agreement that the principle of naval parity should be preserved between England and America but denied to Japan. President Roosevelt's hope for a reduction in navies, however, was met head on by a British demand for an increase in their allotment of cruisers, which they claimed was necessitated by deterioration since 1930 in the international situation in both Europe and the Far East.[42] They were prepared to compensate for this proposed increase in tonnage by a reduction in the size of battleships and aircraft carriers—a proposal unacceptable to the United States.

A reply to this British demand was formulated by the President in consultation with Under Secretary Phillips. Norman Davis was authorized to say that insistence upon such an increase as the British proposed would make agreement with them impossible, since the United States stood for reduction, or at worst for preservation of the *status quo*. The President wrote out in pencil a personal message to Prime Minister MacDonald, urging him to co-operate "in a reduction of naval armaments for the good of the entire world." He "got somewhat heated," as Phillips recorded in his diary, and talked of making a public appeal to the King of England and the Emperor of Japan, ending with a threat that if it should come to a naval race, the United States would beat them both. "I saw the possibility," wrote Phillips, "of the President sending such a message while at sea without anyone to advise him and so asked permission to prepare a draft in case such an eventuality should occur and he welcomed the suggestion."[43]

No such dramatic appeal was made, and no agreement was reached on the issue of cruiser tonnage. The negotiations, which had been cordial except for some American irritation at leaks to the London press, were suspended July 19, to be resumed in October, when the Japanese delegation was expected.

American and Japanese delegations met to exchange ideas on October 24, 1934, in London. It had been known since September that Japan planned to serve notice, before December 31, that she would no longer accept the restrictions of the Washington and London Treaties after their expiration at the end of 1936. This was the two years' notice required for termination. The substitute which the Japanese delegation now proposed was a "common upper limit" on naval tonnage, to be fixed as low as possible, but to give Japan the right to absolute parity in naval strength with England and America. This "common upper limit," they indicated later, was to apply also to France and Italy and presumably to Germany and Russia, which had not been parties to the earlier treaties. Along with this principle of parity, the Japanese favored the abolition or reduction of "offensive" types of vessels, in which category they placed battleships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. In support of their proposals the Japanese produced two arguments. First, the "equality in defense" which her smaller quota had afforded Japan in her own and adjacent waters had been impaired by new technical developments, especially in aviation. Second, her inferior ratio "caused 'a certain country' to look on Japan with contempt, producing complications in the Orient."[44]

The Japanese proposals were unacceptable to the United States. In a note of November 13 to Norman Davis, Hull insisted that the ratios established at Washington and London still provided "equality of self-defense, equality of security" and represented "a united purpose to avoid competition in armaments," whereas the only construction that fitted the Japanese thesis was that it represented "a desire to obtain overwhelming supremacy in the Orient, opening the way to preferential rights and privileges and destroying the delicate balance in Asia, both economic and political, which is represented by the other basic principles and policies that are embodied in the Washington and other treaties." When the British delegation undertook to devise a "middle course," which might give Japan parity in name but not in fact, conceding her the "right" to equality but with the understanding that she would not exercise it, Hull demurred. To begin negotiations now for a new agreement, he contended, would amount to conceding that the existing ratios had been given up—a gain for Japan and a loss for the United States. Davis was therefore to discourage the British suggestion.[45]

Since agreement proved impossible, the Conference adjourned on December 19, 1934, with the understanding that representatives of the three powers and of France and Italy should meet again upon call of the British Government when the latter should see some reason to hope for agreement. The interval, as William Phillips noted in his diary, "would give time for Japan to show by action its policy in the Far East, that is, whether they would pursue a policy of dictation or of co-operation . . ."[46] On December 29, Japan served the expected notice of termination of the Naval Treaties.

The American delegates, upon their return from London, met the Secretary in his office on January 8,

1935. Norman Davis was still hopeful of coming to terms with the Japanese. He saw possibilities in the latest form of the British "middle course" formula. The Japanese had neither definitely accepted nor rejected it, but Admiral Yamamoto had talked in conciliatory tones in the closing days of the Conference. He had, Davis believed, been much impressed by meeting face to face the spokesmen of the two foremost naval powers, and would return home "either to convert his Government to a more reasonable stand or to lose his head."[47]

The cautious optimism of Norman Davis and William Phillips proved to be unfounded. The Japanese, far from displaying a spirit of co-operation in the Far East, spent much of 1935 in an attempt, through subversion, to extend their control from Manchuria over five of China's northern provinces.[48] Admiral Yamamoto neither converted his government nor lost his head. The Japanese delegation returned to London in December, 1935, insisting as strongly as ever upon naval parity with the United States and England.

The British Government had, on October 24, 1935, invited the United States, Japan, France, and Italy to a conference to meet in London on the following December 2. The invitation was based on no new hopes for the success of such a conference, but rather on provisions of the Washington and London Treaties providing for an attempt at renewal before the date of their expiration. One feature of the invitation created a minor complication in Washington—a suggestion that in order to keep the size of the delegations as small as possible, the governments be represented by their ambassadors in London. A further explanation, offered through Ambassador Robert Bingham, was that in view of the small prospect of success at the Conference, fanfare and publicity should be kept at a minimum. This could be best accomplished by keeping the negotiations in regular diplomatic channels. Whatever the reason, this procedure would have eliminated Norman Davis from the position of chairman of the American delegation, which he had held in all disarmament talks since March, 1933. Davis was resentful; he would not serve under Bingham; and Bingham was determined to occupy the chairmanship. Only the President could settle this hassle, which he finally did by naming Davis chairman, with William Phillips and Admiral William H. Standley (naval representative at the previous talks) as the other delegates. Phillips remarked that it would evidently be his particular job "to act as peacemaker between the Embassy and our principal delegate." Hull, who seemingly had no part in this intramural contest, remarked that in spite of slim hopes for success, the United States "sent a strong delegation to the London Naval Conference. . . . We still had to indicate to the world that we believed in the principle of disarmament, however obscure appeared the prospects for attaining it."[49]

Americans, British, and Japanese adhered to the positions that they had taken a year before. When, on January 15, 1936, the French and Italian delegations joined the Americans and British in voting down the Japanese demand for parity, the Japanese delegation formally withdrew from the Conference, leaving only an observer to report on developments of interest to Japan. Without Japanese participation, there was no possibility of fixing quantitative limits for the British and American navies, since American and British naval building was necessarily determined by Japan's. Abandonment of quantitative limitation, incidentally, eliminated the only point of serious disagreement between Americans and British—Britain's demand for a larger quota of cruisers. All that remained to do was to fix "qualitative" limits—sizes of ships and guns in the various categories—leaving the number of ships to be determined on the basis of national need. A treaty of this character was signed on March 25, 1936, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Even the "qualitative" limits were abandoned two years later, as made possible by an "escalator clause" in the treaty, when Japan failed to affirm or deny rumors that she was building battleships of 45,000 tons, ten thousand tons above the limit set by the London Treaty.[50]

The London Conference of 1935-36 had met, as Hull wrote later, amid inauspicious circumstances. Japan had denounced the naval limitations of the treaties of 1922 and 1930, was pressing for control of northern China, and was assuming the right to call the tune in the Far East.[51] The Disarmament Conference at Geneva had failed; Germany was rearming on land and in June, 1935, had signed with England a treaty by which England consented to the building of a German fleet of 35 percent of the size of Britain's, in plain violation of the Versailles Treaty. On March 7, 1936, while the London Conference was still in session, Hitler's Reichswehr marched into the Rhineland, demilitarized by the Treaty of Versailles. Meanwhile, Italy under Mussolini had launched an undeclared war of conquest against Ethiopia and was prosecuting it successfully in defiance of ineffectual sanctions imposed by the League of Nations.[52] Because of resentment at these sanctions, Italy withdrew from the League and also refused to sign the innocuous treaty of qualitative naval limitations evolved by the London Conference. In all these ways, the tide had clearly turned against the reduction or even the limitation of armed forces. Only a small ray of cheer appeared in an exchange of notes, at the end of the Conference, between the American delegation and the British Foreign Minister, pledging both governments to adhere to the principle of naval parity between Great Britain and the United States.[53]

Talks with Norman Davis after his return from London helped to convince Hull, so he relates, "that peace on the basis of disarmament was next to impossible." Any contribution by the United States to the preservation of peace through measures of collective security was ruled out by the fact that "public opinion here was, in majority, militantly and almost violently against our entering any such joint undertakings. The only remaining alternative," Hull continues, "was for the United States, while continuing to preach and practice peace, and urging like policies on all nations, especially the avowed aggressors, to take immediate notice of the aggressors' movements and arm our nation without delay to the extent adequate for our security."[54] From this time he surpassed even President Roosevelt in urging the addition of new battleships and aircraft carriers to the Navy.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

Hull's long devotion, as Congressman and Senator, to measures for the lowering of trade barriers has been mentioned in previous chapters. Regarding a liberal system of international trade not only as a remedy for the world's economic ills, but also as one of the chief "pillars of peace," he had fought consistently against the high tariff rates imposed by Republican Congresses in 1909, 1922, and 1930. When he agreed to become the Secretary of State of a Democratic President with a huge Democratic majority in House and Senate, one of his highest hopes was to embark the United States upon a program of trade liberalization which might set an example to the world.

In this matter, however, President Roosevelt had rudely pulled the rug from under his Secretary of State. In his Inaugural Address he had given domestic economic questions priority over the lowering of trade barriers. Though in the spring of 1933 he had permitted the State Department to draft legislation delegating to the President comprehensive authority to negotiate trade agreements, on the eve of the London Economic Conference he had informed Hull that the legislation would not then be introduced. In the view of the President and the advisers who then had his ear, the raising of domestic prices through the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the

National Industrial Recovery Act might necessitate higher tariff rates rather than lower. All that Hull was able to accomplish at London in this matter was a short-lived tariff truce.[1]

Perhaps as a gesture to assuage Hull's disappointment, the President, while the Secretary was still in London, authorized the State Department to sound several minor countries on the possibility of negotiating reciprocal trade treaties. Nothing came of this move except a treaty with Colombia, which was signed but never approved by either Government. Hull, upon his return from London, urged his case with the President and with the public. Roosevelt's first move in the desired direction was the creation, November 11, 1933, of an interdepartmental Executive Committee on Commercial Policy. The chairman was to be from the State Department. Other units represented were the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, AAA, and NRA. Since Hull left for the Inter-American Conference at Montevideo on the day the Committee was created, Under Secretary Phillips served temporarily as chairman but was soon succeeded by Assistant Secretary Francis B. Sayre, who assumed primary responsibility for the trade program.

While the Committee was beginning its deliberations, Mr. Hull was winning the brilliant success at the Montevideo Conference, to be described in a later chapter. The President had hesitantly consented to his proposing there a resolution calling for a lowering of trade barriers through the reduction of tariffs and other appropriate measures. This resolution, unanimously adopted at Montevideo, won much praise in Latin America and in the United States. Its favorable reception probably made the President more sympathetic to Hull's program.[2]

Upon his return from Montevideo, Hull found that Mr. Roosevelt now looked with favor upon the type of reciprocal trade agreement that the Secretary thought necessary. On the other hand, with typical Rooseveltian ambivalence he had appointed the arch-protectionist George N. Peek head of a new committee to co-ordinate foreign trade relations. This meant trouble, but not immediately.

Hull's experience at London had convinced him that his earlier idea of a multilateral tariff reduction—he had at times suggested a flat ten percent cut across the board—was not feasible. He was ready to turn instead to a system of bilateral negotiations by which the United States would agree with other interested governments, one by one, upon reciprocal reductions in their duties on specific commodities. These reductions, moreover, would be generalized by application of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, which the United States had incorporated in most of its commercial treaties. In other words, the reduction accorded to a commodity imported from a country with which the United States made an agreement would be accorded to the same commodity when imported from other countries. The Executive Committee on Commercial Policy agreed with Hull on these points, and also upon another that was crucial: that the power to make the agreements should be delegated to the President without the necessity of submitting them to the Senate or to Congress. Experience had shown the futility of authorizing the President to make trade agreements if these, in the form of treaties, must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. The only hope for significant reductions lay in executive agreements.

By the end of February, 1934, the Committee had prepared a draft of a bill embodying these features, and on February 28 the President called a meeting at the White House attended by members of the Committee, Secretaries Hull and Wallace (Agriculture), the Vice President, and the Democratic leaders of House and Senate. The draft was approved by all present and sent to Congress by the President on March 2, with a message (prepared in the State Department) recommending its early enactment.[3] The President cited figures on the decline in international trade since 1929, and argued that a restoration of that trade, brought about by lowered duties, would improve the opportunity for American sales abroad. He stressed the necessity of empowering the Executive to act quickly and with finality if the United States was to occupy a favorable bargaining position. Finally, he warned that in the execution of the proposed law "the Executive must, of course, pay due heed to the requirements of other branches of our recovery program, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act."

The wording of the bill emphasized the emergency character rather than the long-range purpose of the trade program. The preamble described the measure as "For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States (as a means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economic depression . . .) by regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States." Hull took the same line in his testimony before the Ways and Means Committee of the House and the Finance Committee of the Senate.[4] This was especially true of his statement before the Senate Committee, April 26. "Its support," he said of the bill, "is only urged as an emergency measure to deal with a dangerous and threatening emergency situation."

The emergency was, of course, the world-wide economic depression, as a result of which, he told the House Committee, thirty million wage earners were unemployed and eighty percent of the world's population were existing below the poverty line. The remedy, as he saw it, was to free international trade from the excessive tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, exchange controls, barter agreements, and other artificial restrictions, which were strangling the world's commerce and preventing recovery. The primary object of the proposed law, said Hull, was "both to reopen the old and seek new outlets for our surplus production" through the gradual lowering of barriers to American products in foreign markets. "At the same time," he added, "by force of example we would be encouraging the advance of a world-wide movement for the readjustment downward of excessive barriers."

He closed his statement to the House Committee in language that voiced his characteristic thinking on the subject:

> International commerce conducted on a fair and mutually profitable basis, as this bill proposes, is not only calculated to aid materially in the restoration of prosperity everywhere, but it is the greatest civilizer and peacemaker in the experience of the human race.

In his statements to the two committees and in his replies to the questioning that followed, the Secretary defended the constitutionality of the proposed delegation of authority to the President. He urged that exemption of the agreements from legislative approval was essential, since other governments (where such approval was not necessary) would hesitate to sign agreements whose execution would be subject to indefinite delay or rejection on the part of the United States. He opposed, unsuccessfully, the Senate Committee's disposition to require that public hearings be held on any proposed agreement before it was signed. Such hearings, he contended, might cause long delays when prompt action was needed, and would not be necessary to safeguard domestic interests. He had already assured the House Committee "that each trade agreement undertaken would be considered with care and caution, and only after the fullest consideration of all pertinent information. Nothing would be done blindly or hastily."

The House of Representatives passed the bill on March 29, with several amendments. One limited the duration of the grant of authority to three years. Others continued the preferred status enjoyed by Cuba under the existing tariff and barred any cancellation or reduction of the war debts through the authority to be delegated to the President. The Senate added the provision for hearings before the signing of each agreement. It then approved the bill on June 4. Important Republican backing had been given by former Secretary of State Stimson, who after talking with Hull urged passage of the bill in a radio address. The House concurred in the Senate's amendment, and the President signed the bill on June 12, 1934.[5]

Hull, who was present at the signing, wrote this later description of his emotion:

> Each stroke of the pen seemed to write a message of gladness on my heart. My fight of many long years for the reciprocal trade policy and the lowering of trade barriers was won. To say I was delighted is a bald understatement.[6]

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, technically an amendment to the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, empowered the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries and, in pursuance of such agreements, to raise or lower existing tariff rates not more than 50 percent, or to "freeze" existing rates or quotas for the period of the agreement. The rates and restrictions thus established should apply to similar commodities from all foreign countries, though the President might suspend their application to produce of a country which discriminated against American commerce. Agreements would continue in effect for three years, and thereafter until terminated by one of the parties upon six months' notice. Before concluding an agreement the President must provide for hearings and must also seek information and advice from the Tariff Commission, the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce, and from such other sources as he might deem appropriate. The authority granted in the Act, as previously noted, would terminate at the end of three years from the date of signature.[7]

With the Act on the statute books, prompt action was taken to set up the necessary organization for carrying it out. An interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, headed by Assistant Secretary Sayre, was chiefly responsible for initiating agreements and determining their character. A Committee on Reciprocity Information held hearings and received information and opinions relative to proposed agreements. "Country committees" were created as needed to study possibilities of agreements with specific countries and, when chances appeared favorable, to draw up schedules of possible concessions on either side. When such tentative schedules had received approval at higher levels, negotiations were instituted through the Trade Agreements Division of the State Department. Other committees or subcommittees on commodities or on technical subjects fed relevant information into the process at appropriate points.[8]

The negotiators, in offering rate reductions on imports from the foreign country, were guided by two important principles: First, the commodities selected for reductions should be items of which the other country was the chief supplier; otherwise, under the most-favored-nation principle, third countries would reap important benefits gratis. Second, the commodities selected should be as far as possible noncompetitive with domestic products.

The program thus launched got off to a disappointingly slow start. One difficulty was that the President had not really made a choice between the diametrically opposite philosophies of Cordell Hull and George N. Peek. Mr. Peek's empire-building proclivities had led to his being eased out of the Department of Agriculture, but he had important backing among certain farm groups, and the President felt it necessary to find a respectable berth for him. In naming him chairman of a committee to co-ordinate foreign trade relations, during Hull's absence in December, 1933, the President confided to Under Secretary Phillips that this was "window dressing." Phillips was confident that the President would not interfere with the work of the State Department and that the Peek appointment was "a 'step-out' rather than a 'step-in.' "[9]

But Mr. Peek had a way of "stepping in" in unexpected places. At the end of December he presented to the President a set of recommendations which would have transferred to him from the State Department the chairmanship of the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy and have set him up, in William Phillips' words, "as Foreign Trade Administrator, Director of Imports and Exports, presumably with authority to negotiate with foreign governments." Since Peek's ideas on international trade were the antithesis of Hull's, acceptance of his plan by the President would have been a mortal blow to Hull's hopes. As Hull had not yet returned from Montevideo, Phillips called Presidential Aide Marvin McIntyre to suggest "that as foreign trade was Mr. Hull's 'baby' it would . . . be unfortunate for the President to act without Mr. Hull's co-operation."[10]

The President apparently permitted Peek's recommendations to simmer for some weeks, but at a meeting at the White House on February 26, he indicated an intention to give Peek virtually all he had asked for, including the chairmanship of a new committee to take over control of commercial policy. Only a determined protest from Hull in a later private conference with the President persuaded him to modify the plan, leaving the Committee on Commercial Policy intact with Sayre as chairman.[11] On March 23 Mr. Roosevelt signed an order naming Peek Special Adviser on Foreign Trade. To Hull this was a severe blow. "If Mr. Roosevelt had hit me between the eyes with a sledge hammer," he commented later, "he could not have stunned me more than by this appointment." Phillips took a more cheerful view of the order, since it limited Peek's activities and did not affect those of the Department.[12] The fact remains, however, that up to and after the time of the signing of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, June 12, the President had not decided whether Hull or Peek was to administer it. Only on June 29 did he definitely consign the task to the State Department.[13]

In the months that followed, the nature of the disagreement between the two men became very apparent. Hull had embarked upon a program of bilateral trade agreements which, accompanied by the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, would let down trade barriers on a broad front. Peek, in speech and pamphlet, attacked the unconditional most-favored-nation procedure as "unilateral economic disarmament." He wished to see bilateral trade agreements whose benefits would not be extended to third parties without their granting equivalent concessions. He stood, in other words, for a return to the earlier American addiction to the *conditional* form of the most-favored-nation principle. The point that he overlooked, in Hull's view, was that under the unconditional formula the United States as a third party was a beneficiary of every concession granted by its treaty partners to others.

The struggle between the two men reached its final crisis in December, 1934. Peek negotiated a barter agreement with Germany, which would have given American cotton preferential treatment in the German market, and through an artificial exchange rate have enabled German manufacturers to undersell both their foreign and their American competitors in the American market. This was contrary to Hull's whole philosophy of equality of commercial treatment. Brazil, also an exporter of cotton, promptly protested. Peek saw the President and got his approval. Hull had gone to Nashville to make a speech, but William Phillips, who was in touch with the situation, persuaded the President to defer a final decision until Hull's return, and had the Secretary fully briefed by a special messenger who met his train at Charlottesville. On reaching the Department, Hull called in Phillips and others and with their help drafted a long letter to the President, which he presented in person. It pointed out the complete incompatibility between Peek's barter deal and the trade agreements program and ended with a warning of the probable popular reaction to the Peek scheme: "The proposed plan is almost certain to engender extreme resentment among that large section of the American public which is violently opposed to the Hitler regime."[14]

The President bowed to the State Department's reasoning. He withdrew his approval of the German deal, and from that moment Peek's influence waned. His office of Special Adviser had its legal basis in the NIRA and was wiped out when that Act was held unconstitutional in May, 1935. Though the President made other arrangements for him to continue his work, Peek grew increasingly critical of the Administration policy and finally resigned in November, 1935, after firing a blast at Roosevelt's entire foreign policy. Hull was left in control of the field, but the controversy had seriously delayed the trade program.[15]

The first trade agreement signed after passage of the Act was that with Cuba, August 24, 1934. This agreement, however, was of a special character, following the precedent of the reciprocally preferential trade relations that had existed with Cuba since 1902. It did not contain the most-favored-nation provision, and hence the reduced rates were applicable to Cuban products only. Hull took the occasion to cite the "more than twelve months' painstaking and expert study" that preceded it, as indicative of the cautious procedure he had promised when the Trade Act was signed.[16]

Although the Government, shortly after the signing of the agreement with Cuba, announced its intention of negotiating agreements with eleven other countries, the actual negotiation lagged, and it was not until February 2, 1935, that the next agreement, with Brazil, was signed. Aside from the doubt of the President's intentions, induced by his flirtations with Peek, the Committee on Trade Agreements encountered obstacles on both foreign and domestic fronts. Abroad, some governments sought to take an unfair advantage by raising their tariffs before beginning negotiations—the markup preceding the markdown sometimes met with in retail sales. Some governments, too, while ready to lower their duties, were reluctant to abandon quotas or other restrictive or discriminatory practices. It was the American policy to insist that import quotas be either abandoned or adjusted to insure equality of treatment to American products, and that other forms of discrimination be eliminated. This took time. Meanwhile, American interests that conceived of themselves as threatened by proposed agreements resorted to delaying tactics.[17]

The signing of the agreement with Brazil did not greatly cheer the Secretary of State, for, as William Phillips reported, "the manganese lobby . . . got to work and has apparently put the jitters into everyone." Though the Secretary countered with an impressive defense of the manganese schedule, so much concern was shown at the next Cabinet meeting that Mr. Hull was "greatly discouraged about the whole program. He fears," Phillips noted, "that we must go much slower and be satisfied with much fewer conquests, in order not to arouse domestic fears."[18]

The work went forward nevertheless, and before the end of 1936 agreements had been signed with fifteen countries. In chronological order these were: Cuba, Brazil, Belgium, Haiti, Sweden, Colombia, Canada, Honduras, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Nicaragua, Guatemala, France, Finland, and Costa Rica.[19]

Of special importance was the agreement with Canada, signed in Washington, November 15, 1935. Preliminary discussions with Canada were held during 1934, but actual negotiations did not begin until

August 26, 1935, and then proceeded slowly until the Canadian elections late in October. The Canadian negotiators were discouraged at the American unwillingness to grant concessions on such staple Canadian products as codfish, cream, lumber, seed potatoes, and live cattle. A gloomy outlook was suddenly brightened when the national elections threw out the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Richard Bennett and brought in the Liberals, headed by W. L. Mackenzie King.[20]

Mackenzie King was deeply committed to close relations with the United States and specifically to the idea of reciprocity in trade. He recounted to United States Minister Norman Armour in Ottawa how he had gone down to defeat on that issue with Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1911, and how in 1929 he had negotiated with William Phillips an agreement which he had thought constructive but which the United States had turned down. Now he was eager to tackle the question again. There were two roads open to Canada, he said. He wanted to choose the American road if the United States would make it possible. With that end in view, he went to Washington on November 7.[21]

It was his hope to sign the agreement on November 11, in order, as Phillips noted, "to demonstrate to the world on Armistice Day that Canada and the United States were pulling together." Secretary Hull was summoned back to Washington from a brief vacation, and in a conference at the White House, November 9, the President was ready to give a green light to the

Armistice Day signing, had not Secretary Morgenthau objected to the lowered duties on whiskey, and demanded forty-eight hours to study the problem. King returned to Ottawa to get the approval of his Cabinet. On November 11, Morgenthau gave his consent, the Canadian Cabinet approved, and although it was necessary to postpone the signing ceremony for a few days, both the President and the Prime Minister announced the conclusion of the agreement in their Armistice Day speeches.[22]

The Prime Minister returned to Washington for the signing on November 15. The Cabinet was called in, and speeches were made by the President, the Prime Minister, and the Secretary of State, all in the presence of the press and their cameramen. The agreement with Canada was evidently regarded as a major achievement. Certainly Hull was pleased, both at the fact of having reached an agreement with this important neighbor and at the terms of the agreement. It kept agriculture "on or above the level of the Fordney tariff," he told the President, and added: "It will be hard to conjure up . . . a political issue of this situation." To Henry L. Stimson, who had sent congratulations, Hull replied:

> . . . Confidentially speaking, this country got all the advantage in the concessions made. I am glad to be able to report also that statesmen and government heads in many parts of the world have strongly commended the trade agreement as marking a real step and offering a stimulating example

in the direction of genuine world economic rehabilitation.[23]

Other agreements followed that with Canada at a rate of about one a month until the middle of 1936. These included the significant agreements with the Netherlands, including its colonies (December 20, 1935), and with France and its colonies (May 6, 1936). But with Great Britain, "the greatest commercial nation of the world," there was no agreement. The British Government, long dedicated to a free-trade policy, had turned protectionist as a consequence of the depression, and in the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 had instituted a system of Empire preference for trade between the United Kingdom and its overseas dominions and colonies. It had also adopted a system of bilateral balancing, or barter, agreements with certain foreign countries. To Hull this was economic sin, and ever since the London Economic Conference he had been trying to convert the British to his own concept of lowered barriers and equality of treatment for all. "It seemed to me," he wrote in his *Memoirs*, "that our trade agreements program could not be considered complete until the United Kingdom was inserted as the apex of the arch."[24]

In January, 1936, he read the British Ambassador a long lecture on the subject, contrasting the American system with the British and arguing that in its own self-interest Britain should choose the former. Hull sent a memorandum of this conversation to the

President. Mr. Roosevelt replied, praising Hull's line of argument and adding: "Incidentally, I get it from a number of sources in England and Europe that your policy and mine, working toward the long-view program of general increase in trade, is beginning to get under their skins and that they are getting heartily sick of mere bilateral agreements. Keep up the good work!"[25]

The expression "your policy and mine" must have amused Hull if it did not anger him. It had seemed to him so far that the President "had shown interest in the trade agreements program only from time to time." A few months later he ignored Hull's suggestions for planks on foreign policy and foreign trade in the Democratic platform of 1936 and permitted (if he knew what the Platform Committee was doing) the inclusion of a tariff plank which, as Hull complained, "squinted in the direction of our trade agreements policy" but then drifted off into protectionist language which was "Republican terminology almost word for word."[26]

Despite ambiguity in the Democratic platform, the trade agreements program became an issue in the political campaign of 1936. The Secretary made a number of speeches in support of the program, but these were, he recalled, expositions of his principles rather than partisan political speeches. Alfred M. Landon, the Republican presidential candidate, criticized the program, but his heart was not in the attack. His criticisms impressed R. Walton Moore as "very vague and feeble," and Landon himself afterwards confessed to Felix Morley of the *Washington Post* that he had been at heart in favor of the Hull trade program but had been "overpersuaded" to deliver two speeches against it—the only speeches in his campaign which did not represent his own ideas. Such other prominent Republicans as Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, publisher of the *Chicago Daily News* and vice-presidential candidate in 1936, were also believers in the Hull program.[27]

Hull naturally interpreted the overwhelming Democratic victory of 1936 as an endorsement of his program. "We shall go forward with this program," he said in a public statement of November 4, "in the same earnest, persistent, careful, and cautious manner in which we have heretofore sought to advance this great undertaking."

The most desirable direction for the next forward movement was toward Great Britain. The problem of reaching agreement with Britain was complicated by the system of Empire preference and the reluctance of the Dominions to surrender any part of their preferred position. Much might depend upon positions taken at the Imperial Conference, which was to meet in London in the spring of 1937. Hull, therefore, took advantage of a visit of the Canadian Prime Minister to Washington in March to impress upon him the need of British leadership in a broad program of international rehabilitation, for which Hull's Latin American and trade agreements programs might furnish models. Mr. Mackenzie King listened to the lecture without comment, but at the end said that he might be able in London to do something to advance such a program.[28]

When the Imperial Conference met in May, Ambassador Bingham was able to learn that Prime Minister Chamberlain made an earnest appeal to the Dominion delegations for their co-operation in the conclusion of an Anglo-American trade agreement, which might be a move "toward the establishment of economic international peace." Bingham was informed also that of the Dominions, South Africa was favorable, Australia reluctant, while Mackenzie King believed a triangular arrangement could be worked out to meet the needs of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[29]

Conversations at various levels followed during the summer and early fall. In August, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, economic adviser to the British Government, came to Washington for talks. In September he told the American Consul General in Geneva that the British Government was most anxious for an agreement, that the difficulty lay in finding ways to satisfy the Dominions; that Chamberlain attached such importance to the matter that he expected to go to Washington to sign the agreement when the time came.[30]

At length, on November 16, 1937, the Secretary called in Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador, and in the presence of Assistant Secretary Sayre handed him a memorandum to the effect that the United States was ready to state that negotiation for a trade agreement with Great Britain was being contemplated. The memorandum explained that although the latest concessions offered by the British were not satisfactory, the United States was willing to proceed to formal negotiations on the assumption that a better offer would be forthcoming. Hull made it plain that he had more in mind than the stimulation of trade. Alluding to Japanese aggression in China, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, and the formation of the Axis alliance,[31] he remarked "that the world is on fire and that unless those who share common desires to protect the precious things of our civilization stand together in some practical program, . . . we may be too late."[32]

That a trade agreement was contemplated was announced in Washington and London on November 18, 1937; the formal announcement of "intention to negotiate" followed on January 7, 1938. Yet it was to be a year (lacking one day) from the former date before the agreement was signed, and a year during which world conditions went steadily from bad to worse. Japan's military campaign in China marched on, while in Europe Hitler's Third Reich annexed Austria in March and inaugurated the propaganda campaign against Czechoslovakia which culminated in the Munich crisis in September. It was a year when the democracies should have drawn together in a united front; yet until it was nearly over the United States and Great Britain could not agree on a reciprocal trade pact. In the opinion of some, it was the shock of Munich that ended the impasse.[33]

One obstacle appeared early in 1938, with the introduction into Parliament of a proposal to increase the quota of cinema films reserved for British producers from twenty to thirty percent. This raised quite a storm in the United States and led Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Divison of European Affairs, to warn the British Ambassador that this treatment of "our principal non-agricultural export must in the nature of things affect our attitude toward some of their exports to us."[34] Parliament nevertheless proceeded to pass the bill.

The more persistent difficulty arose from British reluctance to meet certain of the American demands. The United States was offering the United Kingdom important reductions on certain types of textiles. This concession, the State Department reasoned, would necessarily be unpopular in New England. To balance this expected loss in votes, the Administration counted on placating the Northwest with reduction of British duties on Douglas fir, and important farm groups with reductions on rice, lard, wheat and wheat flour, tobacco and hams. But on these concessions the British negotiators stood firm. Douglas firs raised an interesting question. To lower the rate on this one type of lumber, the British argued, would be unfair to the Scandinavian countries, which produced closely similar types but not this one. Such specialized classification, Sir Ronald Lindsay contended, would violate the most-favored-nation principle. When Sumner Welles pointed out that British textiles were to benefit from a similar specialization in the American schedule, Sir Ronald admitted that this was true "but that it was a question of how far we could legitimately specialize."[35]

It was characteristic of Hull to avoid discussion of specifics and to emphasize general principles. Thus he voiced to the British Ambassador on August 19 his "great and growing concern in regard to the failure of the British Government thus far to make a single utterance in support of the broad program of reciprocal trade and peace based on mutually profitable commerce and equality of treatment." In the same spirit Assistant Secretary Sayre, in the midst of the crisis that was to end at Munich, deplored the fact that "apparently the negotiations were descending too much into a horse-trade, and that to think of pounds, shillings, and pence, when the whole future of the world is at stake, seemed to me lamentable."[36]

Whether or not moved by these arguments, the British on October 25 made substantial concessions to the American demands. Though not wholly satisfied, Hull decided to accept them. In so deciding he was influenced in part by reports from Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy (who had succeeded Bingham in London) that the British Cabinet was seriously divided on the issue, one report going so far as to state that Prime Minister Chamberlain alone favored going through with the agreement.[37]

Throughout the year Canada had been a party to the discussions, and the agreement signed on November 17, 1938, was a tripartite one. Pierrepont Moffat has left a graphic description of the occasion.

> Today was the big day in Mr. Hull's career [he recorded in his diary]—the signing of the British and Canadian Trade Agreements Pact. There was quite a ceremony at the White House. The old Lincoln table was brought down and at it sat the President, the British Ambassador, the Canadian Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and Overton, Chief of the British Trade Delegation. Chairs were arranged in a big semi-circle around the table and everyone who had anything to do with the Treaty from the Assistant Secretary of State down to the copyists was invited. The press turned out in full force. The three speeches were all appropriate though somewhat conventional, following which the President made one of his graceful speeches in which he said that after all the five men sitting around the table had not borne the grind, the day-to-day worry of negotiating the Treaties. He wished, accordingly, to thank all those patriotic men and women whether British, Canadian or American, who had done the preparatory work and the statistical work and the negotiating work for their contribution to the success of the day.[38]

The agreement with Britain was especially beneficial to American farmers. Duties were abolished on wheat, lard, canned grapefruit, and some fruit juices, and reduced on rice, apples, pears, and certain canned fruits; hams and certain other pork products, corn, and cotton, already on the free list, were bound there, and the quota of hams was increased. Nonagricultural products benefiting included electrical and office machinery, women's shoes, silk hosiery, certain wood products, and frozen salmon. The United States in return granted concessions on textiles, metals and metal manufactures, including textile machinery, engines, cutlery, and silverware. The agreement also covered trade of the United States with Newfoundland and over fifty nonselfgoverning colonies within the British Empire.

The agreement with Canada carried further that of 1935. Preferences accorded by Canada to many British products were, with British consent, removed or reduced, and imports from the United States were relieved of a special 3 percent tax hitherto levied on all but Empire products. Thus considerable inroads were made on the system of Empire preference.[39]

The *New York Times* congratulated Secretary Hull on the attainment of a goal for which he had long striven and predicted beneficial results to both American and British trade.

> But the real significance of the agreement [the editorial continued] goes far beyond this possible result. The treaty makes a closer union between the two most powerful democracies, achieved at a particularly decisive moment in the world's history.

> It increases the hope for more effective co-operation among all the democracies in defense of peace and order.[40]

Mr. Hull in his *Memoirs* acclaimed the agreement for its reversal of the protectionist trend in Britain and for its substantial benefits to American agriculture. Its failure to reverse or halt the trend toward war he attributed to its having come too late, when "Europe was already living in turmoil and fear." Had it been signed a few years earlier, he fondly believed, peace might have had a chance.[41]

In the meantime, the life of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, originally limited to three years, had been extended for three additional years by a joint resolution of March 1, 1937. The Secretary appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee on January 21, 1937, and later presented a statement to the Senate Finance Committee. This time he had less to say than in 1934 about the emergency character of the legislation, though he did fall back upon that position when taxed with an inconsistency between his stand in 1930 and that in 1934 and 1937. This time he talked more about the dependence of world peace upon world trade and the danger that the world would relapse into economic war and perhaps armed conflict if the United States should abandon its trade agreements program. To critics of the program he sometimes exhibited petulance. Thus to a complaint that agricultural imports had grown more than exports, he responded:

> I have not heard a single gentleman who has been looking for some little temporary change of trend of exports or imports whisper the word "peace" or show the slightest interest in carrying forward a program such as we have for that purpose, or offer one himself.[42]

The President, in 1937, had proposed making the extension of the Act permanent instead of for another three-year period. His habitually cautious Secretary of State had feared that Congress would react adversely to the more ambitious proposal, and Congress had indeed limited the extension to three years. As 1940 approached, Harold L. Ickes quoted the President as fearing that another attempt at extending the Act would be defeated—a defeat that would break Hull's heart.[43] But the President this time gave the Hull program his full support. "For the first time since 1933," Hull remembered, "I had the feeling that the President was really behind me on trade agreements." When Hull opened the campaign with a speech to the American Farm Bureau Federation at Chicago, December 5, 1939, the President complimented him and suggested that other Cabinet members study his speech and give active support to the program. When the President learned that Vice President Garner was lining up Senate votes for an amendment that would emasculate the extension bill, he expressed his displeasure in a manner that Garner could not mistake.[44]

Hull appeared again before the appropriate committees of House and Senate.[45] He cited figures to show that in the first three years under the trade agreements program exports to the twenty-two countries with which agreements had been made had increased by 61 percent compared with a 38 percent increase in exports to other countries. He vehemently denied that American agriculture had suffered from increased imports. He defended the exemption of the agreements from Senate approval as essential to the workability of the program, and he argued that the application of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle was the only effective means of protecting American exports from discrimination in foreign markets. That the program had not prevented the outbreak of war in Europe was, he contended, the result of its late start, and he advanced the new argument that continuance of the program would be essential to postwar reconstruction of the world's economy.

The resolution extending the life of the Act for three more years was passed, with a margin of only five votes in the Senate, and signed by the President on April 12, 1940.[46]

In following the development of the trade agreements program we have been carried far beyond events covered in later chapters of this study. In order to complete the story of Secretary Hull's connection with the program it is necessary to proceed still further into the years of World War II, and to refer especially to the Lend-lease Act of March 11, 1941.[47] The provisions of this Act, initially designed to give material aid to Britain in her war with the Axis powers, were eventually applied to most of the other Allied powers. The Lend-lease, or Mutual Aid, agreement, negotiated with Great Britain and signed February 23, 1942, contained in Article VII a provision that in arriving at a settlement of Britain's obligations for aid received under the Act, the two countries should take measures conducive "to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers."[48] The same Article VII was later incorporated in the agreements with other recipients of lend-lease assistance.

To Hull, who had not found it easy to persuade the British to accept Article VII in this form, the provision quoted meant a British promise to abandon the system of Empire preference under the Ottawa agreements. This he considered a significant victory. In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, April 12, 1943, supporting a request for a third extension of the Trade Agreements Act, he pointed out that these declared objectives of Article VII "had been for eight years the announced objectives" of the trade agreements program.[49] Apart from this, his arguments for extension in 1943 were much the same as in 1940 and 1937. As before, he tended to talk in generalities, leaving to his associates the task of presenting concrete figures on the effects of the agreements on the economy. The Secretary himself stressed the theme of peace. He professed to see significance in the fact that of twenty-seven countries with which the United States had made trade agreements, not one was at war with the United States, and only one, Finland, was at war with an ally of the United States. Of the others, sixteen were at war as allies of the United States, six had broken diplomatic relations with the enemy, while the remaining four (Argentina, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey) were neutral.

Pleading for the extension of the Act as a symbol of American willingness to share the world's responsibilities, Hull told the Ways and Means Committee:

> As we look into the future, it is this theme of international co-operation that should be uppermost in our minds if we really want to make sure that another world conflict is not to be ahead of us after we win this war.[50]

Congress passed the extension resolution this time by safe majorities, but only after reducing the period of extension from three years to two, on the theory that the United States should not tie its hands beyond the probable end of the war. The President signed the resolution on June 7, 1943.

In his expectation that Article VII of the Lend-lease Agreement meant the prompt abrogation of Empire preference, Hull was doomed to disappointment. He complained that Prime Minister Churchill persistently evaded execution of that promise. The British, in reality, took a different view from Hull's of the obligations imposed by Article VII. In their eyes, the special trade relations which the United

States maintained with Cuba, with the Philippines, and with its territories and possessions were as truly discriminatory as was Empire preference. They held, furthermore, that under Article VII tariff reduction and the removal of discriminations should go hand in hand, and they regarded the leisurely American system of bilateral agreements as an inadequate method of achieving the world-wide lowering of tariffs that they had hoped to see. When the British proposed a substantial multilateral reduction of tariffs by the principal trading nations—the sort of program that Hull had espoused in 1933 and before—they found the State Department unwilling to ask so much from Congress. Hence, for the remainder of Hull's tenure, there was no general lowering of tariffs and no abandonment of Empire preference. For this failure of hopes Washington must share responsibility with London.[51]

On the whole, Hull had reason to feel well satisfied with the progress of his trade agreements program. That progress had been slow; even if it had been much faster, it could hardly have had the irenic potency that Hull ascribed to it. Yet it had reversed the American trend to higher trade barriers and had done much to bring the Western world back to liberal trade policies. Furthermore, through Hull's careful nursing at three-year intervals, it was fast assuming the character of a permanent policy. Six months after his resignation he saw Congress renew the Act for another three-year period while substantially enlarging the President's authority to cut duties. Hull's persistent endeavor to secure bipartisan support for the program was rewarded when he lived to see a Republican President recommend its continuance and two Republican Congresses, albeit grudgingly, extend its life. Within his lifetime, too, the program's bilateral character became in part multilateral, as the bilateral agreements were drawn into the machinery of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). And seven years after his death, another Democratic President received from a Democratic Congress, in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, tariff-cutting powers much more sweeping than those enjoyed by any of his predecessors. For all this structure Cordell Hull had laid the foundation.

CHAPTER SIX

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

THE GLOOM that settled on the State Department as a consequence of the dismal failures at London and Geneva was brightened somewhat by notable success in the field of inter-American relations. Here the new Secretary of State found a grim inheritance of ill will directed against his country. The practice of intervention in the Central American and Caribbean areas, pursued intermittently since the days of Theodore Roosevelt, had been resented throughout Latin America. But this was not all. "Piled high upon political antagonism," Hull later wrote, "was economic resentment." The Latin American countries, like the rest of the world, were suffering in the throes of the great depression, and the shrinkage of the markets for their raw materials had been aggravated by the high United States tariffs of 1922 and 1930. Intervention in their internal affairs and the erection of barriers against their exports had given the United States the repute of a "bad neighbor" in the minds of great numbers of Latin Americans.[1]

President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, it is true, had begun a retreat from the policy of intervention. Hoover, soon after his inauguration in 1929, had asserted that it had not been and ought not to be American policy to intervene by force to protect the contracts of American citizens in foreign countries. Hoover and Stimson had abandoned the practice, initiated by Woodrow Wilson, of refusing recognition to Latin American governments that had attained power by revolution. In 1930 the State Department had published a *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine,* prepared two years before by J. Reuben Clark, then Under Secretary of State. This document repudiated the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which since Theodore Roosevelt's time had served as a theoretical justification for intervention.

The practice of the Hoover Administration had conformed to its theory. It had extended recognition to a number of revolutionary governments in 1929 and 1930, had withdrawn from Nicaragua in January, 1933, the marines whom President Coolidge had sent in in 1927, and had gone far in negotiations for termination of American controls in Haiti. Each of these steps was in itself gratifying to Latin American sensibilities; but the steps were short, the *right* to intervene had not been repudiated, and after all it was Hoover who had signed the detested Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930.[2]

It was the aim of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State to win the friendship and co-operation of the Latin Americans by removing both their economic and their political grievances against the United States. The lowering of tariff barriers had to await action by Congress on the reciprocal trade program, but the abandonment of intervention in theory as well as in practice was a matter for executive action. On this subject Hull's attitude was clear. "Long before March

4," he wrote, "I had resolved that one of our principles in dealing with Latin America would be religious adherence to the principle of nonintervention. I felt we could never be real friends with the Latin Americans so long as we maintained the right to intervene in their internal affairs." He had helped to write the plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 which contained in two phrases the essence of what was to become known as the "Good Neighbor policy": "No interference in the internal affairs of other nations," and "Co-operation with nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine."[3]

In this attitude the Secretary had the full sympathy and support of the President. Roosevelt's inaugural declaration—"In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor"—had no special reference to Latin America; it was meant to characterize his foreign policy as a whole. Very soon, however, the term "good neighbor policy" was being used to describe the policy of the Roosevelt Administration in its relations with Latin America. Mr. Roosevelt was already on record as being opposed to unilateral interference by the United States in the affairs of the other American republics. We must learn to accord to their sovereignty the same respect that we claimed for ours, he had written in 1928. If in the future, disorder and bad government in one of the sister republics should require a "helping hand" from without "as a matter of temporary necessity to bring back order and stability," such help should be offered jointly with other republics "in the name of the Americas. Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end; with the co-operation of others we shall have more order in this hemisphere and less dislike."[4] As President, however, Roosevelt said nothing very significant on the subject of intervention until December 28, 1933. Speaking then at a Woodrow Wilson Foundation dinner, he declared: "The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention."[5]

This was a forthright declaration of policy by the President of the United States, but it was strictly a unilateral declaration, which could be altered or revoked at will by him or his successors. It had no contractual force. Two days before the President's address, however, Secretary Hull had signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, an instrument by which the United States, in a convention with the other American republics, denied the right of any state "to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." But before thus renouncing the right to intervene in the affairs of other American states, the United States under Roosevelt and Hull had intervened—or at least interfered or intermeddled—in the domestic affairs of its nearest Caribbean neighbor, the Republic of Cuba.[6] That episode must be briefly examined before we turn to the story of the Montevideo Conference.

Gerardo Machado, elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1924, had at first won considerable acclaim for conducting an honest and efficient administration.

In 1928, by questionable methods, he secured re-election and an extension of the presidential term from four to six years. Thereafter his rule became increasingly corrupt and dictatorial. Popular dissatisfaction with his regime was intensified after 1929 by the world economic depression, which was particularly hard on single-crop countries such as Cuba. An open rebellion was suppressed in 1931, but underground resistance continued, drawing its strength largely from young men of student age. The dictator struck back ruthlessly. By the spring of 1933 the University of Havana and many of the high schools were closed, popular liberties were suppressed, and terrorism was the rule on both sides of the struggle.

Secretary Stimson refused to let the United States be drawn into any form of interference in this distressing situation in Cuba. Disillusioned by the difficulties and frustrations he had encountered in the prolonged intervention in Nicaragua, he was determined not to repeat it elsewhere. The Platt Amendment, it is true, authorized the United States to intervene in Cuba for "the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty," but Stimson interpreted this wording as applying to the lives, property, and liberty of foreigners, not Cubans. Only "chaos" or "anarchy," in his view, would justify intervention. And so the situation went from bad to worse.[7]

Superficially, Hull's attitude was similar to Stimson's. Though Cuba "was giving us good cause for anxiety," he writes, "the President and I were determined that we would not intervene in Cuba," since "such an act would further embitter our relations with all Latin America" and "would undo all our protestations of nonintervention and noninterference." At a press conference on April 15, 1933, he assured reporters: "No consideration has been given to any movement in the nature of intervention. Nothing whatever is going on that would call for the slightest departure from the ordinary relationships and contacts between two separate and sovereign nations."[8]

Yet the situation was paradoxical, as Bryce Wood has pointed out, in that a continued hands-off policy might permit conditions so to deteriorate as to make intervention unavoidable. Of this danger Hull and Roosevelt were aware, and so, if we can accept a rather fine line of demarcation, which limits "intervention" to the use of force, they resorted to "intermeddling" in order to avoid the necessity of "intervening."[9]

The instrument of the "intermeddling" was Sumner Welles, who had left the diplomatic service in the 1920's but had been brought back by Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of State. He had the double advantage of enjoying the President's friendship and confidence and of being experienced in the Latin American field. Indeed, he had published a massive work, *Naboth's Vineyard,* on the history of the Dominican Republic. In April, 1933, Welles was named Ambassador to Cuba. His instructions of May 1, 1933, signed by Hull, were perhaps formulated by Welles himself. He was to bear in mind that Cuba was a sovereign and independent state and to avoid any steps that would tend to involve the United States in the intervention permitted by the Platt Amendment. He was to extend such assistance as might be feasible for the improvement of economic conditions in the island, to negotiate a trade agreement, and to urge President Machado to end the state of terrorism. But his "chief objective" was to negotiate a truce between Machado and his opponents which would open the way to free elections.[10]

Because of the World Economic Conference in London, Hull was absent from Washington from the end of May until the early part of August, and Roosevelt had his hands full with other matters. Welles, therefore, was left largely on his own in Cuba. As early as May 18 he outlined for President Roosevelt a program for Cuba, including constitutional reform, a new electoral law, and new national elections. He reported, however, that feeling was so bitter and agitation so general that it might be necessary to suggest a change in the presidency before the electoral period. At any rate, he was convinced that "General Machado should be replaced, at least during the electoral period, by some individual in whom all parties have confidence."[11]

As the weeks passed, the removal of President Machado assumed increasing prominence in Welles's program. Machado agreed tentatively to accept Welles's mediation with that object in view, but in the end it was not Welles's persuasion but withdrawal of support by practically the entire corps of Cuban army officers that induced Machado to "take leave of absence" and depart by plane on August 12, 1933. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who with Welles's approval had been named Secretary of State in order to be in line for the succession, became President of Cuba. Welles described the defection of the army officers as "spontaneous." The fact that Welles had held confidential talks with General Alberto Herrera, Secretary of War, raises doubts about the "spontaneity." Welles, at any rate, was the recipient of "warm congratulations" from the President and Secretary of State in Washington.[12]

The Céspedes regime endured less than a month. It was overthrown on September 5 by a revolt of army sergeants and rank and file against their officers and the government of Céspedes. Leader of the revolt was Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, destined to become Cuba's new strong man and, twenty-five years later, to play a sinister role closely resembling that of Machado. Welles, who had staked his prestige on the Céspedes government, first reacted by calling for United States troops to restore it and to aid it in maintaining order until it could replace the mutinous army with a loyal force. "Such a policy on our part," he telegraphed Hull, "would presumably entail the landing of a considerable force at Havana and lesser forces in certain of the more important ports of the Republic." The only disadvantage of such a policy, he believed, would be that it would "incur the violent animosity of the extreme radical and communist groups in Cuba." Fully explained to the representatives of the other Latin American countries, it "could be construed as well within the limits of the policy of the 'good neighbor' which we have done our utmost to demonstrate in our relations with the Cuban people during the last 5 months."[13]

This proposal produced the first of many clashes of opinion between Hull and Sumner Welles. To Ambassador Josephus Daniels in Mexico, a strong opponent of intervention, Hull remarked on the telephone: "I would rather walk from here to the South Pole than to have to intervene." Upon receipt of Welles's call for troops he went at once to the White House, where he told the President "that we could not and should not think of intervening in Cuba even to a limited extent." Welles, he told Mr. Roosevelt, had evidently been "overinfluenced by local conditions in Cuba and misjudged the disastrous reaction that would follow throughout Latin America if we agreed to his request." The President at once agreed with Hull. There would be no armed intervention in Cuba. A few naval vessels would be sent to Cuban waters but under orders to land no troops "unless it were necessary to evacuate American citizens caught between the contending Cuban factions."[14]

With Roosevelt's backing, Hull instructed Welles that there was to be no intervention in behalf of any Cuban faction, no attempt to set up a government "which would be regarded by the whole world, and especially throughout Latin America, as a creation and creature of the American Government." The President, in conversations with the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, had emphasized the desire of the United States to avoid intervention in Cuba. This attitude had received widespread approval and any action contrary to it "would have disastrous results. . . . in other words," Hull added, "strict neutrality is of the essence."[15]

With American intervention ruled out, a civilian junta which the revolting sergeants had set up in Havana installed as provisional President of Cuba Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, a former professor of biology at the University of Havana. For reasons that are not entirely clear, Welles became a determined opponent of the Grau government. Sensitiveness as to his own prestige and concern over the alleged radicalism of Grau's supporters may partly explain his attitude. His stated reasons were two: that Grau was unable to maintain order in Cuba, and that he lacked the support of the great majority of the Cuban people—the latter a matter of opinion, since no election was held. On these grounds he persuaded Hull and Roosevelt to withhold recognition from the Grau government, perhaps overlooking, perhaps relying upon, the circumstance that lack of recognition by Washington hampered Grau's efforts to restore order and to secure popular support. Grau San Martín, in other words, was trapped in a vicious circle.[16]

Hoping that nonrecognition by Washington would make Grau's position untenable, Welles also held talks with Batista, now a colonel and chief of staff of the Cuban army, with a view to shifting military support from Grau to elements more acceptable to Welles—hardly an exercise of the strict neutrality which Hull had remarked was "of the essence."[17] It seems clear that such activities caused concern in the State Department. On November 6, Under Secretary Phillips suggested by telephone that Welles join the delegation about to depart for the Montevideo Conference. When Welles replied that it was impossible for him to leave Havana, Phillips noted in his diary: "In my opinion Welles is doing no good in Habana; he has become so involved with the various political parties and is being so violently attack[ed] in the local press and otherwise that his presence there has no longer any 'healing' effect." But Welles, Phillips added, "was determined to stick it out and the President certainly has no intention of recalling him."[18]

Contrary to Phillips' expectation, the President was soon to conclude that Welles's usefulness in Cuba was ended. A few days after Hull's departure for Montevideo, President Grau announced in Havana that he had requested that Welles be replaced, since his presence in Havana tended "to maintain conspiracy, fratricidal warfare, and public disorders . . ." Though the White House denied that it had received such a request,[19] the situation brought Welles posthaste to Warm Springs to confer with the President. From Warm Springs the President telephoned William Phillips, November 19, to say that Welles would return to Havana after a day or two in Washington, "and that, confidentially, Sumner would remain in

Cuba only for about two weeks. This was the plan," Mr. Roosevelt added, "in order to avoid the appearance of pulling Sumner out under orders." He suggested that Phillips explain the Cuban situation to the representatives of the Latin American countries and show them a public statement that the President would make from Warm Springs on the occasion of Welles's return to Havana.[20]

The public statement, issued by the President on November 24, was the product of intensive consultation in Washington between Welles, Phillips, and Jefferson Caffery, who was to replace Welles in Cuba. Phillips and Caffery were opposed to issuing such a statement, but Welles prevailed with the President, and the statement was in effect his parting shot—and an effective one—at the Grau regime. It made it clear that although Welles was leaving Cuba, his nonrecognition policy was still to be pursued. Phillips warned the President, by telephone, that a statement which amounted to an attack on the existing government of Cuba might have a bad effect at the Montevideo Conference as well as in Havana. But this warning, Phillips recorded, "did not seem to trouble the President in the least; he said his next step, if the situation grew steadily worse, would be to withdraw the Embassy from Habana and all Americans from the Island."[21]

Welles returned to Cuba, still hoping to conclude his mission with a victory. It was planned that he should leave Havana December 9, but on that day he cabled the Department for permission to delay his departure. There was hope, he reported, that Grau San Martín would retire and a new provisional government take his place. "Naturally," William Phillips commented, "Sumner feels that his prestige would be increased 100% if he could return to the Department after he had accomplished his own desire, which is to rid Cuba of Grau San Martín." At the President's direction, Welles was given permission to prolong his stay in Havana until the 12th or 13th. On the 11th he telephoned that within twenty-four or forty-eight hours "there would be an agreement between all parties by which Grau San Martín would step out and [Carlos] Mendieta would take over the provisional government." But on the next day, December 12, these hopes had collapsed, and Phillips instructed him to leave on December 13. "I am thankful," wrote Phillips, "to get him out of the Cuban mess for he was certainly making no helpful contribution."[22] Welles returned to his former post of Assistant Secretary of State.

When Caffery, the new Ambassador, made it plain that the United States would still withhold recognition from the Grau government, Colonel Batista informed Grau that the army would no longer support him. Grau thereupon resigned, January 15, 1934. Three days later, Carlos Mendieta, whom there was good reason to suppose the United States would recognize, became provisional President, with Batista's support.[23]

Secretary Hull had not played a major part in the Cuban episode. He had been in London during most of the summer. On November 11 he left Washington for the Montevideo Conference and did not return until January 21, 1934. While in Washington he had scrupulously consulted the ambassadors of the more important Latin American countries in regard to Cuba. "This," he records, "was in line with the decision I had reached that whatever diplomatic actions were called for on our part in Latin America would be taken only after consultation with the interested countries to the south of us."[24] With the President's support, he had blocked Welles's proposal for armed intervention in Cuba, which, if carried out, would have been very embarrassing to the United States at Montevideo. It does not appear that during his absence from Washington he was consulted in regard to Welles's visit to Warm Springs and the State Department, the President's statement of November 24, or instructions to Caffery.

Returning from Montevideo by way of the west coast of South America and the Panama Canal, Hull reached Key West a day or two after Mendieta's accession. There Jefferson Caffery met him with a report on the latest developments in Cuba and a recommendation that Mendieta be recognized. Hull telephoned the President endorsing this advice and was informed on the same day that the President planned to meet the Latin American representatives at the White House and to inform them that the Mendieta government fulfilled the two prerequisites for recognition laid down by the United States: ability to maintain order and the support of the Cuban people. How the President had reached these conclusions within three days after Mendieta's accession was not explained. On January 23, 1934, two days after his return to Washington, Hull telegraphed Caffery in Havana to extend a "formal and cordial recognition" to the Government of Cuba.[25]

Recognition of the Mendieta government was quickly followed by the negotiation of a new treaty with Cuba, by which the United States surrendered its right to intervene in Cuban affairs. The President's announcement in November of his willingness to accept such a treaty had strengthened Hull's hand at Montevideo. Signed May 29, 1934, by Hull and the Cuban Ambassador, and by Sumner Welles at his special request, the treaty abrogated all features of the Platt Amendment except American rights to the Guantanamo naval base. These in future could be surrendered only by mutual consent. The Senate approved the treaty promptly and without a dissenting vote. Ratifications were exchanged on June 9, 1934.[26]

Under Secretary Phillips, who saw Hull on the day of his return to Washington from Montevideo, found him seeming "in the best of health and very satisfied with the health of his mission, which proved to be a distinct personal triumph for him; the Secretary," Phillips added, "is extraordinarily gifted to deal with men of 'hot' tempers and the Latins are this breed."[27] The Secretary indeed had reason to feel gratified at his achievement at the Seventh International Conference of American States, which had met at Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3 to December 26, 1933. The outlook when Hull had left Washington in November had been far from cheerful. The world-wide economic depression, the failure of the London and Geneva Conferences, the persistence of the costly Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, all combined to produce an inauspicious atmosphere. The Conference, originally scheduled for 1932, had already been postponed a year, and though Hull does not say so in his *Memoirs,* both he and Under Secretary Phillips had urged the President to accept an offer from the Argentine Government to take the initiative in moving for a further postponement. It was the President who determined that the Conference should meet unless a majority of the Latin American states desired otherwise.[28]

Hull thereupon decided to head the American delegation himself—the first time that a United States Secretary of State had acted in that capacity.[29] From the President, despite his veto of postponement, Hull received little encouragement for any substantial achievement at the Conference. A few days before the delegation sailed, Louis Howe, the President's assistant, came to Hull with the warning: "We don't think you need to undertake much down at Montevideo. Just talk to them about the Pan American highway from the United States down through Central and South America." When Hull suggested that the President issue a statement designed to "squelch too much optimism" about the Conference, Roosevelt went much further than Hull had had in mind.

Nine-tenths of his statement dealt with the need for improving transportation, and it concluded with a sentence which, as Hull remarked, "seemed to close the door to any real achievement at Montevideo." Said the President: "Unsettled conditions, such as European commercial quota restrictions, have made it seem desirable for the United States to forgo immediate discussions of such matters as currency stabilization, uniform import prohibitions, permanent customs duties, and the like."

"As I left Washington, therefore," Hull remembered, "it seemed that most avenues to success at the Conference were barred. Was Montevideo thus to be another London?"[30]

In one respect, at least, conditions were more favorable for the Secretary's purposes than had been the case in London six months before. Hull had spoken plainly to the President of the deficiencies of the ill-assorted delegation to the World Economic Conference, and this time had been permitted himself to select both the delegates and the accompanying experts. "This delegation," he wrote, "was to function with high efficiency; I could not have asked for better co-operation."[31] When the delegates who were not already in South America sailed from New York on the S.S. *American Legion*, November 17, 1933, Hull was sufficiently cheered to issue an optimistic statement, predicting that the nations of the New World would set a profitable example for Europe in the field of "mutual economic national and international planning." On shipboard he organized the delegates into groups for study of the problems on the agenda for the Conference and called them together for meetings on most of the twelve days of the voyage.[32]

Hull himself, in spite of presidential discouragement, had determined to push for his always favorite objective, the lowering of trade barriers. To this end he spent much of his own time on shipboard in preparing "a comprehensive economic resolution," which (like the American proposal at London) included a tariff truce, bilateral and multilateral negotiations for removal of restrictions and reduction of tariff rates, and inclusion in trade agreements of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle. This resolution was transmitted to Washington for the President to pass upon. In Washington there was objection, for as Hull noted, "the old struggle between the nationalistic philosophy of the New Deal group about the President and my international philosophy of economics was still acute." At length, after several exchanges of telegrams, Under Secretary Phillips reported to Hull, December 8, that with certain reservations to cover possible actions of the NRA and AAA during the period of readjustment, the President "gladly approves your effort to keep alive, as a permanent objective, the idea of liberalizing tariff barriers by simultaneous action of many nations."

"I was delighted," wrote Hull. "Already I was well ahead of myself at London."[33]

Before winning this significant victory in Washington, the Secretary of State had turned his principal attention to the problem of winning the friendship and co-operation of the Latin American delegations at the Conference. This was no small task. The preceding Conference, the Sixth (Havana, 1928), had been noteworthy for Latin American attacks upon "Yankee imperialism," particularly as exhibited in the interventions in Haiti and Nicaragua. Now, upon his arrival at Montevideo, the Secretary of State saw from the ship billboards displaying in huge letters the words, "Down with Hull," while, in his words, "most of the press of Montevideo and Buenos Aires across the Plata River rawhided our country and our delegation, called us names, and threw out the idea that we were down there, as usual, for purely selfish, narrow purposes."[34]

Hull was determined to alleviate this distrust of the United States on the part of its southern neighbors, to convince them that the Good Neighbor policy was not merely the old imperialism camouflaged. He set out through personal contacts to win the confidence of the other delegations. Despite the raised eyebrows of members of his own delegation, who thought the Secretary should await approaches from the Latin Americans rather than make them himself, Mr. Hull began at once a series of personal calls upon the other delegations. To each he gave the assurance: "There is nothing my Government wants or is seeking down here except to carry forward the doctrine of the Good Neighbor. We simply want to co-operate fully with all Latin American countries in promoting the political and economic ideals in which we are all alike equally and mutually interested." Surprised, but pleased at his friendly approach, the other delegations were soon returning his calls "in an increasingly cordial atmosphere."[35]

The most formidable antagonist of the United States among the Latin American delegates was the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas. Jealous of United States leadership in the New World, Saavedra Lamas was a recent convert to espousal of the League of Nations, which Argentina under his leadership had rejoined in 1932. Argentina had hitherto been a laggard in the movement for international peace; it had ratified none of the inter-American arbitration and conciliation treaties of the 1920's nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Recently, however, Saavedra Lamas had seized the initiative by proposing his own Anti-War Pact, and a few weeks before the Conference opened at Montevideo he had got it signed by six Latin American states. Few would have predicted that his inveterate opposition to the United States could be overcome; yet this is precisely what Cordell Hull accomplished, at least for the time being.

Hull paid his initial call upon Saavedra Lamas immediately upon the arrival of the Argentine delegation at Montevideo. He had come, he said, to seek the counsel of the man who in the United States "was considered the outstanding Latin American statesman and advocate of peace." The nations of the Old World were looking to the Americas to restore hope of peace by some real accomplishment at the coming Conference. The situation, Hull told the Argentine, called for "two broad, comprehensive resolutions." One should propose a constructive program for economic recovery. The other should pledge the governments represented to sign, so far as they had not done so, the five treaties designed to promote and maintain peace in the Western Hemisphere.[36] The United States, said Hull, was ready to sign Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact, but someone should introduce a resolution pledging the signature of all five. "We want the best man down here to put it forward so we can give it our support. . . . Now, Mr. Minister, if you won't do it, we are going to get the next best man down here to do it."[37]

This ingratiating approach quite won the difficult Argentine's support. He agreed to introduce the resolution calling for adherence to the several peace treaties and to second and support Hull's economic program. Hull supplemented his "coatroom diplomacy" by seeing to it that the United States delegation avoided the limelight in the public business of the Conference. Of the twelve committees into which the Conference personnel was divided, the United States neither sought nor received a single chairmanship. Conspicuous roles were left to the Latin American statesmen. If the United States had been accused of seeking to dominate earlier Pan American Conferences, no such charge could be laid against it in this one.

Hull's manner was not always soft. On at least two occasions during the Conference his hot Tennessee temper got the better of him, and he burst out angrily.

In one committee meeting, when the United States was accused of acting as a collection agent for the international bankers, "Hull shouted, white and furious, that anyone who accused President Roosevelt of having any untoward relations with international bankers was a deliberate liar and that no nation in the Western Hemisphere need fear any such activities . . . as long as Roosevelt was President."[38]

At another meeting, this time of foreign ministers, concerned with the attempt of the Conference to end the Chaco War, there was apparent danger that the recalcitrance of the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations might bring the Conference to a premature end. Confronted with this danger, Hull related, "I got up and literally shouted, 'If we permit these two countries to break up the conference, after so many far-reaching accords have already been reached, we will become the laughingstock of the world. Let us convene in plenary session tomorrow and notify these two delegations that if they give trouble they will be virtually thrown out of the window. The conference must not be intimidated or bluffed in any such manner.'" Though Hull was warned that his outspoken remarks might have broken up the Conference, the Presidents of Bolivia and Paraguay saved the situation by agreeing to submit the specific point in controversy to a commission.[39]

Of the numerous conventions, resolutions, and declarations adopted by the Montevideo Conference, three were of principal interest. A declaration introduced by Argentina and Chile and unanimously adopted on December 16 pledged the delegations to seek adherence by their respective governments to such of the five peace treaties as they had not already ratified. In his speech supporting the declaration, Hull, after praising "this outstanding service of Dr. Saavedra Lamas," went on to say: "I profoundly believe that the American nations during the coming years will write a chapter of achievement in the advancement of peace that will stand out in world history."[40]

Actually, this declaration proved of little practical importance. Two years after its adoption, Argentina had ratified only its own Anti-War Pact, Bolivia had ratified not one of the five treaties, and the record of several others was spotty. The United States and twelve other republics had ratified all.

Hull's "comprehensive economic resolution," very much as he had drafted it on shipboard, was introduced by him on December 12, supported "magnificently" by Saavedra Lamas, and unanimously approved on December 16, with reservations by several delegations. It committed the governments of the American Republics to negotiations for the lowering of tariff barriers, to the removal of prohibitions and restrictions on international trade, to equality of treatment in commercial policy, and adoption of the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional form. The commitment was to ultimate objectives rather than immediate action, but was to prove helpful in trade negotiations with the Latin American governments after passage of the Trade Agreements Act six months later.[41]

By far the most important of the Montevideo agreements was the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which in its Article 8 declared: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." This principle of nonintervention, obviously aimed at past practices of the United States, had been for years an objective of the Latin American governments. In a milder form, limited in application to "internal affairs," it had been opposed by the United States delegation at the Havana Conference in 1928. But times had changed; interventions were in practice being relinquished; the President had indicated his willingness to surrender the right of intervention in Cuba embodied in the Platt Amendment. Nonintervention was at least implicit in the Argentine Anti-War Pact, which Hull had agreed to sign for the United States. Now he apparently felt no hesitation in accepting Article 8 of the Convention, though in doing so he made a formal statement, which was appended to the Convention as a reservation by the United States. The gist of this was that American acceptance of Article 8 meant that the United States would scrupulously adhere to the doctrines and policies embodied since March 4 in the relevant pronouncements by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull "and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted." The last phrase left a possible loophole, which, however, proved to be of no practical importance.[42] The United States had definitely surrendered any claim to a right of intervention in the internal *and external* affairs of its neighbors, and this surrender, more than anything else, came to be considered the heart of the Good Neighbor policy.

In excluding intervention in the *external* affairs of an American state, Article 8 had implications of which perhaps no statesman at Montevideo was quite aware. Article 8 could mean, as Professor Samuel F. Bemis has written:

> that if one of the sovereign and equal American republics should negotiate away its independence, no third state could step in to stop it, no matter how much the process might endanger the security of the third state. . . . What if a non-American power by infiltration and fifth column tactics should secure control of the external affairs of an American republic and turn it inside out? . . . At Montevideo such questions did not seem immediate. Nobody asked them. . . . The phrase fifth column did not yet exist. The delegates, including those of the United States, were interested first and foremost in closing the door against further interventions by the "Colossus of the North." They did not think of the non-American implications of the revised article on nonintervention. . . .[43]

Saavedra Lamas, in his closing speech at Montevideo, had hailed the "spectacle . . . of the eminent

Secretary of State of the United States, standing up and offering the co-operation of his country to the representatives of the League of Nations."[44] He referred to Hull's recognition of a commission of the League of Nations as the most appropriate body to undertake a settlement of the Chaco War, since "the League Covenant was the only peace instrument that both Paraguay and Bolivia had signed." The Conference or the individual delegations, Hull reasoned, could best serve the cause of peace in the Gran Chaco by assisting the League commission. Hull's position was significant as evidence that United States official distrust of the League had so far declined that there was no hesitation in welcoming its efforts to settle what was a wholly American controversy. This new attitude, already foreshadowed under Hoover and Stimson, had been exemplified when, in March, 1933, Roosevelt and Hull accepted an invitation from the League to co-operate with it in settling what was known as the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru. The Leticia dispute was settled by League endeavors without recourse to war.[45] The Chaco War, after a brief armistice from December 19, 1933, to January 6, 1934, dragged on until June 14, 1935. The armistice then signed was arranged by a commission of representatives of six American states, including Argentina and the United States, operating technically within the framework of the League of Nations.[46]

Cordell Hull was to attend two more conferences of the American Republics in the next five years, but in the meantime the principle of nonintervention proclaimed at Montevideo was put into practice. The treaty of 1934 with Cuba, abrogating the Platt Amendment, has been mentioned. Still earlier, in August, 1933, an executive agreement with Haiti had provided for the withdrawal of the United States marines during 1934 and removal of various controls over the Haitian Government. What little remained of the "financial protectorate" over Haiti disappeared in 1941. In 1941, also, the General Receivership of Customs in the Dominican Republic, in effect since 1906, was terminated. In March, 1936, a new treaty with Panama replaced the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. The United States dropped its guarantee of Panama's independence and renounced its rights to intervene in Panamanian affairs and to acquire additional lands to meet the needs of the canal. The Senate in this case postponed action on the treaty and approved it in 1939 only when Panama had agreed to certain safeguards for protection of the canal in time of war.[47]

Thus in the first eight years of the Roosevelt Administration the rights of intervention and the financial controls that the United States had long exercised in the Caribbean area were one by one surrendered. Going one step further, the State Department adopted a policy of refusing advice on political matters to the governments of the Central American and Caribbean republics, where such advice had often been given in the past. Interference in the form of advice, the Department now held, created responsibility and might lead to actual intervention. Such interference, therefore, was to be scrupulously avoided.[48].

Secretary Hull's experience at the next two inter-American conferences (Buenos Aires, 1936, and Lima, 1938), while it carried forward the Good Neighbor policy and adapted it to changing world conditions, lacked something of the very gratifying success achieved at Montevideo. The principal difference was in the changed attitude of the government of Argentina, which reverted to its traditional anti-American position. At Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas was no longer the co-operative friend that he had been at Montevideo. Largely as a result of Hull's efforts, he had just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his various activities in behalf of world peace. He had also recently returned from Geneva, after presiding over a session of the League of Nations Assembly. He was now posing as a champion of the League and fought any proposal of the United States which could possibly be considered as inconsistent with the League's peace machinery. His attitude to the United States showed no trace of appreciation of Hull's activity in steering the Peace Prize in his direction.[49] In 1938 Saavedra Lamas was no longer Foreign Minister, but his successor, José María Cantilo (who though not a delegate at Lima, attended the Conference briefly), was equally unco-operative.

The next regular Inter-American Conference after Montevideo was scheduled to meet at Lima, Peru, in 1938. Long before that, however, alarming developments in Europe—the increasing aggressiveness of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the penetration of German and Italian influence and trade into Latin America, the Italo-Ethiopian War—seemed to menace the peace of the New World as well as the Old. President Roosevelt came to feel that measures to guard the Americas against these new perils ought not to be deferred until 1938. Secretary Hull, though at first cool to the suggestion of a special conference,[50] seems at last to have embraced it with enthusiasm. The State Department, therefore, began sounding the other American Republics as to their interest in holding an earlier conference. Responses were favorable —Argentina's with the stipulation that the conference should be held at Buenos Aires—and on January 30, 1936, President Roosevelt proposed officially to the Presidents of the other republics that a special conference—"to determine how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded"—be held at the Argentine capital. Eventually the Argentine Government issued official invitations for a conference to convene in Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936. The ensuing Conference, not one of the regular series, was known as the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.[51]

Again Cordell Hull headed the American delegation and again the delegation was of his own selection. It included Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who had been in charge of the careful preparations for the Conference.[52] The delegation reached Buenos

Aires November 25. In the days prior to the opening of the Conference Hull and his fellow-delegates had an opportunity to note evidences of Axis penetration. "Nazi Germany, in particular," he wrote, "was making intensive efforts to gain an ascendancy among our neighbors, but Italy and Japan were working feverishly as well."[53]

In order to emphasize the importance of the occasion, President Roosevelt made the long sea journey to Buenos Aires and addressed the Conference on the opening day. Pointing to the rise of doctrines of violence and the practice of violence in Europe and elsewhere—Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland, Italy had conquered Ethiopia, civil war had begun in Spain—the President urged that in America democratic governments be strengthened and a united front be maintained, in order that "others who, driven by war madness or land hunger, might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good."[54]

Hull made his first speech to the Conference on December 5. "The primary purpose of this Conference," he told the delegates, "is to banish war from the Western Hemisphere." He then outlined an eight-point program for the prevention of war—a program which he thereafter liked to refer to as "The Eight Pillars of Peace." The program, briefly summarized, comprised: (1) ". . . the responsibility of each nation carefully to educate and organize its people in opposition to war and its underlying causes"; (2) ". . .

frequent conferences between representatives of the nations and intercourse between their peoples"; (3) the consummation of the five peace agreements endorsed at Montevideo; (4) a common neutrality policy if war should come; (5) a liberal commercial policy; (6) restoration of normal relationships between nations; (7) the revitalizing and strengthening of international law; (8) faithful observance of agreements between nations as "the foundation of international order." He concluded his address with the appeal: "In a very real sense, let this continent set the high example of championing the forces of peace, democracy, and civilization."[55]

The principal features of the program prepared for the Conference by the delegation of the United States were embodied in a resolution introduced by Hull on December 7. This provided for the co-ordination of the now famous five peace agreements, for compulsory consultation among the foreign ministers in the event of any threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere and the setting up of a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee for this purpose, and for a common neutrality policy on the part of the American Republics, patterned after the neutrality legislation recently enacted by the United States Congress.[56]

The opposition of Dr. Saavedra Lamas now became apparent—and important. The Argentine Foreign Minister had drafted a new project of his own by which states not members of the League of Nations might co-ordinate their efforts for peace with those of the League. Presumably aware that his plan had no chance of adoption at the Conference, he viewed rival plans with a jealous eye. In this spirit, he objected to several features of Hull's program on the ground that they would conflict with obligations to the League of Nations on the part of states that were members, although Hull had carefully inserted exceptions and reservations to avoid such conflict. He objected especially to the provision for permanent consultative machinery—a rival league, he seemed to think—and for a common neutrality policy. Nothing that Hull could do could restore the friendly relationship of three years before. The final conference of the two men ended in sharp words and continued disagreement. From this occurrence, according to Sumner Welles, dated a "violent antipathy to Argentina" on Hull's part.[57]

Under these circumstances it was necessary for the American delegation to make concessions in order to secure unanimity. After days of argument, and important contributions from the Brazilian and Central American delegations, several significant documents emerged. One was a Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace. It provided that the governments of the American Republics should consult together upon methods of peaceful co-operation, (a) "in the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced," (b) "in the event of war, or a virtual state of war between American States," or (c) "in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics." In the last-named contingency, which under the circumstances was likely to be most important, the consultation should "determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory States, if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent." No machinery for consultation was specified, and this very mild agreement for collective security was further weakened by the words "if they so desire" in the last sentence. The Argentines, wrote Hull, "were able to emasculate this resolution by inserting four words."[58]

A Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation listed certain principles (nonintervention being one) as "accepted by the international American community." Its most important feature, however, was the declaration: "That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them [the American nations], and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation," as provided for in the Convention previously described. It is this paragraph of the Declaration that has given rise to the statement that the Buenos Aires Conference "continentalized" the Monroe Doctrine. Under its provisions, such European interference as President Monroe feared in 1823 would "affect each and every one" of the American Republics, leading to consultation and potentially to common action to prevent or defeat it.[59]

Of numerous other agreements or resolutions adopted by the Conference, one deserves specific mention: an Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. Going a few degrees beyond the Convention of 1933, this document makes known that the signatories "declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the parties."[60] Accepted and ratified without reservation by the United States, this sweeping declaration put the final capstone on the doctrine of non-intervention.

Though Hull had been seriously annoyed at the unco-operative behavior of the Argentine delegation, he had tactful words of praise, in his closing address, for Saavedra Lamas, who, as chairman of the Conference, "has so ably presided over its sessions," and he declared too that the work of the Conference had been "to a fuller extent than ever before in a meeting of the American republics, . . . carried on in a spirit of friendly understanding and mutual confidence." He was equally diplomatic in his account of the Conference in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations in February, 1937. The work of the Conference, he informed the Council, proved that war was nowhere inevitable. "Upon the same basic principles that were implemented at Buenos Aires, the entire world can—and, I hope with all my heart, *will*—build a structure of enduring peace."[61]

Before the Eighth International Conference of American States convened in Lima, Peru, in December, 1938, any prospect for "a structure of enduring peace" had become dim indeed. Japan had renewed her aggression against China and had joined Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact. Germany and Italy, in violation of a European nonintervention agreement, were shamelessly aiding the forces of Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Germany had annexed Austria, and her threats against Czechoslovakia had been appeased in September by the Munich Pact, the first step toward the complete absorption of Czechoslovakia by her hungry neighbors. Though British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain boasted that Munich meant "peace in our time," to Secretary Hull "the Munich agreement seemed only a momentary solution." War in Europe, he feared, lay just around the corner.[62]

With Europe to all appearances hell-bent for war, the foremost challenge to the delegates of the American Republics at Lima was to safeguard the New World against involvement in such a war and against the kind of subversion that was a prelude to it.

> To me [wrote Hull] the danger to the Western Hemisphere was real and imminent. It was not limited to the possibility of a military invasion. It was more acute in its indirect form of propaganda, penetration, organizing political parties, buying some adherents, and blackmailing others. We had seen the method employed with great success in Austria and in the Sudetenland. The same technique was obvious in Latin America.[63]

To combat this dual danger of military aggression and subversion, Secretary Hull took with him to Lima, in his words, "the strongest delegation I had yet taken to a Pan American Conference." Notable among the members was Alfred M. Landon, Roosevelt's unsuccessful Republican competitor in the presidential election of 1936, who brought assurances to the Latin Americans at Lima that Republicans as well as Democrats supported the Good Neighbor policy.[64]

It was Hull's hope that the American Republics would present a united front to perils from overseas. The chief obstacle to such an achievement was the new Argentine Foreign Minister, José María Cantilo. He had recently returned from serving as Argentine Ambassador in Rome, where, in the spring of 1938, he had advised postponing the Lima Conference for a year or two. He was known to favor close ties with Europe and to oppose the United States aim of presenting a united American front to European aggressors. It was significant that, though not a delegate, he came to Peru in a new Argentine cruiser of Italian construction. After delivering a speech at the opening session of the Conference, and instructing his delegation to agree to nothing without his consent, he secluded himself in a distant Chilean summer resort, where the delegation could not reach him by telephone.[65]

On some items of business the Conference operated harmoniously. It adopted unanimously two resolutions plainly aimed at activities of Germany and Italy. One condemned racial and religious bigotry and intolerance, wherever practiced. The other condemned the collective political activity of alien groups in the Western Hemisphere.[66] A Declaration of American Principles, prepared by Brazil and likewise unanimously adopted on December 24, was essentially a restatement of the principles of international conduct which Cordell Hull had set forth in his "Eight Pillars of Peace" and in other public statements.[67] The disagreement between the United States and Argentina arose over the American proposal of a declaration pledging the American Republics to resist any direct or indirect threat from any non-American state and providing for regular or special meetings of Foreign Ministers to serve as the organ of consultation for the co-ordination of such resistance. Cantilo had also prepared a declaration which, however, not only omitted any specific provision for consultation, but was so phrased as to suggest that the United States, as well as a non-American power, might be the source of the expected threat. Such phrasing would obviously destroy the united front impression which Hull thought of prime importance.

Since José María Cantilo had disappeared into the Chilean wilds, leaving his delegation with no freedom of maneuver, the Conference found itself for several days deadlocked over this issue. At length Hull, by telephoning the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires, appealed directly to President Ortiz of Argentina, a personal friend. Ortiz was able to reach Cantilo and to persuade him to direct the delegation at Lima to accept a compromise. This was embodied in a Declaration of the Principles of the Solidarity of

America, usually known simply as the Declaration of Lima, unanimously adopted by the Conference on Christmas Eve, 1938.

The Declaration of Lima, in a long preamble, reaffirmed the "spiritual unity" of the peoples of America and their devotion to common principles. These principles, the American governments declared, they would defend "against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them." In the event of threats to the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American republic, the governments proclaimed "their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, co-ordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation." For this purpose the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics would meet "when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, . . . in their several capitals by rotation . . ."[68]

That this document had the form of a declaration rather than a treaty was almost certainly an advantage. As a treaty, it is safe to say that Argentina, the prize nonratifier, would not have ratified it, and ratification by several other republics would have been doubtful. As a declaration, it spoke for all twenty-one signatory powers without the need of ratification. Thus it had the great moral advantage of unanimity, always a major objective of Cordell Hull in these conferences. That the unanimity had been attained through concessions to the Argentine position did not trouble Hull, whose interposition with President Ortiz had forced important concessions from Cantilo. The

Declaration of Lima, Hull maintained, "was far closer to my original draft than it was to the Argentine original draft."[69]

Viewed pragmatically, the Declaration of Lima, together with the spirit that lay behind it and the Good Neighbor policy that produced the spirit, served the purposes of the United States admirably when war came to Europe in 1939 and to America two years later. The conferences of Foreign Ministers called under the provisions of the Declaration brought into practical operation that united front at which Hull had aimed—always, it must be admitted, with troublesome deviation on the part of Argentina.[70]

For this fortunate situation, however, by no means all the credit is due to Cordell Hull nor to Hull and Roosevelt together. Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary from 1933 to 1937 and Under Secretary thereafter, carried most of the load of day-to-day negotiation with the Latin American governments. After a false start in the Cuban crisis, he had become a firm convert to the nonintervention policy and had won the confidence and admiration of the Latin American diplomats in Washington. He was ably seconded by Laurence Duggan, chief of the Department's Division of Latin American Affairs.[71]

Indeed, Hull was narrowly prevented from taking steps, in the months before Lima, which might well have thrown the whole Good Neighbor policy out of gear. A controversy with President Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico reached a peak on March 18, 1938, when the Mexican Government expropriated the properties of the principal American and British oil companies in Mexico. While admitting the right of expropriation, both Hull and Welles were disposed to demand prompt compensation in terms that Mexico could not possibly have met. A peremptory note from Hull of March 26 was withheld from official presentation by United States Ambassador Josephus Daniels, who wisely preferred a more patient approach. Had Daniels carried out his instructions to present the note, Mexico would in all probability have broken off diplomatic relations, as it did upon receipt of a similarly harsh note from Great Britain.[72]

A few months later, while the oil controversy still simmered, the Secretary became involved in an argumentative and well publicized correspondence with the Mexican Ambassador over compensation for expropriated agricultural lands. Here again Josephus Daniels intervened, urging the President to stop the "further exchange of notes for the public, which get us nowhere." Five days later, Hull proposed to Ambassador Castillo Nájera that they should discontinue note-writing and continue the discussion in private talks. These went on in a more friendly atmosphere, and early in November the two governments agreed to submit the agrarian claims to a mixed commission, as Mexico had proposed. That the United States and Mexico could go to Lima on terms of cordiality was thus due in large part to the tempering of Hull's legalistic approach to the expropriation issue, by the efforts of Josephus Daniels in Mexico City, backed by Laurence Duggan in the State Department and presumably by the President. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau had also helped by refusing to carry out the stern economic reprisals against Mexico desired by the State Department.[73]

The Good Neighbor policy passed through its first serious crisis between March and November, 1938. In the same period it took the first step in transformation from simply a policy "opposed to armed intervention" to one that relinquished traditional forms of nonmilitary pressure for the protection of United States economic interests in Latin America. The further story of that transformation is reserved for a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: CONGRESS CHOOSES NEUTRALISM

In Cordell Hull's *Memoirs,* the first chapter dealing with his diplomacy as Secretary of State tells of the futile attempts at limitation of armaments. The second, entitled "Germany Equals Trouble," describes his initial difficulties with the troublesome government of Adolf Hitler, whose inauguration as Chancellor had preceded by a few weeks that of Franklin Roosevelt as President. Apart from Germany's role in disrupting the Disarmament Conference, the chief sources of friction in Hull's first two years were three: the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazis and the resulting boycotts of German goods by American Jews and their sympathizers; mistreatment of American tourists in Germany, usually for their refusal to give the Nazi salute; partial repudiation by the German Government of its financial obligations in the United States. Back of these specific grievances lay the wholly undependable character and the unashamedly aggressive purposes of the top ranks of German officialdom. Of these characteristics of the Nazi high command Hull received clear warning in June of 1933 from George Messersmith, the able United States Consul General in Berlin.[1]

Though acknowledging that the treatment of German Jews was "an internal problem within Germany," Hull asked the Embassy in Berlin, in March, 1933, for a full report on that aspect of Germany policy, and on May 3 called in the German Ambassador, Dr. Hans Luther, to apprise him of the flood of protests against German mistreatment of the Jews which was pouring into the White House and the State Department from "Americans of all religions and races." Not wishing to make a formal protest to the German Government, Hull expressed to Luther a desire "to encourage a return to normal conditions." Surprisingly, the Ambassador assured Hull that the worst of the Jewish troubles was over, that Jewish rights and property were receiving increasing protection, and that normal conditions would soon be restored.[2]

This forecast, whether Dr. Luther really believed it or not, was of course soon belied by the fact of continuing persecution. American Jews and others responded with boycotts of German goods, bringing protests from the German Embassy in Washington. When Dr. Luther called at the Department, September 21, 1933, to make such a protest, Hull informed him of the "bitter criticism" endured by the State Department for its official silence about Germany's "internal Jewish policies," and warned him that when Congress should meet in January there would probably be a "flood of denunciation of the German Government and nationals" unless the persecutions ceased. "If the German Government will bring about a cessation of this treatment of the Jews," he promised, "it will then be possible to check boycotting and similar incidents in the United States."[3]

On an August day in 1933, Dr. Daniel A. Mulvihill, an American medical specialist working in Berlin, was knocked unconscious when he failed to salute a passing parade of Storm Troopers. A strong protest from Consul General Messersmith resulted eventually in the imprisonment of the attacker and an apology to Ambassador William E. Dodd by the group leader of the Storm Troops. A few days later, however, two similar assaults were reported, one of the victims being a young son of the radio commentator, H. V. Kaltenborn. Mr. Hull authorized Dodd and Messersmith "to go to the mat for these cases" and summoned the German chargé in Washington, Rudolph Leitner, to meet him at the Department. Discussing the case with Pierrepont Moffat before Leitner's call, the Secretary raised the question whether it would be advisable to hint that the United States might have to issue a general warning that Americans traveling in Germany would do so at their own risk. Moffat thought not. Instead of leaving the matter to the Consul General as heretofore, "now we were firing a double-barrelled shot simultaneously through our Ambassador in Berlin and through the Secretary of State here." Moffat thought that "was sufficient for the moment and that we should reserve some ammunition for future use if needed."[4]

Moffat thought that the Secretary agreed, but in his oral complaint to Leitner over the assaults on Americans in Germany, Hull gave the hint anyway, concluding the conversation with the remark: "I am seeking to keep a hundred miles away from an emergency that would cause my Government to feel obliged to warn all Americans to stay out of Germany. The hint evidently made some impression in Berlin, for when Dodd discussed the matter a few days later with Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath, the latter remarked "that he appreciated the gravity of the matter, especially if the State Department contemplated an announcement that it was unsafe for Americans to visit Germany." Von Neurath assured Dodd that he had discussed the matter with Goering and Hitler and that both agreed that the law must be more strictly enforced. He believed there would be no more trouble. Dodd remained justifiably skeptical.[5]

The financial controversy with Nazi Germany, like that over Jewish policy, confronted Hull in the early days of his Secretaryship. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank, came to Washington early in May, 1933, for discussions preparatory to the London Economic Conference. On May 6 he talked with the President. Two days later he suddenly "announced that his Government would cease payments abroad on Germany's external debts, . . . of which nearly $2,000,000,000 were held by Americans." Hull was outraged at what he described as "a bald attempt to involve this Government in so odious an act by Germany." In a conference with Schacht the following day, he complained that by giving ground for suspicion that the Roosevelt Administration had connived at his act of repudiation, the

German had done a thing that was "greatly calculated to check and undermine American efforts to restore domestic business conditions." The President, Hull reported, was "profoundly shocked."[6]

Hull's protest, and negotiations at the London Conference, resulted in a modification of the drastic policy that Schacht had announced, but later in the year the German Government, in Hull's words, "perpetrated one of its numerous colossal frauds. It announced it would pay 50 per cent of the interest on its foreign bonds in cash and 50 per cent in scrip. The scrip could be sold to a German Government-controlled bank for reichsmarks at half its face value. Germany was therefore paying only 75 per cent of the interest payments. The remaining 25 per cent was turned over to German exporters to subsidize exports. Later on, interest was discontinued altogether."[7]

The effect of this partial repudiation was, of course, to depress the value of German bonds on the American market and thus to enable Germany to repurchase them at greatly depreciated prices. "In this way," wrote Hull, "85 to 90 per cent of these bonds were repurchased in America by Germany at great loss to American investors. In devilish fashion the Germans tied in nonpayment of bond interest, depreciation of bond prices, and subsidization of German exports. And at the same time they were able to continue their enormous purchases of material that went into armaments."[8]

To add insult to injury, as it were, Ambassador Dodd reported in June, 1934, that holders of German bonds in certain other countries were to receive more favorable treatment than American holders of similar bonds. Hull cabled Dodd on June 16 to protest to the German Foreign Office "against the summary independent action of Germany in respect to her internal debts" and particularly against any arrangement under which American investors would receive poorer treatment than investors of other countries.[9] Dodd saw Under Secretary of State Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow on June 18 and read him parts of Hull's telegram. Von Bülow denied that there was any discrimination, actual or contemplated, against American bondholders.[10] The reply did not satisfy the State Department, for on July 6 Dodd received further instructions to protest, this time specifically, "against payment of British creditors of Germany, under the Dawes-Young plan, and the announced purpose not to pay American creditors under the same plan."[11]

Dodd, a former professor of American history at the University of Chicago, a dedicated believer in Jeffersonian democracy with a Bryanesque dislike and distrust of "Wall Street," was not happy in this portion of his duties as Ambassador. Apropos of declining a luncheon invitation from a group of business men during a recent visit in New York, he had noted in his diary: "I would not sit down to lunch with a Morgan—except possibly to learn something of his motives and attitudes." In such prejudices he was the antithesis of a predecessor at the Berlin post, Jacob Gould Schurman, who had delighted in hobnobbing with millionaires, whether native or foreign.[12]

Now he was reported, whether accurately or not, as having said to Leon Fraser, president of the Bank for International Settlements, "that he was not in the least interested in securing relief for the American holders of Dawes-Young securities," not realizing, as Under Secretary William Phillips complained, that the holders of those securities were "in a large measure innocent Americans scattered throughout the country."[13]

Upon receiving Hull's latest instruction on July 6, Dodd remarked that he had already protested three times about the discriminations, but that protests were useless because, as he wrote, "German exports to the United States are only one-fourth of American exports to Germany. While debts are valid and interest is due, German balances are utterly unequal to the payment of obligations."[14] Nevertheless, he promptly called on Von Neurath and gave him Hull's telegram, but without pressing the matter because, as he again confided to his diary, both he and Von Neurath knew that Germany could not really pay even the British debt, much less the American.[15] A further telegram from Hull two days later Dodd excused on the ground that the American public did not understand debt problems and the Secretary, who did, felt "compelled to keep prodding Berlin foreign officials" in order to satisfy the public. Dodd would try again next day, but, he observed bluntly, "I see no way out except a frank moratorium."[16]

Ambassador Dodd's failure to present the American demands "in a forcible manner" was of serious concern to the State Department. Information reached the Department through the House of Morgan that the German Foreign Office itself had been somewhat surprised at the halfhearted manner in which he had made his latest representations on the matter of the Dawes-Young loans. In consequence, Under Secretary Phillips recorded, July 11, "We decided this afternoon to prepare a very solemn note or aide memoire to the German Government to be presented textually by the Ambassador."[17] True to form, however, when the Ambassador presented the "very solemn note" on July 16, he remained with Von Neurath only ten minutes. "Von Neurath was as concerned as I was," he noted. "I know well Germany cannot pay any of her obligations if conditions continue as now."[18]

But German mistreatment of Jews and of a few non-saluting American students or tourists, and nonpayment of the interest on American-owned German bonds, were matters of less vital concern to the United States than Germany's rearmament and her unconcealed appetite for *Lebensraum* at the expense of her neighbors. Germany wanted peace for the time being, Consul General Messersmith reported in June, 1933, but it was "by no means a peaceful country or one looking forward to a long period of peace." What her leaders desired was "to make Germany the most capable instrument of war that there has ever existed."[19]

As evidence in support of this diagnosis there came, first, Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations and her notorious though not publicized measures of rearmament; then, in March, 1935, Hitler's repudiation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and his announcement that the German army would be expanded to a half-million men; in June, 1935, the naval agreement with England allowing Germany a navy 35 per cent as large as Britain's. Though Ambassador Luther denied to Hull that Germany had designs on Austria, the Polish Corridor, Czechoslovakia, Memel, or other territories to the east, the Secretary was not convinced. "It was therefore clear to me," Hull wrote, describing his attitude probably in the spring of 1935, "that we should on every possible occasion emphasize to our own people and to the democracies of Europe the dangers inherent in this new and terrible Germany, and . . . take all steps possible to show to the German Government our unalterable opposition to all plans of aggrandizement based on force or threat."[20]

The words, considered in historical context, are supremely ironical; for while they unquestionably represented the Secretary's feeling, the course which his country was about to take in 1935 seemed to show an "unalterable opposition" not to "plans of aggrandizement" but to any effective measures by the United States to resist such plans. Congress was about to enact the Neutrality Act of 1935.

It will be recalled that in May, 1933, the Administration had sponsored a resolution which would have empowered the President, in the event of a foreign war, to prohibit the export of arms and ammunition to the belligerent adjudged to be the aggressor. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee amended the resolution to make the arms embargo apply to both belligerents, the State Department ceased to support it, and the resolution died. Secretary Hull had stated, however, that the Administration would later seek passage of the legislation in its original form.[21]

The matter remained dormant for almost a year. At the end of April, 1934, Under Secretary Phillips noted in his diary that the problem of the arms embargo had come up again, with the question of whether to accept the amendment making the embargo applicable to both parties. Phillips understood that the President "was wobbly and inclined to accept the resolution with the amendment; Norman Davis, however, felt strongly against this course and has persuaded the President to let the resolution die in the committee."[22]

The Secretary evidently decided to include the question of an arms embargo in a study of the various problems of neutrality that might arise in the new situation created by the existence of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris.[23] In June the attorney Charles Warren, a former Assistant Attorney General, was asked to undertake a study of the subject, and two months later a memorandum prepared by him was sent to the President at Hyde Park. Soon thereafter a State Department committee consisting of Phillips, Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore, Pierrepont Moffat, and Green Hackworth inaugurated a study based on Warren's memorandum. It was hoped, Phillips noted, September 24, that the legislation would "grant permissive authority to the President rather than trying to make prescribed laws governing certain fixed situations."[24]

The committee labored for several months, using the Warren memorandum, a study prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations, and ideas submitted by Walter Lippmann, Edwin M. Borchard, and others. The committee prepared a series of drafts for proposed legislation. On the question of the applicability of an arms embargo to both belligerents or to one, at the President's discretion, there was evidently divergence of opinion within the committee, for the drafts differ among themselves on this point.[25] For the time being, apparently, the former idea prevailed, for Norman Davis, who, Phillips recorded, January 9, 1935, was "in and out of the office all day," complained that the draft article on arms and ammunition ran contrary to his offer at Geneva that the United States would not interfere with League sanctions against an aggressor. Phillips met this objection by reminding Davis that his offer at Geneva had been contingent upon the achievement of an agreement on disarmament and was not otherwise binding.[26] But Davis still objected, and at his request "and because of unsettled conditions in Europe," as Phillips recorded later, "we decided it was not the time to legislate publicly on neutrality. It would look too much as if we expected a European war."[27]

These reasons were cited by Hull in April in advising the President that the Administration should not as yet commit itself in favor of any specific legislation on the subject. In addition, he remarked that Senate leaders were opposed to raising controversial issues of foreign policy which might delay action on the domestic legislative program. Hull himself disliked the idea of so tying the nation's hands that it could take no action to deter or penalize aggression.[28] There the matter presumably would have rested but for what Hull termed the "fatal conjunction [of] two ill-omened events"—the investigation of the munitions industry by a Senate committee and the approach of the Italo-Ethiopian War.

While the State Department's committee was working quietly on problems of neutrality, a committee of the Senate headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota had been making almost daily headlines with an investigation that began with the munitions industry and moved from there into the general field of United States relations with the European Allies during the First World War.[29] Secretary Hull deplored the whole proceedings, which had been touched off by the appearance of a number of sensational books and articles on the alleged sins of the munitions-makers. It was particularly unfortunate, he thought, that Nye, an isolationist Republican, had been chosen to head the committee. Nye had selected a chief investigator who "was eager to get the committee into the headlines" and a staff some of whom "made a kind of hobby of attacking the big bankers and munitions manufacturers."[30]

The committee's release of reckless charges of bribery and corruption involving officials of other governments in their dealings with American arms manufacturers brought a series of protests to the State Department, especially from certain Latin American governments. Unauthorized release by the committee of the substance of confidential correspondence between the United States and Great Britain and France, and the committee's attempt to pry into the relations of those governments with New York banks during the war years led to heated complaints from the British and French Embassies.

These fireworks began when the committee opened its hearings early in September, 1934. Hull returned to the Department from a vacation on September 11, to be confronted with an array of protests that had already come in from foreign governments. Pierrepont Moffat described his reaction: "It was refreshing to watch oath after oath pour out of his rather saintlike countenance and then to have him smile and say 'It's not more than once every six months that I have to use language like that!' " Hull was particularly disturbed by reports from South America that the committee's airing of charges against public men and governments in that area was "undoing all the good work accomplished at the Montevideo Conference that autumn."[31]

Hull did what he could to mollify the offended governments by transmitting to them a letter from Senator Nye and a statement of his own, disclaiming any intent to give offense to any foreign government or official. It was necessary for the State Department to co-operate with the committee, which had widespread popular support. With indifferent success the Secretary endeavored to secure in turn the co-operation of the committee in preventing unauthorized publication of confidential correspondence with foreign governments. Finally, after a particularly flagrant violation of confidence by the committee, Mr. Hull issued a statement to the press (January 20, 1936), explaining the generally accepted rule covering the publication of confidential documents and indicating that the Department's co-operation with committees of Congress would depend upon the co-operation of the committees in observing the Department's rules.[32]

But the most serious consequence of the Nye Committee's work, in Mr. Hull's eyes, was its contribution to the prevalent isolationist mood of the country. By presenting a distorted conception of American participation in World War I as brought about by the greed of bankers and munitions-makers, the committee added to the existing disillusionment over the results of the "great crusade" and in Hull's words, threw the country "into deepest isolationism at the very moment when our influence was so vitally needed to help ward off the approaching threats of war abroad." It was his opinion that no committee of Congress had ever had a more unfortunate effect than this one on American foreign relations, with the possible exception of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which engineered the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles.[33]

The Nye Committee, while its work certainly prepared the soil for isolationist neutrality legislation, was not actually concerned with that issue until the President unfortunately suggested it. On March 15, 1935, Secretary Hull asked that the President call the members of the committee to the White House and caution them against the public airing of questions that might embarrass the Government in its foreign relations. The President saw the committee on March 19, but instead of reading the Senators the lecture that Hull had suggested, he gave them and their staff the impression that he wished them to prepare legislation on neutrality. As their chief investigator informed the State Department a few days later, "the President had 'pushed' them into it, and now they were 'hot on the trail.' "[34] With understandable bewilderment, William Phillips remarked: "In view of the publicity just made by the Nye Committee that the President had wished this matter on them, it is difficult to know precisely where we stand with respect to our studies and draft legislation."[35]

The joint exertions of the State Department and of Senator Pittman, who claimed jurisdiction for the Foreign Relations Committee, dissuaded Senator Nye and his committee colleagues from attempting to frame neutrality legislation, but the subject had received fresh publicity. Since the preceding December, too, it had been evident that Italy under Mussolini's guidance was preparing to attack Ethiopia. War could not be far off. Several Senators introduced neutrality bills, and by July it was clear to Mr. Hull that it would be better for the State Department to attempt to guide legislation than to resist an inevitable trend.

The Department, therefore, completed a draft of a bill, which gave the President discretion about applying an arms embargo in the event of war and covered such other subjects as the carrying of munitions in American ships, the use of American ports as supply bases, the making of loans to belligerent governments, and travel by Americans on belligerent ships. Approved by the President, the bill was sent to the chairmen of the appropriate Senate and House committees on July 31.[36] When the Senate Committee refused to approve the draft, the State Department prepared another, in the form of a joint resolution, limited in its application to the expected war between Italy and Ethiopia. Authorizing the President, at his discretion, to prohibit export of arms to Italy or to Ethiopia or to both, if they went to war, the resolution would have given the President the right to apply an arms embargo against the belligerent which he might adjudge to be the aggressor.

Senator Pittman, when invited by the White House to sponsor the new resolution, refused. He would introduce the measure if the President so requested; sponsor it he would not.[37] His attitude killed any chance that the Senate might pass the State Department's resolution. The Senator introduced a joint resolution of his own on August 20, and the Senate passed it next day. Pittman's resolution directed the President, upon the outbreak of war between two foreign countries, to proclaim the existence of such war, and prohibited thenceforth the exportation from the United States of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to or for either belligerent. It also forbade American ships to carry such articles from any point to or for a belligerent, and it empowered the President, at his discretion, to warn American citizens that they would travel on belligerent ships only at their own risk. Another section of the resolution provided for the creation of a National Munitions Control Board with the Secretary of State as Chairman. Every person engaged in manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war (in, from, or into the United States) was required to register with the Secretary of State and to obtain a license for every transaction by which such commodities were exported from or imported into the United States.[38]

Section one of this resolution, prescribing an arms embargo applicable to both belligerents, was the inflexible type of legislation that Hull and Roosevelt had both opposed, though the President's opposition had wavered. A meeting of the two with Chairman McReynolds of the House Foreign Affairs Committee revealed no hope of improving the bill in the House, beyond putting a six-month time limit on section one. With this accomplished, the resolution passed the House and on August 24 reached the President for his signature. The whole process had taken just four days.[39]

Should the President sign the joint resolution? In reply to a request for Hull's opinion the Secretary pointed out what he considered the faults of the resolution, particularly the mandatory arms embargo provision. This he considered an invasion of the power of the President to conduct the country's foreign relations, which furthermore "would tend to deprive this Government of a great measure of its influence in promoting and preserving peace." Nevertheless, he advised the President to sign the measure: first, because a veto would provoke a conflict with Congress and might be overridden; second, because it contained one valuable feature in the machinery for regulation of the arms traffic; third, because in the approaching war between maritime Italy and landlocked Ethiopia, an arms embargo against both belligerents "could not but affect the aggressor, Italy, far more adversely than the victim, Ethiopia."

The President signed the joint resolution—thereafter usually known as the First Neutrality Act—on August 31, 1935. In so doing he issued, with minor changes, a statement prepared in the State Department. The resolution, he said, might in some degree support the laudable purpose of the Government and people of the United States to avoid action that might involve the nation in war; but he hoped that the inflexible provisions of section one (the arms embargo) would be reconsidered before the date of its termination, since "history is filled with unforeseeable situations that call for some flexibility of action." Situations might arise, he warned, in which the inflexible provisions of section one could "have exactly the opposite effect from that which is intended. In other words, the inflexible provisions [here followed the President's words, more direct than the Secretary's] might drag us into war instead of keeping us out."[40]

The Neutrality Act became law slightly more than a month before Mussolini, after long preparation, launched his campaign for the conquest of Ethiopia. The invasion began October 3, 1935. There was no declaration of war; Italy, a signatory of the Pact of Paris, had renounced war as an instrument of national policy!

The State Department had done what it could through the invocation of moral principles to dissuade Italy from the proposed aggression.[41] From the time of Emperor Haile Selassie's appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in December, 1934, however, the Department made it clear that it considered the problem primarily one for the League to handle. Thus it sidestepped suggestions of United States mediation between the opponents and repelled proposals that the Pact of Paris be invoked, on the ground that such action would appear to encroach upon the functions of the League. But in statement after statement Secretary Hull sought to drive home the idea that "a war started anywhere would be awfully dangerous to everybody" ("peace is indivisible," as Maxim Litvinov was fond of saying), and to emphasize the solemn obligation of treaty commitments. When Emperor Haile Selassie suddenly granted an oil concession to a subsidiary of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, with the obvious intent of giving the United States an economic stake in the independence of the Ethiopian Empire, the State Department secured a prompt renunciation of the grant by the company, thus cleaning its slate of any implication of improper motives.

But while keeping the decks clear for League action, Hull was careful to avoid any appearance of being led by the League. On September 16 he conferred with State Department subordinates on what should be done if the League should impose sanctions and invite the United States to co-operate. "I took the position," wrote Hull, "that we should define our position relative to trade with Italy prior to any action by the League, in order to avoid accusations by the isolationist elements that we were following the League." United States Ambassadors and Ministers in Europe were directed to discourage any suggestion for discussion of possible sanctions between the League or its members and the United States. "I was anxious that some action should be taken by the United States to hamper the forthcoming aggressor, Italy," he wrote, "but it had to be taken on our own and not in conjunction with the League or treading in the League's footsteps."[42]

To a considerable extent, the United States had defined what its policy toward the belligerents would be before the war began. On September 27, Hull informed the British Government, through Ambassador Robert Bingham in London, that the Johnson Act of 1934 prohibited private credits to Italy as a defaulter on her war debt and that the Neutrality

Act would require an arms embargo against both belligerents. In addition, the Government would not approve credits through the Export-Import Bank for export of goods to Italy, and private banking institutions were restricting credits to Italian borrowers. These measures were not "sanctions," but sanctions would surely have included such measures.[43]

When Italian armies crossed the Ethiopian border on October 3, 1935, President Roosevelt was vacationing on the cruiser *Houston* in the Gulf of Mexico. Before sailing he had taken the precaution of signing an undated proclamation which when issued would put into effect the arms embargo against both belligerents. It remained to be determined when the proclamation should be issued. Ambassador Breckinridge Long, in Rome, advised that the United States state its position before the League of Nations acted. Minister Hugh Wilson in Geneva, on the other hand, advised that the United States not take the lead in recognizing the undeclared war but await action by the League of Nations, which was expected Monday, October 7. Wilson feared that a recognition of a state of war and a proclamation of neutrality by the United States before the League acted might encourage some League members to take a neutral position, thus hampering collective action. Discussion in the Department revealed a cleavage there also with Walton Moore and Joseph C. Green for immediate issuance of the proclamation and Phillips against. Phillips, apparently misinterpreting the Secretary's silence, thought he too was opposed. In reality, he felt strongly that the United States should act without waiting for the League, since to follow the League's lead "would provide deadly ammunition for the isolationists." Nevertheless, in view of Wilson's recommendation, he inquired of the President whether in his judgment "we might not well delay the embargo declaration until probably not later than Monday afternoon." The President, however, irritated at what he regarded as shillyshallying by the State Department, gave orders that the proclamation be issued at once, "in view," as he said, "of the undoubted state of war and without waiting for League action."[44]

The embargo proclamation, therefore, was issued on Saturday, October 5, and with it, over the President's signature, a statement prepared in the State Department, warning "that any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk."[45] On one point the President overruled both Hull and Phillips. The President had proposed warning Americans against traveling on belligerent ships—actually on Italian ships, since Ethiopia had none. Phillips argued against this measure as going beyond neutrality into sanctions against Italy, and Hull wirelessed Roosevelt that such action might subject him to criticism at home and "be regarded by Italy as a gratuitous affront in the nature of sanctions." The President replied that travel by American citizens on Italian ships might give rise to some incident that would violate the spirit of the arms embargo, and also that such travel would give financial aid to Italy, whereas the intent of the Neutrality Act was "to prevent aid to either belligerent." The warning was given, therefore, in a proclamation on the day after the arms embargo.[46]

The denial to Italy of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States and from the states of the League—for the League prescribed a similar embargo for its members, as well as imposing other sanctions[47]—did not greatly hamper Italy's military operation, for Il Duce (as Mussolini was called) had seen to it that Italy was well provided with these commodities before he launched his attack. Italy's shortages were raw materials, processed metals, and oil—particularly oil for her highly mechanized armed forces. The President, in a telegram to the Department of October 11, proposed adding "processed coppers, steel, etc.," to the list of embargoed items, being "mixed up," as Phillips amusedly noted, "as to the difference of the meaning of 'ammunition' and 'munitions of war.' " The Department had to explain that the embargo under the Neutrality Act dealt with ammunition, not munitions, and that the items the President had in mind, and oil too, were not ammunition.[48]

Out of this situation—the need to curtail the export to Italy of essential war materials which the President had no legal authority to forbid—came the so-called "moral embargo." On October 30 both the President and the Secretary of State issued appeals to the American people to forgo commerce with the belligerents, and its profits, in the interest of not prolonging the war. Again anticipating the League, whose sanctions against Italy were to become effective November 18, the Secretary issued on the fifteenth a statement much stronger and more specific than the appeals of October 30. The statement called attention to a considerable increase in the exportation "for war purposes" of such commodities as oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron and scrap steel, which were "essential war materials, although not actually 'arms, ammunition, and implements of war'. . . . This class of trade," the statement continued, "is directly contrary to the policy of this Government as announced in official statements of the President and the Secretary of State, as it is also contrary to the general spirit of the recent Neutrality Act." Subsequently Hull made it clear that the statement was not intended to shut off all trade with the belligerents in the commodities listed, but only trade in excess of that of normal years.[49]

The statement of November 15 brought protests from the Italian Government. Ambassador Long reported from Rome on November 18 that that Government was interpreting the American neutrality measures as putting the United States in the category of the nations applying sanctions against Italy. Hull thereupon cabled the Ambassador "an exposition of our policy," denying that the steps taken could in any sense be considered as sanctions. They had been taken independently and on our own initiative without any agreement with other governments and were clearly in accordance with the spirit of the Neutrality Act.[50]

On November 22 the Italian Ambassador, Augusto Rosso, made the first of several calls upon the Secretary to complain of the restrictions upon commerce with Italy, which he maintained were in conflict with the terms of the commercial treaty of 1871. The arms embargo, he said, was "bound to assume the meaning of a 'sanction' and therefore the positive character of an unfriendly act."

In his reply to the Ambassador, with whom he was personally on friendly terms, the Secretary pulled no punches. In answer to the complaint of treaty violation, he charged that Italy had violated three or four treaties in attacking Ethiopia, and upheld the right of the United States under international law to protect its neutrality in such manner as it saw fit. He denied that the neutrality policy discriminated against Italy, but at the same time he emphasized the indignation of the American people at the war policy of the Italian Government and at the expenditure for purposes of aggression of sums that might have been used to pay the Italian debt to the United States.[51]

Hull's long denunciation of Italian policy and defense of the United States, of which only a suggestion can be given here, impressed William Phillips as "a marvelous presentation of our case . . . the best thing that the Secretary has ever done." From Warm Springs the President wrote: "That memorandum of your conversation with the Italian Ambassador . . . is a classic. You did a splendid job of making our position clear and, at the same time, pointing out the very untenable position in which Italy has deliberately placed herself." And from Berlin, Ambassador Dodd cabled: "I only wish that all the peoples of Europe could read it . . . What the Secretary said is unanswerable from the Italian side."[52]

While defending the neutrality policy of the United States against Italian complaints that it was in reality unneutral and sanctionist in character, the Secretary found it also necessary to protect his rear against the isolationists at home. For this purpose he had scrupulously to avoid any appearance of being guided by the League of Nations or co-operating with it. He had, as has been seen, preceded the League in recognizing the war and in announcing the moral embargo. Another necessary precaution was to head off any invitation from the League to nonmember nations to co-operate in sanctions. Such an invitation the United States would have to refuse, and in so doing would seem to throw cold water on the League's endeavors, an appearance that Hull was anxious to avoid. He was careful, therefore, to keep the Council informed, through the Minister in Switzerland and the Consul General in Geneva, of just what steps the United States was taking independently. When the League, nevertheless, transmitted to nonmember states the League documents on the Italo-Ethiopian dispute with an invitation for comments, the State Department prepared a reply which Under Secretary Phillips described as being "as tough a document as I have ever had anything to do with because we are so hampered by the Act of Congress providing strict neutrality."[53]

Transmitted to Geneva on October 26, 1935, the document expressed a "sympathetic interest" in the efforts of other nations to preserve peace and to shorten and localize war; but it recounted in a tone of self-satisfaction the steps that the United States had taken and in summary remarked: "The course thus pursued in advance of action by other Governments, most of which are parties to one or more of the peace pacts to which I have referred, represents the independent and affirmative policy of the Government of the United States and indicates its purpose not to be drawn into the war and its desire not to contribute to a prolongation of the war."[54]

Of similar tone were Hull's repeated reminders that the League had omitted oil from its embargo list while the United States had placed it under moral embargo, and his refusal to make any commitment to the League or its members as to what the future oil policy of the United States would be if the League did or did not institute an oil embargo. The United States must pursue its policy independently, free from agreements or understandings with the League of Nations or its members.[55]

The efforts of the League to frustrate Italian aggression suffered a setback with the publication in December of the agreement of the British Foreign Secretary and French Premier, Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre

Laval, on a proposal for "compromise" which would have given Italy most of what Mussolini desired in Ethiopia. British indignation forced the resignation of Hoare and brought Anthony Eden to the Foreign Office. The prospect of more vigorous sanctions, including a possible embargo on oil, ended when Hitler's legions reoccupied the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. The French, at least, feared to pursue a course against Italy which might drive Il Duce into the arms of Der Führer. The Italian campaign moved on successfully, and on May 5, 1936, an Italian motorized column entered Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. Four days later Mussolini proclaimed the annexation of all Ethiopia to the Italian Empire. On June 20, President Roosevelt, announcing that a state of war no longer existed, removed the arms embargo and the warning to Americans to avoid traveling on ships of the belligerents. The moral embargo was also terminated. In July the League Assembly voted an end of the sanctions against Italy.

In the meantime Congress had amended the Neutrality Act of 1935 by a joint resolution of February 29, 1936, the date of expiration of the embargo provisions of the earlier law. Secretary Hull and his advisers in the Department had devised modifications of the original law which would have brought it nearer to their desires. Apparently all except Norman Davis had abandoned hope of permitting the President to discriminate between belligerents in imposing the arms embargo; but it was hoped that he might be given freedom of decision as to whether to apply the embargo at all, and if so when.[56] Hull was particularly anxious to secure for the President discretionary authority to restrict to normal levels the exportation of essential war materials other than arms, ammunition, and implements of war—in other words, to substitute a legal embargo of such commodities for the only partially effective moral embargo.[57]

When Congress began consideration of the matter in January, 1936, there was strong opposition, especially in the Senate, to giving the President any discretion whatever. Fear that the President might use such discretion to co-ordinate the policy of the United States with that of the League, or to involve the country in war, was too strong to be overcome, even by the Secretary of State, who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee six times in two weeks. Congress finally cast aside the bill that the State Department had prepared and passed a joint resolution which extended the life of the existing law to May 1, 1937, with three amendments. One, which the State Department had urged, forbade loans to belligerent governments. The second directed the President, instead of merely empowering him as formerly, to extend the arms embargo to a new belligerent entering an existing war. This would have had the effect of extending the embargo to England if Italy had chosen to go to war with England over sanctions. Certainly this was no way of encouraging vigorous collective action by the League. The third amendment, suggested by President Roosevelt, exempted from the restriction of the act any American republic at war with a non-American state, provided the American republic was not co-operating with another non-American state. One slight change in wording did, perhaps inadvertently on the part of Congress, give the President a bit of discretion which he had not previously enjoyed. The original resolution of 1935 had directed the President to institute the arms embargo "upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign states." The amended resolution substituted the wording, "Whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war," etc. The change made it possible for the President to "turn his blind eye" to the undeclared war in the Far East in 1937.[58]

The President signed the joint resolution, thereafter referred to as the Second Neutrality Act, on February 29, 1936. In a statement given out at the same time, he asked the country to continue to observe the moral embargo. Both the moral embargo and the mandatory legal embargo on arms and the like continued, therefore, till removed by the President, June 20, 1936.

Upon completion of the conquest of Ethiopia, the King of Italy became, to his subjects, King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. The United States refused then and thereafter to recognize the conquest by accepting the change in the sovereign's title. To do so, it seemed to Hull, would be "to condone recourse to arms in violation of treaties." This position on the part of the United States gave rise to a question of protocol when new ambassadors were appointed. When William Phillips was named as successor to Breckinridge Long as United States Ambassador in Rome in August, 1936, the Italian Government after some objection agreed to accept his letters of credence addressed to the King of Italy only. Two months later Mussolini sent a new Ambassador, Fulvio Suvich, to Washington. He presented letters of credence from the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, but the President in his official greeting mentioned only the King of Italy. The same procedure was followed two years later when another Italian Ambassador replaced Suvich.[59] Hull tried in vain to dissuade Prime Minister Chamberlain from recognizing Mussolini's conquest in 1938 and concurred reluctantly in Roosevelt's expression of "sympathetic interest" in Chamberlain's accord with Mussolini as "proof of the value of peaceful negotiations." Mr. Hull had accepted the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition and extended it from Eastern Asia to Africa.

The American adherence to the doctrine in the case of Italy had one unfortunate consequence. Ambassador Phillips, under instructions from Washington, arranged with the Italian Government for the abrogation of the out-of-date commercial treaty between Italy and the United States. A new treaty was drawn up, with agreement on all important points except the title of the Italian sovereign. The Italian Foreign Office insisted that he be designated both King and

Emperor. The State Department refused. "Consequently," Phillips wrote, "all our efforts to negotiate a new treaty came to naught because of two or three words in the preamble."[60]

CHAPTER EIGHT

NEUTRALITY AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

A NEW phase in the evolution of the neutrality policy was introduced by the outbreak of civil war in Spain. Hardly had the shooting in Ethiopia ceased when General Francisco Franco on July 17, 1936, launched his rebellion against the republican Government of Spain. The existing neutrality legislation made no provision for civil wars, but the major European governments, under French and British leadership, set a pattern which Mr. Hull was glad to follow. Fearing that intervention by other powers in the Spanish conflict might develop into a general war, the French Government, under Premier Léon Blum, after consultation with the British, proposed to the Governments of Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Russia, Portugal, and other powers that all agree not to furnish aid to either side or to interfere in any way in the civil strife in Spain. These governments and others, twenty-seven in all, accepted the French proposal, and early in September an International Nonintervention Committee was set up in London to supervise execution of the agreement.[1]

This organized system of nonintervention was a wholly European affair; the United States had no part in it. But Secretary Hull not only approved its purpose and proposals; he saw in the noninterference policy recently adopted by the American Republics at Montevideo a general principle which the United

States might properly apply in the case of Spain. After consultation within the State Department, Hull cabled to the American Embassy and consulates in Spain, August 7, and published four days later, a statement of United States policy. Pointing out that the Neutrality Act did not apply in a case of civil war, the statement announced that the United States Government would nevertheless "scrupulously refrain from any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation. We believe," the statement continued, "that American citizens, both at home and abroad, are patriotically observing this well-recognized American policy."[2]

Thus a "moral embargo" was instituted against both parties to the war in Spain. Manufacturers of airplanes and other arms or implements of war were informed, upon inquiring at the State Department, that sale of their products to either side in Spain "would not follow the spirit of the Government's policy." American policy to Spain, Hull records, "was now clear and public. Once stated, it had this added importance that it could not be changed without serious political controversy on this side and without grave embarrassment to the European nations, particularly Britain and France, to whom it was welcome as being in conformity with their own policy of nonintervention." The policy appears at first to have won wide acceptance in the United States, pleasing isolationists because it kept the United States aloof from the conflict, and internationalists because it meant co-operation with France and England.[3]

The moral embargo seems to have been very generally observed until December, 1936. While Hull was returning from the Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires, he was informed that several American firms had applied to the State Department for licenses to export airplanes and arms to Spain for the legitimate, or, as it came to be called, Loyalist Government. Since there was no legal authority to refuse such licenses, the first one was issued on December 28. At his press conference next day the President denounced the exporter's action as "thoroughly legal but unpatriotic" and stated that he had approved plans of congressional leaders for legislation to make the Neutrality Act applicable to the situation in Spain. He specifically requested such legislation in his message on January 6, 1937, to the new session of Congress.[4]

With extraordinary speed and with unanimity in the Senate and a single dissenting vote in the House, Congress passed on the same day (January 6, 1937) a joint resolution specifically prohibiting the exportation of "arms, ammunition, or implements of war" to Spain directly or indirectly "or for use of either of the opposing forces in Spain." The President signed the resolution January 8, too late to prevent the departure from New York of the Spanish steamer *Mar Cantábrico* with a cargo of planes consigned to the Loyalist Government. Unfortunately for the Loyalists, ship and planes were captured by the Franco forces.[5]

Thus the moral embargo was transformed into a legal embargo, upon the recommendation of the President, with the full approval of the absent Secretary of State, and with a virtually unanimous vote in Congress. When, within a few months, it became apparent that European noninterference was a fiction, that Italy and Germany were giving substantial aid to Franco, there was a growing demand in liberal circles in the United States for repeal of the embargo so as to permit the Loyalist Government of Spain to purchase military supplies in the United States. Certainly it was not in the interest of the United States that a fascist government, headed by a protégé of Hitler and Mussolini, should come into power in Spain. The President himself eventually came to consider that the policy was a mistaken one. Sumner Welles, in a book published in 1944, expressed the opinion that there had been "no more cardinal error than the policy adopted during the civil war in Spain." Quite erroneously, he implied that the embargo resolution had been prepared during the President's absence at the Buenos Aires Conference and sprung on him upon his return, and that he signed it reluctantly and with "deep disquiet." Welles placed the blame on certain pressure groups, pacifist and Roman Catholic, aided by "the official spokesman of the Department of State." These words evidently referred to Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore, who was Acting Secretary during the absence of Hull and Welles at Buenos Aires. He was, incidentally, a rival of Welles for the post of Under Secretary, vacant since Phillips' appointment as Ambassador to Italy.[6]

In reality, the President had returned from Buenos

Aires on December 15, nearly two weeks before the first license for export of planes to Spain was issued, was in consultation with the leaders in House and Senate, and, as we have seen, strongly recommended the embargo. His belief that it was a mistake came later, as quite possibly did also that of Sumner Welles. Welles was in Buenos Aires or en route home when the embargo issue came to a head and very likely was not consulted about it. No evidence of his having disapproved of it at the time has been discovered.[7]

Probably because of much criticism of his Spanish policy in its later phases, Hull was at considerable pains to defend it in writing his *Memoirs*.[8] Asserting that he and the President "were in complete agreement on our policy of nonintervention in Spain throughout the war," he gave three reasons for their stand. First, at a time when twenty-seven nations of Europe, under the leadership of England and France, "had solemnly agreed not to intervene in Spain by sending arms or men to one side or the other, it would have been unthinkable for the United States to take a contrary course." Secondly, the United States was in sympathy with the purpose of the Nonintervention Committee, to prevent the spread of the conflict. As long as the British and French leaders believed that their policy, however defective in practice, contributed to that end, the United States was unwilling to embarrass them by permitting a free flow of arms to Spain. Thirdly, the Secretary and the President believed that nonintervention in Spain, in keeping with the neutrality policy in general, helped to safeguard the peace and security of the United States.

On this last point, which is really the crucial one if the Spanish policy is to be justified as a part of the neutrality policy, Hull's reasoning is not convincing. He argued that authorizing the export of arms to Spain would have necessitated taking steps to see that they were delivered by "sending a cruiser or two along with our shipments." This might have involved us in hostilities with Germany and Italy, and "we might well have plunged into the Spanish War before we realized it." It seems obvious that a mere opening of the American arms market to the Spanish Government would not have obligated the United States to guarantee the delivery of the purchases. Such obligation had not customarily, if ever, been assumed by neutral governments which permitted sales of contraband to belligerents in either international or civil wars. Indeed, the proposal in the spring of 1938 to permit the sale of arms to the Loyalist Government prohibited their being conveyed in American ships.[9]

This aspect of the question leads to another complaint against Hull's Spanish policy, a complaint voiced by American critics as well as by the Spanish Ambassador, Fernando de los Ríos. The latter reminded Hull on a number of occasions that in its relations with Latin American countries the United States had followed the practice of permitting the export of arms to recognized governments but not to insurgents so long as the latter were not recognized as belligerents. Going further, he contended that the refusal to permit the sale of arms to his government was contrary to the Spanish-American commercial treaty of 1902 and also "to a provision of international law recognizing the right of a legitimate government to acquire the means to defend itself."

In reply, Hull did not take up the treaty question, which he reminded de los Ríos had been covered in an interview with him by Assistant Secretary Hugh R. Wilson. On the point of international law, Hull argued forcefully that control of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the United States was a domestic question to be decided by the United States Government alone on the basis of its relation to the fundamental policies of that Government—in this case the avoidance of war and of intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. "This Government," Hull concluded, "does not concur in the thesis that it is obligatory under international law to provide arms to either or both of the parties to a war or a civil conflict." In any event, he commented elsewhere, "the principle of self-defense was over and above any isolated clause of such law," and the United States, "while supporting the general European policy of nonintervention, based its course on the law of self-defense. The question was not which side in Spain was right and which wrong, but the necessity to keep ourselves from being drawn into the war."[10]

To most American critics of Hull's policy, legal questions were of less moment than what those critics considered the American stake in the ideological struggle in Spain. To American liberals and leftists, the Loyalist Government represented democracy; Franco's Nationalists, with their Italian and German support, were the embodiment of fascism. Thus the Civil War in Spain took on the appearance of a microcosm of the world-wide struggle between fascism and democracy. Liberals were not too concerned over the fact that the Sovet Union gave what aid it could to the Loyalists, or that communists exerted a growing influence in the Loyalist Government. Between communism and fascism, communism seemed to them by far the lesser peril. Thus liberals deplored the denial to the Loyalist Government of the right of access to means of self-defense which legitimate governments had normally enjoyed. To most American Catholics, on the other hand, and to spokesmen of ultraconservatism, like the Hearst newspapers, the Loyalists, with their anticlerical and socialistic programs, seemed the embodiment of evil, and the denial of aid to them eminently proper.

To Cordell Hull these issues seemed irrelevant to the determination of American policy. Speaking of Claude G. Bowers, the liberal Democrat who was the United States Ambassador to Spain, Hull wrote that Bowers "felt the United States should make its policies conform with the vital interests of the liberal forces prosecuting one side of the war." In contrast, Hull continued, the State Department "had to pursue a broader course which recognized the grave danger that the Civil War in Spain might erupt into a European war." Elsewhere Hull remarks: "Our policy had nothing to do with our views on the right or the wrong in the Spanish Civil War. We were not judging between the two sides."[11]

After May 1, 1937, the Spanish embargo became a part of the general neutrality policy of the United States. On that date the President signed the Third Neutrality Act, replacing the Act of 1935 as amended in 1936. The State Department had taken little part in the preparation of the new Act, though reminding the committees of Senate and House of its preference for flexibility in the application of embargoes. The Act of 1937, like that of 1936, made the arms embargo mandatory when the President should find that an international war existed. It contained a new provision relating to civil wars. This directed the President to impose an embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to or for parties to civil strife when he should find that such exports "would threaten or endanger the peace of the United States." The embargo provisions were without time limit; they were intended to be permanent. The Act forbade American citizens to travel on belligerent ships instead of merely warning them that they would do so at their own risk. It forbade the arming of American merchant ships trading with belligerents. It contained a "cash and carry" provision, limited to two years, empowering the President, at his discretion, to forbid the export to or for belligerents or parties to a civil war of commodities to be designated by him, other than arms, ammunition, and implements of war, in American ships and until title to such commodities should have been transferred to a foreign government or agency. This feature, first suggested by Bernard Baruch, apparently appealed to the President because in a European war it would favor England and France. In most other respects the Third Neutrality Act was similar to the second.[12]

The President at once issued a proclamation, prepared in the State Department, applying the arms embargo to Spain on the ground, as specified in the new law, that export of arms to Spain "would threaten or endanger the peace of the United States." The exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to or for Spain was now doubly prohibited, since the joint resolution of January 8, 1937, had not been repealed.[13]

From the spring of 1937 to the collapse of the Loyalist Government of Spain nearly two years later, United States policy toward the struggle became increasingly subject to controversy. German and Italian military aid to Franco was so notorious that a demand arose in the United States to apply the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act to Germany and Italy, on the ground that they were actual belligerents. A resolution in this sense was introduced by Senator Nye in March, 1937. Studies and discussions in the State Department led to the conclusion that such action would be illogical, since the Spanish Government itself had not treated Germany and Italy as belligerents; also that it would have little if any effect on the policy of those governments and might even increase the danger of a general war.

Soon, however, the President himself became interested. "It has been our contention," he wrote Hull, June 29, "that war exists if the government armed forces of any nation upon the territory of another nation are engaged in fighting." He wished Hull to ascertain whether Hitler or Mussolini or either of their Governments had made official admission that their armed forces were fighting in Spain. If so, he thought, "we shall have to act under the Neutrality Act."[14]

Inquiries addressed to the American Embassies in Rome and London brought cautionary replies. Bingham in London and Phillips in Rome pointed out that Russia, France, and—according to the Italian contention—England too had at one time or another given aid to the Loyalists. To impose an embargo against Italy and Germany alone would cause keen resentment and might—so Phillips was warned—result in enlarging the area of conflict. Eden told Bingham that so long as the Nonintervention Committee continued to function, war could not technically be said to exist between the Spanish Government and the Governments of Germany and Italy. An embargo now would be premature "and would complicate his task." Hull, who was clearly opposed to the contemplated step, placed the objections before the President, who dropped the idea.[15]

Several of Hull's cabinet colleagues were entirely out of sympathy with his Spanish policy. Notable among them was the "Old Curmudgeon," Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes. Ickes deplored Hull's announcement in Cabinet meeting (March 15, 1937) that he would not issue passports to an American ambulance unit to operate in Spain on the Government side. Passports would be issued, Hull explained, for personnel to work with the International Red Cross, which served both sides. "I have been a great admirer of Secretary Hull's foreign policies," wrote Ickes, "but this makes me ashamed."[16] The refusal to sell munitions to the Loyalist Government he thought would be "one of the black pages in American history." For it to have happened "under a liberal Administration is indeed regrettable." Our policy had been "a direct aid to Franco and his Italian and German allies."[17]

As far as the denial of passports to the ambulance unit was concerned, there was such vigorous criticism from so many quarters that Hull was forced to retreat. On March 20 he announced that passports to Spain would be issued "for physicians, nurses, and necessary attendants of bona fide medical and relief missions."[18]

Another Cabinet member who shared Ickes's sympathy with the Loyalists was the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Anxious to aid the Loyalist Government financially but estopped by the Neutrality Act from making a loan, he got around the obstacle by purchasing 35 million ounces of old silver coins for about 14 million dollars. An agent of Franco laid claim to the silver in the courts. In the action that followed Franco was represented by the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell of New York, in the person of John Foster Dulles, while the Treasury employed Henry L. Stimson as counsel—a former Secretary of State confronting a future one. Stimson remarked in this connection "that he always preferred to support the side with which he could sympathize." The Treasury, with Stimson's aid, won its case, to the advantage of the Spanish Loyalists. The State Department, under its current Secretary, Mr. Morgenthau had found unco-operative.[19]

The spring of 1938 saw a growing demand in liberal circles in the United States for repeal of the arms embargo as it applied to sale of arms to the Spanish Loyalists. Rather surprisingly, the movement found support in such isolationist Senators as Borah of Idaho and Nye of North Dakota. On May 2, Nye introduced a joint resolution authorizing the President to lift the arms embargo against the Loyalists and permit arms to go to them on a cash-and-carry basis.[20] Senator Pittman reported to the State Department on May 3 that "he had rarely seen so powerful a lobby" as that supporting the resolution, and urged that the Department provide him with a statement to be used in his committee the following morning.[21]

The Senator's request led to prolonged discussions in the State Department. The Secretary, Pierrepont Moffat reported, was indignant at the press campaign in support of repeal, particularly at charges that certain of his subordinates—James Dunn, R. Walton Moore, and Green H. Hackworth—had pro-Nazi leanings; but his primary purpose was to prevent a reversal of the philosophy which had saved the United States from being drawn into trouble over Spain. The discussion on May 4 revealed, said Moffat, that "most of us" in the Department were for taking a neutral position on repeal, neither for nor against, but pointing out the reversal in policy involved. The Secretary wanted more time and a fuller reply and was really against repeal, Moffat thought. Moffat's account gives the impression that Mr. Hull and his close advisers were hesitating to stick their necks out in opposition to a powerful movement. It was reported that most Senators would vote for repeal if there were no record vote, and someone had erroneously tipped off the *New York Times* that the President and Secretary of State were really for repeal.[22]

The attacks on the Department reached a climax in Drew Pearson's column of May 6, charging the Department, and particularly "Joe" Green, the armaments expert, with licensing the sale of airplanes and arms to Germany in violation of Secretary Hull's statement in 1933 that the Department would view such sales with disapproval. As Moffat explained the attack, "It is all part and parcel of the Left Wing attempt to force the repeal of the Spanish embargo, one phase of which is the discrediting of subordinates in the Department." At his press conference that day the Secretary "blew up . . . and had a passage at arms with Drew Pearson that those present will not soon forget."[23]

Preparation of the reply to Senator Pittman was delayed by orders from Mr. Roosevelt, at sea on a fishing trip, to await his return before making a decision. The story in the *New York Times* had resulted in stepped-up pressure upon the President by groups opposed to repeal.[24] Meanwhile discussion in the State Department continued amid rumors that the resolution would surely pass, rumors that the President was against it, and intimations that the Foreign Relations Committee would do whatever the President wished. There were consultations with the President upon his return and with certain Senators who desired changes in the draft. On May 10 a copy was sent to the President, who asked that it not be sent to the Senate that day, since he wished to read it in the evening. "Few if any documents," Moffat commented, "are politically as dangerous for the bitterness inspired by this Spanish strife among the Left Wingers on the one hand and the Catholic conservative elements on the other surpasses anything I have seen for years."[25]

With further changes, the reply was sent to Senator Pittman on Thursday, May 12. Then came anticlimax. On the thirteenth Senator Pittman unsealed the letter and handed a copy to each Senator on the committee, whereupon the committee voted 17 to 1 to postpone action indefinitely.[26]

Hull's letter summarized the history of the American policy toward the war in Spain and of the nonintervention position adopted by twenty-seven European nations. It pointed out that the Nye Resolution would lift the embargo as to only one party in Spain.

while leaving it in effect against the other. Even if it treated both parties alike, said the Secretary, "its enactment would still subject us to unnecessary risks we have so far avoided." In view of the continued danger of international conflict inherent in the Spanish situation, and the complications likely to result from "a reversal of our policy of strict non-interference," the Secretary concluded that he "would not feel justified in recommending affirmative action on the Resolution under consideration."[27]

The position adopted by the State Department after much soul-searching had scotched repeal of the Spanish embargo when it seemed on the point of passage. Failure of the Nye Resolution, however, did not end the attempt to get rid of the embargo. The President, whose position in May seems to have been in some doubt, was by the fall of 1938 certainly looking for a path to repeal. Hull remarks that the President, "beset by pressures from all sides and by informal legal opinions from interested parties, began to wonder whether he had authority to lift the embargo on Spain." One such "informal legal opinion" came from Secretary Ickes. Ickes had written the President in May and repeated in November the argument that the Third Neutrality Act had had the effect of repealing the resolution of January 8, 1937, which specifically imposed the embargo on Spain. Therefore, Ickes contended, the President could revoke the embargo which in his discretion he had imposed. With his November letter Ickes enclosed a petition for removal of the embargo from members of the

American Bar Association. A "Lawyers' Conference to Lift the Embargo against Spain" was held in Washington on November 19-20. At a banquet, November 19, former Ambassador William E. Dodd presided, and the speakers included Professor James W. Garner, Lewis Mumford, and Senator Nye. Representatives of the lawyers left at the State Department two petitions with about 380 signatures, with accompanying memoranda, addressed to the President and to members of the Senate and House. One of the petitions argued at length that the President had the power to lift the embargo.[28]

Roosevelt may have been swayed by such forms of pressure. The French and British surrender to Hitler at Munich in September may have increased his reluctance to see a fascist stooge in command of Spain. At any rate, he asked Hull's opinion as to his authority to remove the embargo. Hull replied November 18, enclosing a copy of the unrepealed joint resolution specifically imposing an embargo on shipments of arms to Spain. "This makes it clear, I think," Hull wrote, "that only Congress can change our embargo policy as continued in this Act."[29]

The President evidently accepted Hull's advice, for the next day Pierrepont Moffat reported "a long meeting in the Secretary's office with regard to the possibility of an announcement by the President that he would ask Congress to repeal the Spanish embargo measure in January. The President," Moffat commented, "is clearly anxious to do so." Opinion in the Department was divided, Moore and Hackworth opposed, Dunn inclined to favor, as was Moffat with reservations. "Berle favored an immediate announcement with a view to influencing the course of the Daladier-Chamberlain conference in Paris this week." Under Secretary Welles is not mentioned; apparently he was not present. The Secretary, according to Moffat, "absorbed all the pros and cons and put them before the President with his own recommendation to think them through more carefully before a public commitment." He later told Moffat and Dunn that "he thought the President would move on this very shortly; if so he hoped he would tie his recommendation up with his entire neutrality policy rather than isolating the Spanish phase for separate treatment."[30]

The President did not pursue the idea. Hull does not mention the episode in his *Memoirs*, but the last sentence in Moffat's account is significant, since it shows the question of repeal of the Spanish embargo merging with the broader issue of repeal or modification of the neutrality program as a whole, which was to be pressed by both the President and the Secretary in the following year. The larger subject, in fact, had already been under discussion in the Department at least since October 18.[31]

In reality, the issue of the Spanish embargo was on the eve of becoming one for the historians only. In December the Nationalist forces of General Franco launched a massive offensive which within three months had ended the Civil War. The Loyalist stronghold of Barcelona surrendered on January 26, 1939, and on March 28 Nationalist troops occupied Madrid. On February 27 Great Britain and France had recognized the Nationalist Government.

President Roosevelt told his Cabinet on January 27, 1939, that the Spanish embargo had been a grave mistake, but it was clearly too late to do anything to correct it. The State Department had been discussing the possibility of repeal as late as January 19, but on that date Senator Pittman informed the Secretary that because of a flood of telegrams from both sides, his committee had voted unanimously to drop all consideration of the subject for the time being.[32] At the end of February Ambassador Bowers was recalled "for consultation," actually in order to pave the way for recognition of the victorious Nationalist Government. On April 1 the President by proclamation lifted the arms embargo against Spain and two days later established diplomatic relations with the Government of General Franco, after receiving assurances that American lives and property would be protected.[33]

In retrospect Hull, unlike Roosevelt, believed the policy followed toward Spain had been in the best interests of the United States. It had, as he saw it, in conjunction with the nonintervention policy of England and France, prevented the expansion of the war into a general conflict, and it had preserved and even improved the relations of the United States with Great Britain and France. The triumph of fascist forces in Spain, he maintained, was not the cause of the major war that soon followed. ". . . given all the circumstances of the time," he wrote in 1948, "it was difficult for me then, as it is now, to see how we could have followed any other course."[34]

Two other considerations are worthy of attention. First, it seems unlikely that a mere lifting of the embargo on arms for the Loyalists would have changed the outcome of the war, unless followed up by positive assistance that would in all probability have involved the United States in hostilities with Germany and Italy. Secondly, had the Loyalists won, so potent had the communists, native and Russian, become in their organization by the middle of 1938, that a Loyalist Government would most likely have been a satellite of Moscow.[35] During World War II, at least after June, 1941, such a relationship would no doubt have been to the advantage of the United States and its friends and allies. In the long pull of the cold war, better a Franco Spain than a Communist Spain. A world situation that Hull could not foresee is not admissible as evidence of his wisdom; it is pertinent in assessing the results of his Spanish policy.

CHAPTER NINE

GROWING FRICTION WITH JAPAN, 1933-1937

IN THE Far East, the only substantial difference between the policy of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and that of their predecessors in office was in the attitude to independence for the Philippines. President Hoover and his entire Cabinet had opposed, as premature, legislation for that objective, and Hoover had used the veto in vain to block the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill. When the Philippines legislature rejected the ungenerous terms of that act, a new and slightly more generous measure—the Tydings-McDuffie Bill—was passed by Congress and unhesitatingly signed by the new President, March 24, 1934, with the full approval of his Secretary of State. By its terms the Philippines, after ten years as a self-governing "commonwealth," would become fully independent on July 4, 1946.[1] In spite of this definite withdrawal from the western Pacific, Roosevelt and Hull adopted, with no change other than a temporarily milder tone, the Stimson policy toward Japan and China. During the "interregnum" both Roosevelt and Hull had conferred with Stimson and had assured him that there would be no abandonment of his stand against recognition of Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo.

> As I entered the State Department [wrote Hull later], I had two points on the Far East firmly in

> mind. One was the definite interest the United States had in maintaining the independence of China and in preventing Japan from gaining overlordship of the entire Far East. The other was an equally definite conviction that Japan had no intention whatever of abiding by treaties but would regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the moment.[2]

Manchukuo, therefore, remained unrecognized by the United States and, in accordance with a recommendation of the League of Nations Assembly of February 24, 1933, by most members of the League as well. When the League set up an Advisory Committee on the Far East to keep a finger on the pulse of that feverish area, the United States accepted a nonvoting membership on the committee. As additional gestures which it was hoped might help to deter Japan from further acts of aggression, the President kept the battleship fleet in the Pacific, where it had been since 1932, and announced that the Navy would be built up to the full strength allowed by the treaties of Washington (1922) and London (1930).

During the first year of the new Administration relations with Japan were marked by less acerbity than had prevailed since September, 1931. Having made it clear that it would not recognize the new situation in Manchuria, the United States desisted from protests against it. In May, 1933, the Japanese Ambassador remarked to Hull that Japanese sentiment toward the United States had improved in the last two months, partly because there had been a "quiet period" in the exchange of communications. During the spring of 1933 Hull received calls from Japanese diplomats Yosuke Matsuoka and Viscount Kikujiro Ishii. Matsuoka, fresh from serving notice of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, aroused Hull's well justified distrust. Ishii had come to Washington in preparation for his attendance at the World Economic Conference in London, at which he generally supported Hull's position.[3] In February, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, sent Hull a special good will message. He declared that a "basic principle" in Japan's foreign policy was "to collaborate in peace and harmony with all nations," and that in his belief no question existed between Japan and the United States that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." In reply, Hull expressed his concurrence with Hirota's friendly views but added his hope that satisfactory solutions might be found for questions affecting "all of the countries which have interests in the Far East."[4] On this occasion as later the Secretary refused to be drawn into any discussion of a purely bilateral understanding with Japan on Far Eastern questions.

Within two months after this exchange of cordial messages Japan gave new evidence of her real intentions with regard to China. On April 17, 1934, Eiji Amau, spokesman for the Foreign Office, informed a press conference that because of Japan's "position and mission," she alone had the duty "to keep peace and order in East Asia." Japan objected, he asserted, to "any joint operations, even in the name of technical or financial assistance," such as the League of Nations had proposed for China. She would also object to aid or advice of a military or political nature furnished to China by foreign nations individually.[5] Foreign Minister Hirota declared to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew a few days later that the Amau statement, issued "entirely without his own knowledge or approval," "had given the world a totally wrong impression of the Japanese Government." Japan's policy, he said, was to observe the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty in every respect. Japan had no intention of interfering with China's territorial or administrative integrity or of opposing the "bona fide trade of other countries with China." He acknowledged that it was difficult to maintain this position against the demands of the extremists but assured Grew that his moderate policies had the support of the Emperor and the Minister of War.[6]

Not impressed by Hirota's "watering down" of the Amau statement, Hull warned Hirota on April 28 that the United States had rights and obligations in China under multilateral treaties with Japan and other powers, and that "in the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states." The British Government lodged a like dissent from the Amau statement but irritated Hull by acknowledging that Japan might have some special rights in Manchuria and in parts of China.[7]

About a month after the Amau incident, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Hiroshi Saito, proposed to Hull, as "entirely my private thoughts," an eight-point agreement which would have amounted to recognition of Japanese and American spheres of influence in the western and eastern Pacific respectively and an undertaking on the part of the two governments "so far as lies within their proper and legitimate power to establish a reign of law and order in the regions geographically adjacent to their respective countries." Such an agreement, as Hull saw at once, would have "meant giving our blessing to her [Japan's] sending troops into China and elsewhere." Instead of at once rejecting it, however, he allowed discussion of it to run through several interviews with Saito, in which he lectured the Ambassador at length on the obligation of "highly civilized countries" like the United States and Japan to set an example of responsible international behavior and the avoidance of crises that might lead to war. Remarking upon the growth of weaponry in the past twenty years, such that two thousand bombing planes "carrying explosives infinitely more powerful than any heretofore used, could . . . blow London off the map," Hull warned prophetically: "Only the Lord can begin to visualize the even more startling changes that may take place during the next twenty years." Finally, he told Saito that any special agreement with Japan on political lines would run counter to the American antipathy to political alliances.[8]

Meanwhile, Hull was coming to feel growing concern about another feature of Japan's ambitious course in Eastern Asia—disregard of the Open Door principle by the puppet government of Manchukuo. From time to time throughout 1934 he found reason to protest to Tokyo over discriminations against American business in that area, particularly through the creation of a Manchukuoan oil monopoly. Japan had initially given assurances that the Open Door would be respected in Manchukuo but in April, 1935, the British and American Ambassadors were told by the Foreign Minister that these assurances "had been given on the understanding that 'Manchukuo' would be recognized by other nations and that until the existence of 'Manchukuo' were recognized 'no dispute whatever could be entertained with regard to that country.'" On another occasion Ambassador Grew was informed that since Manchukuo was an independent country, any protests should be addressed to Hsinking, the Manchukuoan capital, "but that if foreign countries claim that Manchuria is still a part of China they should protest to Nanking." In any event, Grew was told, Japan did not consider that the Nine-Power Treaty applied to Manchukuo.[9]

Faced by these evasions, there was little that the Secretary of State could do beyond continuing to write futile notes of protest and moralizing on the virtue of keeping promises. In December, 1934, a new dilemma faced the State Department and the President. On December 29 Japan finally gave the expected notice that she would not renew the naval limitation treaties of 1922 and 1930 when they expired on December 31, 1936.[10] On the 27th came a dispatch from Grew analyzing the situation in Japan and drawing some conclusions as to a proper policy for the United States. The Ambassador warned of the prevalence in Japan of a "swashbuckling temper . . . largely developed by military propaganda, which can lead Japan during the next few years, or in the next few generations, to any extremes unless the sane minds in the Government prove able to cope with it and to restrain the country from national suicide." This ability he doubted. There was a body of liberal thought in Japan, but it was "inarticulate and largely impotent." Hence, he continued, "unless we are prepared to subscribe to a 'Pax Japonica' in the Far East, with all that this movement, as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to entail, we should rapidly build up our navy to treaty strength," and if and when the treaties expired, "we should continue to maintain the present ratio with Japan regardless of cost, a peace-time insurance both to cover and to reduce the risk of war." Only such a determined stand by the United States, Grew believed, could bring Japan to reason.[11]

The United States had now reached what Hull in his *Memoirs* described as "the Oriental crossroads of decision." It might elect "to withdraw gradually, perhaps with dignity, from the Far East," to acquiesce in the nullification of its treaty rights, and to yield to Japan the domination not only of China but of what Japan later termed "Greater East Asia." On the other hand, it might continue to insist on respect for its rights and interests in the Far East "and on observance of the treaties and declarations that guaranteed an independent China and pledged equality to all nations, nonintervention, nonaggression, and peaceful settlement of disputes in the Orient." This second course would necessitate substantial military and naval preparedness, parallel action with other powers, especially Great Britain, having interests similar to ours, friendship and co-operation with China.

> The President and I [Hull relates] chose the second course. As a great and enlightened nation, seeking to uphold and spread the doctrine of world order under law, liberal commercial policy, and other basic principles on which alone the world could live in peace and economic well-being, the United States could choose no other.[12]

The decision to stand firm against a *Pax Japonica* was implicit in the refusal to concede naval parity to Japan in the London negotiations in 1935[13] But for several years it was not otherwise put to a test. After seizing control of Manchuria and the neighboring province of Jehol, the Japanese had halted their military operations in north China by the Tangku truce of May 31, 1933. This agreement between

Japanese and Chinese local commanders established a demilitarized zone in Hopei province, north and east of Peiping and Tientsin and south of the Great Wall. During the next four years the Japanese attempted, with very limited success, to stimulate autonomy movements with a view to setting up puppet governments in five of China's northern provinces. These further attempts against China's territorial integrity did not escape the attention of the State Department. In a statement issued December 5, 1935, Secretary Hull noted that an effort was being made—and being resisted—"to bring about a substantial change in the political status and condition of several of China's northern provinces." Pointing out that such moves were of concern to powers having rights and interests in China, the Secretary in characteristic fashion avowed that the United States always adhered to its treaty obligations and continued "to bespeak respect by all nations for the provisions of treaties solemnly entered into."[14]

Through the year 1936 there were intermittent negotiations between Japanese and Chinese representatives looking to an amicable settlement between the two governments, with indications that Japan might shelve its designs on China's five northern provinces and that China might grant at least *de facto* recognition of the "independence" of Manchukuo.[15] But events toward the end of the year foreshadowed a stiffening of attitudes on both sides. On November 25 Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. Aimed at Russia, not China, it nevertheless tended to safeguard Japan against Russian interference if she resumed her aggressive policy toward China. In December, Chiang Kai-shek, as a consequence of his "kidnapping" at Sian, reached a tacit understanding with the Chinese Communists for a united front against Japan. Though these events seem to have ended any chance of a Sino-Japanese *rapprochement,* the British (who had been urging moderation on the Chinese) continued to hope for a peaceful solution. Neville Chamberlain—a friend of Hull's since the World Economic Conference of 1933—succeeded Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister on May 28, 1937. A few days before, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had sent to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., a long memorandum outlining his conception of Great Britain's problems and hopes in the international sphere and stressing his desire for close co-operation with the United States. In order that England's hand might be free to deal with the menacing situation in Europe, he would welcome a settlement in the Far East and suggested "an exchange of views on the possibility of putting Anglo-American-Japanese relations on a harmonious footing."

The memorandum was referred to the State Department, and the reply, an informal memorandum, formulated after considerable collective thinking in the Department and approved by the President, was handed by the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on June 1. It discouraged any special bilateral or trilateral agreement on the Far East. The Department had, like the British, noticed some signs that seemed to point to a more co-operative course on Japan's part. If there should, however, be a renewal of aggression in that area, the United States would attempt to give suitable protection to its interests there, but in doing so its co-operation with others, like Great Britain, would take the form of parallel action rather than any type of agreement suggesting an alliance. Such was the "traditional policy of this country."[16]

Before Chamberlain's friendly response of July 30 was written, Japanese and Chinese armed forces clashed on July 7 near the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping. They thus touched off the large-scale military operations which the Japanese persisted in calling the "China incident," but which continued without a formal declaration of war until they eventually merged with World War II. For several days there seemed to be a good chance that the fighting might be localized and terminated by an agreement of the commanders on the spot. On July 12, however, Ambassador Grew reported that the Tokyo Government had decided to send reinforcements to the mainland, an ominous sign, since Japan already had more "treaty troops" in the Peiping area than all other foreign powers together.[17] Secretary Hull, meanwhile, in interviews with the Japanese Ambassador and the Counselor of the Chinese Legation, was urging on both parties self-restraint and avoidance of expanded hostilities.[18]

The outbreak of hostilities in China confronted the State Department and the President with two important questions of policy. Should the action of Japan be branded as a violation of Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, which assured respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China? Should the President treat the hostilities as a "war" *de facto* (though neither party had declared war) and so apply the provisions of the Neutrality Act?

The Secretary answered the first question directly and the second by implication in an off-the-record press conference on July 16, 1937. He had, he said, received various inquiries as to whether the government had been asked to invoke the Nine-Power Treaty or other treaties that might be relevant. He explained that information from the scene of hostilities was still so imperfect that it was impossible to be sure to what extent the parties were endeavoring to localize the conflict or what were the chances of success. To invoke the Nine-Power Treaty at a time when both parties were protesting their peaceful purposes would be to discredit "the peaceful professions of either or both parties" and would mean that we had "passed the stage where we could use all our efforts to aid in any such peaceful adjustment as might be feasible and practicable. For these reasons," the Secretary continued, "at the moment we are doing everything and saying everything that we can which is calculated to aid in encouraging a peaceful outcome of the present controversy."[19]

Though the question of applying the Neutrality

Act was not raised in this press conference, the same reasoning was applicable to it. For the United States to label as a "war" hostilities which there was still a chance of localizing and concluding would not only be premature; it might lessen the chances of a peaceful settlement. At a long meeting in the Secretary's office on August 16 of some ten or twelve State Department personnel it was agreed that the President should not be advised to apply the act "unless and until absolutely necessary."[20] As the hostilities broadened out and developed into an undoubted, but still undeclared, war between China and Japan, there was growing pressure from isolationist and pacifist organizations in the United States for application of the Neutrality Act. Such advocates, who feared possible involvement of the United States in the war, could conveniently cite the President's action and words at the time of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia without the formality of a declaration of war. Explaining application of the newly enacted Neutrality Law in that situation, Mr. Roosevelt had said: "We are acting to simplify definitions and facts by calling war 'war' when armed invasion and a resulting killing of human beings takes place."

Why was not the same principle applied in the "China incident"? The basic reason could not be publicly avowed at the time but was admitted by Roosevelt in an off-the-record press conference in April, 1938, and clearly stated by Hull later in his *Memoirs*. Invoking the Act, he remarks, "would have shut off supplies of arms to both Japan and China. Japan did not need them but China did. Invoking the Act would have placed both aggressor and victim on the same footing. Its moral effect on China might have been considerable."[21] Invoking the Neutrality Act in this case, in other words, would have hampered the victim of aggression more than the aggressor; in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict the opposite was true. In each case the President, with the approval of his Secretary of State, made use of the discretion that resulted from the absence of a formal declaration of war. The President did, however, forbid the use of government-owned ships to carry arms, ammunition, or implements of war to either party, and he warned private shipowners that they would engage in such trade at their own risk.[22] "The question of applying the Neutrality Act," he added, "remains . . . on a twenty-four-hour basis."

What could the United States do toward bringing the hostilities in China to an end without seeming to take sides, as it would be regarded as doing if it invoked the Nine-Power Treaty or the Kellogg-Briand Pact? The Secretary was, of course, seizing every occasion to urge peace upon the Japanese and Chinese representatives in Washington. But it evidently occurred to him that it might be possible to mobilize world opinion on the side of peace and thus bring moral pressure upon both the combatants. With this end in view, Mr. Hull, at his press conference on July 16, issued a statement of principles, based chiefly, as he records, on the "Eight Pillars of Peace" program which he had presented at Buenos Aires in

1936, but containing "the fundamental principles of international conduct" that he had proclaimed on various occasions. Because, as he remarked to the reporters on July 16, hostilities anywhere in the world must inevitably affect the interests, rights, or obligations of the United States, he felt it his duty to make "a statement of this Government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern." The statement of principles was as follows:

> This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive bar-

> riers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armaments. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in co-operative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.[23]

The statement, says Hull, was communicated "to all the Governments of the world, with a request that they state their attitude[s] by way of reply." To a newsman who inquired whether the statement did not "have reference to the situation in the Far East," Hull replied that it applied "universally." It is clear, nevertheless, that the Secretary regarded the statement as his main contribution, for the time being, to a settlement of the Far Eastern crisis. The Secretary was worried, Pierrepont Moffat recorded at the end of July, because many critics were attacking him for the failure to invoke the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact against Japan. Unwilling to do this, he felt "that he should be able to show these critics that he has done something. The 'something' consists in his having circulated his statement of July 16 on the eight pillars of peace and asking all countries to express their opinions on the principles involved."[24] The Secretary watched eagerly for the replies, which came in slowly, some, like the British, French, and Canadian, after considerable prodding. All were, of course, favorable—everybody was against sin—the Portuguese reply alone indulging in sarcasm about "the habit of entrusting the solution of grave external problems to vague formulae." The Japanese Government qualified its concurrence in the Secretary's principles by stating its belief that they could be successfully applied in the Far East only "by a full recognition and practical consideration of the actual particular circumstances of that region."[25]

Thirty-seven of the replies were given out for publication on Sunday, August 8, twenty-five more a week later. With the second group Mr. Hull issued a statement, the product of considerable joint effort in the Department. The replies, it was asserted, revealed "a solidarity of attitude and aspiration which should ensure renewed and increased efforts by the governments and peoples of every country in the direction of peace and restored world order. . . . From the standpoint of peace and progress the importance of this program, advancing basic principles of conduct, and of its affirmation, reiteration, confirmation and application, cannot be overestimated." Unfortunately, any impact that the replies and the commentary might have had was largely nullified by the outbreak of violent fighting in the Shanghai area, which relegated Mr. Hull's Eight Pillars to the inside pages of the Sunday papers.[26]

The fighting at Shanghai put a strain on United States policy as well as upon the Secretary of State, whom Moffat, at their croquet game on August 16, found "looking perfectly exhausted."[27] At his press conference next day, Hull had to explain why it had been necessary to order a regiment of marines to Shanghai for the protection of the thousands of American citizens in the city and to request $500,000 for emergency expenses arising in the same connection. The exposition involved giving the background of the unique situation in the great Chinese and international city and explaining the necessity of affording protection to Americans engaged in legitimate activities abroad. Moffat was told by newsmen who attended the conference that it was one of the most impressive that the Secretary had ever had.[28]

In a press release six days later (August 23), Hull referred again to the principles stated on July 16 and emphasized the fact that in his view the issues in the Pacific went "far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States" and involved those fundamental principles of international behavior.[29] The aggressive attitude of Japan had become so obvious that the position of impartiality at first adopted by the State Department was no longer tenable. When Ambassador Grew cabled on August 27, pleading for a continuance of that impartial attitude, Hull replied, September 2, approving the Ambassador's "tactful and dignified approach" in his relations with the Japanese Foreign Office, but making it plain that

American opinion was shocked by the Japanese course and urging Grew to take every opportunity to emphasize the importance that the United States attached to the principles of July 16. He had no desire to injure either China or Japan, said the Secretary, but he did not "intend to permit the United States to be hampered in making its decisions by especial solicitude lest its actions displease one or the other, or both, of the combatants."[30]

On September 5 (three days after the instruction to Grew), addresses to the Japanese Diet by Premier Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Hirota made it clear that, in Hull's words, "Japan was now committed to all-out war."[31] By this time, too, the League of Nations was weighing Chinese appeals for aid, and members of the League were sounding out the United States as to the chances of its co-operation with that body in any measures that it might undertake against Japan. Hull refused to commit the United States in advance, preferring, as he cabled Ambassador Bullitt in Paris (September 3), "to leave our hands free to deal with the fact when it arises. This does not indicate," he added, "that we will not give sympathetic consideration to the possibility of co-operation with any serious effort of the states of the League to deal with this problem."[32]

The League, in the hope of bringing the United States actively into the picture, referred the Chinese appeal to the long inactive Far East Advisory Committee, on which the United States agreed to renew its nonvoting membership. When the further proposal was made that a special subcommittee be created to deal with the Sino-Japanese quarrel, Hull authorized Minister Leland Harrison in Switzerland to sit with such a subcommittee if invited, but argued against the rumored proposal that the subcommittee be formed of representatives of the states "most concerned" with the Pacific area, perhaps principally the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty. Recurring again to the "principles of July 16" and their world-wide acceptance, he contended that any violation of those principles was a matter of concern to every nation that accepted them. "The Secretary is not able to see why a position could not be taken by any or all nations regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict from the viewpoint of their own interest in preserving peace and settling disputes by peaceful methods." In another note a few days later the Secretary referred yet again to his July 16 statement and asserted that the United States had gone further than any other government or group of governments in its efforts to strengthen the principles of world peace and security and in expressing its disapproval when they were violated. Again he avowed the American preference for parallel over joint action and, while disclaiming any thought of charting a course for members of the League, made it clear nevertheless that he felt the United States had set a rather good example.[33]

Events now moved swiftly. On October 5 the Far East Advisory Committee adopted two reports prepared by its subcommittee. The first, after reviewing in some detail events in China since July 7, concluded that Japan had acted without justification and in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg-Briand Pact). The second report suggested that the best procedure for getting collective action would be to call the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty into consultation, and proposed that the Assembly request those signatories who were members of the League to initiate the process. It expressed the hope also that the states parties to the Nine-Power Treaty would associate with their work "other States which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement." In the meantime, the report recommended that the Assembly should express moral support for China and advise members of the League to refrain from action that might weaken China's power of resistance and to consider how they might individually extend aid to China.[34]

The Assembly of the League approved both reports in full on the following day, October 6. But before it acted, a dramatic pronouncement by President Roosevelt at Chicago, October 5, had encouraged those at Geneva who wished to see vigorous action against Japan by the League supported by the United States. In his "quarantine speech," as it came to be called, the President declared:

> The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy

> and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
>
> When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. . . .
>
> Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause [course?]. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. . . .[35]

Most of the Chicago speech had been prepared in the State Department under the guidance of the Secretary and Norman Davis, both of whom thought the country should be alerted to the dangers in the Far Eastern situation and the inadequacy of an isolationist policy. But the "quarantine" idea, with its hint of sanctions, was the President's own[36] and caught Hull by surprise. Pierrepont Moffat, who was at a meeting in Hull's office when the speech came over the wire, noted in his diary: "The Secretary was delighted at the speech and the majority thought it would be strongly approved by the public." There was, as a matter of fact, rather widespread public approval of the President's vigorous language, but the Secretary was more impressed by the vociferous protests of the isolationists, and his initial delight soon gave way to chagrin. Remarking in his *Memoirs* that "the reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and violent," he added: "As I saw it, this had the effect of setting back for at least six months our constant educational campaign intended to create and strengthen public opinion toward international co-operation."[37]

But in Geneva the effect of the speech was very different. League of Nations functionaries who hoped for co-operation from the United States had already been encouraged by Hull's sending to the League as a formal communication a copy of his statement of July 16. Now the President's speech called for "concerted effort" on the part of peace-loving nations to discourage acts of aggression. What could this mean short of an assurance of American co-operation with the League? The speech, relayed to Geneva over short-wave radio, had, said Moffat, an instantaneous effect; it "put an end to considerable shilly-shally that was going on. We can now," he added, "regard a nine-power conference as almost inevitable."[38]

Whether the speech encouraged the State Department to act more vigorously than it otherwise would have done is not clear. For whatever reason, the Department promptly (October 6) concurred in the verdict of the League Assembly in labeling Japan a treaty-breaker,[39] and soon thereafter let it be known that the United States would attend a meeting of signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty. Thus Hull dropped his opposition to treating the Sino-Japanese dispute as a regional matter. Rejecting a British proposal that the United States "father the Nine-Power Conference and hold it in Washington," and the suggestion of Norman Davis, who, "sniffing a conference from afar like a battle horse," suggested London, the State Department at length proposed Brussels as the place of meeting. Accordingly, on October 16, 1937, the Belgian Government issued invitations "in compliance with the request of the government of the United Kingdom made with the approval of the Government of the United States of America," to the nine original signers of the treaty, to five subsequent signers (Bolivia, Mexico, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), and, at British urging, to Germany and the Soviet Union.[40] The conference would meet in Brussels, November 3, 1937. Its stated purpose was to examine the situation in the Far East in accordance with the provision for consultation in the Nine-Power Treaty and to study "peaceable means of hastening an end of the regrettable conflict which prevails there."[41]

The American decisions of October 5 and 6, 1937—the President's Chicago speech, the State Department's concurrence in the League's condemnation of Japan, the decision to participate in the Brussels Conference—were all contrary to the thinking and advice of the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Grew. It was Grew's firm belief that only by refraining from taking sides in the conflict, and thus preserving the friendship and confidence of Japan, could the United States hope to guide Japan toward a moderate course in China. He had followed his dispatch of August 27 with a long personal letter to the Secretary of September 15, reiterating and re-enforcing his earlier arguments. "The shock to us all was great," he wrote in his diary, October 7, on receipt of the news from Chicago and Washington. By abandoning the impartial and neutral attitude that it had hitherto maintained, the United States had thrown overboard its growing influence, "and now, alas, it may never return." Having worked for the past five years to build up that influence, the Ambassador felt "like the architect who sees his edifice demolished overnight." The new course chosen by the United States, he foresaw, was sure to lead to involvement in "the Far Eastern mess," and by means that could do no good.[42]

In the weeks between the President's Chicago speech and the opening of the Brussels Conference, there occurred an episode which brought a sharp clash of opinions between Secretary Hull and Sumner Welles, recently promoted to Under Secretary of State. Both, ironically, were seeking to promote the cause of peace by committing the governments of the world to a program embracing respect for international obligations and relief from restrictions on international trade. Each distrusted the procedure advocated by the other. The Secretary's program comprised his "eight pillars of peace" statement of July 16, 1937, and his reciprocal trade agreements policy. To Sumner Welles this program, while unassailable in principle, was ineffectual in practice. As he saw it, the statement of July 16 "merely convinced the dictators that the United States would limit its interference to words," and "no economic remedy [such as the trade agreements program] could have dissipated the political and military threats that confronted the democracies."[43] "What was needed in 1937," he believed, "was not a further reiteration of principles," but "some clear indication that the United States was willing to act in order to try to prevent war in Europe, and thus save those principles from oblivion." In reality, what he proposed was little more than a "further reiteration of principles" in a more dramatic and possibly more binding form than Mr. Hull's statement and the perfunctory assent of sixty governments.

In a memorandum to the President of October 6, the day after the Chicago speech, Welles suggested "that an attempt should be made to secure general international agreement as to the fundamental norms which should govern international conduct." The President apparently responded with some enthusiasm. After further discussion between him and Welles, it was agreed that, if the Secretary of State approved, the President should summon to the White House on Armistice Day, November 11, the chiefs of all foreign missions in Washington. To them, and at the same time to their governments at home, he would emphasize the danger that the world would be engulfed in new wars unless the nations "returned to those basic standards of international law which Western civilization had gradually and painfully evolved." He would offer, if the other governments approved, to invite nine nations to join with the United States in drawing up a statement of principles upon which it was hoped all could agree. The four subjects upon which agreement was to be suggested as necessary were: (1) "the essential and fundamental principles which should be observed in international relations"; (2) procedures to insure to all nations without discrimination access to raw materials and other essential commodities; (3) methods for peaceful revision of international agreements; (4) the rights and obligations of neutrals "in the unhappy event of war."[44]

Welles argued, at least retrospectively and presumably in his conferences with Hull at the time, that the President's world-wide appeal on Armistice Day would, by its impact on Japan, improve the chances of success at the Brussels Conference. But though Hull's first reaction was apparently favorable, and though Welles enlisted the aid of Norman Davis to sell the plan to the Secretary, Hull finally proved to be adamant in his opposition. His reasons have never been made entirely clear. In his *Memoirs* he relates that he "earnestly argued against the project as being illogical and impossible," as thoroughly unrealistic," as tending to "lull the democracies into a feeling of tranquillity," when what they needed was to be aroused to the importance of rearming. Possibly a better clue to Hull's opposition is found in his complaint that two of Welles's four points, principles of international conduct and economic stability, were already taken care of, as far as that was possible, "in my statement of principles on July 16, to which sixty nations adhered," and in the trade agreements program. Resentment at what must have seemed to Hull encroachment upon his preserves may go far to explain his opposition.[45]

In any event, Hull's opposition prevented the Armistice Day convocation of ambassadors to hear the President's appeal. One of Hull's criticisms had been that the President's appeal was to be "sprung" on the world without prior notification to the British and French Governments. In the following January, Roosevelt undertook to meet this objection by submitting the plan confidentially to the British Government. He now proposed to make his appeal to the diplomatic corps on January 22, 1938. Prime Minister Chamberlain was about to open negotiations with Italy and was not averse to humoring Mussolini by formally recognizing his conquest of Ethiopia. He was under the illusion that he might be able to tame both Mussolini and Hitler, and he feared that Roosevelt's appeal would embarrass his negotiations. Without waiting to consult Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who hurried home from a vacation, he advised Roosevelt to postpone his contemplated action. Eden, who thought the plan worth trying if only as a demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity, was unable to win from Chamberlain more than a grudging acceptance. Roosevelt's initiative was not rejected in London, but it was received so coolly that he let the matter drop.[46]

The United States as a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty, had agreed without hesitation to attend the Conference at Brussels but without any clear idea of what such a conference could, or ought to, achieve. Though Anthony Eden had expressed a hope that Hull would represent the United States at the Conference, the Secretary thought it inexpedient to be so long away from Washington. On October 16, Norman Davis was named as the American delegate, with Jay Pierrepont Moffat and Stanley K. Hornbeck as advisers, Robert Pell as press officer, and Charles Bohlen as secretary. Davis and his two advisers, Moffat philosophized later, represented a healthy balance in viewpoint. Davis believed that preservation of the British Empire was essential to the security of the United States. Hornbeck thought only of the Far East. Moffat's preoccupation was, in his words, "to prevent at any costs the involvement of the United States in hostilities anywhere, and to that end to discourage any formation of a common front of the democratic powers."[47] Three days of discussion by the group with the Secretary of State found, as Moffat related, as many different opinions as there were individuals, but essentially two opposing points of view: one "that we must go very slowly, on the ground that if Japan should retaliate we alone would bear the burden"; the other "that if we did not stop Japan at present we should eventually be confronted by a yet stronger Japan." If the Secretary at this time took a definite position, Moffat does not describe it. In fact, he says, "the final upshot of these talks was rather inconclusive" because of the President's absence at Hyde Park.[48]

Apparently Davis received no definite instructions from the State Department. Just before sailing on October 20 he spent two hours at Hyde Park with Mr. Roosevelt, but the President, Moffat reluctantly concluded, "did not see his way out of the situation any more than did we." Such instructions as Davis received from the President were on the cautious side. Davis was to "avoid any commitments that might tie our hand from 'exerting pressure.'" But he was also to steer clear of any use of the word "sanctions" (the President interjecting that the word "quarantine" had a friendly sound), and "in the early stages of the Conference at least our tone was to be one of high-minded co-operation." The President stressed the point that American policy would necessarily be guided by American public opinion, which Davis was advised to watch. In fact, the President conceived of the function of the Conference as in part that of educating public opinion and for that reason wished to see it prolonged as much as possible. Finally, alluding to the technique which had proved so successful among the twenty-one American Republics, the President thought it important that no one nation should take the lead and thus be "in a position to have a finger of fear or scorn pointed at it." Whatever was done at Brussels "should represent, first, the substantial unanimous opinion of the nations meeting at Brussels, and later the substantial unanimous opinion of the overwhelming majority of all nations, whether in or out of the League of Nations."[49]

The Brussels Conference began inauspiciously. Germany had declined to attend, assigning the reason that she was not a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty. Italy attended, but only to treat the Conference with scorn and to support the case of Japan. Significantly, on the fourth day of the Conference she joined Germany and Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan had rejected the invitation to attend, complaining that the League Assembly, and the United States, had already condemned her without a hearing, that since her action in China was in "self-defence" the Nine-Power Treaty was not applicable, and that the conflict could be settled only by Japan and China without the intervention of third parties. When the Conference inquired whether she would meet for consultation with representatives of a smaller group of powers, she declined that proposal also. There was no hope, therefore, of bringing Japan and China together for a possible amicable settlement.[50]

What, then, could the Conference do? The British and French delegations intimated that they would go as far as the United States in action against Japan, though the French stipulated that they would share in measures likely to incur Japanese hostility only if the United States and Great Britain would guarantee them against Japanese retaliation in Indochina. Still better, from the French point of view, would be the inclusion of the United States in a united front of the democracies. Davis and his advisers had to insist repeatedly that they had come to Brussels to discuss a peaceful solution, not sanctions, and to protest against the tendency of the British and French to place first responsibility on the United States by offering to model their action upon its. As for Roosevelt's idea of prolonging the Conference for its effect on public opinion, the American delegation found that an urge for prompt adjournment was the only sentiment in which the members were almost unanimous. This Conference was unique in his experience, wrote Moffat, November 1, in that "even before we meet people are discussing ways to end it."[51]

A proposed alternative to keeping the Conference in prolonged session was to name a committee to carry on after the Conference adjourned. This suggestion met general approval but had to be dropped when the Conference proved unable to agree on the composition of the committee.[52] On November 10 Davis cabled the President and the Secretary of State that it would not be possible to prolong the Conference, as the President had hoped, and suggesting several alternative procedures for ending it: (1) a declaration that it had failed to move Japan, and adjournment to let the delegates go home and discuss the problem; (2) an attempt to agree on some form of pressure against Japan; (3) adoption of a resolution recommending nonrecognition of changes in China in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, and a general attitude of doing nothing that would aid Japan or hamper China in their conflict. Davis threw in the suggestion that the President recommend to Congress the repeal or suspension of the Neutrality

Act so far as the Sino-Japanese conflict was concerned. "This would startle and worry Japan, encourage the Chinese and have a dynamic effect upon world opinion."[53]

In reply Hull, who had just taken ten days off for rest and recuperation at Pinehurst, North Carolina,[54] rejected any idea of considering pressure on Japan and discouraged measures of the third category, with which the United States might find it difficult to go along. A recess subject to call by the chairman, or a recess leaving a committee to carry on, was to be preferred to adjournment. In any event, said Hull, "there should be no admission of failure in any pronouncement made by the conference," and before recess or adjournment the Conference should issue a public statement recounting its efforts to restore peace and Japan's refusal to co-operate. There was no prospect, Hull informed Davis later, of repeal, suspension, or modification of existing neutrality legislation.[55]

On November 15 the Conference, with Italy opposing and the Scandinavian states abstaining, adopted a Declaration which was in the main a refutation of Japan's contention that the conflict in China was of concern only to the two states directly involved. It renewed the appeal for a cessation of hostilities and for consultation by Japan with the Conference or with representatives of a few powers chosen for that purpose. If Japan persisted in her refusal, the signers of the Declaration "must consider what is to be their common attitude" in such an instance of disregard of an international treaty.[56]

If the expression "common attitude" in the closing sentence of the Declaration seemed to imply some form of collective action against Japan, Davis was promptly informed by the Secretary that "the temper of this country [was] not disposed to favor a course of pressure or threat." In the same telegram (November 17) Hull complained that press dispatches from Brussels, encouraged, he suspected, by the British and French, were playing up two false theses: first, that the United States had taken the lead in promoting the Conference, and, second, that the United States was now standing in the way of effective action against Japan. Davis was asked to do what he could to counteract this effort "to put the entire responsibility for action in the present situation upon this Government."[57]

The Secretary had evidently been disturbed by a report from Grew in Tokyo. On the 16th, Foreign Minister Hirota had complained to Grew of the phrase in the Brussels Declaration which to him suggested "united action." Any "united action," such as an economic boycott against Japan, would, he warned, merely prolong the hostilities by encouraging the Chinese. He went on to say that "through the diplomatic representative of 'a certain power' " he was informed that "the United States not only took the initiative in proposing the Brussels Conference but is also taking the active leadership there." Such rumors were certain to appear in the Japanese press and could have a very unfortunate effect upon the Japanese attitude to the United States, a nation which had hitherto been regarded as "the most impartial of all the friends of Japan."[58]

Hull authorized Grew to tell Hirota that there was "*not an atom of truth* in any report that we took the initiative in calling the Conference," or that any government represented there had "done any more than assume its share of the common responsibility to exchange views with regard to the situation." He appreciated and shared Hirota's desire for the maintenance of good relations between Japan and the United States, but was apprehensive lest these relations be impaired by the existing situation in the Far East.[59] To Norman Davis in Brussels he complained repeatedly of the bad press that the United States was getting at the Conference—one complaint so critical of the delegation that Stanley Hornbeck called it a "stinkbomb"—and he lost all desire to see the Conference prolonged. ". . . the longer you stay in Brussels," he cabled Davis, November 17, "the more the probability that you will be accused by the press of advocating such policies [pressure of threat against Japan] and trying to make them prevail at the Conference."[60]

In another telegram of November 17, the Secretary suggested that prior to recessing, the Conference might simply adopt a report to be submitted to the participating governments, and he appended a long memorandum, "prepared by certain officers of the Department," which might be of assistance in drafting such a report. Then followed a curious sentence, which reveals how sensitive Hull had become to any suggestion that the United States was playing a leading role at Brussels: "While you will of course not take the initiative in the formulation of the report nor assume a position of special leadership in regard thereto, we feel that the report should not run counter to the points covered in the memorandum."[61] On this directive Pierrepont Moffat commented with mild sarcasm that though he approved the suggestion of a report instead of another resolution, he had less admiration "for the idea of the Department drafting a report and then sending it textually in double code (it took nine hours to decipher) and then telling us that while this is what they want we must neither propose it nor make it seem our own."[62]

In reality, the Report of the Conference and an accompanying Declaration were drawn up in day-long conferences of the American and British delegations, with the French delegation finally joining in sponsorship. Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister and presiding officer of the Conference, circularized the text as having been prepared at his request. The American and British members then took on the task of persuading the other delegations to accept the draft. All did so except the Italians, and on the evening of November 24 the Conference, with Italy abstaining, formally adopted the Report and Declaration and then recessed, to meet again when its chairman or any two of its members should have reported a belief that its deliberations could be advantageously resumed.[63]

The Report and Declaration together covered much the same ground as the State Department's memorandum of November 17. The Report was strictly factual, summarizing the efforts of the Conference and describing the positions taken by Japan and China without attempt at appraisal. The Declaration began with a statement of the general principles that should govern the settlement of international disputes and international relations generally and cited the Nine-Power Treaty as exemplifying those principles. It urged suspension of hostilities between Japan and China and a resort to peaceful processes of settlement and again invoked the Nine-Power Treaty as stating the principles to which a settlement must conform. It declared the continuing concern of the governments represented at the Conference with the Far Eastern conflict and their willingness to aid in a solution when circumstances should permit. There was no hint of sanctions or of any pressure on Japan other than the mild moral pressure inherent in the Conference's two Declarations of November 15 and November 24.

Norman Davis, in his statement to the press upon his return to the United States and in his official report on the Conference, argued that despite its failure to check Japan's aggressive course, the Conference had accomplished useful work. Especially it had exhibited Japan's unco-operative attitude, reaffirmed faith in basic principles, insisted that any agreement between Japan and China must conform to the Nine-Power Treaty, and demonstrated the determination of the participating governments to concern themselves with the problem until it could be solved constructively.[64] Secretary Hull, in retrospect, was even more modest. "Not much had been accomplished," he wrote, "but at least the resolutions adopted showed plainly that all the nations interested in the Far East with the exception of Japan and Italy were in accord as to where lay the responsibility for the war, and that the Nine-Power Treaty was still in force and must be respected. The conference clarified a few issues, if only in a negative way."[65] The Secretary might have added that perhaps the chief point made clear by the Conference was that isolationist sentiment in the United States prevented that country from going beyond mere words in upholding the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty, and that the cosigners of that Treaty, China excepted, would go no further than the United States.[66]

CHAPTER TEN

THE DEMOCRACIES FALTER

THE FAILURE to stop the second outbreak of Japanese armed aggression in China followed by a few months the failure to halt Italian armed aggression in Ethiopia. It was contemporary with the application of the so-called nonintervention policy in Spain, which actually permitted German and Italian armed support of rebellion against the legal Spanish Government. Only in the case of the Italo-Ethiopian War had the League of Nations intervened directly, and then without success. The League failed because of the failure of will of its members, and the same feebleness of will that denied strength to the League brought to naught the efforts of its members outside the League, whether in the Brussels Conference or the International Nonintervention Committee in London. The United States, shackled by the predominant isolationist sentiment of the moment, shared in the weakness and the failure of the League and its members.

To Cordell Hull, a fervent follower of Woodrow Wilson, the failure of the League of Nations brought great disappointment. Ever since 1920, he recalls, both he and Roosevelt had "made strenuous but vain attempts to uphold the League in its full vigor by preachments and concrete acts." He had not minimized the strength of isolationist opposition to American membership in the League, but had regretted

Roosevelt's Hearst-inspired statement in February, 1932, that he did not then favor such membership. As Secretary of State, Hull remarks: "I chose every legitimate opportunity to put as much American influence behind the League as I could," sponsoring American participation in a variety of *ad hoc* League commissions.[1] Under Hull's and Roosevelt's guidance, furthermore, the United States in 1934 joined the International Labor Organization, an agency of the League, and began the practice of registering its treaties with the League Secretariat.

While American entry into the League of Nations was out of the question in the 1930's, Hull and Roosevelt were both confident of securing Senate approval of the protocol providing for American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court. This tribunal, designed for the judicial settlement of international disputes, embodied an essentially American idea, but though endorsed by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, the protocol of adherence had been loaded down with reservations by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and final action upon it had been repeatedly postponed.[2]

Hull was jointly responsible with Woodrow Wilson's former Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, for a plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 calling for "adherence to the World Court with appending reservations." Strengthening the Court, Hull believed, "would help buttress the whole structure of whatever remained in the way of order under law. The participation of the United States in the World Court would add to its substance and authority."

Not until the fall of 1934 did the Secretary consider the time ripe for taking the matter up. Then conferences in the State Department produced a new resolution of adherence, and the President gave his approval. But Chairman Pittman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee viewed the proposal without enthusiasm, and at his suggestion Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, Democratic floor leader, undertook to sponsor the resolution. Informal polls of the Senators seemed to assure bipartisan support of well over two-thirds of the body. The resolution was sent to the Senate, and on January 16, 1935, the President sent a message, largely prepared in the State Department, assuring the Senate that joining the Court would in no way diminish or jeopardize the sovereignty of the United States. "At this period of international relationships," the message declared, "when every act is of moment to the future of world peace, the United States has an opportunity once more to throw its weight into the scale in favor of peace."

It was Hull's belief that if the Senate had voted on the resolution on Friday, January 25, it would have passed safely. But on that day, the Senate recessed without voting, and over the week end an enormous barrage of isolationist propaganda, emanating largely from the Hearst press and the radio priest, Father Charles E. Coughlin, roused the misgivings of so many Senators that when the vote was taken on January 29, it stood 52 to 36, a majority, but seven votes short of the necessary two-thirds.[3]

The President had not greatly exerted himself to save the day for the Court, and Under Secretary Phillips found him, on the afternoon of the vote, not "in the least disturbed that [things] were not going well." But in the State Department on the next morning everyone "was feeling low." The expectation was that the defeat would have an adverse effect on American foreign policy as a whole, particularly in connection with disarmament. "The Secretary," Phillips recorded, "wished to make a public statement saying in effect that the fight would continue more ardently than ever . . ." His advisers persuaded him to say nothing, "in view of the fact that the country apparently is substantially behind the Senatorial action."[4] The defeat proved final. Hull made no further attempt to secure Senate support for the Court.

In the absence of effective international machinery for keeping the peace, Hull felt that the best hope of restraining the would-be aggressor powers—recalling "the three jingoist countries to their senses" as he phrased it—lay in the adoption of a common attitude by the United States, Great Britain, and France, and he added, "preferably joined by Russia." With Great Britain in particular, good relations seemed to the Secretary of paramount importance.[5] Yet in the first years of his secretaryship those relations lacked cordiality, to say the least. The disruptive part played by the United States at the London Economic Conference, though no fault of Hull's, had incurred the resentment of both French and British. Insistence by the United States that payments on the European war debts be resumed at the end of the Hoover Moratorium, and failure of England and France to make those payments, made for bad feeling on both sides of the Atlantic.

England, it is true, made token payments on June 15 and December 15, 1933. France paid nothing. Then, in April, 1934, Congress passed and the President signed (April 13) the Johnson Act, named for isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson, which prohibited the floating of loans in the United States, through the sale of securities or otherwise, by any government in default upon its debts to the United States. When the Attorney General ruled that in the future token payments would not save the payers from being held in default, such payments ceased. Finland continued to make the payments upon her small debt in full. All the other debtor governments were in default and hence debarred by the Johnson Act from borrowing money in the United States.[6]

The investigations of the Nye Committee and divergent views on various phases of the disarmament discussions (both described in previous chapters) created additional friction. The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, apparently took his cue from his friends in the wealthy, anti-Roosevelt segments of American society, and Hull found him difficult to deal with. And behind Lindsay was the coolness of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, who still cherished unhappy memories of President Roosevelt's "bombshell" message of July, 1933.[7]

Although Lindsay was to remain for some six years in Washington, changes in the British Government soon contributed to an improvement in Anglo-American relations. Early in June, 1935, Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare Foreign Secretary, and Anthony Eden Secretary for League of Nations Affairs. It was not a cabinet destined for great achievement, but two of its members, Baldwin and Eden had spoken recently, publicly, and emphatically of the necessity for close co-operation between Great Britain and the United States. Hull had replied in kind, gladly promising co-operation in a "constructive policy favoring the promotion and preservation of peace."[8]

Before the change in the British Cabinet, in fact, there had been an approach to an accord on the stabilization of currencies, a sore point since the London Conference. This was a matter that involved both the State and Treasury Departments, and although it ended happily, it illustrated the friction that was of common occurrence between Secretaries Hull and Morgenthau.[9]

In this instance, however, Morgenthau was not stepping out of his legitimate field, for the subject of international currency stabilization had been entrusted to the Treasury. France, which had not followed Britain and the United States in going off gold, was seeking the aid of the United States in persuading Britain to prevent further decline of the pound. The Treasury sent to the State Department a draft of its proposed negative reply, which William Phillips and Herbert Feis, Under Secretary and Economic Adviser respectively, criticized as containing "not even an expression of interest or concern" and as presenting "a hopeless viewpoint." Phillips and Feis drew up a substitute message which was "more responsive to the French fears" and "showed our intense interest in the European financial currency situation." Secretary Hull read the new draft to Morgenthau on the telephone, and the latter, to Phillips' surprise, accepted it.[10]

Within a few weeks the shoe was on the other foot. Secretary Hull, anxious for stabilization, would have welcomed an appreciating dollar and a return to the pre-1933 ratio of dollar, pound, and franc. The State Department prepared a memorandum to that effect, which the Secretary proposed to circulate to American embassies in Europe. Now it was Morgenthau's turn to complain, and he did so vociferously, denouncing Hull's memorandum to the President "as one of the most anti-New Deal broadsides he had seen in a long time." The President concurred, detecting a lingering influence of J. P. Morgan in the State Department and letting Hull be reminded that stabilization was in the domain of the Treasury. Hull seems to have yielded gracefully, explaining that he was interested in the subject because of its relation to trade. In a speech on May 13, 1935, Morgenthau gave what Phillips characterized as "a sort of backhand invitation" to stabilization, indicating that the United

States could not take the initiative but would welcome moves in that direction by others. Hull wrote Morgenthau, praising his "remarkably fine address," and with Morgenthau's and the President's permission, issued a statement publicly commending Morgenthau's speech and pointing out that currency stability stimulated trade and that healthy trade facilitated stabilization of currencies.[11]

These were merely tentative moves. The real victory for stabilization came more than a year later, and here again it was the Treasury that acted, the State Department that approved. In June, 1936, Morgenthau reached agreement with Neville Chamberlain, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the two Treasuries would co-operate to sustain the existing dollar-pound ratio and to assist in stabilizing the franc if the French Government would bring it into proper alignment with the other two currencies. Morgenthau had by this time returned to comparative monetary orthodoxy after his adventure with the theories of Professor Warren,[12] but he had difficulty converting the President, who, Morgenthau noted, felt that his "bombshell" message of 1933 "should be our text and bible." But the President yielded to Morgenthau's argument, and William Phillips, speaking for himself and Secretary Hull, said to Morgenthau: "I congratulate you on the most important diplomatic step that has been taken. . . . It touches our trade agreement program; it touches everything."[13]

Negotiations during the summer, in which Herbert

Feis represented the State Department, brought the French into line, and the agreement for stabilization of the three currencies was embodied in statements issued by the three governments on September 25, 1936. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland later adhered to the arrangement.

Morgenthau's motives, it should be stated, were political in the highest sense of the term. Greatly alarmed at the growth of fascism, he was at this time particularly intent upon upholding democracy in France, now under the government of Léon Blum as Premier, and thus improving the chances for peace. He thought of the stabilization agreement as "the greatest move taken for peace in the world since the [First] World War. . . . It may be the turning point for again resuming rational thinking in Europe." As for Secretary Hull, Morgenthau reported to the President: "Hull is just tickled pink. He thinks it is the greatest thing that has happened."[14]

The weapons of the Treasury were susceptible of use for offense no less than for defense, and Hull and Morgenthau had already been in disagreement over what Hull termed Morgenthau's "personal war against Germany," motivated, as Hull believed, by Morgenthau's resentment at "Hitler's vile treatment of the Jews." The Tariff Act of 1930 directed the Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing duties upon imports into the United States which were found to be subsidized in the countries of their origin. The Treasury contended that manipulation of the currency by the Nazi Government of Germany amounted to subsidization of German exports, and on June 4, 1936, began imposition of countervailing duties upon a list of German commodities when imported into the United States. Hull took issue with the Treasury's thesis that currency manipulation was equivalent to subsidization and secured from the interdepartmental Executive Committee on Commercial Policy an opinion that the Treasury's interpretation was open to doubt. Hull pointed out to Morgenthau that the Treasury's policy would impair improving trade relations with Germany and that, consistently pursued, it would require that countervailing duties be levied upon imports from other countries in Europe and Latin America, which also manipulated their currencies. But Morgenthau got a favorable opinion from the Attorney General and a blessing from the President, and, as Hull complained, "rushed blindly ahead with a project that stood to throw a crowbar into the machinery of our foreign relations."

In spite of Hull's contemporary warnings and retrospective criticism, Morgenthau's policy worked. Though Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht complained bitterly to Ambassador Dodd, Germany in August abandoned the specific practices responsible for the trouble, and the countervailing duties were removed. Morgenthau could boast that he had provided "the first check to Germany's career of economic conquest."[15]

Any satisfaction derived from such minor successes must have been short-lived. The aggressor states, far from moderating their ambitions, were combining to pursue them in common. On October 25, 1936, Germany and Italy signed an agreement pledging collaboration in their policy toward Spain and in the defense of Europe against communism, and arranging for economic co-operation in southeastern Europe. Hitler recognized Mussolini's Ethiopian empire and received in return economic privileges there and in other Italian colonies. The "Rome-Berlin Axis" had been born. Just a month later (November 25, 1936), Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ostensibly aimed at the Communist International, or Comintern, and pledging the signatories to consultation and co-operation in measures to combat communism, the pact contained a secret addendum providing for political, or even military, co-operation against the Soviet Union. A year later Italy too signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, thus completing the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis.

The American response to these ominous gestures was, as we have seen, the adoption and strengthening of the new type of neutrality legislation. The imposition of rigid arms embargoes against both parties in a war was, as both Hull and Roosevelt saw, almost an invitation to well-armed aggressor states to attack their neighbors, since the neighbors would be unable to procure means of defense in the United States. Hull, in his own words, had "never ceased to believe that the President should have the right to impose an embargo against an aggressor and not against a victim."[16] But Congress would hear of no such leeway for the President; the President must be prevented at all costs from taking sides, since taking sides might be a step toward war.

Not until near the end of 1938 did the movement for repeal of the arms embargo provisions begin to take shape. During 1937, however, there were a number of appeals to President Roosevelt, some from strange sources, to take some action to check the armaments race and the drift toward war.

Early in February, Secretary Morgenthau, distressed at the way in which the cost of armaments was "breaking down the Treasuries of the World," reminded the President of a plan the latter had once mentioned of meeting a group of world leaders to "try and talk sense to them." The only way to stop war, Morgenthau believed, was "to stop this mad race to arm." "I hope the President will let me help him work this out," Morgenthau noted in his diary. "I don't believe that Hull and Norman Davis ever will. They just don't have guts enough." Hull's program of increasing world trade, and thus taking up the slack of unemployment as the nations disarmed, was sound in principle, Morgenthau told the President, but it would take five years, whereas war might come in five months.

With Roosevelt's permission, Morgenthau sent a verbal appeal to Neville Chamberlain, asking for suggestions of possible means of stopping the arms race. While awaiting Chamberlain's reply, Morgenthau and the President talked again about a disarmament conference to which, the President thought, he would invite only six nations. But Chamberlain's reply, when it came, was unhelpful, and the President made no move toward a conference.[17]

A different type of proposal had been made in the preceding month by the Reichsbank president, Hjalmar Schacht. Talking in Berlin with Joseph E. Davies, United States Ambassador to Russia, Schacht asserted that he was authorized by Hitler to make proposals for permanent peace to France and England. Schacht hoped President Roosevelt would call a congress, a "peace congress," in Washington to perfect such a settlement after preliminary agreements had been reached. Ambassador Dodd commented skeptically on the proposal, and Hull did not take it seriously.[18]

A few months later, in May, 1937, Mussolini gave an interview to a Scripps-Howard reporter, William Philip Simms, in which he appealed to the President to call a conference on the limitation of armaments for the benefit of the sorely burdened nations of Europe. Ambassador Phillips was so much impressed that he cabled the full text of the interview to the State Department and followed it with a personal telegram to the Secretary, urging that Il Duce's feeler be sympathetically received. Mr. Hull was not in Washington. "This is bad luck," Phillips wrote, "because a sympathetic expression from Hull would have gone much further than anything which anyone else in the Department could have said." Sumner Welles assured Phillips, however, that the Department was taking a cordial and sympathetic attitude toward Mussolini's suggestions, and had so informed the Italian Ambassador.

But then Mussolini began to back water. Phillips found Foreign Minister Ciano entirely vague on the subject of the interview, and a leading article in Il Duce's paper of May 31 asserted that the interview was not intended as an invitation to President Roosevelt but merely as an indication of what the Italian attitude would be if the President should take the initiative. So, after a week of excitement and some hope, United States-Italian relations reverted to normal.[19]

It is possible that hazy suggestions like the foregoing may have been partly responsible for Sumner Welles's proposal of a meeting of ambassadors and ministers to be convened by the President at the White House on Armistice Day, 1937. This idea, as related elsewhere, was opposed by Secretary Hull and never got beyond the discussion stage.[20]

The year 1937 saw significant changes in the State Department and the diplomatic service. The appointment in the preceding September of William Phillips to be Ambassador to Italy had left the post of Under Secretary vacant. Hull had reluctantly agreed to Phillips' desire for the transfer. He had found Phillips "capable, loyal, and co-operative" as Under Secretary, and he foresaw difficulty in the choice of Phillips' successor. Two Assistant Secretaries, Sumner Welles and R. Walton Moore, hoped for promotion to the higher rank. The President was said to prefer Welles, a personal friend as well as an experienced diplomat. Hull preferred the 78-year-old Moore, an ex-Congressman and Virginia judge and a personal friend of the Secretary. But Hull refrained from making a recommendation. Moore deplored the Secretary's "timid inactivity." Hull excuses his inaction on the ground that he was convinced that the President intended to name Welles in any event and that his recommending Moore would only create embarrassment.[21]

The tactics of the eight-month-long fight for the position are obscure. Hull says that the two candidates "waged a bitter controversy for many months." Moore, on the other hand, wrote his friend Ambassador Bullitt in January, 1937, that he had decided "to let that matter take its course, without myself making any inquiry of my superiors or requesting any one else to speak to either of them"; and to Ambassador William E. Dodd he stated two months later that he had never asked, and never would ask, for the appointment, though he should accept it if offered. Moore believed that Roosevelt preferred him but found it hard to turn down his old friend Welles. Dodd was told that six Senators had threatened to vote against Roosevelt's Supreme Court reform program unless he appointed Welles.[22] It seems clear that each candidate had his strong partisans.

The contest was settled by a compromise. Congress was persuaded to revive the post of Counselor in the State Department, which had been dormant for some years, and in May, 1937, the President appointed

Welles as Under Secretary and Moore as Counselor. "A sop to Cerberus—and rather a silly sop," was the comment of Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, who thought the appointment of "the Olympian Sumner Welles . . . all to the good from the Service point of view." In theory the positions were of substantially equal rank, but authority gravitated steadily into the hands of Welles. The consequence was growing friction between Welles and Hull during the six years that followed. Yet the appointment of Moore would not have been a good one. Already approaching his eightieth year, he prided himself upon his vigor and good health, but friendly observers were soon reporting that his pace was slowing down, and he died, still "in harness," in February, 1941.[23]

Sumner Welles's elevation to Under Secretary was soon followed by the recall of Ambassador Dodd from Berlin. Dodd, who thoroughly disliked Welles, held him responsible for his recall. There is no doubt that Welles was anxious to see Dodd replaced, but it is equally clear that both Roosevelt and Hull were dissatisfied with the Ambassador's performance. He had failed to make useful contacts with the Nazi leaders, and his penchant for undiplomatic speeches and letters had brought a series of protests from the German Embassy. Hull, in his *Memoirs,* describes Dodd as "sincere though impulsive and inexperienced." The President had, in fact, set September 1, 1937, as the date for Dodd's resignation, but in a White House conversation in August had given the Ambassador the impression that he might retain his post till the following March. Dodd was therefore aggrieved when Hull notified him in November that his successor would be named within a month. The new Ambassador to Germany was Hugh Wilson, formerly Minister to Switzerland and more recently Assistant Secretary of State.[24]

As the momentous year 1938 dawned, Secretary Hull was thought by one of his close observers to be "so increasingly perturbed over the plight of the Democratic powers and the increasing gains of the Dictatorships" that he was "swinging to the left" from his customary middle-of-the-road position.[25] "Swinging to the left" presumably meant inclining toward a more activist role for the United States in blocking the aggressive designs of the Axis powers.

Hull's difficulties were increased by a divergence of views in the State Department between what Pierrepont Moffat called the "realist" and the "messianic" schools of thought. The "messianic" group, of whom Moffat names only Stanley Hornbeck and inferentially Norman Davis, kept telling the Secretary "that the great mass of the country is behind an active policy and that only a vociferous minority is against it." The "realist" group, in which Moffat placed himself, had been weakened by the departure of Hugh Wilson for the Berlin Embassy, but the loss of Wilson was balanced by the naming of Adolf A. Berle as Assistant Secretary, and the "realists" were further fortified by a visit from Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, home from London, who insisted that the Administration was "far ahead of public opinion in its advocacy of an 'active' policy." Managers of his chain of small moving picture theatres in New England towns had been checking the sentiment of their audiences and found them "almost to a man" opposed to an active policy under existing conditions.[26]

From Moffat himself the Secretary learned that there was a widespread suspicion that the Administration was heading toward war "to cover up its domestic difficulties." The Secretary had alarmed some Congressmen "by the intensity of his feeling that we must stand for the maintenance of law and order everywhere" to prevent world-wide anarchy. The President had asked Congress, in a message of January 28, for a twenty per cent increase in the Navy. Why? Was the Administration planning to "police the world"? Did it have secret understandings with other governments as to how and where the enlarged Navy was to be used? On Capitol Hill there was a growing demand for a definition of foreign policy.[27]

Hull denied, in letters to Senators and Congressmen, that any secret understandings with other governments existed. Then, on March 17, he delivered a major foreign policy address before the National Press Club in Washington. The speech had been carefully worked over in the Department and approved by the President with "Grand! F.D.R." It had been given much advance publicity and was carried by three national radio networks, broadcast in Canada and Great Britain, and transmitted by short wave in translations into Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and Italian. Pierrepont Moffat, who heard it delivered, thought it contained too much—eighteen or twenty ideas compared with the two or three that an average audience can assimilate effectively. He thought, nevertheless, that it would "be tremendously useful for the record and the opposition can no longer say that they do not know what the Administration's foreign policy is."[28]

The Secretary condemned the rise of international lawlessness, defended the Administration's rearmament program, and offered the world again the principles of international conduct—the "Eight Pillars of Peace"—that he had set forth on July 16, 1937.[29] He announced that the United States would refuse to withdraw from the Far East or to retreat from the protection of American interests wherever they might be. He denied any intent to "police the world," but promised that the United States would continue to pursue parallel action with other governments having similar interests and would stand ready to co-operate with others in the preservation of peace. He drew special applause in declaring that the most effective contribution that the Administration could make to the cause of peace was "to have this country respected throughout the world for integrity, justice, good will, strength, and unswerving loyalty to principles."

The speech was confined to general principles, for the United States would not, said the Secretary, provide others with a chart of what it would do under varying circumstances. The points he had made, as he wrote later,

> would not please an isolationist determined to confine us to our own shores. They would not please an internationalist determined to commit us to alliances. But they represented a positive foreign policy under which we could exert our influence, as well as example, for peace, increase our strength, and render ourselves a factor that no aggressor could overlook in making his plans.[30]

Before Hull delivered this address, Hitler had annexed Austria to Germany. To this act of aggression the United States could not well refuse *de facto* recognition. Hull publicly expressed concern over the effect such an incident might have on the maintenance of peace and the preservation of sound principles, but out of necessity he closed the American Legation in Vienna and established a Consulate General instead. He informed Berlin that the United States would hold Germany responsible for Austria's debt to the United States—a responsibility which the Führer declined to assume. He added the Austrian immigration quota to the German and, through the Treasury, subjected imports from Austria to the higher rates applicable to Germany because of German discrimination against exports from the United States.[31]

The absorption of Austria into Germany had hardly been consummated when a growing tempest of German propaganda against Czechoslovakia pointed to a new danger spot, with German invasion apparently imminent. Hull called in members of his staff on

Saturday, May 28, to advise him on a statement for the press. French Foreign Minister Bonnet had suggested that Ambassador Bullitt in a forthcoming speech express the hope of the United States for the preservation of peace in Europe, "urging moderation on all concerned," but the President had thought such a statement had best come from Washington. There were also domestic reasons for such a declaration. As Pierrepont Moffat described the situation,

> The pressure from various peace groups and church organizations which seemed to face two ways at once, namely in demanding that we keep out of war and at the same time demanding that we inject ourselves into every foreign crisis was growing so strong that a statement for the record, and for the benefit of our own people seemed imminently [*sic*] in order.[32]

After considerable discussion the text of a statement was agreed upon and given out at noon on that day. It was a wholly innocuous document, invoking the Pact of Paris, restating the familiar concept that hostilities anywhere threaten disturbance everywhere, and stressing the desire of the American people that peace be maintained, "no matter where or in what circumstances there may be controversies between nations." The mere issuance of the statement, however, created a sense of crisis, and the Department was immediately overrun by newsmen "who said they could only assume that we were in possession of confidential information that the crisis was far more serious than the public thought. We calmed them down as best we could," Moffat recorded, "and, as a matter of fact, the publicity was on the whole pretty favorable." From Paris, Bullitt reported that the French press regarded Hull's statement as "of extreme importance since it was a public declaration indicating the interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace in Central Europe."[33]

The May crisis passed, but by August tension between Germany and Czechoslovakia was reaching new heights. The Sudeten Germans, occupying Czechoslovakia's border areas adjoining Germany, were stepping up their demands for complete local autonomy. Their leader, Konrad Henlein, had been briefed by Hitler to make impossible demands. Germany announced military maneuvers for September. France moved reserves into the Maginot Line, facing the German frontier; England concentrated her Home Fleet in the North Sea. France and England were working for a peaceful settlement, but France was expected to aid her Czechoslovak ally if the latter were attacked, and there was little doubt that England would support France. A general European war seemed very near.

Whatever Roosevelt and Hull may have wished to do to encourage the democratic governments, the neutrality legislation and the isolationist spirit of the country limited their efforts to exhortation. Hull, in a radio address, August 16, warned of the "dangerous developments" threatening peace and security in the world and called for intensified support by the American people for a program that would lead to "enduring peace and security." The program he proposed was similar to the one set forth in his "Eight Pillars of Peace" statement of thirteen months before. The President, speaking at Kingston, Ontario, two days later, went out of his way to assure the Canadian people that the United States would not stand idly by if Canadian soil were to be "threatened by any other empire." Again, on August 27, the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Pact of Paris, the Secretary issued a statement in which, plainly alluding to the three Axis powers, he deplored the existence of war in one part of the world and the glorification of war in another, and warned that on the observance of the pledges of ten years before depended "the preservation of all that is valuable and worth while in the life of each and every nation."[34]

While the Secretary of State carefully refrained from predicting what the United States would or would not do in the event of war in Europe, certain American ambassadors were inclined to be less cautious. Late on August 31, the Department received from Ambassador Kennedy the text of a speech which he proposed to deliver two days later. One paragraph, as described by Pierrepont Moffat, "could only be interpreted as meaning that the United States would never fight and practically advising the British not to fight." Moffat and Assistant Secretaries Messersmith and Berle converged upon the Secretary at his croquet game, all urging rejection of the indiscreet paragraph. The Secretary agreed, as did the White House, and Kennedy was told to delete it.[35]

Two days later Ambassador Bullitt in Paris telephoned the Secretary with the request for permission to use in a forthcoming speech a phrase hinting that the United States might eventually be drawn into another European war. This was erring on the opposite side from Kennedy. Mr. Hull objected and when Bullitt insisted, switched the call to the White House. The President and Bullitt agreed on a compromise statement that if war should come no one could foresee whether the United States would or would not become involved. Of these two incidents with strong-minded ambassadors Moffat remarked: "The real truth of the matter is that the Secretary will always refer Bullitt, Kennedy, and Daniels to the White House as he considers these the President's personal selections."[36]

Ambassador Bullitt, it need hardly be said, was in complete sympathy with the French Government. According to Hull's account, he passed on to Hull a series of suggestions from Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet as to ways in which Washington could be helpful to Paris, chiefly by keeping up secret pressure on Germany for a peaceful solution of the Sudeten question. These suggestions were not followed. "The President and I were opposed to any secret moves," Hull records. "Our position was clear; we had stated it repeatedly; and any restatements should be made publicly. Open approaches would have more effect than secret approaches. In addition to their influence on the governments concerned, they would marshal public opinion."[37]

On September 12, at the Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg, Hitler demanded full self-determination for the Sudeten Germans and promised help to "these tortured and oppressed creatures" if they could not defend themselves. Anti-Czech demonstrations at once broke out in the Sudeten areas. Konrad Henlein, declaring that union with the German fatherland was the only acceptable solution of the problem, fled across the border into Germany. On the fifteenth Prime Minister Chamberlain flew to Germany to meet the Führer at Berchtesgaden.

This is not the place to tell the story of the negotiations that ended with the Munich agreement of September 29, but a bare outline must be given in order to provide a setting for decisions that were made in Washington, at the White House and the State Department. At Berchtesgaden Chamberlain learned that Hitler would insist upon the right of the Sudeten Germans to join the Reich, at the risk of a European war if necessary. The British and French Governments then put pressure on Czechoslovakia to agree to immediate cession to Germany of areas where Germans constituted more than half the population, with international guarantees for Czechoslovakia's independence within her shrunken boundaries. But when, on September 22, Chamberlain submitted Czechoslovakia's reluctant acceptance of these terms to Hitler at Godesberg, the Führer rejected them and on the following day demanded instead that the

Sudeten German areas as designated by him be surrendered to armed occupation by Germany on October 1. These terms the Czech Government refused, with assurances of French and British support in case of unprovoked attack. Hitler appeared determined to move into the disputed area on October 1, and Mussolini had declared that in the event of a general war Italy would fight by the side of her Axis partner. Mobilization or partial mobilization was ordered in Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, and Great Britain, and on September 27 Hitler let it be known that he would order mobilization against Czechoslovakia unless the Prague Government accepted his ultimatum by two o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th.

Washington, meanwhile, had not been entirely inactive, though its action had been reluctant so far as the Secretary and several of his advisers were concerned. When Chamberlain planned his first visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, his Government had asked for a public statement of approval by the President. The request was discussed in the State Department, and there was a general agreement that such a blank-check endorsement would be unwise, since whatever the outcome of the conference, a statement from the President would enable the British to place partial responsibility on the United States. On the chance that the President might think otherwise, a discreet statement was prepared by Messersmith, Moffat, and Norman Davis, but the President did not call for it.[38]

After Hitler's ultimatum of September 23, however, when war seemed imminent, Ambassador Bullitt urged that the United States should make some effort to preserve the peace, futile though it might be. On the 24th he suggested that the President appeal to the heads of state of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland to send representatives to The Hague to settle the controversy, with an indication that the United States would be willing to take part. Next day he added the further suggestion, coming from Foreign Minister Bonnet, that the President offer to act as arbitrator.

The suggestion of an arbitrator's role for the President was rejected at once, since, as Hull believed, "such an offer would have aroused the wrath of the isolationists." Hull relates that he did not oppose the suggestion of an appeal to heads of state, but he lists the reasons why he had no faith in it. He believed Hitler had reached a point where only armed force could stop him. He would not, in any event, trust any promises that the Führer might make. He feared that "frantic appeals" to Hitler "might exaggerate his already stupendous ego" and convince him of his invincibility. Furthermore, Hull "feared lest too ardent steps by the President should throw us into the same appeasement camp with Chamberlain and sooner or later attract the same obloquy that Chamberlain received." Hull concludes: "Welles kept pushing the President on, while I kept advising him to go slow."[39]

Some, at least, of this analysis seems to be based upon wisdom after the event. It seems doubtful that Hull could have foreseen the "obloquy" to which Chamberlain's act of appeasement would subject him.

In Moffat's record of the intramural discussions of September 24 and 25, there is no hint that Welles (who had just arrived from Europe on the 24th) took a leading part, or that his opinion differed from the opinions of his colleagues or from the Secretary's. The President needed no "pushing." Moffat, after working all Sunday at the Department, had gone to bed and tuned in on the Ford Concert when he was called back to the Department. The Secretary

> said that the President had received such bad telephone reports from both Kennedy and Bullitt that he felt he could no longer keep silent. That he wanted to send a direct appeal to Hitler, Benes, Chamberlain, and Daladier urging them to keep the negotiations going and adding as a further step, but subsidiary thereto, an offer of his good offices.

The appeal was put in shape, with the offer of good offices finally omitted upon the advice of Hull and Norman Davis, and the notes were dispatched between 12:30 and 1:30 in the morning of September 26 to London, Paris, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest.[40]

Further doubt of the accuracy of Hull's narrative is raised by Moffat's comment upon the Secretary's annoyance "because he found that some quarters close to the White House had been circulating the whisper that he was opposed to all action and that the President had not only decided on the appeal to Hitler and Benes but had drafted it himself."[41] On the whole, it seems probable that while the Secretary may have felt most of the misgivings which he describes in his *Memoirs*, he did not air them in talk with his aides nor, as he says, keep advising the President "to go slow."

The President's appeal of September 26, made "on behalf of the one hundred thirty millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity," was a simple plea for the continuation of negotiations, because, "once they are broken off, reason is banished and force asserts itself." Chamberlain, Daladier, and Benes replied at once, assuring the President of their full accord with his views. Hitler's reply, received on the night of the 26th, was uncompromising. If war came, said the Führer, responsibility would rest upon Czechoslovakia alone. His ultimatum, expiring at 2:00 P.M. on the 28th, still stood.[42]

Many other governments endorsed and seconded the President's appeal, some on their own initiative, others upon urging by the State Department. At a long conference in the Secretary's office on the morning of the 27th, "we all agreed," says Moffat, "that no stone must be left unturned." Two additional measures emerged: a personal and confidential message from the President to Mussolini, asking his help in assuring settlement of the Sudeten crisis by negotiation, and a second appeal from the President to Hitler. The message to Mussolini was entrusted to Ambassador William Phillips, who was spending a long week end at the villa of Myron Taylor in Florence. Notified by telephone Wednesday morning, September 28, of the arrival of the President's message, he returned to Rome but when, about 4:00 P.M., he was received by Il Duce, it was to learn that the British Ambassador, Lord Perth, had brought a similar appeal, that Mussolini had telephoned Hitler, and that the latter had postponed the terminal date of his ultimatum and agreed to a four-power conference. Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini himself were to meet Hitler next day in Munich.[43]

Meanwhile, the President's second appeal to Hitler had been delivered. Urging the Führer to submit his quarrel with Czechoslovakia to an international conference, the President had added, "Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding service to all humanity."[44] It is doubtful whether this promise of recognition as a benefactor of all humanity as a reward for burglary by coercion instead of force—"translating the Nietzschean Uebermensch into a pacific animal" as Adolf Berle phrased it—had much appeal to the Führer. King George VI, it is true, gave Roosevelt a large share of credit for preserving the peace. What had really persuaded Hitler to agree to a conference is uncertain. Doubt as to the adequacy of his military preparedness against a determined Czechoslovakia and its allies was presumably a factor. The last-minute urgency of Chamberlain and Daladier to have peace at whatever cost to Czechoslovakia was another.[45] The Munich Conference was held on September 29, and as is well known, Hitler received all that he had asked, though at the cost of a few days' delay. Czechoslovakia had suffered the first of the mortal blows that were within six months to extinguish her as an independent state.

Hull did not share the faith of Neville Chamberlain, or of Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson in Berlin, that the Munich settlement assured "peace in our time." At best, as he said to the French Ambassador, it might result in a "temporary peace." In his public statement on September 30 he tried to preserve a wholesome balance. The "immediate peace results," he said, "afford a universal sense of relief." He declined to pass upon the merits of the controversy which the agreement had settled.

> It is hoped [he added] that in any event the forces which stand for the principles governing peaceful and orderly international relations and their proper application should not relax, but redouble, their efforts to maintain these principles of order under law, resting on a sound economic foundation.[46]

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE END OF THE ARMS EMBARGO

SECRETARY HULL'S pessimism about the results of the Munich settlement was soon reinforced by Ambassador Bullitt's reports of French pessimism and by a speech by Hitler calling for further German rearmament. The President shared the Secretary's apprehension. On October 11, 1938, he announced an increment of $300,000,000 in expenditures for national defense and was soon emphasizing the special importance of a large increase in aircraft production.[1] The Secretary, Pierrepont Moffat reported, was "highly pleased over the President's decision to rearm in a drastic fashion," but at the same time he was deeply concerned over the faultfinding of columnists and editorial writers who were complaining that his policy was bankrupt.[2]

The Secretary was suffering tribulations, too, within his official family. Ambassador Kennedy, in a speech in London on October 19, set forth what he called "a pet theory of my own," the essence of which was that the democracies and the Axis powers, instead of harping on their irreconcilable disagreements, "could advantageously bend their energies toward solving their common problems by an attempt to reestablish good relations on a world basis." The speech naturally set the press and the public, at home and abroad, to speculating whether the Ambassador was forecasting a change of policy in Washington. The

Secretary was "very upset" and wished "that all Ambassadors would forego all speeches. He says," wrote Moffat, "that every time our foreign policy has run off the rocks it has been because of a speech made by one of our Ambassadors abroad." He asked why neither Welles nor Moffat had foreseen the danger in the speech when it was reviewed in advance. Welles, it seemed, had had his mind on Mexico, and Moffat, though he had warned mildly of repercussions, accepted the role of "the goat." The press was assured that Kennedy was not speaking for the Administration.[3]

Moffat also worked with Assistant Secretary Berle on a fifteen-minute radio address for the President which they thought "would undo the damage done by Kennedy's recent speech." The President rewrote and dramatized it, making it clear "that the line of demarcation between democracy and Naziism was one which could not be bridged." Mr. Hull, who had made but one change in the original draft, was called away from his croquet game to see and approve the final form. Delivered on the evening of October 26, 1938, to the *Herald Tribune* Forum, the speech contained, among other things, the following:

> It is becoming clear that peace by fear has no higher or more enduring quality than peace by the sword.
>
> There can be no peace if the reign of law is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force.
>
> There can be no peace if national policy adopts as

> a deliberate instrument the threat of war. . . .
>
> There can be no peace if humble men and women are not free to think their own thoughts, to express their own feelings, to worship God.[4]

The unbridgeable chasm between Nazi Germany and the Western democracies was soon highlighted by a series of merciless pogroms against the Jews of the Third Reich, in revenge for the assassination of a Nazi official by a young Jew in Paris. Feeling that mere words were inadequate to express American indignation at such atrocities, the State Department recommended that Ambassador Wilson be recalled from Berlin "for report and consultation." The President approved. In announcing the recall at his press conference on November 15, he inserted in the rather mild statement prepared in the State Department the sentence: "I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century civilization."[5]

The German Government responded by recalling Ambassador Hans Dieckhoff from Washington, and from this time until Germany's declaration of war against the United States over three years later neither Government was represented by an ambassador in the capital of the other.

Hugh Wilson, returning from Germany, arrived in New York on the day that Hull sailed for the Inter-American Conference at Lima.[6] Wilson came aboard Hull's ship for an hour's conference. "He gave me a graphic account of Germany's preparations and intentions for war," Hull recorded, "but little more than he had already conveyed in his dispatches from Berlin. My opinion that Munich did not mean peace was merely confirmed."[7] For several weeks to come the Secretary's attention was to be fixed on the Latin American scene. It was on board the S.S. *Santa Clara,* homeward bound from Lima, that he listened on the radio to one of Roosevelt's most significant pronouncements on foreign policy, his Annual Message to Congress of January 4, 1939.

The President warned that although one threat of war had been averted, it had become increasingly clear that world peace was not assured. "All about us," he said, "are threats of new aggression—military and economic." The fact that the United States "rightly" declined to intervene with arms to prevent aggression against others did not mean, said the President, that we must remain inactive. "There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people." One such "method short of war," the President indicated, might be amendment or repeal of the Neutrality Act. We had learned, he said, that this legislation might not only "operate unevenly and unfairly" but that it might "actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim." In the interest of our own self-preservation we should not let this happen again.[8]

The Secretary of State returned to Washington on January 7 and at once resumed the discussion of amending or repealing the Neutrality Act which had begun before his departure for Lima. State Department and President believed that the existing law, which would close the American arms market to England and France if they were attacked by Hitler, "was an incitement to Hitler to go to war." The State Department would have liked to see an outright repeal of the arms embargo, or failing that, an amendment giving the President some discretion as to whether and when an embargo should be proclaimed. With Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Hull came to agreement on a bill which the Senator agreed to sponsor. It proposed to wipe out the distinction between arms and other commodities and to put all trade with belligerent countries on a cash-and-carry basis. This would mean that if war came in Europe, England and France, if they had the ships and the money, could buy anything available, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, in the United States. Pittman introduced the bill in the Senate on March 20, 1939, and assured Hull that the prospect for its passage was good.[9]

Before this issue could come to a head, the aggressors were again on the march. Dissension having broken out between Czechs and Slovaks in the truncated state of Czechoslovakia, Hitler intervened on March 15, to make Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia protectorates of the Reich. Carpatho-Ukraine, the easternmost portion of once independent Czechoslovakia, was seized by Hungary, which with Poland had already appropriated ethnically kindred fragments of its territory. Three weeks later, April 7 (Good Friday, as it happened), Italian troops occupied the petty kingdom of Albania, across the Adriatic, and a few days later the Albanian crown was bestowed upon the King of Italy.

The State Department issued verbal condemnations of these acts of aggression, but what "methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words" were available? Nonrecognition for one —though one could question its strength and effectiveness. The United States continued to recognize the Czech and Albanian Ministers as though their governments still existed. In the Albanian case, little more could be done. With Czechoslovakia there had been a reciprocal trade agreement and a respectable volume of trade. The trade agreement was suspended, lest it profit Germany, and, as a measure short of war, countervailing duties were imposed upon imports from Germany. The theoretical ground was that the imports in question were subsidized by the German Government, but the timing of the action shows clearly that it was intended as reproof for the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Hull, who had earlier battled with Morgenthau over this same issue,[10] was resting in Florida when the decision was made, but he did not oppose it after his return, and he defended the new duties against German criticism.[11]

On Pan American Day, April 14, 1939, the President delivered to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union an address which had been prepared in the State Department. He acclaimed the accords reached by the American Republics at the recent Lima Conference and suggested that the nations of Europe would do well to follow the example of the Americas in adopting the principles of nonaggression, nonintervention, and renunciation of force in the settlement of controversies.[12]

Next day, April 15, the President launched his "Saturday surprise" appeal to Hitler and Mussolini. In this personal communication to the dictators he remarked that within a period of a few months three nations in Europe and one in Africa had been deprived of their independence through force or the threat of force, while in the Far East large areas of one nation were occupied by the armed forces of another. There were rumors of further aggressions impending, he said, and consequently widespread fear. He made it clear that he held Germany and Italy responsible for this state of apprehension, and he called upon Hitler and Mussolini for pledges that for ten, or preferably twenty-five, years they would not attack any one of thirty-one nations of Europe and the Near East, which he listed by name. He expressed confidence that in return he could secure pledges from the thirty-one that they would not attack Germany or Italy. With peace thus assured for a substantial period, the United States would be glad to participate in discussions of disarmament and the expansion of international trade.[13]

The "Saturday surprise" message was distinctly a Rooseveltian project, for which Hull had no enthusiasm. Hull says it was suggested to the President by Ambassador Bullitt in a telephone conversation. Whether or not this was literally true, there is no doubt that Roosevelt was receiving alarming reports that further aggressions were in preparation. Hitler had begun his agitation against Poland. Chamberlain, seeing at last that appeasement of Hitler was a failure, had joined France in a promise to aid Poland if attacked. England and France had extended similar guarantees to Rumania and to Greece, whose security seemed threatened by the Italian occupation of Albania. Europe was facing a new crisis, and the President felt an urge to do something that might ease the tension. Hull, who had little confidence in direct appeals to heads of foreign governments, warned the President that this appeal would not succeed. Roosevelt conceded that it might fail to halt the dictators' aggressive plans, but even then, he contended, "it would put Hitler and Mussolini on the spot for what they were—planners of the conquest of Europe." To this Hull agreed.

Roosevelt's draft of the message was carefully worked over in the State Department. Passages to which Hull objected as implying an American guarantee of possible European agreements were eliminated, and a final draft, in a tone somewhere between the President's enthusiasm and the Department's skepticism, was prepared by Sumner Welles. It was this that was dispatched to Berlin and Rome on April 15.[14]

In the United States, Latin America, and non-Axis Europe, reaction to the President's appeal was generally enthusiastic. In Italy and Germany, to no one's surprise, reaction was hostile. In Rome, Mussolini and Hermann Goering exchanged witticisms as to whether Roosevelt was suffering from the results of infantile paralysis or "an incipient mental disease." Neither Hitler nor Mussolini replied directly to Roosevelt's message. Mussolini brushed it off with a few contemptuous words in a speech on April 20. Hitler's reply came in a major speech to the Reichstag on April 28, which a member of his audience, the correspondent William L. Shirer, describes as "probably the most brilliant oration he ever gave." He described and answered Roosevelt's appeal with deadpan sarcasm, which kept his German audience roaring. The climax of his speech came in his announcement that he had addressed all, or nearly all, of the governments listed by Mr. Roosevelt and had received from each a denial that it felt threatened or that it had requested Mr. Roosevelt's intervention. Nevertheless, said the Führer, he was prepared "to give each of the States named an assurance of the kind desired by Mr. Roosevelt," if the state cared to request such assurance. It was significant, however, that he omitted Poland from the list of the states approached.[15]

In the eyes, probably, of most Germans and of some American isolationists, Hitler had had the better of the argument and had given Roosevelt a deserved rebuke. But Roosevelt, though naturally angered by the insolence with which the dictators had responded to his message, had achieved much of his purpose. He had, as he had predicted to Hull, "put Hitler and Mussolini on the spot for what they were," which no one of his stature had yet ventured to do; and he had, more clearly than before, associated the United States with those who would oppose further Axis aggression. This was cause for gratification in the European democracies, despite the absence of any hint that the United States would fight and despite the Administration's failure, as yet, to make any progress toward repeal or amendment of the arms embargo.

Senator Pittman, as mentioned earlier, had introduced in the Senate on March 20 a bill to amend the Neutrality Act by putting all trade with belligerent countries on a cash-and-carry basis. This proposal met prompt objection from the Chinese Government. Such a provision, if applied in the war in the Far East, as Stanley K. Hornbeck had warned the State Department, would obviously favor Japan. The President remarked, when it was called to his attention, that "while the cash-and-carry plan works all right in the Atlantic, it works all wrong in the Pacific." He had come to believe that "the existing Neutrality Act should be repealed *in toto* without any substitute."[16]

Pittman was willing to take steps to meet the Chinese objection[17] but saw no possibility of repealing the Neutrality Act as a whole. When hearings began in the Foreign Relations Committee on Pittman's bill and other proposals, Hull thought it best not to appear before the Committee. He learned that certain isolationist Senators were anxious to ask him whether the proposed changes in the Act were designed to aid England and France. He could not answer this query in the negative, since the primary purpose of the proposal was to deter Hitler from war by strengthening the position of England and France. But to answer yes would give a new handle to the isolationists, whereas to refuse to answer would lead to charges of concealment.[18]

The Secretary, therefore, avoided the Committee hearings and sought to influence Senatorial opinion through informal conferences, often in his apartment at the Carlton Hotel, where he could speak freely. "His language," says a contemporary, "was extremely salty." The coming conflict would not be "another goddam piddling dispute over a boundary line," but an assault on the peace of the world by "powerful nations, armed to the teeth, preaching the doctrine of naked force and practicing a philosophy of barbarism." By the arms embargo, he complained, the United States had "substituted a wretched little bob-tailed, sawed-off domestic statute for the established rules of international law." The embargo "conferred a gratuitous benefit on the probable aggressors" by closing the American arms market to those whom they might attack.[19]

The President was using his own more sophisticated powers of persuasion at the same time, but in spite of the best that he and Hull could do, Senator

Pittman reported early in May that he could not get his bill through the Senate, or even out of his Committee. The Administration then turned to the House of Representatives, though the prospects there were little brighter than in the Senate. On May 27, Hull sent to Chairman Pittman and to Sol Bloom, acting chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a document that had emerged from weeks of discussion in the State Department and set forth what the Department thought desirable in neutrality legislation. The essence of the six-point program proposed was repeal of the arms embargo and substitution of a cash-and-carry requirement for all commodities. Mr. Hull argued that this plan, excluding American ships and citizens from combat areas, was better designed than the existing law to prevent "incidents" involving American lives and property, and hence would be more effective in keeping the United States out of any war that might arise.[20]

Chairman Bloom on May 29 introduced a bill embodying these ideas, and the House considered it while the Secretary of State did his part in the ceremonies attending the visit of British King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to the United States. It fell to him to meet them when they crossed the international border at Niagara Falls on June 7, and to escort them thence to Washington. "The visit of the royal couple, which was one of virtual comradeship," Hull wrote later, "was very effective in improving and solidifying the already friendly relations between our two countries."[21]

On June 30, 1939, the House of Representatives passed the Bloom bill, but only by a slender margin and after amending it to restore the mandatory embargo on arms and ammunition. "The night session had lasted until 11:30," Adolf Berle noted; "a hundred Democratic members had gone home; half of those there had not discovered what it was all about . . ." The slight concession to the point of view of the Administration in omitting "implements of war" from the embargo provision was of no real value. Hull issued a public statement next day expressing the Administration's disappointment at the mutilation of the bill and arguing that his proposed six-point program "would be far more effective in the interests of peace and in keeping the country out of war than the present embargo or any equivalent." American diplomatic missions in Europe reported that the action of the House was generally regarded as a defeat for the Administration and as reassuring to the Axis Governments.[22]

What slight hope remained for a satisfactory bill now rested in the Senate, where the erratic Pittman was ready to make another effort. As reported by R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the State Department and often its contact man with Congress, Pittman saw little chance of actually passing the bill before Congress adjourned to escape Washington's July heat. He believed, however, that he could get a favorable vote from his committee which could be construed as promising affirmative action at the next session of Congress. Moore believed this strategy should have been followed. The Secretary, who was receiving almost daily reports forecasting early war in Europe, thought such delay might be disastrous. He wanted the arms embargo repealed at once. At his press conference on July 11, the day set for the committee's vote, he stated yet again, with the President's approval, the arguments for his cash-and-carry program. The Foreign Relations Committee, it seemed, was not to be thus hurried into action. It voted, 12 to 11, to defer further action on neutrality till the next session, beginning in January, 1940.[23]

The extreme importance which the President and the Secretary of State attached to elimination of the arms embargo as a deterrent to aggression is evident from their unwillingness to give up after this series of rebuffs. The State Department prepared a fresh statement of its case, which the President sent to Congress with an urgent message on July 14. The existing embargo, the statement asserted, "plays into the hands of those nations which have taken the lead in building up their fighting power." It encouraged "a general state of war both in Europe and in Asia" and was thus "prejudicial to the highest interests and to the peace and to the security of the United States."[24]

On July 18 a group of Senate leaders of both parties met at the White House, upon the President's call, with the President, Vice President Garner, and Secretary Hull. It was in this meeting, destined to become famous, that Senator Borah asserted confidently that there would be no European war in the near future and, when challenged by Hull, declared that his sources of information in Europe were more dependable than those of the State Department. Borah's arrogance virtually ended the meeting. "Tears actually came to Hull's eyes," says one account, "and when the discussion began again and someone asked his opinion, he said bitterly that he had nothing further to offer in view of Borah's remark." A canvass of opinion of the Senators present led to an inescapable conclusion, which Garner reported to the President: "Well, Captain, we may as well face the facts. You haven't got the votes, and that's all there is to it." The meeting adjourned, and soon thereafter (August 5), the Congress, with no further action on neutrality.[25]

Two communiqués were issued after the White House meeting. One simply stated the consensus of the Senators that no legislation on neutrality was feasible during the current session of Congress. The second was designed to place responsibility where it belonged.

> The President and the Secretary of State [it said] maintained the definite position that failure by the Senate to take action now would weaken the leadership of the United States in exercising its potent influence in the cause of preserving peace among other nations in the event of a new crisis in Europe between now and next January.[26]

"Neutrality Disaster" is the title that Hull gave to the chapter in his *Memoirs* which tells the story of the failure of Congress to repeal the arms embargo in the summer of 1939. The implication is that that failure led to Hitler's decision to attack Poland and hence to the outbreak of World War II. Yet Hull admits that there is no proof of such a cause-and-effect relationship. "No one can say definitely," he writes, "that the failure of our efforts to lift the arms embargo was a final, or even an important, factor in Hitler's ultimate decision to go to war." That it was a factor that must have had some weight in Hitler's decision, that it must have "encouraged him to go ahead," the Secretary felt certain, and this conclusion was supported by reports of opinion in both Paris and London in July, 1939.[27] Messrs. Langer and Gleason, in their exhaustive survey of American diplomacy in this period, reach a tentative conclusion that repeal of the embargo would not have altered Hitler's plans. "In any event," they write, "his plans had been laid long before Congress reached its decision. The chances are that he would have proceeded with them come what might . . ."[28] The fact remains that Hull and Roosevelt saw the one chance, however frail, of using America's power to preserve the peace, and that Congress, from whatever motives, refused to take it.

On August 1, 1939, Secretary Hull departed for a three-week vacation at White Sulphur Springs. Such was the intransigence of Hitler's demands of Poland that the Secretary was sure that war could not be long delayed, and he wished to enjoy a period of rest before taking up the extra load of work that war in Europe would inevitably entail. He remained, however, in close contact with the Department through a telephone line direct to his hotel room and a daily mail pouch containing paraphrases of the most urgent dispatches from Europe.[29] During his absence, his associates in the Department were active in preparing for the impending emergency. In conferences with representatives of the Departments of Justice, War, Navy, and Treasury, they agreed upon the numerous proclamations, executive orders, and other documents which an outbreak of war would necessitate.[30]

On the afternoon of August 21 came the "bombshell" announcement that Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would fly to Moscow on the 23rd to sign a nonaggression pact with Foreign Commissar Molotov of the Soviet Union. Hull returned to Washington on the 23rd, and the President, who had been vacationing on the cruiser *Tuscaloosa*, arrived on the next day. In the hectic week that followed there were appeals from the President to Hitler and to President Moscicki of Poland to settle their differences by peaceful process—appeals in which the Secretary had no faith, except in so far as they would keep the record straight. A suggestion from Ambassador Kennedy that the British hoped the United States would put pressure on Poland to yield to Hitler's ultimatum received, as Pierrepont Moffat recorded, "short shrift from the President, the Secretary, and Sumner Welles down."[31] An appeal from the President to the King of Italy to exercise his influence for peace was courteously received by His Majesty, who commented only that as a constitutional sovereign he could do no more than refer it to his Government.[32]

On September 1, German troops entered Poland and German planes began raining bombs on Polish cities. Two days later Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.

The first official American response to the outbreak of hostilities was the dispatching, September 1, to Germany and Poland, and also to Great Britain, France, and Italy, though the last three were not yet at war, of appeals to refrain from bombing nonmilitary objectives. On the night of Sunday, September 3, after Great Britain and France had declared war, the President talked to the American public in a fireside chat. "I hope the United States will keep out of this war," the President said. "I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end." It was characteristic of Secretary Hull's cautious attitude that he advised the President to delete from his speech a statement that though the United States would remain a neutral nation, he could not ask (as President Wilson had done) "that every American remain neutral in thought as well." Hull feared that any hint of unneutrality on the President's part would be seized upon by the isolationist opposition when the President again asked

Congress to repeal the arms embargo. The President retained the passage, nevertheless.[33]

The State Department was prompt in making adaptations to the war situation. To meet the immediately pressing problem of repatriating the thousands of Americans caught in Europe by the war, and such other responsibilities as liaison with the Red Cross, and representing the interests of other governments in belligerent capitals, a Special Division was established, with former Ambassadors Breckinridge Long and Hugh Wilson as Special Assistants to the Secretary. To insure continuous and up-to-date contacts with Europe, the Secretary instituted an around-the-clock service in the Department, with an average of three officers on duty throughout the night. At the Secretary's request, also, a radio listening group was set up, to monitor European short-wave broadcasts from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. and to provide the President, Secretary, and Under Secretary with hourly bulletins. In this way the Department and White House often received information an hour or more before it became available through other channels.[34]

Under the existing Neutrality Act the President had no choice but to issue a neutrality proclamation, thus activating the arms embargo and other features of the law. This Mr. Roosevelt did on September 5, but only after some debate as to whether Canada, which had not yet declared war, must be included. The Secretary opposed including Canada, though most of his advisers held that the declaration of war by the United Kingdom applied automatically to the Dominions. The President telephoned Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who, perhaps hoping to get some planes across the border ahead of the embargo, said Canada was not yet at war. The neutrality proclamation was not extended to Canada until September 10. "I think it is bad law as well as bad policy," commented Pierrepont Moffat.[35]

A new question arose on September 17, when Russian armed forces invaded eastern Poland, in accordance with a secret annex to the Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact. Since there had been no declaration of war, was the President legally bound to apply the Neutrality Act against Russia? The consensus in the State Department favored delay. The situation bore resemblances to that in China, which Japanese troops had invaded without a declaration of war. Having omitted to recognize a state of war between Japan and China, could the United States without embarrassment recognize a state of war between Russia and Poland?[36] There were, however, more fundamental considerations. As Hull remembered the discussions, he and the President decided not to subject Russia to the Neutrality Act because they feared that "to place her on the same belligerent footing as Germany . . . might thrust her further into Hitler's arms.We had the feeling," Hull explained, "that Russia and Germany would not become full allies, and that Hitler had not abandoned his ambitions with regard to Russia." The path must be kept open for Russia to join the anti-Hitler forces.[37]

In a conversation between Hull and the President on September 1, the two had agreed that Congress should be called in special session for the purpose of amending the Neutrality Act along the lines that had been vainly proposed in June and July. Specifically, both statesmen desired to have the arms embargo repealed and the sale to belligerents of arms and all other commodities placed on a cash-and-carry-basis. This would enable England and France, so long as they controlled the seas and had the ships and the cash, to purchase all available types of arms and war materials in the American market. At the same time, the proposed legislation, by prohibiting American ships and citizens from entering combat zones, would reduce the risk of incidents which might tend to provoke hostilities with Germany.

Thus legislation which was basically designed to aid England and France and thereby to protect the United States from what Roosevelt and Hull foresaw as the disastrous consequences of an Axis victory, could be supported chiefly with the argument that it was the best safeguard against involvement of the United States in war. This was the line of argument that was used, for, as Hull has written, "with isolationism still powerful and militant in the United States, it would have been the peak of folly to make aid to the democracies an issue in connection with neutrality legislation." Stress was therefore placed upon the advantages of keeping American ships and citizens out of danger. The further reasoning that was in the minds of Hull and Roosevelt, but which could not yet be prudently used with Congress, was that aid to Britain and France "would afford us a better chance of keeping out of the war . . . because, if Britain and France won the war, we could remain at peace, whereas if Germany won there was every likelihood that we should soon have to fight."[38]

Congress had been called to meet on September 21. Consideration of the message in which the President was to propose repeal of the arms embargo occupied much of the State Department's time on the 18th and 19th. The discussion revealed a divergence of views between the President and the Secretary. The President favored a brief presentation of the modifications desired. The Secretary, who felt that "a single false step might lose the whole battle," thought "that the essential arguments should be uttered by the President as only in this way can they get the widest publicity." A number of alternative drafts were prepared. The President made use of them and of frequent consultations with the Secretary, but characteristically reworked the State Department's suggestions into a message that was essentially his.[39]

In his message the President expressed regret that Congress had passed and that he had signed the Neutrality Act of 1935, with its radical departure from traditional concepts of international law. What he now proposed was a partial return to those earlier concepts. The American market should be freely opened to the belligerents; the resulting orders would stimulate business, provide new jobs, and aid in building up the national defense. But the President would not assert the claim to "freedom of the seas" of which the United States had made much on earlier occasions. Far from claiming immunity for American ships and passengers in "combat areas," he would have them excluded from such areas and from the risks involved. Let the belligerents send their own ships and haul away what they needed, cash-and-carry. That this arrangement would be very much to the advantage of the democracies he did not say. This fact was of course well known to his hearers, but the points in his message that they applauded, Pierrepont Moffat noted, were chiefly his references to keeping American ships out of danger zones and the United States out of war.[40]

A meeting of President and Secretary of State with congressional leaders on the day before Congress opened had given hope for a nonpartisan approach to the question of repeal. Though Senator Pittman proved, as usual, difficult to deal with, and though Senator Borah, Father Coughlin, and aviator Charles A. Lindbergh sounded off against the Administration's program, valuable support came from Republicans. Henry L. Stimson, in particular, by letters to the newspapers and a radio address on October 5, made known his agreement on this issue with Roosevelt and Hull.[41]

Meanwhile, on the day of the President's message, the Secretary had issued a public statement to cover one point that the President had not taken up: the argument of the opposition that any change in the rules of neutrality after the outbreak of war would be an unneutral act.

> This nation, or any neutral nation [he said], has a right during a war to change its national policies whenever experience shows the necessity for such change for the protection of its interests and safety. . . . In advocating repeal of the embargo provisions . . . we are endeavoring to return to a more rational position and one that is more in keeping with real neutrality under international law. The question whether such proposed action is unneutral should not, in my judgment, be a matter of serious debate.[42]

Senator Pittman's bill, technically an amendment to the bill passed by the House in the preceding June, was reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee on September 28. It contained features that were objectionable to the State Department, especially what were thought to be unnecessarily severe restrictions upon the movements of American ships. The Administration hesitated to press for changes, fearing that it might thereby jeopardize passage of the bill. But American commercial and shipping interests exerted pressure which eventually brought the bill for the most part into line with what the Department wanted. The Senate passed it, October 27, by a vote of 63 to 30; the House on November 2, 243-181. The final conference report was adopted November 3, and the President signed the bill into law on November 4. The hoped-for nonpartisan support had been realized only in small measure. In the final voting the bill received only six Republican votes in the Senate, 19 in the House.[43]

In a public statement on the day the bill was signed the Secretary expressed his gratification at the changes effected by it. He was satisfied, he said, that the new Act would greatly assist the Administration in its "first and most sacred task" of keeping the country secure and at peace. Privately he deplored the fact that Congress, which had made these changes now, had refused to make them in the preceding spring or summer, when they "would have been far more effective for the cause of the peace-loving nations."[44] But his bitterness at this failure he kept to himself.

On the day that he signed the new law the President issued a proclamation lifting the arms embargo and defining the combat areas from which American ships and American citizens were excluded. These included the waters adjacent to the British Isles and France, the North and Baltic Seas. Norway from Bergen north was still accessible, as were the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Africa south of the latitude of the Canaries. Outside the combat areas, American ships could enter ports of the belligerents, but not with shipments of arms, ammunition, or implements of war.[45]

For the belligerent British and French the new law—the Fourth Neutrality Act, as it came to be called—contained disadvantages as well as benefits. They could now buy war materials in the United States on a cash-and-carry basis. On the other hand, American ships, which previously could freely enter their ports with cargoes of goods not classified as arms etc., were now excluded altogether. This meant the withdrawal of over ninety ships from Atlantic routes. "By taking our ships off the seas," wrote one observer, "the bill aided the German blockade of Britain as effectively as if all our ships had been torpedoed."[46]

CHAPTER TWELVE

FROM NEUTRALITY TO NONBELLIGERENCY

QUESTIONS of how the Fourth Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939, was to be interpreted arose at once. United States ships were now barred from trade with most of Western Europe, but could such ships be transferred to alien registry without actual sale, and so escape the prohibition? Could ships owned in the United States, by private parties or by the Government through the Maritime Commission, be sold to belligerent governments? Two days after passage of the Act the United States Lines applied for permission to transfer nine ships to Panama registry. The President at first approved. Hull hesitated, but finally concluded that mere change of registry for the purpose of trading in the combat areas would violate the spirit of the law. The President concurred and the application was withdrawn. Other rulings forbade the United States Maritime Commission to sell its ships to belligerent governments, but permitted sale to private purchasers, who then, like other private owners, could sell to the British and French Governments. In these indirect ways, the United States was able to make limited contributions to the solution of the shipping problem faced by the British and French.[1]

In a war which the British hoped to win by economic strangulation of Germany, it was inevitable that controversies over neutral rights should arise between Great Britain and the United States, controversies that called up unhappy memories of the 1914-1917 period. The Secretary of State and his advisers were here caught between a desire to assist the British in every reasonable way and a compulsion to defend American neutral rights against unreasonable interference. The question was what was reasonable?[2]

On the day after Great Britain declared war, Hull talked with the new British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, on ways and means of keeping controversies at a minimum. For several months the attempt succeeded remarkably well, but by December the British had begun or intensified a number of practices that caused resentment and the voicing of noticeable anti-British sentiment in the United States. Among these were censorship of American mails, especially from the Pan American Clipper during its stops at Bermuda; the forcing of American ships into British ports in the combat zones for search of their cargoes; assertion of the right to seize exports from Germany, even though shipped from neutral ports; the setting up of a system of navicerts (certifying the innocent character of cargoes before the ships left American ports) without prior agreement with the United States on details. To these interferences with neutral rights was added a decision that injured the United States in a different manner—a decision to conserve dollar exchange by shifting purchases of tobacco from the United States to Turkey. Secretary Hull was also concerned over the possibility that British interference with American trade in wartime might expose that trade to postwar disadvantages. At the level of theory, the position of the United States had been stated by Secretary Hull, September 14, 1939. The United States, he said, had not abandoned any of the rights to which it and its nationals were entitled under international law. It would adopt such measures as might seem most practical and prudent if those rights should be violated. In practice, however, the State Department paid less attention to questions of legality than to the actual results of British measures. The United States wished to do nothing that would hamper Great Britain in winning the war, but were the gains to England—for example, in censoring the mails at Bermuda—sufficient to outweigh the consequent friction and resentment? Over such questions as this, a degree of acrimony crept into the correspondence with Great Britain which gave concern to firm pro-Ally members of the Department, such as Economic Adviser Herbert Feis.[3]

Early in March, 1940, the British and French Governments sent two experts on commercial warfare to Washington to iron out misunderstandings. This they succeeded in doing, for the most part, and any remaining grievances were completely overshadowed by the perils implicit in the Nazi victories of April, May, and June.

In the meantime, a little war within the big war had begun and ended, and this too had necessitated some difficult decisions by the United States. The Soviet Union, after occupying eastern Poland, had demanded and received from the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the right to establish military bases in their territory, and had thereupon stationed garrisons of 20,000 troops in each. As soon became apparent, this step was but a preliminary to the absorption of these three small countries into the U.S.S.R.

When Finland was confronted with similar demands, she refused, and prepared to defend herself. Early in October, 1939, the Finnish Minister in Washington, Hjalmar Procopé, approached Mr. Hull with a request that the Secretary say something to dissuade the Kremlin from pressing unreasonable demands on Finland. The Secretary declined, saying that the United States was not in a position to project itself "into political controversies between two other countries," and that, even if it did so, the intercession would almost certainly provoke an unfavorable reaction in Moscow.[4] A few days later, upon returning from a speaking engagement in New York, Mr. Hull learned that the President had yielded to Finnish and Swedish pressure and had himself drafted a telegram to the Kremlin, which he sent over for Hull's inspection and criticism. The Secretary, wrote Pierrepont Moffat, "did not like the idea at all, fearing that for the President to intervene in one case would create a precedent that would come home to plague us." The President, however, had gone too far to turn back, and Hull could only suggest changes in wording. The telegram, addressed to Mikhail Kalinin, titular President of the Soviet Union, was dispatched October 11. Alluding to the long friendship between the United States and Finland, it expressed the hope that the U.S.S.R. would make no demands on Finland that would tend to impair its independence or to injure good relations between the two neighbors.[5]

As Hull had foreseen, the intercession was not well received in Moscow. President Kalinin's reply was polite but noncommittal, but Foreign Commissar Molotov indulged in sarcasm at Mr. Roosevelt's expense, both in an interview with United States Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt and in a subsequent speech.[6] This rebuff did not prevent the United States from making one further attempt to prevent a Russo-Finnish war. Negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union broke down November 13. On the 28th Ambassador Bullitt telephoned from Paris that Russia was planning to attack and urged that the United States take some preventive action quickly. After consulting with the President by telephone, the Secretary on November 29, dispatched to Moscow and Helsinki, and also gave to the press, a statement deploring the threatened spread of the war area and offering the good offices of the United States in settling the dispute if both governments should desire it.[7] The offer was accepted by Helsinki, rejected by Moscow, and on the afternoon of its dispatch Russian troops and planes attacked Finland.

At the State Department next day the Secretary remarked to Sumner Welles, Moffat, and other advisers that "we could not remain silent in the face of the Russian bombing of Finland and that we should prepare a strong statement setting forth the views of this Government." Sumner Welles suggested that it would be even better to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Such a dramatic action, he thought, would have a deterrent effect on Russia and also on Germany and Japan. The Secretary was doubtful. He acknowledged that such an action would be extremely popular at home for the time being, but warned "that the tide would recede and we would be left 'holding the bag.'" Pierrepont Moffat argued strongly against such a breach of relations. He disliked the implication that recognition was a sign of approval of a nation's behavior or its form of government, and he thought it important to maintain an official source of information at the Soviet capital.[8]

Apparently the Secretary gave little serious thought to a breaking of relations with the Soviet Union. The President issued a statement deploring the outbreak of war and an appeal to both belligerents to refrain from bombing civilian populations. Upon receipt of convincing evidence that Russian planes were bombing unfortified Finnish towns, the United States instituted a "moral embargo" upon the sale of airplanes to the Soviet Union. The Neutrality Act, however, was not applied to the Russo-Finnish conflict. Its application would have prevented sale of arms to Finland by private exporters; this the Government did not wish. Furthermore, the Secretary continued to believe, as at the time when Russia invaded Poland, that the Soviet-Nazi partnership was certain to be short-lived and that "eventually Russia would come over to the side of the Allies. We had to be careful," wrote the Secretary later, "not to push her in the other direction."[9]

In spite of the desire not to antagonize the Soviet Union, the United States, as Hull remarks, did "take a few modest steps in aid of Finland." The emotional Finnish Minister, Mr. Procopé, considered the aid that he was able to get from the United States rather less than modest. Finland was in desperate need of war materials in its struggle with the Russian giant. Secretary Hull, always with a cautious eye on the isolationists in Congress, would hear of no sale or transfer of arms by the United States Government to Finland. He and the isolationist Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, successfully opposed the President's halfhearted efforts to find surplus arms in Army and Navy stores that might be thus disposed of. They were supported by General George Marshall, out of sensitive concern for the needs of the United States. Through the President's intervention, the Export-Import Bank provided Finland with a credit of $10,000,000. It was stipulated that this should not be used for the purchase of arms, but Procopé was told there would be no objection if he bought agricultural products and exchanged them for arms in England!

More the Executive could not do for the Finns without legislation. Early in January, 1940, presumably stimulated by Procopé's persistent importuning for a loan of $60,000,000, Senator Prentiss M. Brown of Michigan introduced a bill providing for an unrestricted loan of that amount to Finland. The Finnish Minister hoped for firm presidential support for this measure, but the President, "warned again and again by Mr. Hull that the opposition was 'laying for the Administration,' "[10] left the proposal wholly to the discretion of Congress, merely remarking in a message to the Vice President and Speaker: "There is without doubt in the United States a great desire for some action to assist Finland to finance the purchase of agricultural surpluses and manufactured products, not including implements of war."[11]

It is not altogether surprising that Minister Procopé, after seeing the message, came to Moffat's office in a distraught condition, "wringing his hands and pulling out his hair." He called the message a "tragic document," which could not have been either written or approved by the President. He demanded to see the Secretary, who discreetly declined.[12]

Even the President's modest suggestion was bitterly attacked in Congress, which after long debate passed a measure, signed March 2, 1940, which merely raised the capital of the Export-Import Bank from $100 to $200 millions with provisos, first, that no one country should receive a loan of more than $20 millions, and, second, that none of the proceeds should be expended for arms, ammunition, or implements of war. Finland was not named.[13] By this time the Russo-Finnish War was practically over.

Informed early in March, 1940, that Finland had asked Russia to indicate its peace terms, Secretary

Hull attempted to aid the Finns by discreet hints to Moscow. Through Ambassador Steinhardt the Secretary intimated that the American attitude toward future economic relations with the Soviet Union was likely to be influenced by the kind of peace that Russia made with Finland. Moderation in Russia's demands upon Finland could be expected to contribute to a co-operative attitude in the United States.[14]

It is improbable that such hints had any influence on the policy of the Kremlin. By the treaty signed March 12, 1940, Finland retained her independence. Otherwise the terms exacted were severe in surrender of territory, population, and economic and military concessions to Russia. In Washington the State Department prepared a statement which the President issued on March 13. It acclaimed the Finnish people for "their unexcelled valor and strong resistance in the face of overwhelming armed forces" and declared that they had "won the moral right to live in everlasting peace and independence in the land they have so bravely defended. . . . The ending of this war," the statement continued rather cryptically, "does not yet clarify the inherent right of small nations to the maintenance of their integrity against attack by superior force."[15]

Meanwhile, from the collapse of Poland under the German offensive in September, 1939, to the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April, 1940, French and British troops faced Germans along the Franco-German border with no significant activity. Such fighting as there was between the chief antagonists took place at sea. It was the period of the "phony war."

During the autumn, Washington was in receipt of persistent hints from neutral and German sources that Hitler was ready to make peace if only the United States would take the initiative. To discuss these suggestions Hull called a meeting of his departmental advisers, including the experienced negotiator, Norman Davis, for Sunday, October 8. There the pros and cons were debated and a draft of a possible proposal was prepared, in which the belligerents would be invited to state their terms, with the United States acting as intermediary. Before the meeting ended, however, the Secretary explained why he was opposed to such an initiative on the part of the United States. With the military successes so far all on the German side, it could not be expected that Hitler would consent to surrender any of his territorial gains, whether in Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. A peace that left these gains in Hitler's hands the Allies ought not to accept or the United States to encourage. Any peace suggestion that the United States might make now would be useless or worse; it would tend to weaken the Allied position. This forthright statement by the Secretary apparently ended all thought in Washington of an American peace initiative in that phase of the war, though it did not end the inflow of rumors and suggestions from Europe.[16] Nor did it prevent the creation in the Department of a special committee to study questions of peace terms and postwar reconstruction. Headed at first by Sumner Welles, this committee was destined to play an important part in planning for postwar international organization.[17]

It was also in October, 1939, that Hull and Roosevelt were discussing the sending of a personal representative of the President to the Vatican. This possibility had been in the President's mind for some time. Hull and Welles had talked of it, chiefly on the ground that the Vatican would be a useful source of information, especially on developments in Italy, Germany, and Spain. Ambassador William Phillips in Rome, consulted by Welles, recommended the establishment of regular diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The matter was brought to a head in a letter from the President to Hull, October 2, 1939, which emphasized the advantages to be derived by working with the Vatican on the growing problem of refugees, both Christian and Jewish.[18] Inquiries in Rome revealed that the proposed arrangement would be acceptable there. On December 24, 1939, the President made public his Christmas letter to Pope Pius XII (whom he had known some years earlier as Cardinal Pacelli), and at the same time announced that he was appointing Myron C. Taylor, with the rank of Ambassador, as his personal representative at the Vatican. Aside from co-operation in meeting the refugee problem, it seems clear that President Roosevelt hoped also that friendly collaboration with the Vatican might be of service in preventing the further spread of the war—particularly through

Italian participation—and in promoting a just peace.

In Secretary Hull's estimation, the establishment of this new relationship was valuable. "A more suitable selection than Mr. Taylor could not have been made," he wrote; and "it developed that the Pope had the same realistic approach to the problem of peace in Europe as ourselves, and was determined not to put forward ideas for settlement unless a peace could be won that would last. That time was not to come until Germany lay in shambles."[19]

Another American project of the "phony war" period was a proposed organization of neutrals, which seems first to have been proposed to the President and Secretary of State by Sumner Welles in January, 1940. The plan eventually formulated and proposed looked ahead to the end of hostilities and called for studies of the most effective means of restoring respect for international law, assuring the limitation and reduction of armaments, and establishing a sound international economic system. On February 9, 1940, Mr. Hull announced that the State Department had begun informal conversations for these purposes with other neutral governments. The plan got off to a rather unpropitious start because of skepticism about achieving the ends in view without the participation of the powerful belligerents. It was lost sight of in the general upheaval that followed the Nazi spring offensive.[20]

One other diplomatic episode of this period must be mentioned here—one, however, to which Secretary Hull's relation was distinctly negative. In February, 1940, the President sent Sumner Welles on what was primarily a fact-finding mission to the principal European capitals: Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London.[21] Early in February, Mr. Hull relates, the President inquired whether he would have any objection to Mr. Welles's being sent to Europe "to see whether there were any prospects for peace." Hull offered no objection but observed that with the war approaching a critical period, the suggestion of a peace mission, with the rumors it was sure to start, would create confusion and discourage the democracies, since any peace now would have to be on Hitler's terms.

Hull suspected, as did Secretary Harold L. Ickes and others, that the idea of the mission had originated with Welles.[22] There is good reason, however, to believe that the President had such a mission already in mind when Welles's return from a vacation about February 1 fixed attention on him as a suitable envoy. An accumulation of reports forecasting a formidable German spring offensive apparently led the President to make one desperate effort to find a basis for peace before Europe exploded into real war. Welles himself described his mission as a "forlorn hope."[23] It is possible that Roosevelt regarded Welles's mission as preparation for what at a later time would have been termed a "summit meeting." Rexford Tugwell believes that if Welles had found substantial encouragement for agreement on peace terms, the President would have invited Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Reynaud to meet him on neutral soil, or perhaps at sea, where "the famous charm, backed by the mightily increasing power of the United States, would have its chance."[24]

In announcing the Welles mission, February 9, the President stated that the Under Secretary would visit the European capitals "solely for the purpose of advising the President and the Secretary of State as to present conditions in Europe." He added that Mr. Welles would make "no proposals or commitments in the name of the United States Government." The second assertion was not entirely frank. It is plain from Welles's account of his interview with Hitler that he was authorized to offer what the authors of *American White Paper* termed "the same old basis of disarmament and an opening of trade," which Roosevelt had vainly dangled before the eyes of Hitler and Mussolini in April of 1939. For such rather shadowy promises it was perhaps hoped that Hitler would surrender his conquests and bestow upon Europe that priceless boon, "freedom from fear."[25]

As Hull had perhaps foreseen, the President's announcement alarmed the isolationists on the one hand and the pro-Allies group on the other; it disturbed the British and annoyed Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt. It also gave rise to rumors of dissension between Hull and Roosevelt and between Hull and Welles. To quiet such rumors the Secretary issued a statement on February 14, remarking upon the almost uniform agreement on foreign affairs between himself and the President and adding what was probably the highest praise of Welles that he ever uttered:

> As to Mr. Welles [said the Secretary], I regard him as one of my most trusted personal friends and loyal co-workers and it is always in that spirit that we discuss the various phases of our duties and problems. I do not think a more capable person could be sent upon the proposed European mission than Mr. Welles.[26]

This is no place to tell the story of the Welles tour of exploration. He arrived in Rome February 25, went from there in turn to Berlin, Paris, and London, and returned to Rome March 16. He sailed from Italy March 20 and arrived in New York on the 28th. He had interviewed the four heads of government, their foreign ministers, and other important personages, as well as the Pope. Nowhere, except possibly in Rome, had the President's hopes for peace found serious encouragement. Welles saw no chance for peace negotiations based on political, territorial, or economic adjustments. The chief concern of the belligerents was security. If the President, supported by the other nations of the Western Hemisphere, could bring forward a practicable plan for security and disarmament, Welles believed that even the Nazis might accept it. This was the burden of his confidential report to the President and Secretary of State. Hull praised his report as "superb" but added the all-too-true appraisal: "No one could have gleaned more information . . . than he, but nothing he learned gave us any basis for action."[27]

The German invasion of Norway, April 9, 1940, and of France and the Low Countries a month later was followed, necessarily, by presidential proclamations applying the Neutrality Act to Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The principal practical effect of this action was to extend the combat area to include northern Norway.[28]

The King of Norway and the Queen of the Netherlands escaped to England. Governments-in-exile of these states and eventually of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Poland were set up in London, and throughout the war the United States continued to treat them as the legitimate governments of their occupied countries.

The German occupation of Denmark and the subjection of the Danish Government to German control raised questions about the future of the Danish possessions, Iceland and Greenland. State Department maps showed Greenland wholly and Iceland partly in the Western Hemisphere. Occupation of either by Germany would have been considered inadmissible. Iceland helped in solving its part of the problem by asserting its rights to control its own foreign relations independently of Denmark. The United States, therefore, established diplomatic relations with the Icelandic Government. It did not object when in May the British Government landed troops there to prevent possible German occupation, with assurance that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the war ended.

About Greenland, Hull was much more touchy. The United States had long since asserted that Greenland was covered by the Monroe Doctrine and its corollary, the No-Transfer principle. When Canada suggested sending a small force thither to guard valuable cryolite mines against possible German attack, Hull warned both the British and the Canadian Governments that the United States would object to occupation of Greenland by forces of either. He arranged to have the local authorities supplied with artillery for protection of the mines but rejected for the time being their request for a United States force for their protection.[29]

The rapid development of the German offensive and the exposure of Allied weakness brought desperate appeals to the United States for direct aid. Winston Churchill, who on May 10 replaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister, appealed to Roosevelt on the fifteenth for a declaration of nonbelligerency by the United States; in other words, for assurance that the United States would render assistance to the Allies without actually going to war. Premier Reynaud of France pleaded for an outright declaration of war, as did the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

To all such pleas the United States could only give negative replies. Public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to American participation in the war.[30] Furthermore, the United States had little that it could immediately contribute to the war effort other than its productive capacity, and this was already at the disposal of the Allies. Participation in the war under existing circumstances was "unthinkable," as Hull informed the Australian Minister.

Yet Hull and Roosevelt did not share the opinion of Ambassador Kennedy in London, who observed that if the American people should have to fight to protect their lives, they would "do better fighting in [their] own back yard." "It seemed to us," Hull wrote, "we should do better to keep the fighting away from our own back yard. . . . Of one point the President and I had not the slightest doubt; namely, that an Allied victory was essential to the security of the United States."[31] An effort was made to hurry a carrier-load of war planes to France, but France had fallen before they could be delivered. The German offensive had revealed the crucial importance of the airplane. In discussing with the President the measures necessary to strengthen the defenses of the United States and increase its capacity to aid the Allies, Hull startled his chief by suggesting that he ask for a ten-fold increase in plane production— from the current 5,000 to 50,000 annually. The President accepted the suggestion and included it in his special message to Congress of May 16, 1940. In all, he asked for appropriation of an additional $1,182,000,000 for all branches of the armed forces.[32]

With France facing defeat in the north, the policy of Italy, involving control of the Mediterranean, became a matter of great concern, and Roosevelt was urged by the French, the British, and the Vatican to make another effort to dissuade Mussolini from entering the war. Having already attempted this through the appointment of Myron Taylor and the Welles mission, the President doubted the usefulness of further appeals to Il Duce. The Secretary of State was even more skeptical. "My own faith in the value of these personal appeals had always been low," he wrote. "It was even lower now, in view of the failure of such appeals as he had made in recent years."[33] Despite such reluctance in the State Department, the President yielded to pressure from overseas, and on April 29 dispatched the first of several personal notes to Mussolini, urging him to keep the peace and intimating in a guarded way that the further spread of the war might bring in the United States on the anti-Axis side. As Hull had foreseen, these appeals were received by Il Duce with scant courtesy and growing irritation, and on June 10 the Italian dictator proclaimed Italy's entry into the war.[34]

President Roosevelt's immediate response to the Italian move was voiced that same evening in an address to the graduating class of the University of Virginia. After recounting his efforts to keep Italy out of the war, the President announced: "On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor."[35] More important than this famous thrust at Mussolini was the President's announcement of American policy from then on. Mr. Hull has recorded that neither he nor the President shared the widespread opinion that the German victories and Italy's entry meant the end of the war. "We were," he wrote, "more determined than ever to provide Britain, plus the remnants of the overrun democracies, with all the help we could." It was in this spirit that the President told his hearers at Charlottesville:

> In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense.[36]

It was in the declaration that "we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation" that the President unequivocally abandoned any pretense of old-fashioned neutrality toward the wars in Europe and Asia. Increasingly from now on the position of the United States was that of a nonbelligerent.

Because of Italy's entry into the war, another presidential proclamation added the Mediterranean and Red Sea to the combat area and subjected Italy to other provisions of the Neutrality Act.[37]

It was soon after the Italian declaration of war and before the fall of France—France, under Marshal Pétain as Premier, surrendered on June 22—that

President Roosevelt reconstructed his Cabinet by bringing in two prominent Republicans, Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy. Stimson, long in public life, had served as Secretary of War under President Taft and as Secretary of State under President Hoover. Knox was publisher of the *Chicago Daily News* and had been the Republican vice presidential candidate in 1936. Both belonged to the more internationalist wing of the party and were sympathetic to the foreign policies of Roosevelt and Hull. In both men Hull found congenial colleagues. This was particularly true of Stimson. Stimson had been in a high degree friendly and co-operative from the time when Hull succeeded him as Secretary of State. Of their new Cabinet relationship Hull later wrote that he and Stimson "worked together as would double cousins." At Stimson's suggestion, he, Hull, and Knox began holding weekly conferences in Hull's office in order to co-ordinate the policies of their three departments. These conferences, says Stimson's biographer, reduced interdepartmental frictions and permitted the three Secretaries "to present recommendations of policy, commonly agreed upon, to the President."[38]

After the fall of France, Secretary Hull found himself playing a role of shrinking importance in the relations of the United States and Europe. In relations with England, in particular, Roosevelt and Churchill came to deal with each other more and more directly or through Harry Hopkins, while on a lower level consultations of the military tended to overshadow those of the diplomats. Hull was still to carry on significant negotiations with the Soviet Union, but here too his role would be overshadowed by the President's. He was to engage in a long and frustrating controversy with the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle. In Latin America he had a freer hand. In the Far East, both before and after the Japanese attack, Roosevelt left much discretion to his Secretary of State. These activities will be dealt with in other chapters. Hull had little to do with the destroyers deal, initiation of the Lend-Lease Act, or the Atlantic Conference. We must, however, glance at such connection as he had with these episodes as well as his part in other developments prior to American entry into the war.

Beginning in May, 1940, the State Department was instrumental in finding legal ways of supplying Great Britain with artillery, rifles, ammunition, and a limited number of airplanes from United States Government stores.[39] This aid was important in enabling the British to meet the emergency resulting from the disastrous loss of equipment at Dunkirk. The most urgent British need, however, was for destroyers to combat the U-boat menace. The United States had over fifty destroyers of the World War I period, which it could well spare for the defense of Britain, but here both national and international law appeared to present obstacles, and both Roosevelt and Hull were at first under the impression that the vessels could not be surrendered without legislation, which they were loath to request. The urgency of Winston

Churchill, pressure from the newly formed Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and some clever legal reasoning on the part of Attorney General Robert Jackson and other lawyers finally convinced the President that he had the necessary authority. Arrangements for the transaction were worked out, for the most part, while Hull was absent from Washington, first at the Conference of American Foreign Ministers at Havana, then for a rest at White Sulphur Springs. Hull was present, however, for the conclusion of the negotiations. Thanks to a suggestion from Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser to the Department, he was able to propose a compromise between Churchill's desire to exchange bases for destroyers as free gifts on each side and the President's need to represent the deal to Congress and the public as an advantageous trade. Under the compromise, Great Britain "gave" the United States the 99-year leases on bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda and exchanged the others—in the Bahamas, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Trinidad, and British Guiana—for the fifty American destroyers. The final papers were signed by Hull and Ambassador Lord Lothian on September 2, 1940.[40]

Hull's satisfaction at the deal was evident at the press conference at which he announced it. Drew Pearson, often an unfriendly critic, remarked that the Secretary "put on a great show for the newsmen." When queried about the legality of the transaction, "his eyes flashed, his halting delivery disappeared, and he defended the deal with a force and fluency that made the room electric." Though permitted to use his remarks only as "background," the press corps, Pearson added, "will long remember the spectacle of the white-haired, gentle old man deeply stirred by a sense of the transcendental character of these stirring times."[41]

Secretary Hull promptly notified the governments of the other American Republics that the base facilities acquired on British territory would be made available to them "on the fullest co-operative basis for the common defense of the hemisphere" in harmony with the agreements reached at recent inter-American conferences.[42]

Long before the consummation of the destroyer-bases deal the presidential campaign of 1940 was in full swing, with Roosevelt seeking a third term in opposition to Wendell Willkie as the Republican candidate. Hull was on principle opposed to the third term and saw its only justification in 1940 in the international crisis and the danger of an interregnum if the Republicans should defeat a weaker candidate than the President. Hull had, as a matter of fact, been much talked of as Roosevelt's successor with James A. Farley as a running mate. Such a choice would have been distasteful to genuine New Dealers,[43] but Hull was regarded in many quarters as more popular with the country than any Democrat other than the President himself. Hull, according to his own account, had believed until early July, 1940, that he was Roosevelt's choice for the succession. Though Roosevelt seems to have decided some time in May that he would seek a third term, the decision was a well guarded secret, and it was only at luncheon with the President on July 3 that Hull became aware of the former's intentions.[44] In the next few days Hull rejected the President's urging that he accept the nomination for Vice President.

The Democratic Convention met in Chicago on July 15. It nominated Roosevelt for President with Henry A. Wallace as his running mate. To Hull's chagrin, it adopted a strongly isolationist platform, one plank declaring: "We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our armies, navies, or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside the Americas, except in case of attack." When Hull protested to the President at the adoption of this declaration, he was told that it was too late to have it changed, but the President assured him that whatever the platform said, "he intended to state that there would be no change in our foreign policy."[45]

Wendell Willkie was in general agreement with Roosevelt's foreign policy, and isolationism was really not an issue in the campaign. Both candidates assured the electorate that they would not lead the country into any "foreign war," yet both favored aid to Britain. There were rumors that Willkie, if elected, would ask Hull to continue as Secretary of State. Hull regarded such reports as politically inspired, but he did not, as the White House urged, declare that he would not serve under Willkie. He did, however, issue a statement saying that he would not countenance such reports and disapproved of their circulation. Since becoming Secretary of State Hull had consistently refrained from making political speeches. He adhered to that practice now until almost the end of the campaign, when he did, on November 1 and 4, answer attacks by Willkie on certain features of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Previously, on October 26, in what he described as a nonpolitical speech to the National Press Club, he had made, in his own words, "the first official exposition of what became the Administration's doctrine of self-defense." This was, in short, the doctrine that the right of self-defense overrode the traditional requirements of neutrality; that the United States, therefore, was justified in giving material aid to the Allies, whose resistance to aggression was reducing the danger to the Western Hemisphere.

Following Roosevelt's re-election, Hull issued, on November 6, 1940, an appeal to the American people for nonpartisan support in a "united effort to carry forward a program of principles and practical measures, the success of which means everything to the peace and safety and welfare of the American people."[46]

In the weeks before the election Hull had told his more intimate associates that he planned to resign at the end of the President's second term. His reasons, as explained by "Jimmy" Dunn to Pierrepont Moffat (now Minister to Canada), were his dislike of the third term, his feeling that his work was finished, and the President's apparent reliance upon the advice of Sumner Welles in preference to his own.

Dunn believed that he would remain at his post only if the President, after the election, insisted that it was his patriotic duty to do so.[47]

A few days after the election, Assistant Secretary Berle called at the Secretary's office to urge him not to resign. "In New York," Berle remarked, "half the people thought they were voting for Roosevelt and Hull, anyway." As Berle recorded the Secretary's reaction:

> Hull said that he did not want to run out; but that he had been constantly affronted and made unhappy by having Morgenthau or somebody else spring a fast diversion in foreign policy over his head, and finding that the President stood by some favorite. If he could get assurance that this kind of thing would not go on, he would stay.[48]

Whether he got such assurance the available evidence does not state. Certainly there was pressure on the President to retain Hull as Secretary, pressure attributable both to admiration for Hull and to distaste for Sumner Welles and for William C. Bullitt, who were mentioned as possible successors. A Canadian businessman, for example, wrote from Winnipeg that Canadians viewed the prospect of Hull's resignation with alarm, "as every Canadian-Englishman I have talked with looks upon Cordell Hull as the outstanding statesman in President Roosevelt's Cabinet." It was "the unanimous opinion of British subjects," this writer continued, "that Cordell Hull's staying in President Roosevelt's cabinet is a necessity for the world's future."[49] Whatever the reason, there seems to have been no further talk of Hull's resigning.

The President's re-election was followed by several weeks of apparent hesitation, during which, however, the desperate financial straits into which Great Britain had fallen were made known to the American Government and people. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador, led off. Upon returning from a leave of absence in England, he told the American press on November 23 that Great Britain was fast approaching the end of her dollar reserves and would need assistance if she was to continue purchases of war materials in the United States. Sir Frederick Phillips, Under Secretary of the British Treasury, came to Washington to explain the British plight to the United States Treasury and State Departments. Finally, Winston Churchill, in a long letter of December 8 to the President, outlined the British needs and, arguing that defeat of the Axis was as important to the United States as to Britain, hoped that Roosevelt would regard the message "not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose."[50]

Roosevelt, when he received Churchill's letter, was cruising on the *Tuscaloosa* in the Caribbean. Before his return to Washington on December 16, conferences of State, Treasury, War, and Navy Department officials had reached the conclusion that Britain's needs could not be met without legislation. It was the President himself, however, who in his press conference on December 17, came up with the idea that was to be called "lend-lease"—the suggestion that instead of selling or giving war materials to nations resisting aggression, the United States should lend such materials, as a man lends a garden hose to a neighbor whose house is burning. In a fireside chat on December 29, 1940, the President pictured the United States as the "arsenal of democracy," and in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941—the same in which he named the "four freedoms" which the United States sought for all the world—he made officially the proposal that resulted in the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941.[51]

Preparation of the bill was primarily in the hands of the Treasury Department, but in the crucial matter of getting it through Congress, the President called upon Secretary Hull, because of his high standing and great influence in Congress, to assume the chief sponsorship for it. The Secretary, his friends thought, was being "used, but not consulted."[52] Mr. Hull himself seems to have been a little touchy on this point, but he agreed to become the lead-off Administration witness before both House and Senate committees. In his testimony he emphasized the perils that would confront the United States in the event of an Axis victory and based his advocacy of the bill on the self-defense argument that he had advanced in his speech of October 26, 1940. Hull was not entirely satisfied with the bill—he would have preferred to require the British to put up collateral for the anticipated aid—but he thoroughly approved its general principle, and he was helpful in opposing amendments that would have tied the President's hands in unfortunate ways. One of these, by naming the countries to which war materials, services, or information might be lent or leased, would have ruled out aid to Russia when Hitler launched his Russian offensive in the following June. Hull's influence was undoubtedly important in securing passage of a law satisfactory to the Administration.[53] The Lend-Lease Act empowered the President to make available to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States" any "defense article," any service, or any "defense information," that he might see fit.[54] With its signing by the President on March 11, the United States entered fully into the condition of nonbelligerency. From now on it was to be "all aid short of war" to the victims of Axis aggression.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

FROM NONBELLIGERENCY TO SHOOTING WAR

While the lend-lease bill was under discussion in Congress, Washington welcomed a new British Ambassador. Lord Lothian had died soon after returning from a leave in England and was replaced by Lord Halifax, recently Foreign Secretary in the Chamberlain Cabinet. President Roosevelt gave dramatic emphasis to the growing strength of American ties with Great Britain by going in person to Annapolis to meet the new Ambassador when he landed from the battleship *King George V*. Hull did not accompany the President—in fact he was not told of the Annapolis trip. He received his first visit from Halifax on January 25, 1941, and realized at once that he "could work on the same effective, cordial terms" with the new Ambassador that had marked his relations with Lothian. A new United States Ambassador also represented the United States in London. Joseph P. Kennedy, a defeatist in his attitude to Britain and essentially an isolationist, had resigned soon after Roosevelt's re-election. In January he testified against the lend-lease bill. His successor was John G. Winant, a former governor of New Hampshire, whose thinking was more in tune with that of Roosevelt and Hull.[1]

With Lord Halifax on the *King George V* came a group of British military and naval officers, representatives of the Chiefs of Staff, who from January to March, 1941, held a series of conversations with the American Chiefs of Staff in Washington with the purpose of agreeing upon joint Anglo-American military policy if and when the United States should enter the war. The Secretary of State did not participate in these conferences and, perhaps by preference, was not informed of their details. Though the conferences were kept on the technical level, they led to at least one major policy decision—the decision that even if Japan should join her Axis partners in the war, the defeat of Hitler should still have priority.[2] Following the conversations, American military and naval officers were sent to Scotland and Northern Ireland to select base sites and make other preparations for American participation in the war should circumstances so determine.

In connection with Hull's isolation from those military talks, so organically related to foreign policy, it is worth remarking that in the previous August, when Roosevelt and the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, met at Ogdensburg, New York, and agreed to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the Secretary of State was resting at White Sulphur Springs. With the President at Ogdensburg were Secretary of War Stimson and Pierrepont Moffat, Minister to Canada. Stimson noted in his diary on that occasion: "For the last few days I have been acting more as Secretary of State than as Secretary of War . . ."[3]

During the spring of 1941, as relations with England grew closer, there was growing friction with the Axis powers. On the State Department's recommendation, German, Italian, and Danish ships in American ports were placed under the custody of the Coast Guard, which found that considerable sabotage to their machinery had already occurred. Italian consulates in Newark and Detroit were closed in retaliation for interference with American consular establishments in Italy. The State Department did what it could to stiffen resistance to the Axis in the Balkans, only to see Bulgaria yield to Nazi pressure, and Yugoslavia and Greece overwhelmed by Nazi power. Turkey alone remained resistant to Axis intrigue and immune to Axis arms. Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, where the State Department also undertook to counteract Axis influence, maintained their neutrality.[4]

On April 9, 1941, Secretary Hull and Danish Minister Henrik de Kauffmann signed an agreement providing for the occupation of Greenland by the United States for the duration of the war, with the privilege of constructing and using air and naval bases and such other facilities as might be necessary to prevent the Germans from securing a foothold in the island. Such action had been urged on the United States for nearly a year by the British and Canadians, who saw grave danger to transatlantic communications in a possible German base in Greenland. Evidence of German aerial surveys of the Greenland coast gave specific cause for alarm. Hull, in a letter to Secretary Knox, justified the occupation under the Monroe

Doctrine, the Act of Havana, and the right of self-defense.

The agreement specifically recognized and guaranteed Danish sovereignty over Greenland, but, as was to be expected, the German-controlled Danish Government repudiated the agreement and recalled De Kauffmann, the Minister who had signed it. The American Minister in Denmark on the other hand, reported general popular approval of the arrangement. The United States, viewing the Danish Government as acting under duress, continued to recognize De Kauffmann as the authentic representative of Denmark and refused to do business with the chargé d'affaires *ad interim* appointed to succeed him. Hence further diplomatic relations with the Danish Government were necessarily conducted through the American Legation in Copenhagen.[5]

The Lend-Lease Act was by now in operation. Congress on March 27 had appropriated seven billion dollars for its implementation. But German submarines were taking a heavy toll of the ships carrying lend-lease supplies to England, and to some members of Roosevelt's Cabinet it seemed clear that lend-lease would be of decisive benefit to England only if the United States went a step further and provided naval escorts for the convoys carrying the goods. This was the position of Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Ickes. The President was not ready to go so far, and in his cautious attitude he had the full support of his Secretary of State. At a meeting at the White House on April 10, a temporary compromise was devised, by which the naval patrols instituted after the Panama Conference of 1939[6] were to extend their activities eastward as far as longitude 25° west. It was the President's idea that these patrols, by detecting and reporting the location of German surface or submarine craft in the area west of 25°, would enable the British to conserve their naval force by concentrating it east of the line.[7]

Secretary Hull took at least partial credit for the adoption of this policy, asserting that it represented a "flexible zone" conception that he had advocated since 1939. It would appear, however, that Hull's relation to this decision was at best a passive one. After the meeting at the White House, Stimson was asked to come to Hull's office to consider the communiqué announcing the enlargement of the patrol area. "Hull," Stimson recorded in his diary, "was a little bit weak, I thought, in his effort to make it look wholly peaceful and in his fear of repercussions from the isolationists."[8]

Hull's concern over the isolationists was probably increased by the reaction to an address which he delivered on April 24, 1941, to the American Society of International Law. It was a courageous speech in which he stated clearly his opinion that aid to Britain was essential to American security, and added, possibly as a trial balloon, that "such aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity. So ways must be found to do this." Of some 1,700 telegrams and letters that he received in response to the speech, 1,100 were critical, opposing further action by the United States. "A considerable number of them," Hull noted, "severely criticized me for being too warlike."[9] Hence, when Stimson and Knox, early in May, made speeches in which they argued publicly for repeal of the Neutrality Act and American naval escorts for ships to Britain, Hull took strong issue with them in Cabinet meeting, arguing that such speeches "would stir up public controversy and arouse unnecessary opposition to the Administration." The President supported him, Hull records, "and agreed that the time had not yet come to request repeal of the Act."[10]

The late spring of 1941 was a time of gloom for those Americans, in the Government and out, to whom an Allied victory in the war was of the first importance. The war was going badly in the Balkans, in North Africa, and in the Atlantic. Worst of all, the President, having got lend-lease through Congress and launched his naval patrol, seemed inclined to do nothing more. He seemed to some of his associates, as one scholar has written, "to have withdrawn into a kind of torpor."[11] He suffered from a prolonged cold—or, as his secretary, "Missy" LeHand remarked, "a case of sheer exasperation"—and for days remained in bed.[12] To men like Stimson and Ickes, it seemed that leadership was lacking when it was most needed. Stimson tried, through letters and conversations, to communicate the group's alarm to the President. Ickes called Stimson, Knox, and Attorney General Robert Jackson to his office on May 12. All agreed, as Ickes recorded, "that the country was sadly in need of leadership and that only the President himself could supply the want." But they had to agree also that there was little they could do to improve the situation. Ickes had thought of a round robin to alert the President to the dissatisfaction among his advisers, but those present doubted whether any other member of the Cabinet would sign it. "So the meeting ended," wrote Stimson, "without anything positive accomplished at all."[13]

Much of the dissatisfaction of this group was with the war production program, which under William S. Knudsen seemed to be bogging down. But they were also disturbed over what they thought the overly cautious attitude of Hull and the State Department. Secretary Ickes, who was a chronic complainer against State Department delays and hesitations, noted on May 10 evidence that Stimson shared his views. He had been told by John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, that Stimson had been so disturbed by State Department attitudes "that he actually interrupted Hull's croquet game to discuss it with him a day or two ago."[14]

Actually, Stimson, supported by Knox and General Marshall, had engaged in days of argument with Hull over the disposition and use of the Pacific Fleet. Stimson wished it moved bodily to the Atlantic, where it would be in a position to counter possible German moves against the Azores or Dakar. Hull, in the midst of crucial negotiations with Japan, insisted on keeping the Fleet in the Pacific to support his diplomacy. Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, first supported Stimson and Knox, but was won over by Hull. His change of position was apparently decisive with the President. In a compromise, three battleships with a supporting force were transferred, the major portion of the Fleet remaining at Pearl Harbor.[15]

It was thus Hull whom Stimson blamed for what seemed to him a deficiency in the President's important speech of May 27, 1941, which he concluded by proclaiming an "unlimited national emergency." It was a strong speech, which really reached its climax in the declaration: "I will say that the delivery of needed supplies to Britain is imperative. I say this can be done; it must be done; it will be done." This language seemed to be a commitment to the full use of the Navy, if necessary, to insure delivery of supplies to Britain, and Stimson had hoped that it would be backed up with an announcement of the transfer of the main Fleet to the Atlantic. This Hull had prevented. Hull had been hesitant, too, about the emergency proclamation, but on this his hesitation was overruled. On the whole, the bolder spirits seemed really to have won the day. The President himself was surprised and elated at the overwhelmingly favorable response. Then, characteristically, he drew the teeth of his pronouncement the following day by assuring his press conference that he had no plan for convoys, no plan to ask repeal of the Neutrality Act. Everything was as before.[16]

The President's address and proclamation were, however, followed by certain new anti-Axis measures.

On June 6, Congress authorized the requisitioning of foreign ships lying idle in American ports (a measure that the President had requested in April). In answer to protests from the German and Italian Embassies, Hull asserted the right of the Government to requisition alien property within its jurisdiction for public use with compensation. Some forty Danish vessels were taken over and put to work. Seizure of German and Italian ships was delayed until after those governments declared war against the United States.[17] On June 14, the President froze all German and Italian assets in the United States and those of occupied countries not already frozen. Within a few days thereafter, the President ordered the closing of all German and Italian consulates in the United States, charging that their personnel had engaged in espionage, propaganda, and other improper activities. The Latin American governments were warned to beware of German and Italian agents expelled from the United States, who might undertake to continue their subversive activities in the other American Republics.[18]

On May 21 the American freighter *Robin Moor* was sunk by a German submarine in the South Atlantic. Her crew, set adrift in small boats, were not rescued for weeks. Announcing the sinking to Congress, June 20, the President denounced the incident as being a warning from the Nazis "that the United States may use the high seas of the world only with Nazi consent."[19]

A few weeks later (July 7, 1941) the President announced that United States Marines had landed in Iceland to take over the protection of the island from the British. This move was the result of negotiations that had been carried almost to completion behind the back of the Secretary of State. In December, 1940, and January, 1941, Hull had discouraged feelers from the Icelandic Government as to possible American protection if the British should withdraw. In March, however, reports of German air and submarine activity over and around Iceland and of concentration in Norway of what might be an invasion force, led the President to order the destroyer *Niblack* into Iceland waters for reconnaissance. Involvement of the *Niblack* in a shooting affray with a German U-boat—the first American shots of the war—increased the President's concern. He set aside a tentative plan to occupy the Azores, where German designs were also suspected, and directed that negotiations be opened for the protection of Iceland by the United States.

Why the President bypassed the Secretary in this negotiation is not clear. Whatever the reason, he entrusted the business to Harry Hopkins, Sumner Welles, and representatives of the Navy. On June 2, according to Stimson's record, Presidential Assistant Harry Hopkins informed him and Knox of the state of the negotiations, and on the next day Stimson and Knox approached Hull on the subject, evidently anticipating difficulty. ". . . I think Knox and I got across the Iceland project with him better than we have any work-forward movement yet," Stimson wrote. "We both worked very hard in favor of it . . . He had no arguments against it and I think may not make much resistance to it, although he is pretty apt to be on the other side."[20]

Hull, in his *Memoirs,* gives no indication of having opposed the agreement. If he had misgivings, it may be that it was out of deference to them that the President insisted that there should be an invitation from the Iceland Government, on the ground that an occupation without such an invitation might revive distrust of the United States on the part of the other American Republics. The Icelandic Prime Minister objected to the use of the word "invite," but a compromise formula was agreed to and signed July 1, 1941. The notes constituting the agreement were signed respectively by the Prime Minister of Iceland and President Roosevelt. Mr. Hull's name does not appear.[21]

Secretary Hull found at least an indirect satisfaction in the agreement on Iceland. Winston Churchill, in welcoming the President's decision to send troops there, expressed the hope that he would give full publicity to the arrival of the first installment. "It would," he wrote, "give us hope to face the long haul that lies ahead. It would also produce the best effects in Spain, Vichy France, and Turkey." On these expressions, Hull made this comment:

> Here was striking support for the belief I had entertained for years that events throughout the world were closely interwoven, and that a major development in one country could not but influence

> other countries however far removed. It was rather startling to reflect that what we did in Iceland might have an effect in far-off Turkey, but I fully realized it could.[22]

Whatever may have been the effect in Turkey of the American garrisoning of Iceland, it certainly had an important effect on the struggle in the North Atlantic. It was now necessary to keep the troops in Iceland—the First Marine Brigade—supplied with food and equipment. That meant convoys from American ports, escorted by ships of the United States Navy. In due time, British and Canadian cargo ships were welcomed into the convoys, so that it presently came about that British shipping could depend on United States protection from mainland ports to Iceland, leaving the British Navy a much shortened route to guard.[23]

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked her former partner, the Soviet Union. In Washington the attack was not unexpected. Indeed, the State Department had on several occasions passed on to the Soviet Government confidential information from sources in Berlin giving clear indications of Hitler's plans. Hull thus witnessed the dissolution of the Nazi-Soviet partnership to which he had looked forward ever since the partnership was formed in 1939. In the interval, the behavior of the Soviet Union and of its spokesman in Washington had sorely tried the Secretary's patience, if not his faith.

It will be recalled that when the Russians invaded first Poland and later Finland in 1939, the United States had expressed its disapproval and, after the attack on Finland, had imposed a moral embargo on shipment of airplanes and airplane equipment to Russia. In neither case had it subjected Russia to the restrictions of the Neutrality Act, for, as Hull recorded, he and the President wished to do nothing that might tend to push Russia further into the German embrace.[24] The United States did, however, take steps to prevent the purchase by Russia of war materials that might find their way into the hands of her German partner or that would interfere with aid to England or the rearmament of the United States.[25]

The Russians resented the moral embargo and the restrictions on their purchases and on certain of the activities of their agents in the United States. The Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Constantin Oumansky, described by Hull as "a walking insult when at his worst," brought in complaint after complaint against what he characterized as the unfriendly attitude of the United States. In an interview with him on June 12, 1940, Hull took the offensive, complaining of the unco-operative behavior of the Soviet Union from the very time of recognition over six years before. He closed his remarks with an expression of the willingness of the United States to meet the Soviets halfway in the development of "the relations of peace and mutually profitable co-operation in every practicable way."[26]

A few days after this conversation the Soviets set up another obstacle to good relations by taking full possession of the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and by wresting from Rumania (which consented under German pressure) Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. No doubt the U.S.S.R. was acting defensively, in alarm at Germany's overwhelming successes in the west. But if this was defense, it was also aggression. In Washington, Sumner Welles expressed the opposition of the American people "to predatory activities, no matter whether they are carried out by the use of force or by the threat of force."[27] The United States, furthermore, froze the funds or credits of the Baltic States in the United States and denied clearances to their ships in American ports, lest funds and ships be appropriated for Soviet use. It also continued to recognize their diplomatic representatives as if the three governments were still independent. All of this gave Mr. Oumansky additional grievances to bring to the Department.

The signing on September 27, 1940, of the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan[28] produced apprehension in both the United States and England, where it was feared that the Soviet Union might align itself with the three aggressor powers. In a Cabinet meeting that same day there was a long discussion of "whether we could not woo Russia a little." Mr. Hull, who had evidently been subjected to much conflicting advice on the subject, announced that he would not continue negotiations with the Russians, whom he completely distrusted. If the President wished to "woo Russia," he would have to handle it through someone else. It was apparently at this time that the Secretary relinquished the task of dealing with Oumansky to Sumner Welles. The Welles-Oumansky conversations dragged on, averaging about one a fortnight, till the late spring of 1941.[29]

The British, in the summer of 1940, had sent to Moscow a new Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, and attempted through him to convince the Russians that their best interests lay in co-operation with Great Britain. Hull declined to join in such attempts at persuasion. What Cripps proved unable to do and Hull unwilling to undertake was achieved by Hitler. In November, 1940, Foreign Commissar Molotov paid an official visit to Berlin. His reception was such as to produce discord rather than harmony, and by December the State Department was in possession of authentic evidence that Hitler and his generals were planning a spring campaign against Russia.[30]

The attitude of the State Department to the Soviet Union from December, 1940, to June, 1941, is not easy to determine. The information as to the impending German attack was passed on to the Kremlin, though apparently not until March. The Department turned down British suggestions that it "get tough" with Russia in the matter of exports of American cotton which were thought to be finding their way, directly or by substitution, from Russia into Germany, and in January, 1941, it lifted the moral embargo on sale of airplanes to Russia. On the other hand, as the time for the German offensive drew near, the apparent position of the Department as to possible aid to Russia was, to say the least, unenthusiastic. An official policy formulation of June 14 took a most reserved attitude toward possible concessions to the Soviet Union, saying in part: "We make clear to Russia our belief that improvement of our relations is more important to them than to us." A memorandum prepared by the Division of European Affairs, dated June 21 (the day before the Nazi attack), conceded that if the Soviet Government should make a direct request for assistance it would be advisable to "relax restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union, permitting it even to have such military supplies as it might need and which we could afford to spare," but the memorandum opposed the making of any commitments as to future policy to the men of the Kremlin.[31]

These documents differ greatly in tone from Hull's response, as recorded by him, to the news of the German attack on June 22. The news found him ill in his apartment. "Immediately," he wrote later, "I telephoned the President and then Under Secretary Welles. To each I said, in effect:

" 'We must give Russia all aid to the hilt. We have repeatedly said we will give all the help we can to any nation resisting the Axis. There can be no doubt for a moment that Russia comes within that category.' "

Hull records further that he telephoned others of his "associates" in the Department, emphasizing the same point of view. Under doctor's orders to get away for a rest, he went next day to White Sulphur Springs, where he remained until August 4, but from there by telephone, he writes, he "emphasized again and again . . . that we should take every step to aid the Soviets." He did not, he says, share the prevailing view of the military experts that Russia would be crushed in a few weeks. "I believed we could send Russia all weapons and supplies possible without real risk that the Germans would overrun and capture them."[32]

The Secretary's view was shared by the President. Mr. Roosevelt had assured Prime Minister Churchill in advance that he would endorse any statement that Churchill chose to make on support of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Speaking for the President at a press conference on June 23, Acting Secretary Sumner Welles, without specifically promising aid to the Soviet Union, made it reasonably clear that such aid in some form was considered vital to the defense of the United States. "In the opinion of this Government," said the statement, "any defense against Hitlerism . . . will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and security." The President himself had added a final sentence: "Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."[33]

During the remainder of the summer and the fall of 1941, aid to Russia was small and on a hand-to-mouth basis. The President did not at first declare Russia eligible for lend-lease assistance. The debate on the lend-lease bill in the preceding winter had revealed much opposition to its possible use in Russia's behalf. The President was now under the necessity of requesting further large-scale appropriations for implementing lend-lease to Britain and feared that serious opposition might be aroused by extension of lend-lease assistance to Russia. Such aid as could be made available to Russia, therefore, was financed by purchase of Russian gold and other temporary expedients, while the President sought to mollify American resentment against the Soviets. The new appropriation for lend-lease passed Congress and was signed October 28, 1941. Ten days later the President informed the Lend-Lease Administrator that he had found the defense of the U.S.S.R. "vital to the defense of the United States," and hence that the Soviet Union was eligible for lend-lease aid. With this decision the Secretary of State was in hearty accord.[34]

The French Government of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain at Vichy presented a number of challenging problems to the State Department and the White House. There was no question of the propriety of recognizing Pétain's government as the Government of France. It had come to power constitutionally and at the beginning had no rival. The over-all problem was to prevent Pétain, under the influence of advisers like Pierre Laval and Admiral Jean François Darlan, from drifting into actual collaboration with Germany.[35] More specifically, the President and the Secretary of State worked successfully to dissuade the Vichy

Government from permitting the Germans, in violation of the armistice terms, to make use of the French Fleet; from moving the battleships *Jean Bart* and *Richelieu* from African ports to Toulon, where they might fall under German control; and from permitting German occupation of North and West African ports, such as Bizerte, Casablanca, and Dakar. The most serious crisis in relations with Vichy prior to American entry into the war occurred in May and June, 1941. A tentative agreement reached in Paris between Admiral Darlan and the German Otto Abetz provided, among other things, for the use of the West African port of Dakar as a supply base for German submarines. German occupation of Dakar would not only have seriously menaced the South Atlantic sea lanes; it would have brought the Axis into uncomfortable proximity to the bulge of Brazil and so have menaced the security of the Western Hemisphere. Sumner Welles urged the President to declare all West Africa north of the Equator covered by the Monroe Doctrine. Hull successfully opposed such a declaration, arguing that the Germans would regard it as an invitation to occupy the area. Strong statements from Hull, pressure through the American Ambassador in Vichy, but especially the refusal of French General Weygand to accept the agreement led to its being set aside by Marshal Pétain. It was at this time that President Roosevelt transferred three battleships from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He was ready to occupy the Azores if the German danger materialized.[36]

The President and Secretary were less successful in their efforts to restore good relations between France and Great Britain. The British attack on a portion of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran, July 3, 1940, had led Pétain to break off diplomatic relations with his former ally, and the bitterness thus engendered was aggravated by the British Government's hospitality to the Free French resistance movement under General Charles de Gaulle, whom Pétain denounced as "a viper that bit the breast that nursed him."[37] But if American efforts failed to bring about reconciliation, they almost certainly were influential in preventing Vichy from re-entering the war as an ally of Germany.[38]

Beyond this, the maintenance of an American Embassy at Vichy and of numerous consuls and consular agents in North Africa provided useful sources of information about Axis activities. The agents in North Africa, furthermore, accomplished much in keeping anti-German feeling alive and in preparing the way for the Anglo-American troop landings in North Africa in November, 1942.

For some months after the French surrender the United States was represented at Vichy only by a chargé d'affaires, H. Freeman Matthews. Ambassador William C. Bullitt had chosen—contrary to Hull's advice—to remain in Paris when the Germans invaded, and soon returned to Washington. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, formerly Ambassador to Poland, temporarily represented the United States with the fleeing French Government at Tours and Bordeaux, but then went to London to be near the Polish Government-in-exile. Matthews performed his duties satisfactorily, but it seemed to both Hull and Roosevelt that it would be useful to have at Vichy a military or naval personage who could establish close personal rapport with the old Marshal. General Pershing was offered the appointment, but his physician advised against his going. Hull and the President then agreed on Admiral William D. Leahy, who since retiring from the Navy had served for a short time as Governor of Puerto Rico. He was appointed in December, 1940. The prospects for American influence had been improved by Marshal Pétain's courageous act in dismissing the pro-German Laval as Foreign Minister. Leahy was well received by Pétain and was effective in counteracting German pressure, in so far as that was possible with a regime that was, as the Marshal told the Ambassador, "a prisoner" in the hands of the Germans.[39]

It fell first to Matthews and then to Leahy to present to the Vichy regime the long succession of exhortations, and occasional threats, that were addressed by President Roosevelt to the Marshal on the occasions when the policies of Laval or Darlan seemed about to triumph.

Next to Ambassador Leahy, the American who performed the most important service with the French during 1940 and 1941 was undoubtedly Robert D. Murphy. For ten years Murphy had served in Paris as Consul General and Counselor of Embassy, and he had moved with the Embassy to

Vichy. In December, 1940, he was transferred to North Africa, where he negotiated with General Maxime Weygand, the anti-German Delegate-General for French North Africa, an agreement by which the United States was to supply petroleum and other commodities badly needed by French Morocco and its neighbors. Under the agreement, signed February 26, 1941, American officials were to be admitted to the area to supervise the distribution of the imported supplies and to make sure that none of them came into Axis possession. When Weygand was dismissed, on German insistence, in November, 1941, the arrangement was continued, on his advice and Murphy's. The result was a psychological and informational beachhead in North Africa for the future—and as yet unforeseen—military invasion.

In the events and decisions that have just been described, the role of the Secretary of State appears to have been definitely subsidiary to the President's. There is little if any indication of disagreement between them. This was also true of their attitudes to General Charles de Gaulle and the Free French movement. De Gaulle arrived in London a few days before the French surrender, in June, 1940. On June 18, he broadcast over the BBC an appeal to Frenchmen to fight on for the honor and salvation of France. Encouraged by the British, he soon had a military organization and the support of many earnest and patriotic Frenchmen. In September, 1941, he and his following in London organized the Free French National Committee and assumed more and more the right to speak for France, as a sort of provisional government, on the theory that the Vichy regime was neither representative nor a free agent.

Mr. Churchill's Government, having no diplomatic ties with Vichy, gave the committee a certain measure of recognition. The State Department, on the other hand, adopted a position to which it was to adhere, in the face of often violent criticism, almost to the end of Hull's incumbency. General de Gaulle's military efforts were welcomed, but there was to be no recognition of him or his Committee as entitled to speak for France. Aside from the fact that recognition of De Gaulle would mean a breach with Vichy and an end of the useful contacts with North Africa, Hull explained further:

> The President and I early adopted the view that we should do nothing that would impose De Gaulle upon the French as their future ruler. We determined that the French themselves must be left with full freedom, when the appropriate time came, to choose their own Government.

As of May, 1941, furthermore, Hull remarked, the evidence available to the Department indicated that Marshal Pétain enjoyed more popular support in unoccupied France than did De Gaulle.

But as a military leader, and one whose forces controlled a number of French possessions in Africa and the Pacific, De Gaulle was undeniably fighting the Axis. He was therefore entitled to lend-lease assistance, and the President so ordered on November 11, 1941. Hull notes that he fully supported this move and that the United States was already stationing consular representatives in territories controlled by De Gaulle. He adds:

> The distinction in our treatment of the Free French was thus clear. We would give them material assistance wherever necessary in their efforts to combat the Axis. We would keep in touch with them through our consular representatives. But we would not recognize them as a government.[40]

Cordell Hull had no part in planning the Atlantic Conference of August, 1941, at which Roosevelt and Churchill met for the first time, nor in preparing the document adopted there, which became famous as the Atlantic Charter. At White Sulphur Springs, where he spent July under doctor's orders, he was informed by Welles of the President's plan to meet the Prime Minister. Welles wrote him, July 28, that if he should learn that other than military questions were to be discussed, he would urge the President to take some one with him to keep a precise record of conversations and agreements. The President took Welles. Harry Hopkins, fresh from a tour of exploration in Moscow, came with Churchill.

After publication of the Charter, Hull issued a statement, August 14, in which he praised the document as embodying "basic principles and fundamental ideas and policies that are universal in their practical application." He was disappointed, however, in the fourth article, which qualified the two statesmen's dedication to freer trade with the phrase, "with due respect for their existing obligations." This he interpreted as meaning that Great Britain would adhere to the system of Empire preferences which the Secretary had been striving to eliminate. He was able, as he records, to remedy this defect a few months later in negotiating a lend-lease agreement with Great Britain.[41]

The principal preoccupation of American diplomacy between the Atlantic Conference and the attack on Pearl Harbor was with Japanese relations. That subject is treated elsewhere. Decisions in the period affecting the American relation to the European War were administrative and legislative, and in these the role of the Secretary of State was not great. It would appear that the President was at last and reluctantly accepting the thesis of an important group of his advisers, including Secretaries Stimson and Knox and former Ambassador Bullitt, that Hitler's Germany could not be beaten without actual American participation in the conflict.[42] As a first step in that direction he had already authorized the Navy to protect British and Canadian convoys as far as Iceland. He now called upon Congress for repeal of the more constricting features of the Neutrality Act of 1939. The first step contributed to the success of the second, in that incidents arising from convoy duty were skilfully used to cultivate sentiment for repeal. Mr. Hull did his share, but with a certain degree of hesitancy and caution.[43]

On September 5, the American destroyer *Greer* on the Iceland patrol was engaged in tracking a German submarine and signalling its location to British planes. Not surprisingly, the submarine fired two torpedoes at the *Greer*. Unharmed, the *Greer* attacked the submarine with depth charges. Roosevelt proposed to use the incident—without details of the *Greer's* activities—as an instance of German aggression and a justification for ordering the Navy to attack Axis vessels of war in American "defensive" waters. He outlined his proposed statement to Hull and Harry Hopkins. Hull, as Hopkins recalled, "in very aggressive and stern language laid out the policy of the United States Government and the reason for this patrol." Roosevelt was so pleased with the Secretary's oral statement that he asked him to put it into the form of a speech for his, the President's, use. But when Hull's draft arrived, "it was a pretty weak document." The President found it "totally inadequate." With the aid of Hopkins and Judge Rosenman he prepared another, which he read to Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox. All approved, but before the speech was delivered, Hull again dissented, "urging the President," as Harry Hopkins was told, "to take out of the speech the real guts of it."[44]

Hopkins remarked that on other occasions in the preceding six months the Secretary of State had shown similar caution, using strong language in private conversation but wanting "to dilute everything" in official utterances. Hopkins added: "He has in recent months given me the impression that he isn't prepared for the implications of a tough row with Hitler."[45] Such a cautious attitude, if it existed, might well find an explanation in the Secretary's awareness of the crucial relations with Japan and a natural reluctance to face the prospect of a two-front war.[46]

The President was not swayed by the Secretary's caution. In his nationwide broadcast of September 11, he described the attack on the *Greer* as "piracy—legally and morally," and after recounting other attacks or alleged attacks on ships flying United States or Panamanian flags, and describing Nazi submarines and raiders as "the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic," he announced: "From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is necessary for American defense they do so at their own peril." He had given orders to the Army and Navy "to carry out that policy—at once."[47]

Any misgivings that Hull may have felt about the strong language in this address do not appear in his *Memoirs*. Indeed, if we can rely on his subsequent account, he gave a bold interpretation to one phrase in the address. Roosevelt, he notes, did not define the waters whose protection was "necessary to American defense." "But it was clear," says Hull, "that, as the defense of Britain was vital to our security, the waters between the United States and Britain were defensive waters."[48]

In accordance with this assumption was Hull's belief, shared by the President, that American ships must be freed to carry supplies to Britain through repeal or modification of the Neutrality Act of November, 1939. The restrictive portions of that Act were sections 2 (excluding American ships from belligerent ports in Europe), 3 (excluding them from combat areas), and 6 (forbidding the arming of American merchant vessels). Consultations with congressional leaders indicated majorities for repeal of these sections in both houses, but with the probability of troublesome filibustering by Senate isolationists. The strategy adopted was to ask Congress first for repeal of section 6, to which only minor opposition was expected, and follow up with a request for repeal of sections 2 and 3.[49]

President Roosevelt, accordingly, in a message to Congress on October 9, asked specifically for repeal of section 6 but expressed the hope that Congress would also give consideration to the fact that we were inviting Axis control of the seas "by keeping our ships out of the ports of our own friends."[50]

On October 13, Secretary Hull appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to testify in favor of the bill for repeal of section 6. In a prepared statement he argued strongly that since that article was enacted, entirely new conditions had developed. "The theory of the neutrality legislation was that by acting within the limitations which it prescribed we could keep away from danger." But now, he continued, the danger had come to us, with the intrusion of hostile craft into our "defensive waters," and our problem had become that "of defending ourselves against a hostile movement seriously threatening us and the entire Western Hemisphere." Since German submarines sank indiscriminately armed and unarmed vessels, "it is manifest that a greater degree of safety would be had by arming them." In passing the neutrality legislation, he asserted, Congress had had no intention "to abandon to the slightest extent the full right of our necessary self-defense." Let Congress now assure the right of self-defense to our merchant vessels by permitting them to arm. Like the President, he gave his opinion that section 2 also should be repealed or modified.[51]

Secretary Stimson followed Hull before the House Committee. When he came in he found two or three of the isolationist minority "still badgering poor old Hull." One of them was pressing him as to whether arming our ships would not draw us nearer to war or belligerency, and "Hull had let him drag it out to interminable lengths." Stimson got "hotter and hotter" as he listened and when his turn came "ripped them up from end to end." When the Congressman put the same question to him, says Stimson, "I told him sharply and shortly and in a loud voice that if he would tell me what war was and what belligerency was now in these days since the Nazi efforts had come in, why I would answer his question. . . ."[52]

The House passed the bill repealing section 6 on October 17. Four days later Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His statement followed the same line of argument as that before the House Committee. One paragraph was important as implying a much broader program than the mere arming of merchantmen. The right of self-defense, he said, "must now be invoked. The key to that defense under present conditions is to prevent Hitler from gaining control of the seas." He repeated, without elaboration, the statement that in his judgment section 2 should be repealed or modified.

Going beyond the specific requests of the Administration, the Foreign Relations Committee voted, October 25, to repeal both sections 2 and 3 as well as section 6. As the amended bill came to the Senate floor, October 27, the President, in his Navy Day address, gave useful ammunition to its supporters. Ten days before, the destroyer *Kearny,* on convoy duty, had suffered damage and heavy casualties when struck by a German torpedo. Announcing the attack and naming the twelve home states of the sailors killed and wounded in the engagement, the President declared: "We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot." Orders had now been given to the American Navy "to shoot on sight." The President commended the Senate Committee's proposal to repeal not only the ban on arming merchantmen but "other hamstringing provisions" of the Neutrality Act. "That," he said, "is the course of honesty and realism."[54]

The Senate passed the amended bill on November 7. When opposition to the amendments developed in the House, both the President and Secretary Hull wrote letters to the House leadership urging passage of the bill in its amended form.[55] The House passed the measure November 13, by a close and predominantly partisan vote (212 to 194), and the President signed it on November 17. American ships were now free to arm themselves, to carry what cargoes they chose, and to voyage to ports anywhere in the world. After six years of renunciation in the supposed interest of peace, America was again claiming Freedom of the Seas.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

JAPAN'S NEW ORDER

Meeting at Brussels in November, 1937, the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 had mildly rebuked their co-signer, Japan, for violation of the terms of that treaty, which they proclaimed to be still legally binding and applicable. Any expectation that such reproof would effect an improvement in the behavior of the Japanese military was quickly dispelled. Not only was the undeclared war against China continued on a large scale, with indiscriminate bombings of Chinese cities, but on December 12, 1937, occurred an incident which threatened to produce a serious crisis with the United States.

The United States gunboat *Panay*, escorting tankers in the Yangtze River (where it and they had a right to be, under treaties with China), was attacked in broad daylight by Japanese planes, bombed, machine-gunned, and sunk, with casualties of four killed and a number wounded. While Hull was getting off instructions to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to impress the gravity of the situation upon the Japanese Government, Foreign Minister Koki Hirota took the initiative and came at once to the United States Embassy to offer "the profound apology" of his Government. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington brought similar apologies next day for what he described as "a very grave blunder."

The Japanese Foreign Office showed every indication of being genuinely alarmed at the rash act of undisciplined aviators and was prompt in agreeing to the American demands: an official expression of regret, indemnities ($2,214,000) for the injured and the relatives of the dead, assurances that the incident would not be repeated, and punishment of the officers responsible. There had been little popular excitement in the United States, where public opinion generally approved the amicable settlement.[1]

There were by-products of the *Panay* incident. One was a bit of temporary friction with the British, who were piqued by Hull's refusal to make common cause with them over the *Panay* and a British gunboat that had been similarly attacked. Another was the revival of interest in a proposed amendment to the Constitution which would have made any declaration of war by Congress subject to a popular referendum. The Ludlow Amendment (so-called from its author, Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana) had been introduced in the House of Representatives early in 1937 but had been pigeonholed in the Judiciary Committee until alarm at the possibility of war over the *Panay* enabled its isolationist and pacifist backers to muster the support necessary to bring it before the House.

To Hull and the President the Ludlow resolution seemed "a disastrous move toward the most rigid form of isolationism." The State Department prepared a letter which the President addressed to Speaker Bankhead, and Hull wrote personally to Chairman McReynolds of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Both warned that such an amendment would cripple the Executive in the conduct of foreign policy and "encourage other nations to believe that they could violate American rights with impunity." With all the persuasion and pressure that the Administration could exert, the resolution was defeated by the uncomfortably close vote of 188 to 209. The vote, as Hull remarked, gave an idea of isolationist strength in Congress and illustrated "the difficulties the President and I had in carrying out toward the aggressor nations the stronger policies we should have liked to follow."[2]

In the years just ahead, however, it was not so much isolationism that formed an obstacle to "stronger policies" toward Japan as it was the doubt in Hull's own mind as to the degree of pressure that could be exerted against Japan without provoking that nation to a war for which the United States was not prepared. In spite of the vote on the Ludlow resolution, in spite of some adverse reaction to the President's "quarantine" speech of October, 1937, isolationism was less vehement about the Far East than about Europe. Or, to view the matter from a different angle, the general public and many of Hull's colleagues were more confident than he that Japan could be subjected to serious economic pressure without resorting to arms in retaliation. Hull himself soon came to be considered by bolder spirits in the Cabinet a principal barrier to "stronger policies."

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Hull's caution in regard to the application of pressure against Japan had the full support of Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. In April, 1938, Grew sent to Stanley Hornbeck at the State Department a long report in answer to a "hypothetical question" as to the probable Japanese response to "definite steps in the field of positive pressure" by the United States. Grew's conclusions, in which the entire staff of the Embassy concurred, were that the Japanese Government would regard any form of sanctions by the United States as a hostile act and would "consider American rights in China forfeit"; that the existing Government would in such case probably "be replaced by an out-and-out military dictatorship"; that the Japanese people would become strongly anti-American and generally anti-foreign; that their increased determination to pursue their objectives would eventually lead to war with the United States, which could in the end benefit no one.[3]

Economic pressure against Japan was indeed to be used, but under Hull's influence it was kept fairly innocuous until the summer of 1941, at which time its application in drastic form turned out to be a prelude to war.

The first move in that direction was a "moral embargo" on the export of certain types of airplanes in July, 1938. Following Japanese bombing of the city of Canton, Secretary Hull called in his principal advisers, June 10, for what turned out to be almost an all-day conference. What was to be done about a situation in which the United States was protesting against such bombings while American manufacturers were selling bomber planes to Japan? Finding considerable difference of opinion in the Department, the Secretary consulted the President. There followed a statement by the Secretary, June 11, reiterating the Department's disapproval of bombing attacks on civilians and hinting that American manufacturers should take notice. Several weeks later the Department sent a letter to 148 firms and persons in the United States, informing them that the Government was "strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes or aeronautical equipment" to countries which used such planes in bombing civilian populations. Some months later the Secretary was able to state that nearly all companies had adhered to the Department's request.[4]

Meanwhile, Japanese armies pressed their campaigns with great apparent success. Nanking, the Chinese capital, was occupied in December, 1937. The Chinese Government had withdrawn to Hankow, from which it later retreated to Chungking on the upper Yangtze. Hankow and Canton fell to the Japanese in October, 1938. The principal ports, the coastal cities, and the principal railroads of China were now in Japanese hands. Japan was at the same time attempting to consolidate her economic hold on the country and following a policy of restricting the activities of foreign business firms, if not forcing them out altogether, while American and other foreign missionary establishments in China were so often the targets of Japanese bombs as to indicate a deliberate policy of eliminating all Western influence.

American protests against these evident violations of the spirit of the Open Door policy brought assurrances that Japan intended no such violation, and that if the United States would only be "patient" until the "China incident" was liquidated, she would find all her rights respected. Then in November, 1938, came a change in the tone of Japanese official utterances. On November 3, the Government, headed by Prince Konoye, announced that Japan's goal was "a new order which [would] insure the permanent stability of East Asia." Its foundation would be a "tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China." This did not mean, said the Prime Minister in a speech of the same date, the exclusion of other nations which would "understand the real intentions of Japan and devise a policy in accordance with the new situation in the Far East."[5]

Ambassador Grew was not able to get from the new Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, the unqualified endorsement of the Open Door that his predecessors had given. And when Secretary Hull sent a long protest over unfair treatment of American persons and property in China, he was told that in view of changed conditions and the establishment of the new order in East Asia, "an attempt to apply to present and future conditions without any changes concepts and principles which were applicable to conditions prevailing before the present incident" would not contribute to the solution of immediate issues, or to the establishment of a real peace in East Asia. Thus Japan undertook to free herself from any inconvenient restrictions in the Nine-Power Treaty or other documents of bygone years.[6]

Hull's definitive comment on Japan's "new order" was expressed in a note which Ambassador Grew, under instructions from the Department, presented to the Japanese Foreign Office on December 30, 1938. The United States Government, he said, did not admit

> that there is need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.

The United States was aware, said Grew, that, as Japan had asserted, conditions had changed in the Far East; it was aware, too, that many of those changes were the work of Japan, which now cited the changes as justification for dispensing with old obligations. Where changed conditions called for modification in existing treaties, the United States was willing to effect this by the orderly "processes of negotiation and agreement," but

> the people and the Government of the United States cannot assent to the abrogation of any of this country's rights or obligations by the arbitrary action of agents or authorities of any other country.[7]

Here was an evident impasse, if both parties stuck to their positions, as indeed both did.

How far, at this point, the position of Japan was influenced by events in Europe it is impossible to say. It is probably significant, however, that the announcement of the "new order for East Asia" followed by a few weeks the display of weakness by the democracies at Munich. Certainly the diplomatic victories of Hitler impressed the Japanese, and as the year 1939 got under way, influential elements in the Japanese Army were urging the transformation of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a full-fledged alliance. Ambassador Grew reported to the State Department that negotiations with this object in view were in progress, and on instructions from the Secretary attempted to convince Foreign Minister Arita that such an alliance would not be in Japan's best interests. As a matter of fact, Arita, the Emperor, the Japanese Navy, and influential business elements, while they would have welcomed an alliance directed solely against Russia, were opposed to one that would align Japan against the United States and Great Britain. They successfully opposed the Army's designs until Hitler's accord with Stalin in August, 1939, temporarily destroyed the basis for the plan.[8]

The new Cabinet that succeeded Konoye's in January, 1939, while evidently hoping not to antagonize the United States, soon showed that it represented no abatement of Japan's ambition. In February, Japanese forces occupied the island of Hainan, off the southeast coast of China, a Chinese island, but one long regarded as in the French sphere of influence. In reply to parallel queries from the United States, Britain, and France, the Japanese Foreign Minister gave assurances that Japan had no intention of keeping Hainan but needed it to strengthen her blockade of the coast of China. In March, Japan laid claim to the Spratly Islands, a group lying in the South China Sea. These islands, to which France had claims, were in a location from which the occupying power might threaten French Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, or the Philippines. Hull thereupon warned the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that the United States did not recognize the Japanese claim to sovereignty as having "any international validity."[9]

It was partly as a reaction to these Japanese moves that the President, on April 15, 1939, ordered the United States Fleet to return to its regular station in the Pacific. The Fleet had been moved to the Atlantic in January to conduct maneuvers in the Caribbean and to "show the flag" at the World's Fair in New York. The aggressive moves of Japan, and suggestions from the worried governments in London and Paris, which could spare few ships for the Pacific, induced the President to cut short the Fleet's sojourn in Atlantic waters.[10]

As the threat of war in Europe increased, the Japanese undertook to exploit it by intensified pressure on the harassed British and French. British subjects, in particular, were subjected to grave indignities in entering and leaving the British concession in Tientsin. Under this and other forms of pressure,

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the British Government felt compelled to authorize its Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, to sign an agreement, July 24, 1939, by which the British recognized the responsibility of the Japanese Army for the maintenance of order in the occupied areas of China and promised that British consular officials would do nothing to hamper the Army's activities.[11]

To Hull it seemed that this Craigie-Arita formula, with its recognition of the "special requirements" of the Japanese Army in China, was the point of a wedge which might be used to pry loose all Western rights and interests in China, including the American. As a gesture of disapproval and as a measure that would remove any doubt of the right of the United States to subject Japan to economic pressure, Hull and Roosevelt resolved to abrogate the commercial treaty with Japan concluded in 1911. This action had been under discussion for months. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had before it several resolutions proposing restrictions on trade with Japan. But as Congress was near adjournment and any legislation was problematical, the President authorized Hull to take the necessary step.

If we may credit the censorious Harold L. Ickes, Hull acted with an unaccustomed promptitude that led the President to exclaim, "Cordell, I feel like kissing you on both cheeks."[12] On July 26, 1939, the Secretary informed Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi that the treaty would terminate six months from that date, January 26, 1940. To anxious inquiries from Japan as to what American policy would be after termination of the treaty, Hull refused to vouchsafe any information. "I felt," he explained later, "that our best tactic was to keep them guessing, which might bring them to a sense of the position in which their flagrant disregard of our rights and interests in China was placing them."[13]

In the meantime, Hull had seized the occasion of a communication from Prime Minister Hiranuma to lecture the Japanese statesman on the iniquities of his country's behavior. Hiranuma had proposed in May that Japan and the United States co-operate to prevent an outbreak of war in Europe and, incidentally, to bring about a peaceful settlement of the war in China. A formal reply to Hiranuma was not delivered until August 8, but the substance of it was stated by the Secretary in a conversation with Ambassador Horinouchi on July 10. Referring to the repeated efforts of the United States to promote respect for law and the preservation of peace throughout the world, Hull remarked that

> nations perhaps could not but take notice that Japan herself is engaged in military operations for the purpose of conquest, and that this situation might well call for an ending, if Japan were to exercise her fullest influence along with the United States and other countries in efforts to compose threatened military conquest in other parts of the world.[14]

Ambassador Grew was in the United States on leave of absence throughout the summer of 1939. Still hopeful that American abstinence from harsh measures of retaliation would strengthen the position of the Japanese moderates and pave the way for an acceptable compromise, he recognized, nevertheless, that there was in the United States, in his words, "an unmistakable hardening of the Administration's attitude toward Japan and a marked disinclination to allow American interests to be crowded out of China."[15] He returned to Japan convinced that the American attitude should be clearly made known to the people as well as to the Government of Japan. In his briefcase he carried the text of a speech, carefully reviewed in the State Department, by which he proposed to perform that service.

In the meantime, the Hiranuma Cabinet, humiliated by the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact behind its back, had resigned late in August. The new Cabinet, headed by General Noboyuki Abe, though it kept up pressure on the French and British, gave so many indications of desiring improved relations with the United States that Grew asked and received permission to soften portions of his speech. As delivered, October 19, 1939, to the America-Japan Society of Tokyo, it came, in the Ambassador's words, "straight from the horse's mouth." Pleading for preservation of the ancient friendship between the Japanese and American peoples, the Ambassador warned that that friendship was endangered by a growing resentment in the United States at "the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing in

China today and what appear to be their objectives." The American people, he continued,

> have good reason to believe that an effort is being made to establish control, in Japan's own interest, of large areas on the continent of Asia and to impose upon those areas a system of closed economy. It is this thought, added to the effect of the bombings, the indignities, the manifold interference with American rights, that accounts for the attitude of the American people toward Japan today.[16]

It seemed at first that the Ambassador's frank statement might have beneficial results. There were temporary signs of greater respect for American rights in China. The Army agreed to the reopening of the Yangtze to international commerce as far as Nanking. But the concessions made were described by Hull as "chicken feed." They were offset by continued bombings of Chungking, with obvious danger to American installations and personnel, and by Japan's persistence in her plan to set up a puppet Chinese government at Nanking. Hull's view of this proposal was frankly expressed in a cable to Grew on November 13, 1939. The proposed regime, he said, would be "a purely artificial creation," supported by Japanese arms, and designed to deprive Americans and other Westerners "of long-established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment in China."[17]

As the time approached for the termination of the commercial treaty with Japan (January 26, 1940), the Japanese exhibited natural anxiety about the effect of its expiration upon their trade with the United States. Foreign Minister Nomura inquired about the negotiation of a new treaty, to which, of course, the United States could not consent until there was a fundamental change in Japanese policy. Ambassador Grew, hopeful as usual of strengthening a moderate Government against the militarists, proposed that a treaty be negotiated but its ratification made conditional upon Japan's living up to her assurances of respect for American rights. Hull agreed with Grew's aims, but believed his proposed solution "would be likely to produce more potentialities of misunderstanding and disadvantage than would a treatyless condition." The decision was simply to let the treaty expire, but for the time being to permit trade to go on as before. Thus, as Hull wrote,

> we put our trade relations with Japan on a twenty-four hour basis, and Tokyo knew that we now had legal freedom to impose any commercial restrictions we wished in the event of further Japanese violations of our rights. Tokyo was still kept guessing.[18]

A new Cabinet, headed by Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and with Arita again Foreign Minister, took office in Tokyo in January, 1940. While determined to bring the "China incident" to a successful conclusion, it was also resolved not to become embroiled in the European War, and Yonai assured Ambassador Grew that any idea of an alliance with Germany had been abandoned.[19] Under these circumstances, it seemed wise to Hull to refrain from subjecting Japan to further economic pressure, despite a campaign for economic sanctions touched off by Henry L. Stimson (still in private life) in a letter to the *New York Times*, January 11, 1940. Grew, who as we have seen, believed that sanctions meant war, noted gloomily in his diary that although the American people did not want war, "they listen to Mr. Stimson and his satellites because they [*i.e.*, Stimson *et al.*] discount the possibility of war and they tell the people that there is no risk of war."[20] But while trade with Japan continued under the mild "moral" restrictions already imposed, the United States did throw weight into the other side of the scale by arranging in March for a new loan of $20,000,000 to China through the Export-Import Bank. Shortly thereafter Hull commented with scorn upon the long-anticipated setting up at Nanking of a puppet government under the renegade Chinese Nationalist, Wang Ching-wei.[21]

The original good intentions of the Yonai Cabinet were to succumb in part to the glittering temptations created by the German victories in the spring. The fall of the Netherlands and then of France raised at once the problem of the disposition of the rich Dutch and French colonies in the Far East. Anticipating the former event, Arita on April 15, 1940, gave out a statement pointing out that any extension of the European War to the Netherlands Indies would interfere with Japan's economic relations with the islands and would threaten the peace and stability of Asia. Hull, perhaps unnecessarily alarmed lest this statement be a prelude to aggressive Japanese action, issued a counterstatement two days later. Any change in the status of the N.E.I. by other than peaceful means, he warned, "would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." Fearing that the Japanese might find an excuse for occupying the N.E.I. in the landing of British and French troops in the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curaçao,[22] he secured from France and Great Britain a promise that the troops would be promptly withdrawn and assurances that neither Britain nor France had the slightest intention of occupying the Dutch East Indian possessions. It was Hull's belief that without these assurances, Japan might have seized the Dutch islands in the summer of 1940.[23] In a conversation on this subject with the Japanese Ambassador, Hull took occasion to lecture Mr. Horinouchi on the difference between the Monroe Doctrine, which the Japanese had cited in Japan's defense, and the "new order" which Japan was seeking to impose upon Eastern Asia. "An admirable exposition of our attitude toward Japan," commented Ambassador Grew.[24]

Well into June, Ambassador Grew was hoping and working for an understanding with the Yonai Government that might be in accord with American principles. In a long entry in his diary he described the growing disillusionment in high quarters in Tokyo.

The Embassy knew through "reliable pipelines," he wrote, that key officials in the Government were coming to realize "that their plan for a closed economic bloc in East Asia is doomed to failure and that sooner or later they will have to abandon that short-sighted scheme in favor of a free flow of trade with the great commercial powers, particularly with the United States and the British Empire." It was not going to be easy to change Japan's course in that direction, but he thought it worth trying. "After long cogitation," he added, "I asked Washington to let me have a hack at it and my suggestions were approved." He abandoned his plan for going home on leave, and, as he wrote, in the middle of June, was "working along those lines . . . not without hope that those efforts may bear fruit in due course."[25]

Hull had agreed to Grew's suggestion, perhaps with the idea that further discussions would gain time if nothing else. He instructed his experts on the Far East, as he says, to "take a fine-tooth comb and a microscope" and to search American relations with Japan in the hope of finding a new approach. The only new proposal turned up was for an exchange of notes guaranteeing the *status quo* in European possessions in the Pacific. This Arita refused. For the rest, Hull's instructions to Grew reiterated the time-honored American principles and positions, while Arita, now under increasing pressure from the military, could yield nothing on China or the "new order." Hence the talks, though friendly, were completely futile so far as concrete results were concerned. In Grew's mind, this need not have been so. He believed that had he been permitted to take "the positive step" of offering to begin negotiation of a new commercial treaty, the United States could "have helped Japan to steer its ship of state into healthy channels."[26]

Meanwhile, France had fallen, German stock was soaring on the Tokyo diplomatic market, and the Army renewed its demands for alliance with Germany and more vigorous measures in East Asia. Vainly the Yonai Cabinet attempted to appease the radicals. In July it was forced out in favor of another Konoye Cabinet. The new Foreign Minister was Yosuke Matsuoka, an extreme nationalist, erratic, loquacious, described by Hull as being "as crooked as a basket of fishhooks." Under pressure from the Yonai Cabinet, the British and French had already agreed to close the Burma Road for three months, and the Indochina railway, to arms traffic into China. The new Cabinet, after expanding the East Asia of the "new order" to Greater East Asia, opened negotiations with the Netherlands Indies Government for special economic privileges and presented French Indochina with demands for military and air bases and transit rights for Japanese troops. The Dutch, with encouragement from the United States, refused special privileges and agreed to provide only a small part of the petroleum and rubber that Japan demanded. The French were in no position to offer resistance. Late in August they agreed in principle to the Japanese demands and implemented the agreement by a military accord a few weeks later. Then, on September 27, 1940, in Berlin, Japan signed with Germany and Italy the Tripartite Pact, which had been quietly and quickly negotiated in Tokyo.[27]

The signers of the Pact paid respect to one another's "new orders" in Europe and Asia, but the heart of the Pact was in Article III, by which each of the partners promised to give all aid to the others, should the latter be attacked by a power not then "involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict." This promise, made inapplicable to Russia by another article, was aimed specifically at the United States. Its purpose was to neutralize that country through the threat that if it went to war with either Japan or Germany, it would have the other also (and Italy too) to fight. For the United States any war would be a two-front war.

Conclusion of the Pact had been hastened by tokens that the United States was drawing nearer to the democracies—the Ogdensburg agreement with Canada, the destroyer deal with England.[28] It warned the United States not to go too far in aid to Britain. For Japan it had, or was supposed to have, a threefold value. Not only was it expected to deter the United States from interference with Japan's "new order"; it was accompanied by a promise that Germany would settle Japan's friction with the Soviet Union and an assurance that Germany had no interest in the Asiatic colonies of France and the Netherlands. There Japan might have a free hand.

The effect of the Axis Pact on the United States was the reverse of what its signers had planned. Far from being intimidated, the United States became more determined than before in its resolve to aid England and to oppose both German and Japanese aggression. Actually, however, the trend toward a firmer stand against Japan had been manifest before the Pact was signed. In March had occurred Mr. Hull's rejection of the Wang Ching-wei regime and a loan to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. In April, the Pacific Fleet was moved from its base at San Diego to Hawaii for maneuvers, and early in May the President ordered that it should remain based on Pearl Harbor until further notice. In this location, as Arita complained to Grew in their June talks, it implied that America suspected Japan of harboring aggressive designs against the Netherlands Indies—a wholly unwarranted suspicion, Arita assured the Ambassador.[29]

There was also a gradual tightening of restrictions on exports to Japan. Up to July, 1940, the only restrictions on such trade were the "moral embargoes" previously mentioned. On July 2, Congress provided a foundation for legal embargoes by authorizing the President to prohibit or regulate through a licensing system the export of strategic materials, machine tools, and other items essential to national defense. Now began a long debate within the Administration, with Secretary Hull (or Under Secretary Welles in his absence) opposing drastic restrictions but gradually giving way before the urging of men like Secretaries Stimson, Morgenthau, and Ickes.

When Japan, in June, demanded that Britain close the Burma Road, the British Government had indicated a willingness to refuse if assured of American support, which might take the form of a stern warning to Japan, the imposition of embargoes, or the sending of a detachment of the United States Fleet to Singapore. Hull had had to refuse, but did not hesitate to give out a statement deploring the closing of the road when that step was taken. The British were understandably irritated. Lord Lothian made this plain to Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau when they dined at the Embassy on July 18. The United States, he said, had not only refused support, but was still supplying Japan with aviation gasoline. He suggested that if the United States would stop sales of gasoline, Britain would see to it that the Indonesian oil wells were destroyed, and Japan, without fuel for her airplanes, would be forced to accept a settlement.

Morgenthau reported the conversation to the President, giving his own opinion that the proposed measures could bring peace in the Pacific in three months. The President was "tremendously interested," and his interest was increased by reports that the Japanese had almost secured a corner on supplies of aviation gasoline in the United States. He called in Stimson, Knox, and Welles (Hull being at the American Foreign Ministers' Conference in Havana), and over Welles's objection, on July 25, placed the exportation of petroleum products and iron and steel scrap under license. But Welles returned to the attack, backed by State Department specialists, with the argument that the denial of petroleum products to Japan would be seized as an excuse for invading the Netherlands Indies. The President was persuaded to reconsider, and issued an "explanation," limiting the embargo to aviation gasoline and lubricating oil and the highest grade of iron and steel scrap. Thus modified, the order had little effect on Japan, since the Japanese could convert lower grades of gasoline into aviation fuel and could do very well with exempted grades of scrap. Secretary Ickes commented sarcastically: "In other words, we are pretending to be holding back on exports of gasoline for Japanese planes while we are doing nothing of the sort."[30]

A beginning had been made, nevertheless, and despite the reluctance of Hull and Welles—shared, it must be added, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark—to take steps that might provoke Japan to war, progressively stronger pressures were applied through the fall of 1940 and into the winter. One influence in this direction, no doubt, was a change of attitude on the part of Ambassador Grew. Hitherto he had argued consistently for conciliatory policies and against measures that might be interpreted as sanctions. He had approved abrogation of the commercial treaty, which, as he said, left a "sword of Damocles" hanging over Japan's head, but he had opposed letting the sword fall.

On September 12, 1940, however, Grew sent to the Secretary of State what he described as his "green light" telegram. Still feeling that strong measures involved a risk of war, he now emphasized the risk involved in the failure to employ strong measures. With the Japanese Army now in full control and, as he saw it, threatening the vital interests of the United States in Southeast Asia, the Ambassador believed, as he expressed it, "that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render American-Japanese relations progressively precarious."[31]

Grew's change of position seems not at first to have appreciably affected that of Hull or Welles, possibly because they, through their contacts with Marshall and Stark, were more aware than Grew of America's deplorable unpreparedness for conflict in the Pacific. But as Japan's pressure on Indochina increased, Stimson and Morgenthau urged more effective embargoes on petroleum products and scrap iron. The matter came up in the Cabinet meeting of September 13, but, as Harold Ickes complained, "as usual, the State Department is pulling petals off the daisy." It appeared to Ickes that although Hull expected Japan to move into Indochina and perhaps the Netherlands Indies, his policy was "to wait for Japan to make these forward moves before doing anything about it." And six days later Hull was still holding back on embargoing scrap iron.[32]

It is most unlikely that any new embargoes at this juncture would have deterred Japan from her move into Indochina. The final military agreement with the representative of the Vichy regime was concluded on September 22, and on the next day Vichy gave out a statement that the arrangement had been made with American approval. Hull indignantly denied this claim and thereupon evidently dropped his opposition to an effective embargo upon scrap iron and steel. Exportation of these items, except to Britain and the Western Hemisphere, was forbidden on the twenty-fourth, but the State Department still opposed an extension of the oil embargo. The American position was further indicated on the following day by the making of a new loan of $25,000,000 to the Government of China.[33]

Hull's reaction to the announcement of the Tripartite Pact was calm. His public statement characterized it as merely formalizing a relationship which was already well known. He opposed further retaliatory measures against Japan and was successful in dissuading the President from instituting the effective oil embargo urged by the more aggressive Cabinet group—Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau, and Ickes. On the other hand, Hull told his staff on September 30 that "the United States could not afford to see the Singapore base fall into the hands of Japan, exposing Australia and New Zealand,"[34] and when Lord Lothian called to discuss the significance of the Tripartite Pact and the risks involved in the contemplated reopening of the Burma Road, he found that Hull, without making any commitments, was so sympathetic to the British position and so interested in possible joint arrangements for the defense of the British and Dutch colonies, that the British Government took heart. The Burma Road was reopened on October 18, without violent reaction from Japan; and with Hull's blessing, talks were quietly begun between American and British military men, which were to lead to the important staff conversations of the following winter.[35]

Early in October, 1940, Pierrepont Moffat, on a brief visit to Washington from his post in Ottawa, talked at length with Hull, Welles, and other members of the State Department. He found both Hull and Welles greatly worried lest the United States be drawn into war with Japan and its energies and resources thus be diverted from Europe, "the main theater where the war will be won or lost." "There must be no lessening of our supplies to England," Hull emphasized. Welles went still further. For once "less aggressive than the Secretary," he suspected that Japanese aggression "might well be a baited trap for us," to divert our efforts from supplying England. Only Stanley Hornbeck, in the Department, viewed the problem "as centering in the Far East" and advocated "measures that almost certainly would bring us into war." He seemed to Moffat to regard Japan "as the sun, around which her satellites, Germany and Italy, were revolving." Of some interest was Hornbeck's view that Singapore was "a vital interest to the United States for which we should, if need be, fight."[36]

A month later Hornbeck was explaining to Stimson a plan for the defense of Singapore which he said had been approved by Hull but as yet had got no further. It called for reinforcement by the British of their Air Force in Singapore and the dispatch by the United States of additional submarines to the Philippines. He thought this combination of air and undersea strength would be an adequate deterrent. Asked prophetically by Stimson about the chances of the Japanese attacking Singapore by moving infantry down the peninsula, Hornbeck replied "that the War Department had advised the State Department that such an expedition would be impossible."[37]

Apparently Hornbeck's plan won acceptance. A few days after this conversation, Stimson met Knox and Hull for their weekly consultation in the State Department—"the most fruitful and interesting one which we have had," Stimson commented. Knox reported that the Navy was sending ten additional submarines to the Philippines and that the Australians were sending a reinforcement of fifty planes to Singapore. "This constituted a reinforcement of the defense forces in regard to the New Netherlands [*sic*] which the State Department thinks is the best that we can do."[38]

This was going rather far in the direction of military co-operation with the British. Hull, who apparently was in full sympathy with the plan, wisely advised the President and Secretary Knox against publicizing the sending of submarines to the Philippines. An announcement of the move would sound too much like waving the big stick. The Japanese would find it out in their own way, and it would be better so. In dealing with lawless governments, Hull believed, "it was important to lead them to do a bit of guessing without making any threats."[39]

Other measures of the fall and early winter of 1940-1941 contributed further to the impression of a hardening policy toward Japan. In October the State Department announced that it was instructing consuls in the Far East to advise all Americans who could do so to leave at once—from Japan, China, Manchuria, Indochina. When, on November 30, Japan at last recognized Wang Ching-wei's Nanking government as the Government of China, the United States promptly countered with a new credit of $50,000,000 to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking, with another $50,000,000 to follow. Furthermore, while Hull still held out against an oil embargo, he made no objection to the adding of item after item to the list of licensed commodities—iron ore, pig iron, steel, many kinds of tools in December, with other articles to be included in January and February, 1941.[40]

Early in the new year, 1941, came intimations that Japan was at last disposed to discuss a settlement on reasonable terms, and soon thereafter a new Japanese Ambassador arrived in Washington. A new and fateful chapter in Hull's negotiations with Japan was about to begin.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

PEARL HARBOR

THE SELECTION of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura as Japan's new Ambassador to the United States was, so far as it went, indicative of a desire for improved relations, for Nomura had in earlier years been stationed in Washington and was personally acquainted with President Roosevelt and Admiral Stark. Any hopes raised by his appointment, however, were largely nullified by foreign Minister Matsuoka in the chauvinistic speech which he delivered in Tokyo at a farewell luncheon for the envoy. The essence of this address was the assertion that the United States did not understand that Japan's program in China was a "moral crusade," not a "war of greed and imperialism." This "crusade," he said, must be pursued; and he made it clear, too, that Japan would remain loyal to her allies of the Tripartite Pact.[1]

Secretary Hull's distrust of Matsuoka's professions of peaceful intent was voiced publicly in his statement of January 15, 1941, before the House committee considering the lend-lease bill, in which he accused Japan's leaders of having openly declared their intention to make themselves, by force of arms, "masters of an area containing almost one half of the entire population of the world."[2]

But although official utterances showed few if any signs of a softening attitude on either side, a number of unofficial approaches by private individuals suggested that Japan might be seeking a path by which to retreat without losing face. Among such approaches were a visit of a Japanese Buddhist to Washington, apparently sponsored by certain highly placed Japanese in government and business, and a feeler put out by Japanese business interests through former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies. These came to naught.[3]

More important than these were the unofficial negotiations undertaken by two Roman Catholic clerics, Bishop James E. Walsh and Father James M. Drought of the Catholic Mission Society of Maryknoll, New York. The two had been in Japan in December on business of the Mission Society. They had been introduced to Matsuoka and, whether with or without his knowledge, had undertaken to take to Washington a proposal which they understood as coming directly from Konoye and as representing his position and that of other "liberals" in the Japanese Government. Through Postmaster General Frank C. Walker, a prominent Catholic layman, the priestly envoys secured an interview with the President and Secretary of State on January 23, 1941, and left at the White House a memorandum of the Japanese offer as they understood it.

The offer, had it been official and in good faith, would have gone far to satisfy American aims in the Far East and to detach Japan from her Axis partners. Hull and the President received the memorandum with well justified skepticism but agreed that they "could not afford to neglect any chance to avoid a war in the Pacific." Hence they invited Bishop Walsh, Father Drought, and Mr. Walker to continue such contacts as they had with the Japanese Embassy on an unofficial basis, deferring any official action until the arrival of Admiral Nomura, the new Ambassador.[4]

Nomura arrived in Washington early in February and paid his first call on Secretary Hull on the twelfth. Hull had advised the President that he considered the chances for an agreement with Japan slender indeed—not more than one in twenty, or fifty, or even one hundred. The Secretary and President agreed, nevertheless, that they would do everything possible "to bring about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the whole Pacific question," but barring any sacrifice of basic American principles, "without which peace would be illusory."[5] The President greeted the Ambassador cordially on February 14, advised him to review with the State Department the history of recent Japanese-American relations in the hope of finding means to improve them, and concluded by remarking that there was room in the Pacific for all and that war would be harmful to both countries.

It was not until several weeks later that regular conversations began between Hull and Nomura. In order to avoid publicity, these were held in the evening in the Secretary's apartment, first in the Carlton Hotel, later in the Wardman Park. At first the Secretary and the Ambassador met without attendants, but finding Nomura's vaunted command of English less than adequate, Hull brought in Joseph W. Ballantine, Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, whose knowledge of Japanese helped to overcome the deficiency. It was Ballantine, too, who kept notes and prepared the memoranda of the conversations. Hull's other principal advisers in the conversations—he insisted throughout that they were not negotiations—were Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the above-mentioned division, and Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Department's Adviser on Political Affairs. Hornbeck, in particular, could be depended upon to go over every Japanese proposal with a microscope and detect any traps concealed in the fine print. He was the Department's most articulate advocate of a "hard" line toward Japan.[6]

It was evident in Hull's first talks with Nomura that the Ambassador knew nothing of the Walsh-Drought feelers. Soon, however, the gap between the official and unofficial channels of communication was closed by the arrival in Washington of two new Japanese emissaries, Tadao Ikawa and Colonel Hideo Iwakuro. Ikawa was an English-speaking banker, who had assisted Walsh and Drought as interpreter in their talks with Japanese officialdom. Iwakuro was an authentic spokesman for the Army, sent to Washington as a result of the Ambassador's request for an adviser representing the Army's point of view.[7] With Nomura's knowledge, and with Ikawa acting as interpreter, Colonel Iwakuro and Father Drought prepared a document which they hoped would prove acceptable to both Governments. It proposed clarification or improvement of attitudes under seven headings, the negotiations to culminate in a meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye, to be held in Honolulu as soon as possible. The document was transmitted to Secretary Hull on April 9 through Postmaster General Walker.

As the Secretary and his advisers studied the proposal of April 9, Hull later recalled, "our disappointment was keen. It was much less accommodating than we had been led to believe it would be, and most of its provisions were all that the ardent Japanese imperialists could want."[8] The proposal, as a matter of fact, was predominantly the work of Colonel Iwakuro. To him the American priests had conveyed the impression that the United States was ready to concede to Japan considerably more than it actually was, just as they had, in their well-meant endeavors for peace, given Washington an exaggerated impression of Japan's readiness to yield. The result was necessarily disillusionment.[9]

The proposal contained items that would undoubtedly be to the benefit of the United States. Peace would be made in China, without annexations or indemnities. The Open Door in China would be resumed, the interpretation of that term to be later agreed upon between Japan and the United States. Japan would pledge that her activities in the Southwest Pacific would be peaceful, and in return would receive American co-operation in her endeavors to obtain the needed products of that region. Japan would join in a guarantee of independence for the Philippines. The serious deficiencies in the document from the American point of view were in the proposed procedure for making peace with China, the vagueness or ambiguity of the suggested terms for that peace, and the proposed definitions of the relationship of both Governments to the European War.

The President of the United States, it was stated, might request the "Chiang Kai-shek regime" to make peace with Japan on terms in part specified, including coalescence of Chiang's government with the puppet government at Nanking. If Chiang accepted the request, negotiations should begin with the coalesced government, Japan to submit concrete terms "along the line of neighboring friendship, joint defense against communist activities and economic co-operation." But if Chiang should refuse the President's request, the United States should stop all aid to his regime. Thus the United States would be placing itself in the position of coercing Chiang Kai-shek to make peace on terms imposed by Japan.

Of the suggested terms themselves, coalescence of the Chungking and Nanking governments was not the only one certain of meeting Chinese resistance. Another called for recognition of Manchukuo, contrary to Chinese as well as American policy. The provision for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China in accordance with an agreement to be reached between China (that is, the coalesced government) and Japan, in conjunction with that for "joint defense against communist activities," seemed certain to mean insistence upon retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia. Likewise, the promise of resumption of the Open Door might well be negated by the stipulated "economic co-operation" between Japan and China. All of these provisions were susceptible of interpretations that would be unacceptable to both China and the United States.

Finally, as to the European War and the Tripartite Pact, Japan was to declare that its military obligations under the Axis Alliance would come into force "only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War." This was perhaps reasonably satisfactory, since the United States, in its own view, had no intention of "aggressively attacking" the Third Reich. The United States, on its side, was to declare that its attitude to the war was and would continue to be "determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another," but "solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security." The phrasing here was tricky. Certainly the United States considered itself a member of "no aggressive alliance," but as certainly its policy aimed to assist Great Britain against Germany and to protect British welfare and security as well as its own.[10]

Disappointing though the April 9 proposal was, the Secretary decided that, if the Japanese Government cared to offer it officially, it could be accepted as a basis for discussion. He so stated to Ambassador Nomura in two interviews, April 14 and 16. In the second of these conversations, Mr. Hull also handed the Ambassador a document which was to play a part of some importance in the subsequent discussions—a statement of four basic principles of international conduct which, Hull remarked, "would have to underlie any agreement we reached." They were as follows:

> (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
> (2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
> (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
> (4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

If the Japanese Government would accept these four principles, Hull told the Ambassador, and if it would instruct him to propose officially the informal document of April 9, conversations could start on that basis. The United States would then "offer counter proposals and independent proposals," and conversations could proceed in a friendly spirit "to a conclusion one way or the other."[11]

Aware that Nomura's command of English was imperfect, the Secretary took great pains, through repetition and emphasis, to make it clear that the United States was in no sense accepting the terms of the proposal of April 9. It contained, he said, points that could be accepted and others that would have to be eliminated or modified. Without committing the United States, he wished the Ambassador to ascertain whether the Japanese Government cared to adopt this unofficial draft and propose it officially as a basis for discussion. Unfortunately, Nomura either misunderstood Hull's explanation or had reasons of his own for misrepresenting the Secretary's position. In his reports to Tokyo he gave the impression that the draft of April 9 was an American proposal, presumably approved by the Secretary and the President. Nomura neglected also, until May 8, to inform the Foreign Office of Hull's four basic principles and even then intimated that he had succeeded in sidetracking them from the conversations. The consequence was that Tokyo received a wholly mistaken impression of the American position and was later to complain that the United States was drawing back from the "American proposal" of April 9.[12]

The supposedly American proposal was welcomed with understandable elation in Tokyo. A Liaison Conference of high government and military leaders on April 18 decided to accept it conditionally as the basis of an agreement with the United States. At the same time, however, the conference "resolved that nothing must be done that would affect Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact." A day or two before, the Army and Navy, at Imperial Headquarters, had resolved that economic relations with Southeast Asia must be expanded, preferably by diplomatic means but by force if need be. Thus two of the qualified assurances appearing in the proposal of April 9 were partially nullified from the start.[13]

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Matsuoka was absent on a mission to Europe, and final decision on the answer to the United States was deferred until after his return on April 22. Matsuoka had hobnobbed with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin, and in Moscow on April 13 had signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. From Hitler he had received a promise that Germany "would take the necessary steps at once" if Japan and the United States went to war. In return, having no authority to make official promises for his Government, he had assured his German friends that he would exert his personal influence to bring about the attack on Singapore which they were urging.[14] In his enthusiasm for his Axis allies, he was distinctly cool to any proposal for an amicable arrangement with the United States, even one so favorable to Japan as that of April 9, with the proposed amendments. Not until May 12—in the meantime having proposed a neutrality treaty, which Hull immediately rejected—did he give his consent to the making of what the Japanese considered a reply to an American proposal.

By Hull and the State Department, on the other hand, the communication brought in by Nomura on May 12 was assumed to be Japan's initial official proposal, a substitute for that prepared by Colonel Iwakuro and Father Drought with Nomura's concurrence. To the American eye the new document, though highly commended by Father Drought, was definitely more distasteful than the the earlier one. "Very few rays of hope shone from the document," Hull wrote later.[15] The article on the European War no longer restricted Japan's military obligations under the Axis Pact to cases of "aggressive attack" upon her allies, while it made more explicit the proposed pledge of the United States not to assist one belligerent against another. Japan's pledge not to use force in the Southwest Pacific was dropped. The terms for peace with China were stated in more general terms. It was proposed that the United States agree, either in a separate, secret document or "a definite pledge by 'some highest authorities'," to discontinue assistance to Chiang Kai-shek if the latter should reject the President's advice that he enter into negotiations for peace.

In short, whereas Hull had looked upon the April 9 draft as a Japanese proposal which might be modified to the advantage of the United States, the Japanese had taken it as an American proposal and had amended it to the advantage of Japan. Nevertheless, discouraged though he was, Hull believed that it would be a mistake to reject the proposal outright, thus throwing away the only chance of discussing basic issues with Japan and conceivably of detaching Japan from the Axis alliance. The President agreed. "Consequently," Hull wrote, "we decided to go forward on the basis of the Japanese proposals and seek to argue Japan into modifying here, eliminating there, and inserting elsewhere, until we might reach an accord we both could sign with mutual good will."[16]

The Secretary and his advisers, therefore, took up the weary and, as it proved, hopeless task of attempting to bring the Japanese around to the American point of view on the disputed issues. Ambassador Grew was asked his opinion on whether the Japanese Government could and would carry out the terms of such an agreement as was contemplated and whether such an agreement was advisable. The Ambassador, in what he described in his diary as "perhaps the most important telegram sent during my service in Japan, or one of the most important," unhesitatingly advised the Department to go ahead. The Japanese Government, he argued, would not make such an agreement without the approval of the higher councils of the armed services, and these would be in a position to control any elements that could effectively sabotage a settlement. He had reason to believe that the armed services were favorably disposed, and he was confident that "the Japanese public would welcome such a settlement with a profound sense of relief."[17]

Already, on May 16, Hull had proposed to Nomura changes in the Japanese proposals on four important issues: an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact which would insure the United States against attack by Japan if it went to war with Germany; assurance that all Japanese troops would be withdrawn from China after a peace settlement; assurance of a real

Open Door in China and the Southwest Pacific after restoration of peace; a Japanese pledge (to be joined in also by the United States) to refrain from the use of armed force in the Southwest Pacific. The United States, in return, would restore normal trade relations and co-operate with Japan in securing for both countries equal access to the products of the Southwest Pacific area. When this proposal failed to elicit a satisfactory response, while Foreign Minister Matsuoka indulged in a series of statements unfriendly to the United States and friendly to the other Axis powers, Hull tried again. In a comprehensive note of June 21, he again set forth the American position, at the same time handing Nomura an "oral statement," complaining that it was difficult to accept Japanese professions of peaceful intent when highly placed personages talked in a contrary tone.[18]

Matsuoka objected violently to the "oral statement," which he denounced as an attempt to interfere in Japan's internal affairs by driving him from the Cabinet. In order to mollify him the Secretary consented to have the statement returned to the Department.[19] This was, however, one of the last acts of Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. His colleagues had found his unpredictability, his chauvinism and intense pro-Germanism, a handicap to any rational conduct of policy. On July 16 the entire Cabinet resigned. It was reconstituted two days later, the only significant change being the replacement of Matsuoka by Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, who had the reputation of being friendly to Great Britain and the United States.[20]

The change in Foreign Ministers improved the tone of Japan's foreign policy but did not alter its substance. The American note of June 21 remained unanswered, and the principal points of difference between the two governments remained unsettled—the meaning of the Tripartite Pact, the retention of Japanese troops in China, the Open Door, and the use or threat of force in the Southwest Pacific. Nor had Japan responded to Hull's proposal of the four principles that should govern future relations.

Japan was, in fact, about to embark upon a new phase of its aggressive policy. Hitler's attack upon the Soviet Union on June 22 had posed a new question for the Japanese Government. Should it, as Matsuoka ardently desired, repudiate his two-months-old neutrality treaty and join Germany in an assault upon Japan's ancient enemy? Or should it take advantage of Russia's preoccupation with the German war to move southward? An Imperial Conference on July 2 overruled Matsuoka, deciding to defer to a later date "a settlement of the Soviet Question," and for the present to concentrate on "the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and world peace." This would mean continued efforts to settle "the China Incident" and "an advance into the Southern Regions," a program that would be carried out "no matter what obstacles may be encountered."[21]

For "the advance into the Southern Regions" the first essential step was the securing of bases in southern Indochina. On July 12, accordingly, an ultimatum to the Vichy Government demanded both air and naval bases in that region and the right to station there an unspecified number of air, sea, and ground forces. The helpless Vichy Government gave its consent on July 21, and a week later Japanese forces were entering Saigon.[22]

Rumors of Japan's intended move into southern Indochina appeared in the press well in advance of the landings. The President and the Secretary of State were not dependent upon rumor for their information. Sometime in the spring, Army and Navy cryptanalysts had broken the principal Japanese diplomatic code, and a few high-level officials in Washington were reading the communications that passed between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Ambassadors in Washington and other capitals. The existence of "Magic" (the code name for this operation) was a well-kept secret, not even revealed to Ambassador Grew or to the military and naval commanders in the Pacific.[23] Hull and the few others who had access to the "Magic" intercepts had to be constantly on their guard lest an allusion to something they knew through this secret channel tip off the Japanese to its existence

Hull was ill and absent from the Department, first in his Washington apartment, then at White Sulphur Springs, during the critical weeks from June 22 to early August, 1941, but was in almost daily contact by telephone with Sumner Welles or other officers of the Department. Welles was speaking for Hull, therefore, when on July 23 he warned Admiral Nomura that a move of French armed forces into southern Indochina would destroy the basis for any continuation of the conversations between the two Governments.[24]

On the next day, July 24, it became known that the Vichy Government had yielded to the Japanese demands. The President told his Cabinet that afternoon of his resolve to freeze Japanese funds in the United States, potentially putting an end to virtually all trade. The decision was announced in a press release on the twenty-fifth, and the freezing order was issued on the morning of July 26, 1941. In the interval between decision and order the President had given Admiral Nomura his solemn promise that if Japan would refrain from the proposed occupation, or would withdraw from it if already begun, he would do everything in his power to secure an international guarantee of the neutrality of Indochina, thus meeting Japan's argument that her occupation was needed to forestall unfriendly interference by other powers. The offer made little impression on the Ambassador, who gave it no emphasis in his report of the conversation.[25] Since Japan's professed fears of intervention by others in Indochina were chiefly a pretense to cloak her real objectives, the offer was unlikely to tempt her leaders.

The United States had now frankly embarked on a program of economic sanctions against Japan. Most earlier restrictions on trade with her, like those on scrap iron and gasoline, had been explained as made necessary by the rearmament program or commitments to Great Britain. The freezing order, which involved bringing all trade with Japan under government control, was admittedly in retaliation for Japan's new aggressive move. Hull, who had hitherto opposed sanctions, agreed by telephone to the new measure, though he did not share the President's confidence that the freezing order would not be followed by new Japanese aggressions. These he expected, and though ever ready to reach an agreement on reasonable terms, from now on the main objective of his diplomacy was to gain time for preparing the nation for war.[26]

The freezing order as administered put an end to most of such trade with Japan as remained after earlier restrictions. The United Kingdom, the British Dominions and colonies, and the Netherlands East Indies followed the example of the United States. Secretary Hull himself undertook, through the United States missions in Latin America, to persuade the governments of that area to do likewise. Japan was caught in a crippling economic squeeze. The effect of the new policy, Herbert Feis has written, "was to force Japan to choose between making terms with us and making war against us."[27]

Hull returned to the Department on August 4. After "a good long talk" with him four days later Secretary Stimson reported: "He has made up his mind that we have reached the end of any possible appeasement with Japan and that there is nothing further that can be done with that country except by a firm policy and, he expected, force itself." "Hull, with his analytical mind," Stimson noted in another entry in his diary, "is asking searching questions now of the Navy what they'll do next in case any of these issues that he has been handling brings up an impasse and the necessity of force."[28]

Hull had, however, consented to talk again with Nomura. The Ambassador called on him August 6, bringing certain one-sided propositions which the Japanese regarded as an answer to the President's offer to secure the neutralization of Indochina and Thailand. Hull found the reply "lacking in responsiveness." For the moment he paid little attention to another suggestion brought by Nomura two days later —the suggestion of a "summit meeting" between the Prime Minister and the President.[29]

In fact, when Nomura paid his visit, the President was on his way to the famous Atlantic Conference with Winston Churchill at Argentia, Newfoundland. Relations with Japan received considerable attention at the Conference, and Sumner Welles, who had represented the State Department, brought back to Washington, August 15, a notice which the President had tentatively promised Churchill to serve on Japan. As drafted by Churchill, the final paragraph of this notice was to read:

> Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.[30]

As Churchill had feared, this strong language was toned down by the State Department. When the President and Secretary met with Nomura on August 17, the warning, while still strong, omitted reference to war, but substituted a statement that persistence by Japan in a "program of military domination by force or threat of force" might compel the United States "to take immediately any and all steps" which it might deem necessary to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests. The force of the warning was further diminished when the President informed the Ambassador that it was not to have even the status of an "oral statement," but was merely an informal paper for his information. A second note, handed to the Ambassador at the same meeting, gave encouragement for a renewal of the conversations if Japan would "suspend its expansionist activities," and argued that the peaceful settlement and nondiscriminatory economic system which the United States envisaged in the whole Pacific area would be more advantageous to Japan than any benefits to be gained from persistence in a policy of aggression.[31]

At the conference with the President and Hull on August 17 Nomura brought forward Konoye's proposal for a meeting with Roosevelt. The President, fresh from his successful meeting with Churchill, warmed to the idea, but Hull was and remained skeptical of the value of such a meeting. Unless agreement on essential points was achieved beforehand, he foresaw a summit meeting ending in failure and an intensified crisis. Possibly, on the other hand, he feared that Roosevelt, in order to prevent such a failure, might concede too much to Konoye. At any rate, at a conference with Nomura on August 28 (after the President on the same morning had exhibited definite interest in the coming meeting with the Premier), the Secretary of State stressed the importance of reaching in advance "an agreement in principle" on the chief questions at issue. A meeting of the President and Premier, he thought, should "have as its purpose the ratification of essential points already agreed to in principle."

Though the Ambassador, in reply, professed to believe that only the question of the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia really divided the two Governments,[32] the proceedings of a secret Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 reveal how deep and numerous the divisions actually were. The only real concession there agreed to was to refrain from using Indochina as a base for operations further south and to withdraw Japanese forces from that peninsula upon the conclusion of "a just peace" in the Far East. This was upon condition that the United States restore normal trade relations with Japan, agree to see that Japan obtained the needed raw materials from the Southwest Pacific area, and suspend all military preparations in the Far East. Japan, furthermore, was to retain "special relations" with Indochina, to which the Vichy Government had consented. Japan would guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines and the "purely commercial" operations of America and England in China. On the other hand, the United States and Great Britain were to do nothing to obstruct a settlement between Japan and China on Japan's terms and were to cease all aid to the Chinese Government at Chungking. Japan would "rigidly adhere" to the right to station troops in various parts of China.

On the question of the Tripartite Pact, the only assurance envisaged by the Imperial Conference was that if the United States entered the war against Germany, Japan would decide for herself upon the meaning and applicability of the Pact.

The Imperial Conference resolved, finally, that every effort should be made by diplomatic means to secure from the United States and Great Britain agreement to Japan's minimum demands. But preparations for war should proceed side by side with diplomatic negotiations, and if by the early part of October there was no reasonable hope that the negotiations would succeed, then Japan should immediately prepare for war with the United States, and England and the Netherlands as well.[33]

On the day of the Imperial Conference, September 6, Nomura handed Hull a new set of proposals. They were in accord with the decisions of the Conference, and Hull found that they "fell far short of any possibility of acceptance." On the same evening Ambassador Grew dined secretly with Prince Konoye upon the latter's invitation. In a three-hour talk, the Premier assured Grew that the Government of Japan "conclusively and wholeheartedly" agreed to Hull's four principles of April 16 and argued strongly for the meeting with Roosevelt. Any agreement that he might make with the President, he maintained, would have the support of the armed services and there would be no question of the Government's ability to carry it out. But six months hence this might not be true; nor, if he failed, could any succeeding Prime Minister, "at least during his own lifetime, . . . achieve the results desired. . . . Prince Konoye repeatedly stressed the view that time is of the essence."[34]

Grew, who from the first had viewed the proposed meeting favorably, was more than ever convinced that it should be given a trial. He argued for it in his reports to Washington, and he was supported by Bishop Walsh, who had returned to Japan. But Hull and his advisers in the Department remained unconvinced. Konoye's acceptance of the four principles[35] seemed to them "like an attempt to make his other proposals more palatable." Weeks of further discussions produced nothing new. On October 2, with the President's approval, Hull handed Nomura a restatement of the American position. He dwelt on the American desire for a settlement applying "liberal and progressive principles" to the entire Pacific area, and his impression that the Japanese Government was unwilling to apply those principles except with "qualifications and exceptions." The President, he said, still desired a meeting with Konoye and hoped "that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held." Polite in language, the note made it clear that the

President would not meet the Prime Minister until their basic disagreements had been settled at a lower level.[36]

Was Secretary Hull right in opposing a meeting of Roosevelt and Konoye without a prior agreement on the main points in controversy? Ambassador Grew, then and later, believed not. In his judgment, there was a good chance that such a meeting would produce a settlement acceptable to both countries.[37] Hull, on the other hand, saw no reason to believe that Konoye could prevail upon the armed forces to accept less than they had consistently demanded since the conversations had got under way in April. We know from Konoye's *Memoirs* that in order to get the consent of the military to his proposed meeting with the President, he had to promise both to insist on "the firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and to lead the nation into war if the President failed to "understand" Japan's noble aims.[38] It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Hull was correct in assuming that only through a surrender by the United States could a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting result in an agreement. Such an agreement, it seemed to him as he reviewed the matter in his *Memoirs*, would have been unacceptable to the American people, a betrayal of China, an abandonment of England and Holland, a possible contribution to a victory of Hitler over Stalin. "And," he added, "on the ladder of an agreement such as Japan demanded, a mightier Japan would have climbed to become a greater danger to us than ever before."[39]

If such reasoning sounded more compelling in 1941 or in 1948 than in the 1960's, how many Americans in 1941 saw a danger to the United States in a Japan that might be too weak rather than too strong? One such was Ambassador Grew. In a letter to Roosevelt on September 22, 1941, he warned that failure to reach agreement with Konoye would greatly increase the chances of war. While the United States "would undoubtedly win in the end," he wrote, "I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power."[40]

Prince Konoye did not abandon his efforts for a settlement. Minister Wakasugi of the Embassy in Washington, who had returned to Tokyo, was sent back in haste to the American capital. Speaking unofficially in a conversation with Welles on October 13, he attempted to reassure the Under Secretary as to the attitude of the Konoye Cabinet toward the Tripartite Pact. He was sure that it could accept the American position on nondiscrimination in the entire Pacific area. He said also "that the Japanese Government was willing to evacuate all of its troops from China," but since he could only be vague on timing, he asked Welles whether, with all other questions settled, "the two Governments could not go ahead and leave the China question in abeyance." Welles replied that this would be too much like asking for a performance of *Hamlet* without Hamlet.[41]

Welles would perhaps have spoken even more emphatically if he had known that in Tokyo on the preceding day War Minister Tojo had rejected a plea from Konoye that Japan agree "in principle" to the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China, with the idea that a later agreement with the Chinese Government could provide for the retention of troops in crucial areas. The Army's prestige was at stake, and even an appearance of yielding would be a crushing blow to Army morale.[42]

Rejection of the plan for a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting sealed the fate of the Konoye Cabinet. Konoye wished to continue the negotiations; War Minister Tojo insisted that they be ended. But since the Navy harbored undercover misgivings about war with the United States, Tojo proposed that the Cabinet, which had participated in the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6, resign in favor of one not bound by that decision. The resignation took place on October 16, 1941, and two days later General Tojo formed a new Cabinet, himself occupying the posts of Premier, Minister of War, and Home Minister. He took office under a directive from the Emperor to "wipe the slate clean" as far as the decision of September 6 was concerned; in other words, war with the United States might still be avoided. The new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, was anxious to achieve that end. It was announced that the new Government would continue negotiations with Washington, and further, on November 3 that a new envoy, the career diplomat Saburo Kurusu, would be sent to assist Admiral Nomura.[43]

But Japan in 1941, as has been said, was governed by "remote control," with the real power of decision wielded by the general staffs of Army and Navy, particularly by the junior officers in those groups, who in turn were influenced by radical elements both within and without the armed services. Such elements would have resisted any significant yielding to the United States, and it is doubtful whether even General Tojo, had he been so minded, could have overcome their resistance.[44] Conferences of civilian and military leaders in late October culminated in a Liaison Conference on November 2, whose decision was approved by an Imperial Conference on November 5. The decision was to present the United States with a set of demands, known as Plan A, and in the event of its rejection, a second set, Plan B, in effect an ultimatum. If one or the other were not accepted by November 25, Japan would launch her campaign against Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies and against the United States, which was considered inseparable in policy from the British and Dutch. Until the Imperial Conference had acted, there was nothing for Nomura to do in Washington. His first significant call on Hull after Konoye's fall was made on November 7, when he came to present Japanese Plan A.[45]

Meanwhile the United States, like Japan, was doing what it could to prepare for war if, as seemed probable, negotiations failed. Since spring, efforts had been made to increase material aid to China and to sustain Chinese morale. The Chungking Government had been made eligible for lend-lease assistance.

An American specialist on the Far East, Owen Lattimore, had been encouraged to become political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. An American transportation mission was studying means of improving the Burma Road, and a military mission was surveying Chinese needs and giving advice on the use of lend-lease. American Army and Navy pilots and ground crews were being permitted to resign and volunteer for service in China in what became known as the American Volunteer Group, or "Flying Tigers." American naval officers had twice met in Singapore with British, Australian, and Dutch representatives to concert tentative plans for joint defense of the Southwest Pacific area against possible Japanese invasion, and light United States naval squadrons had paid courtesy calls to Australia and New Zealand. All these activities, though for the most part not publicized, were known to the Japanese. They gave rise to charges of "encirclement." Americans hoped that they would deter Japan from further aggressive moves. All these measures had Hull's approval.[46]

In the summer, as the likelihood of war increased, the United States had begun taking measures for defense of the Philippines. In July, President Roosevelt recalled General Douglas MacArthur to active duty and gave him command of both United States and Philippines troops in the islands. At the same time a belief arose in the War Department that an efficient force of bombers stationed in the Philippines would constitute such a threat to the sea routes from Japan to the Indies as would serve to deter Japan from naval campaigns in that direction. Every effort was being made, therefore, to rush as many as possible of the so-called Flying Fortresses to Philippines air bases.

But this required time, and for that reason Secretary Stimson was insistent upon postponing a break with Japan. Explaining to Hull, October 6, what the Army was planning in the Far East "in the next three months," Stimson "found him fully impressed with the importance of that. I told him we needed three months to secure our position and to be protected from an explosion of the Japanese Army during that time." Next day Norman Davis reported to Stimson that Hull, whom Stimson usually found "a cagey old bird" and hard to fathom, was "all cheered up over the Army's program."[47]

Hull's problem, therefore, as he again faced Nomura on November 7 was, if Nomura brought no new concessions, to prolong the conversations and delay the outbreak of war until the Army had built up an impressive aerial threat in the Philippines. Such delay, he knew, would be difficult if not impossible to arrange. Through the "Magic" intercepts, he knew both of the unsatisfactory nature of the terms Japan was ready to offer, and of the deadline of November 25 set for completion of the negotiations. He informed the Cabinet, November 7, of the critical status of relations with Japan and added the warning: "We should be on the lookout for a military attack by Japan anywhere at any time."[48]

Nomura presented the proposals of Plan A in part to Hull on November 7 and in whole to Hull and the

President three days later. They were, if anything, less satisfactory than previous offers. Japan would agree to a system of economic equality and nondiscrimination in China and the Pacific area if the same principle were accepted in all parts of the world. Japanese army units would remain in North China, Inner Mongolia, and the island of Hainan for "a necessary period," which Nomura might, if asked, specify as twenty-five years. From other parts of China they would be withdrawn within two years after the "firm establishment of peace and order." Forces in Indochina would be withdrawn after settlement of the "China Affair." Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact were, as Herbert Feis remarks, "defined in new language without new meaning." The United States would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to make peace with Japan under threat of ending support if he refused.[49]

It is not necessary to detail the long discussions to which Plan A gave rise, between Hull and his advisers and the President on one side and Nomura and Kurusu (who arrived November 15) on the other.[50] Kurusu brought no new offers. Not one of the proposals on the three chief points in controversy, as set forth in Plan A, was acceptable to the United States. Hull showed most concern over the Japanese refusal to scrap the Tripartite Pact or agree to regard it as a "dead letter." He might be lynched, he told Nomura, if he made an agreement with Japan which left the latter under obligation to join Germany in a war against the United States.[51] Declarations that Japan would determine her obligations under the Pact independently were not reassuring when an intercepted telegram of November 14 stated that if the United States went to war with Germany, Japan would "automatically carry out what she understands to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement."[52]

Perhaps mainly to gain time, Hull threw out suggestions for a voluntary peace agreement between China and Japan (leading Foreign Minister Togo to the unwarranted conjecture that Hull had approached Chungking on the subject) and for a joint American-Japanese declaration of economic principles. His seemingly technical insistence that he and the envoys were engaged only in "exploratory conversations," not in negotiations, became significant with his explanation: " 'The reason,' I said, 'is that I cannot go to the British or the Chinese or other Governments involved without having first reached a real basis for negotiations, since those Governments have a rightful interest in these problems.' " It would appear, in other words, that there could be no "negotiations" until an agreement was in sight which would satisfy not only the United States but its friends as well.[53]

By November 18 it was evident to the Japanese as well as to the Americans that discussion of Plan A was getting nowhere, and both parties began talking of a *modus vivendi* or temporary agreement, which might serve as a basis for preserving the peace while postponing settlement of the most troublesome issues. Japanese Plan B had been so conceived from its inception. On the American side, Mr. Roosevelt had suggested such an arrangement to Secretary Stimson on November 6. Though Stimson saw objections to the plan as suggested, the President continued to weigh the idea. Presumably he mentioned it to Hull, for on November 11 the Far East Division of the State Department submitted to the Secretary a memorandum suggesting an armistice for negotiations between Japan and China, with a cessation of American aid to China during the negotiations. This was, however, laid aside when the Japanese made their own proposal.[54]

Kurusu, on his own responsibility, November 18, suggested a return to the *status quo* of July, before the Japanese move into southern Indochina and the American freezing order. For this he was rebuked by his Government, and he and Nomura were instructed to present Plan B. This they did on November 20. Two days later, "Magic" decoded an instruction from Tokyo to the Ambassadors. It extended the deadline from the 25th to the 29th of November, urged the envoys to do everything in their power to bring about a settlement by the latter date, and added: "After that things are automatically going to happen."[55]

Plan B pledged both the United States and Japan to make no further armed advances into the area of Southeast Asia or the Southern Pacific. Japan promised to evacuate Indochina upon the conclusion of peace and to withdraw her forces from southern to northern Indochina upon the signing of the agreement. Commercial relations between the two countries would be restored to what they had been before the freezing order, and the United States should "supply Japan a required quantity of oil." The two governments would co-operate in securing from the Netherlands East Indies the commodities which they needed. So far, the proposal amounted to a lifting of economic sanctions by the United States in return for Japan's abandonment of her plans for further southward expansion. But in addition, the United States was to "refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."[56]

The United States, in other words, was to cease giving aid and comfort to the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai-shek, leaving China the choice of fighting on alone or making peace on Japan's terms. The supposedly temporary character of the proposed settlement took some of the curse off this provision; but conspicuously absent from Plan B was any assurance as to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. This deficiency Kurusu believed that he had remedied by assuring Hull that the Government of Japan, interpreting its commitments under the Pact "freely and independently," "would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign power . . . but only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice."[57]

Hull and his State Department advisers, as he wrote later, "subjected these points and their implications to minute study, but it required very little scrutiny to see that they were utterly unacceptable." The essence of the several paragraphs in his *Memoirs* in which Hull expounds the "preposterous" character of the proposals is that their acceptance would have meant betrayal of China and perhaps of Russia, abandonment of American principles, and retention by Japan of gains that might make her a greater threat than before to American security.[58] Some of these extreme consequences may be questioned. Herbert Feis adds, however, that acceptance of the proposal would have destroyed confidence in the United States on the part of the British, Chinese, and Dutch members of the *de facto* "defensive coalition" which Japanese pressure had created, and further, that the proposal left so many openings for misunderstanding that war, though perhaps postponed, would not have been prevented.[59]

At any rate, the decision was against acceptance of Plan B, but since both the Army and the Navy—Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark—were pleading "for more time in which to prepare American resistance," Hull, with the President's concurrence, decided to present a counterproposal, an American *modus vivendi*, instead of an outright rejection of the Japanese plan. Such a temporary accommodation, if accepted by Japan, would allow three months during which discussion of a permanent settlement might proceed, while at the same time the Army and Navy might improve their position in the Pacific. An outline of a proposed permanent settlement was to be handed to the Japanese Ambassadors at the same time as the *modus vivendi.*

The *modus vivendi* owed something to the memorandum prepared in the Far East Division on November 11, something to an undated suggestion sent over by the President later.[60] Briefly summarized, it comprised mutual pledges of devotion to peaceful policies; promises by both parties to abstain from further advances in the Pacific area by force or threat of force; withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern to northern Indochina and reduction of those in the latter area to the number present July 26, 1941 (about 25,000); resumption of limited trade between the United States and Japan, with oil to be supplied to Japan on a monthly basis, sufficient for civilian needs only; reaffirmation of the American expectation that any settlement between Japan and China would be based upon "the principles of peace, law, order, and justice."[61]

The outline for a permanent settlement was embodied in a ten-point document based in part upon a memorandum prepared in the Treasury Department by Harry Dexter White and sent to Hull on November 18 by Secretary Morgenthau. Hull was glad to make use of it, "although," he remarks, "this was a further example of what seemed to me to be the Secretary of the Treasury's persistent inclination to try to function as a second Secretary of State." As worked over and drastically pared by the State Department, the ten-point draft constituted a reversion to the maximum American demands. It is enough to say that the proposed terms included withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China and Indochina, recognition of the Chungking Government as the only legitimate government of China, acceptance of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, and nullification, though not by name, of the Tripartite Pact.[62]

How could Hull and his advisers have seen any possibility that Japan would accept their contemplated *modus vivendi* when the terms simultaneously held out for a permanent settlement comprised a program that Japan had repeatedly rejected? The mystery is heightened when one considers that the proposed three-month delay would at once strengthen the American military position and deprive Japan of the most favorable season for amphibious operations. Hull at first thought the chances of acceptance might be one in three; later he was less hopeful. But though the Japanese would probably refuse it, Hull recorded, "our presentation of a modus vivendi would at least show our interest in peace to the last, and would further expose the Japanese determination to make war."[63]

Even so, when the Secretary, on November 22 and again on the 24th, discussed the proposed truce with the representatives of Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, and China, he encountered a distinct lack of enthusiasm from the first three and vigorous opposition from the fourth. There was, indeed, little for China in the proposed arrangement, though as Hull pointed out to Ambassador Hu Shih, the limitation on Japanese troops in Indochina would prevent invasion from that quarter and interference (except from the air) with the Burma Road. In Chungking, as Madame Chiang Kai-shek later told Harry Hopkins, it was feared that Hull was about to "sell China down the river." From Chiang himself there was "rather strong reaction," which manifested itself not only through Ambassador Hu Shih, but through approaches to Secretaries Stimson and Knox via T. V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law, and through a protest to Winston Churchill. Churchill, to whom Roosevelt had cabled an explanation of the plan, qualified his guarded acceptance of it with the query: "What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?" and a warning of the disastrous consequences that would follow a collapse of Chinese resistance.[64]

Hull was intensely irritated by what he considered the narrow views of the critics of his plan, their failure to realize the importance of gaining time and the necessity of making temporary concessions for that purpose. What irked him most were the "hysterical cable messages" of Chiang Kai-shek and the support these had received from Churchill. Instead of taking Chiang's part, he told the British Ambassador, Churchill should have "sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying . . ."[65]

The slim chance of Japan's acceptance, and opposition and halfhearted support from abroad, combined with the certain prospect of criticism at home, induced in the Secretary's mind second thoughts about offering the *modus vivendi.* What the many and vocal home-front critics of any signs of a "soft" policy toward Japan would have had to say, had the offer been made and accepted, is suggested by a passage from Secretary Ickes' diary under date of November 30, 1941. Ickes had obtained, probably from Chinese sources, a fairly accurate description of the terms of the proposed *modus vivendi.* He rejoiced that British and Chinese opposition had "caused the appeasers of the State Department to pause." If the negotiation had been consummated, he said, "I would have promptly resigned from the Cabinet with a ringing statement attacking the arrangement and raising hell generally with the State Department and its policy of appeasement."[66]

So, although he had been assured by Stimson and Knox that the truce proposal "adequately safeguarded all our interests" in the military sense, Hull spent much of the day, November 25, threshing over the pros and cons with his State Department advisers. After further discussion next morning with the Department's Far Eastern experts, he decided, subject to the President's approval, to shelve the *modus vivendi* and simply present the Japanese Ambassadors with the ten-point proposal as the American reply to Japan's Plan B. Early on the morning of November 26, he called at the White House and read to the President a memorandum justifying his decision on the grounds of opposition and halfhearted support abroad and the certainty of opposition at home. His own view of "the wisdom and the benefit of this step" was unchanged. Nevertheless, he concluded, "I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal."[67]

With the President's prompt approval, Hull handed the ten-point basic proposal to Nomura and Kurusu that same afternoon, November 26. It is possible that Hull harbored a slight suspicion that Japan might continue to negotiate. He hinted to the Ambassadors that the United States might make future concessions in matters of finance and immigration, stressed the tentative character of the ten-point proposal, and assured them that the United States would not expect immediate evacuation of China. But really, it seems clear that he knew that what Langer and Gleason describe as "the decision to reply to Japan's minimum terms by a statement of America's maximum demands"[68] meant war. To Secretary Stimson, who inquired about the negotiations on the next morning, he replied "that he had broken the whole matter off." As Stimson noted the conversation in his diary—Hull thought he had not used the exact words—the Secretary of State added: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."[69] At a meeting next day (November 28) of the so-called War Council (President, Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations), Hull reported: "There is practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan."[70] From November 27 until December 7, the principal concern of the men at highest level in Washington was not whether there would be war, but where and when Japan would strike, and how to impart to the American public their conviction that the United States must fight if Japan confined its attacks to the British and Dutch, virtual allies of the United States.

The question arises, therefore, since the decision to shelve the *modus vivendi* was a decision for war—at least a decision to discard the last frail chance for peace—why was it made without consulting the Army and Navy, whose concern in it was so vital? Why were not Stimson, Knox, Marshall, Stark, any or all of them, asked for advice? Why was the decision made without consultation with the British, the Dutch, or the Australians? These questions are rightly asked by Langer and Gleason. The decision, so far as is known, was made by the Secretary of State and the President alone. Though the chances seem one hundred to one that Japan would have rejected the truce plan out of hand, it is difficult not to agree with the authors named that

> it was both bad strategy and careless administrative procedure for the civilian leaders of the Government to make the momentous decision of

> November 26, 1941, without formal consultation with the responsible military leaders.[71]

In view of the abundant evidence of Hull's extreme irritation at the recalcitrance of the Chinese and what he considered the meddling of the British, it seems likely that his decision "to kick this whole thing over" (as Stimson records his saying) was a petulant one by a tired and angry man. The President had given Hull a very free rein in dealing with Japan. He now perhaps accepted his judgment the more readily because of reports that a large Japanese convoy was steaming toward British Malaya.[72]

For the Secretary of State there was little fruitful activity between November 26 and December 7. He held a background press conference on the 27th, through which without being alarmist, he tried to alert the country to the dangerous situation in the Far East. He held perfunctory meetings with the Japanese Ambassadors, whose orders to keep up a pretense of continuing diplomatic discussions were revealed to him by "Magic." He worked with Stimson and Knox on a draft of a presidential message to Congress, which was never sent; and, with serious misgivings, he prepared a message from the President to the Japanese Emperor, a forlorn-hope endeavor for peace, which was dispatched on the evening of December 6, but did not reach Grew in time to be delivered until almost the hour of the Pearl Harbor attack. It is surprising that after yielding to Chiang Kai-shek in the matter of the *modus* *vivendi,* the President and Secretary virtually ignored China in the message to the Emperor, putting all the stress on the danger to peace posed by the presence of Japanese forces in Indochina.[73]

Hull was tired and, part of the time, ill. At the White House, December 2, Stimson found Sumner Welles substituting for the Secretary, "as poor old Hull is laid up with a cold." Hull was aware of new Japanese military moves, a concentration in the Palau Islands, a large convoy steaming from Indochina toward British Malaya or Thailand. He had repeatedly warned his military and naval colleagues of his expectation that Japan would strike by surprise, perhaps at several places simultaneously. No more than they, did he view Pearl Harbor as a danger spot, though as early as January, 1941, Grew had reported gossip in Tokyo that war with the United States would begin with an attack on the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Recording the report in his diary, Grew had added trustingly: "I rather guess that the boys in Hawaii are not precisely asleep."[74] Japanese threats to the south were now so obvious, the task force heading through the North Pacific so well screened, that no one felt special concern for Pearl Harbor.

Up to Saturday, December 6, 1941, the American note of November 26 to Japan remained unanswered, though intercepted messages left no doubt that it would be rejected. An order to the Japanese Ambassadors to destroy their codes was one of the numerous signs that rejection would be followed by war.[75]

Washington waited tensely for Japan's next move. Late on Saturday "Magic" decoded the first thirteen parts of a fourteen-part communication from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Ambassadors in Washington. This was a long exercise in self-justification for Japan's course since 1931, placing the entire blame for strained relations upon the United States and other countries with which it was charged with having conspired "to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia."[76]

When the decoded message was brought to Roosevelt about 9:30 o'clock Saturday evening, he said to Harry Hopkins, who was with him, "This means war." He tried to telephone Admiral Stark but desisted when told that the Admiral was at the theater.[77] There is no evidence that he tried to reach Hull. Following his usual custom, the Secretary spent Sunday morning in his office at the Department, where he conferred first with his Far Eastern advisers and then with Secretaries Stimson and Knox. It was during the morning, he says, that he received the decoded Japanese telegram. The fourteenth section, which had now come through, contained the key statement that the Japanese Government considered it impossible to reach agreement through further negotiations.[78]

Later in the morning, under instructions already known to the Secretary through "Magic," Ambassador Nomura telephoned to ask for an appointment at one o'clock. Foreign Minister Togo had been insistent upon observing the proprieties to the extent of having Japan's final note delivered before her first armed attack—he did not, apparently, know that it was to fall at Pearl Harbor—and one o'clock, Washington time, was the hour given him by the military. This would have allowed a brief interval between delivery of the note and the dropping of the first bombs on Pearl Harbor. Through inexcusable mismanagement, however, the Embassy staff was so slow in decoding and typing the note that it was not ready for delivery until well after one o'clock. Nomura telephoned to postpone his appointment to 1:45, and actually he and Kurusu did not reach the Department until 2:05.[79]

Almost at the time of their arrival the President telephoned of the report that Japanese planes had attacked Pearl Harbor. Hull kept the Ambassadors waiting until 2:20. Without asking them to be seated, he received from Nomura the long note, whose content he already knew. He made a pretense of glancing through it. Then, contrary to reports that he "cussed out" the Ambassadors "in rich Tennessee mountain language," he said to them:

> I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions —infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale

> so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.[80]

Without giving the Ambassadors an opportunity to reply, the Secretary motioned them to the door and they departed, heads down. The long effort to check Japan's aggressive course by peaceful means had ended. There remained only the formal declarations of war.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TORCH

SHORTLY after three o'clock on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day, Secretary Hull was at the White House, where he found the President "very solemn in demeanor and conversation." At the Department again from four until dinner time, he went over with his advisers some of the many steps necessitated by the actual coming of war. These included preparation of a statement to the press, given out with the text of the American proposals of November 26; notification of the Japanese attack to the Latin American republics and members of the British Commonwealth; and warnings of the outbreak of hostilities to American merchant vessels everywhere. While the group were discussing a draft of a message to be sent by the President to Congress the following day, came the news that Japan had followed the surprise attack by a formal declaration of war.[1]

At 8:30 that evening members of the Cabinet assembled at the White House. Hull, looking, Harold Ickes thought, "more than ever like a Christian martyr," was particularly indignant at Japan's having launched her attack at a moment when her Ambassadors were making the pretense of continuing friendly negotiations. But when the President read a draft of a brief message to Congress based entirely on the treachery of the attack, Hull, and Stimson with him, urged that the message should be longer, should recount the history of the recent negotiations, and should bring out Japan's link with Germany. Hull reported that the State Department was working on such a message, which would cover some twenty to thirty pages. Though Stimson supported Hull, the President and the majority of those present preferred a short message, and the one delivered to Congress the following day, beginning, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—" was only slightly changed from the draft read to the Cabinet.[2]

Congress immediately responded by formally declaring (December 8) the state of war which had been "thrust upon the United States" by "the Imperial Government of Japan." When Germany and Italy, three days later (December 11), declared themselves as being in a state of war with the United States, Congress retorted with declarations similar in form to that against Japan.

Reviewing subsequently his part in the chain of events that had culminated at Pearl Harbor, Hull saw no errors with which to charge himself. He was keenly disappointed that the armed forces in Hawaii had been caught unprepared, but for their failure he felt no responsibility. During the weeks before the attack, as he told his assistants,

> I had time after time warned our military and naval officials with all the vigor at my command that there was constant danger of a treacherous

> attack by Japan anywhere, and in all probability at many places at the same time.[3]

Nor did Hull feel that any mistakes had been made in his discussions—he still refused to call them negotiations—with Japan, any opportunities for a really satisfactory solution neglected. The United States, as he analyzed the picture, might have met the Japanese danger in any one of three ways: a preventive attack against Japan, acceptance of Japan's demands, or continuance of discussions in the hope of persuading Japan that peaceful courses would best serve her interests. The first course was neither feasible nor in accord with American principles. The second would have brought peace—for a while—but at the cost of violation of principle, betrayal of friendly countries, and consignment of the United States to "an infamous place in history." The third course, continuance of discussions, he asserts, "was the only American method," and while the discussions failed to win their first objective, peace, they did achieve their second objective, the gaining of time. Japanese entry into the war a year and a half or even six months before December, 1941, might, Hull argued plausibly, have disastrously affected the Allied cause.[4]

This oversimplified analysis, obviously, leaves unanswered the question whether the discussions could have been steered to a conclusion which might have kept the peace without sacrificing the vital interests of the United States. Hull, it is clear, thought not. Ambassador Grew, at the time and later, believed otherwise, and some historians have thought with Grew that a more elastic policy on the part of the United States might have led to a tolerable settlement with Japan.[5] Opinions on this question must remain speculative. From facts presented in the preceding chapter it seems probable that Japan could have been induced to give up, for a time at least, plans for further aggression in Southeast Asia. It seems probable too that, if allowed to have her way in China, Japan would so have interpreted her obligations under the Tripartite Pact as to permit her to remain neutral if the United States went to war with Germany, though of this she declined to give definite assurance. But in China, it seems almost certain, the Japanese Army was unwilling to abandon its plans for domination. The issue boils down then to the question whether Mr. Hull—who really made the decisions in this sphere—was justified in accepting war with Japan in order to insure an independent and integral China. With today's knowledge one may well doubt whether such a policy served the national interest. But Mr. Hull was not clairvoyant. In his view an independent and integral China—which he visualized as a friendly and democratic China—was a cause to which the United States was so deeply committed that it could abandon it only at the cost of moral bankruptcy.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor settled a number of perplexing issues for Mr. Roosevelt and his fellow policy-makers. For weeks they had wrestled with the question of how to justify to Congress and the public a war with Japan if Japan attacked only the British and the Dutch. That question had vanished at about 1:55 on a Sunday afternoon. The attack and its aftermath also removed any doubt about whether, and if so, how, the United States should enter the war against Germany. Roosevelt and his military and naval advisers had almost certainly believed for months that only thus could the Nazi menace be successfully combated. But the isolationists were still strong, and Hitler had prudently shunned a showdown.[6] Now Hitler had joined his Axis ally, and the isolationists were silenced.

With these perplexities removed and replaced by the less complicated problem of how to win the war with the support of a united country, it is not surprising that Roosevelt felt and looked relieved on the night after the attack.[7] So did Secretary Stimson. Hull does not reveal his thoughts on this angle of the subject, but it is probable that he felt similar relief at removal of the doubts and tensions that had prevailed for many months. But to say this of Roosevelt and his advisers is not to endorse the view, subsequently put forward, that he and they had deliberately provoked war with Japan as a "back door" to the war in Europe. About such allegations, as Elting E. Morison has remarked, "there is nothing to say . . . except that they are not true."[8]

A principal preoccupation of Mr. Hull and members of his staff for some weeks after Pearl Harbor Day was the preparation of the document eventually entitled Declaration by United Nations, designed to bind together the nations fighting the Axis powers in an effective alliance, committed to a set of principles acceptable to the United States. As precedents Hull had in mind the relationship which the United States had, since 1933, developed with the other American republics, and also the machinery for common effort set up by the United States and the Allies in the First World War. After some days of discussion he asked Maxwell M. Hamilton to prepare a declaration to be signed by the nations concerned, which, in Hull's words, "would bind them together until victory and would commit them to the basic principles that we upheld." A conference in the Department, Sunday, December 14, agreed, with some changes, on a draft prepared by Hamilton. By this the signatory governments would accept the principles of the Atlantic Charter and would agree to co-operate fully with one another, for victory over the enemy, to employ all their resources to that end, and not to cease hostilities or conclude a separate armistice except by common consent.

It seemed to Hull that such a declaration would achieve two advances over the procedures of World War I. It would bind all the signatories to acceptance of certain idealistic principles, with no conflicting secret agreements; and it would make the United States a party to a real alliance instead of merely an "associated power," as it had been in the earlier conflict.

Further discussion in the Department evolved a proposal for a Supreme War Council to be composed of the heads of government, or their representatives, of the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, with their military and naval advisers. The purpose of this body, of which a tardily created predecessor had served in World War I, would be to co-ordinate the war effort on all fronts. Drafts of the proposed Declaration and of the proposal for the Council were sent to the President on December 19 and discussed in Cabinet meeting on that afternoon.[9]

Mr. Roosevelt expressed misgivings that had not troubled the lawyers of the State Department. Had he, he queried, the constitutional right to sign a document promising that the United States would not make an armistice or cease hostilities execpt with the consent of the other signatories? To reassure him on this point, Green H. Hackworth, the Department's Legal Adviser, prepared at Hull's request a memorandum arguing that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, unquestionably had the right to make such a promise.[10] The President thereupon agreed to include that provision in the Declaration.

On the evening of December 22, Winston Churchill arrived for his first visit at the White House. Soon he, Roosevelt, and Harry Hopkins, who daily lunched with the pair, were discussing the draft Declaration, and Churchill was exchanging telegrams about it with the War Cabinet in London. The War Cabinet, writes Churchill, "was at once surprised and thrilled by the scale on which the Grand Alliance was planned."

It did not, however—"very rightly," says Churchill—wish to include India, with the British Dominions, among the sovereign states to sign the Declaration. Churchill, supported by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, proposed to insert after "signatory governments," the word "authorities" in order to make possible inclusion of the Free French, "in every sense an Ally," as Eden said. But on this point the British encountered strong opposition from Hull, since the Free French were "at that time in disgrace with the State Department,"[11] and even stronger opposition from Russian Ambassador Litvinov, and the proposal had to be dropped.

On December 27 the President sent Hull some suggestions, inspired by a memorandum of the same date by Harry Hopkins. He shared Hull's opposition to including the Free French. He thought all the states at war with the Axis, including those from Latin America, should join in signing the Declaration, but that China and the Soviet Union should be lifted from the alphabetical order where they had tentatively been placed in the list of signers and stand with the United States and the United Kingdom at the head of the list. He thought the British would have to decide whether or not to include India. "But," he added, "I don't understand why they don't include it. Perhaps you [Hull] could prod them a little."

The most interesting suggestion from Hopkins by way of the President was on the great importance of including freedom of religion in the Declaration among the principles to be fought for. Roosevelt had been criticized for omitting this principle from the Atlantic Charter. Here was a chance to recover the ground then lost if the anticipated Russian resistance could be overcome. To this end Roosevelt and Churchill had Ambassador Litvinov in to lunch with them, and thereafter Roosevelt gave the Russian such a homily on the glories of the Christian religion that Churchill promised to recommend him for appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury if he should fail in his next bid for re-election to the Presidency. It turned out that although Litvinov and his Government had qualms about saluting "freedom of religion," they saw nothing objectionable about "religious freedom," and in this form it went into the Declaration.[12]

Other difficulties were overcome. The British War Cabinet proposed including "social security" among the aims of the alliance, but did not press the point, recognizing the political difficulty which such a New Dealish phrase might create for the President. The British agreed to include India among the signatories, but suggested use of the phrase "high contracting parties" instead of "Governments signatory hereto." This suggestion alarmed Hull, who pointed out that this was language characteristic of treaties, and that its use might give rise to a demand that the Declaration be submitted to the Senate. The British yielded. On December 31 Hull sent the Declaration in final form to the White House. Churchill, who had gone to Ottawa, returned that night. On the morning of January 1, while the Prime Minister was still in his bath, Roosevelt wheeled himself in for an early call. He brought the perfected Declaration and also a name for it—Declaration by United Nations. Churchill heartily approved. It was signed in the White House later that day, January 1, 1942, by Roosevelt, Churchill, Litvinov, and T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek and newly appointed Foreign Minister of China. Next day it was sent to the State Department for signature by the envoys of the twenty-two other nations at war with one or more of the Axis powers.[13]

"The Governments signatory hereto," the Declaration announced, "Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the . . . Atlantic Charter," and avowing their conviction "that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands," declared:

> (1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.
>
> (2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.[14]

Backed by the State Department and by a solemn opinion of its Legal Adviser, and carefully avoiding a language that might have suggested a need for the Senate's approval, President Roosevelt had, in the words of a friendly historian, "virtually contracted an alliance, and this without the consent of any legislative body, and indeed almost without a voice raised in criticism."[15]

A final paragraph in the Declaration provided for adherence to it of "other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism." In recognition of the wish of some of the framers of the document to permit the adherence of political groups representing peoples overrun by the Axis but not having the status of governments, the State Department issued, January 5, 1942, an announcement that the United States, as depository of the Declaration, would "receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments."[16] Whether or not devised with that intent, this language meant that the Free French might adhere to the Declaration only by admitting that they were not "a government." This, as Hull had probably foreseen, they were unwilling to do. But adherences from committees claiming to represent the peoples "of a dozen other countries" flooded the State Department. Their political coloration ranged from royalist to Communist,

> and many hoped to obtain a degree of recognition by the fact of adherence. Several of our Allies, Russia in particular [says Hull], objected to some

> of these groups. As a result, we simply filed the requests for adherence, and the statement of January 4 [5] brought little but trouble.[17]

The number of signatory governments, originally twenty-six, grew as additional nations entered the war. By the spring of 1945 it had reached forty-seven.

The State Department's plan for a Supreme War Council representing the four major powers of what Churchill called the Grand Alliance was less well received than the Declaration. When Hull and the President met with Churchill and Ambassador Halifax on the evening of December 27, Hull found that the President and Prime Minister had reached no agreement on that feature of the program, and the Supreme War Council was left for further discussion. That seems to have been the end of the idea. Presumably the President and Prime Minister were more aware than the Secretary of State of the difficulties that would beset an attempt to plan war strategy jointly with Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. They settled for the more modest arrangement of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, supplemented by periodic meetings of Roosevelt and Churchill. The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was set up by the two Heads of Government during Churchill's presence in Washington in January, 1942. Then or later, also, they provided for a number of Combined Boards—Raw Materials, Munitions Assignments, Shipping Adjustment, Production and Resources, and Food—all Anglo-American, with

Canadian representation on the last two. Such boards, subsidiary to the proposed Supreme War Council, had also been part of the State Department's plan. It may be said, then, that Roosevelt and Churchill had in effect adopted Hull's plan for a Supreme War Council, though limiting it to the United States and Great Britain.[18]

There is no evidence that Hull was consulted in regard to the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Boards. American entry into the war, indeed, resulted in a divorce of the Secretary of State from official concern with military affairs. In the months before Pearl Harbor he had been a member of the so-called War Council, sitting with the President, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the military and naval chiefs. Now, evidently much to his chagrin, the President ceased to invite him to such consultations. When Hull protested that military decisions often had important diplomatic implications, and pointed out that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden customarily accompanied Churchill to top-level meetings, the President simply replied that the British system was different from ours in that the Foreign Secretary was actually a member of "the Government." Hull, therefore, did not participate in military discussions in Washington, nor did he accompany the President to the important conferences at Casablanca, Cairo, and Teheran, although decisions reached at all of these transcended the purely military. Hull learned of such decisions after they had been made, often from

Secretaries Stimson and Knox at his weekly conferences with them in his State Department office. It is clear that Mr. Hull was unhappy over his exclusion from so many of the President's intimate councils.[19]

Other incidents combined with this apparent withdrawal of the President's confidence to make the first part of the year 1942 such an unhappy one for Hull that he seriously contemplated resigning the Secretaryship. In January a crisis occurred between him and Under Secretary Sumner Welles. This story is told in some detail in a later chapter. It is enough to say here that Welles, representing the United States at the Conference of American Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro, was guilty, in Hull's eyes, of violating his instructions to the detriment of American interests, but that the President supported Welles.[20]

It was at this time too that Hull felt a sense of personal injury because of the President's halfhearted support against Churchill and the Free French in what in retrospect seems a tempest-in-a-teapot controversy. The tiny French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, situated off the southern coast of Newfoundland, were all that had been left to France of her great North American empire after the peace settlement of 1763. They now remained under the authority of the Vichy Government, exercised through Admiral Georges Robert, governor of Martinique in the West Indies. The United States had reached an agreement with Admiral Robert providing for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the islands under his jurisdiction. The agreement had been approved by Vichy and had been renewed a few days after the United States entered the war.[21]

The situation appeared reasonably satisfactory except for one complication. On the island of St. Pierre there was a powerful wireless station, the island was near the sea routes to Iceland and England, and there was fear that the station might be used to transmit shipping information to German submarines. To obviate this danger the United States and Canada had reached a tentative agreement to insist that Canadian agents be empowered to supervise all communications from the wireless station, backing up the insistence with economic pressure if need be.

Early in December, 1941, however, the British Government proposed as an alternative that the Free French occupy the islands, and General de Gaulle authorized his Minister of Marine, Admiral Emile Muselier, if circumstances permitted, to "rally" the islands for Free France. The proposal was not welcomed in either Ottawa or Washington. Hull, as he wrote later, "looked with something like horror on any action that would bring conflict between the Vichy French and the Free French or the British." Such action by the Free French would, furthermore, be contrary to the agreement with Admiral Robert for preservation of the *status quo* in France's American possessions. It might give the Germans an excuse for occupying French North Africa and so endanger

Hull's whole policy vis-a-vis the Vichy regime.[22]

Admiral Muselier, whose instructions from DeGaulle were discretionary, thought it best to visit Ottawa and assure himself of Canadian and American approval before undertaking to "rally" the St. Pierre islanders. He found the Canadian Government cool to his project, and Pierrepont Moffat, the American Minister, after communicating with Washington, explained to the Admiral that his Government thought there would be "fewer adverse repercussions" if the Canadians took control of communications from St. Pierre, preferably by persuasion but by force if necessary. The Admiral, though bitterly disappointed and holding the American decision to be a mistake, nevertheless told Moffat he would abide by it.[23] He gave similar assurances to the Canadians, while in London the British, in response to the American objection, secured a similar promise from General de Gaulle. From this promise De Gaulle considered himself released by the appearance of "a new fact"—the information, so he says, from the British Foreign Office, that the Canadian Government, in agreement with the United States, was planning to send a staff to St. Pierre to take over the radio station. He protested in London and Washington. "But," he writes, "as soon as foreign intervention on French territory was in question, no hesitation seemed to me permissible." Without awaiting the outcome of his protests, therefore, on December 18 he ordered Admiral Muselier to carry out the occupation "without saying anything to the foreigners." This the Admiral proceeded to do, without notice to any one, on December 24.[24]

The result of De Gaulle's protest in London appeared on December 22, when the Canadian Legation in Washington informed the State Department that because of British objection the plan to supervise the St. Pierre radio station was being dropped. The Legation reported at the same time that the Free French plan for occupation had also been abandoned. Secretary Hull, therefore, was taken completely by surprise, as was the Canadian Government, by the Christmas morning tidings of the Free French occupation of St. Pierre-Miquelon.

Hull reacted angrily. To Minister Moffat in Ottawa, in a long telephone conversation, he deplored the Free French action as involving not only the agreement with Admiral Robert, "but our understanding with Vichy and all that we were playing for (North Africa and the fleet) by means of our policy." He evidently held the Canadian Government responsible for the Free French action and demanded that that Government take steps that very afternoon to restore the *status quo*. Next day, when Prime Minister Mackenzie King would be in Washington to confer with Roosevelt and Churchill, would be too late.[25]

Though Moffat urged him to withhold a public statement until the attitude of the Canadian authorities—most of them at this time either at or on their way to their Christmas dinners—could be ascertained, the Secretary issued a statement that was perhaps to cause him more grief than any other public utterance in his long career.

> Our preliminary reports show [the statement read] that the action taken by the three so-called Free French ships at St. Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the United States Government.
>
> This Government has inquired of the Canadian Government as to the steps that Government is prepared to take to restore the *status quo* of these islands.[26]

The demand for action by the Canadian Government brought from Prime Minister King a denial of responsibility and a refusal to take action toward removing the Free French except in agreement with the United States and British Governments.[27] But it was the espousal of the cause of Vichy, and especially the unfortunate phrase, the "so-called Free French," that subjected the State Department and the Secretary to torrents of abuse from the American press and public. The Secretary's rather lame explanation that the term "so-called" implied doubt only as to the character of the ships, not of the Free French movement, did not quiet sarcastic references to the "so-called State Department" or the "so-called Secretary of State." Opposition to the Secretary's desire to restore Vichy rule in the islands was heightened when a plebiscite conducted by Admiral Muselier was reported as showing more than ninety per cent of the islanders opposed to the Vichy regime.[28]

Hull's critics, he felt, did not comprehend the "broader issues" involved. For him these were pointed up when Admiral Robert expressed the opinion that the United States was obligated to restore the sovereignty of the Vichy Government in the islands, and when Ambassador Leahy at Vichy reported that the Germans were making De Gaulle's occupation of the islands a pretext for proposing that German troops occupy French North Africa to "protect it against a similar invasion." He engaged in long and sometimes angry arguments with Ambassador Lord Halifax and with Churchill in the White House, urging that the Free French must be removed. The President professed to agree with Hull but the Secretary felt his support was lukewarm. To Churchill it seemed that the President "shrug[ged] his shoulders over the whole affair," while of Hull, whom he now met for the first time, the Prime Minister wrote: "He did not seem to me to have full access at the moment to the President. I was struck by the fact that, amid gigantic events, one small incident seemed to dominate his mind." In this instance, Churchill thought, the Secretary "pushed what was little more than a departmental point far beyond its proportions."[29]

For Hull the situation was made worse when Churchill, in his address to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa, poured scorn upon the men of Vichy and praised General De Gaulle without taking exception to the latest exploit of the Free French. For this the Secretary took him to task upon his return to Washington.

Early in January the Secretary worked out a compromise formula which he hoped would satisfy all parties, including De Gaulle and the Vichy Government. The crucial points were that the wireless stations on the islands were to be controlled by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments; that the islands should "be neutralized and demilitarized and . . . be considered out of the war"; that the Administrator (a Vichy man) should be withdrawn for the period of the war, and administration be left in the hands of a local Consultative Council; that all armed forces should be withdrawn; and that the Canadian and American Governments should provide economic assistance for the inhabitants.[30]

This formula was acceptable to the Canadian and Vichy Governments, and Churchill approved it subject to acceptance by De Gaulle. In a surprising change of position, Churchill, from Washington, sent the British Government a cable which, when read to the Canadian War Cabinet, "caused the utmost consternation." As described to Minister Moffat by a member of the Cabinet: "Churchill's tone was pretty savage. De Gaulle must be made to pull out was the gist of his message; if necessary, the *Arkansas* [U. S. battleship] would steam into the harbor of

St. Pierre-Miquelon." Now it was Hull's turn to talk moderation. He assured the Minister in Canada that neither he nor the President had at any time considered sending armed ships to the islands.[31]

If Churchill's threatening cable was designed to frighten De Gaulle into accepting Hull's formula, it did not succeed. Upon his return to England, the Prime Minister learned, in "a severe conversation" with the Free French leader, that while the latter could accept most of the formula, he rejected completely the sentence, "The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war." His whole purpose, he had told Anthony Eden, "was to bring French territory back into the war."[32]

To the President, Churchill expressed the hope that the formula, thus emasculated, would be "satisfactory to Mr. Hull and the State Department." If so, he said, "these two tiny islands can then relapse into the obscurity from which they have more than once emerged since the Treaty of Utrecht."[33] The islands were, indeed, to relapse into obscurity, but not by the route that Churchill had envisaged. Hull reported to the President, February 2, 1942, that the formula as revised "would not be of assistance to us in holding the Vichy Government to its assurances, nor would it appear to be acceptable to that Government."

Then, in a sentence suggesting that he had recovered the sense of proportion that Churchill had found lacking, the Secretary recommended that in the interest of promoting "unity and harmony in the maximum cooperative war effort with Great Britain, Canada, and the other United Nations, . . . further negotiations or discussions of the matter be postponed for the period of the war."[34]

St. Pierre and Miquelon would remain under Free French control. General de Gaulle had won a notable victory by somewhat questionable methods. But, as Professor Langer has remarked, De Gaulle "had forgotten the old diplomatic adage that it is dangerous to play little tricks on great powers. . . . He had put the United States in a most embarrassing position and had thereby built up a resentment in official circles that it was almost impossible to overcome."[35] The episode left Secretary Hull lastingly resentful toward De Gaulle, angry with Churchill, and so put out with Roosevelt that he was close to resigning.

Hull recorded in his *Memoirs* that the President's refusal to put more pressure on Churchill in the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair was one of a number of factors that led him in January, 1942, to pencil a note of resignation. Other reasons, as reported by Norman Davis to Pierrepont Moffat, were unfounded charges in the press that he had neglected to warn the Army and Navy of the critical relations with Japan, the disagreement with Sumner Welles at the Rio Conference, and other frictions within the State Department. Davis had urged him not to resign in anger over the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair. The Secretary had then resolved to make ill health the excuse for resignation, but a thorough medical examination revealed no organic trouble whatever; he was suffering from nervous exhaustion and needed only a good rest. Thereupon Mr. Hull put away the note of resignation in his desk and departed for a two-month stay at Coral Gables, Florida. Though he was under attack from the extreme New Dealers and certain other elements in Washington, it was Davis' belief that he would remain as long as he felt that the President wanted him.[36]

Hull returned to his duties at the State Department on April 20, 1942. Under doctor's orders he now reduced his working schedule by giving up his Sunday mornings in the office. This meant an end to the informal Sunday morning staff conferences which had been held regularly since 1933 and which he had found very useful in clarifying issues and laying the basis for decisions in the days to come. Unfortunately, the gain in time for rest and relaxation so provided was largely cancelled by an increase in the Secretary's social responsibilities. The rigid limits which he had placed upon such activities upon taking office were necessarily relaxed on the now frequent occasions of visits to Washington of the heads or other high officials of United Nations Governments. It often fell to the Secretary of State to meet such distinguished visitors at airport or railroad station, to attend luncheon or dinner in their honor at the White House, and himself, with Mrs. Hull's assistance, to entertain them at dinner at his hotel. All of this was time-consuming and a drain on the energy of the seventy-year-old Secretary.[37]

Upon returning to the Department, the Secretary was confronted by three crucial problems: The President had just signed an order (April 13) bestowing upon the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) powers that clearly infringed upon the prerogatives of the State Department; the pro-German Pierre Laval had returned to power at Vichy; the Soviet Union was insisting that England recognize the incorporation into the U.S.S.R. of the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The first of these was to be quickly disposed of on paper at any rate. The second was handled with both firmness and discretion. The third was postponed but never really settled, otherwise than by tacit acquiescence in the Soviet claims.[38]

The Board of Economic Warfare (first set up in 1941 as the Economic Defense Board), with Vice President Henry A. Wallace as chairman, was charged primarily with control of export and import of commodities (other than arms, munitions, and weapons of war) vital to the war effort of the United States and its Allies. During Hull's absence from Washington, Wallace had persuaded the President that the BEW needed additional powers, giving Mr. Roosevelt to understand, it appears, that the State Department concurred in his proposal. Hence the President's Executive Order of April 13, which gave the BEW wide authority to negotiate with foreign governments on economic matters, including presumably authority to arrange for postwar economic settlements and trade relations.

These were matters on which Hull was particularly sensitive. Sumner Welles had protested strongly but unsuccessfully to the President against the sweeping nature of the order, which, he complained, in effect set up a second State Department. Hull went to bat at once for his Department's rights. In a conference at the White House, Wallace admitted that he had misled the President as to the State Department's attitude, fearing that if Mr. Roosevelt knew the Department had not agreed, he would not sign the order. Angry at Wallace's disingenuousness, the President told his press conference on May 1 that there was no diminution of the State Department's control over foreign relations. In a new Executive Order, May 20, he required that the BEW secure the Department's approval of all activities and appointments in the foreign field and placed its agents abroad under the authority of the diplomatic missions in the countries where they operated. The new order seems to have satisfied Hull at the time, but it left the BEW in a position where it could often interfere with State Department policies.[39]

On April 15, 1942, five days before Hull returned to the Department, Marshal Pétain had yielded to German pressure and reinstated Pierre Laval as Premier in the Vichy Government of France. The State Department had warned the Marshal in advance that the return of Laval to power would oblige the United States to "discontinue its existing relations of confidence" with the Vichy regime; and Acting Secretary Welles, in a note on another subject, had referred contemptuously to Laval and his following as

> that handful of Frenchmen who, in contempt for the high tradition of liberty and individual freedom which has made France great, have sordidly and abjectly, under the guise of "collaboration," attempted to prostitute their country to that very regime in Germany which is bent upon nothing less than the permanent enslavement of France.[40]

Ambassador Leahy was now (April 16) notified that the Department would announce on the next day that he was being recalled to the United States "for consultation." Diplomatic relations were not severed, however; S. Pinckney Tuck remained at Vichy as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, and economic aid to North Africa, suspended a few days after Laval's appointment, was ordered resumed in June. It was explained in an earlier chapter that the small quantity of petroleum, food, and other commodities, which was permitted to go to French North Africa under the Murphy-Weygand agreement, served as a pretext for stationing a number of American vice consuls in the area to supervise the distribution of these supplies. Under the direction of Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of the Embassy at Vichy, but now on special mission to North Africa, these agents served as invaluable sources of information and contacts with anti-German and anti-Vichy elements among the North African French. After the decision, reached during Churchill's visit to Washington in June, 1942, to invade North Africa in the fall, the presence of these agents took on new importance. Resumption of the shipment of supplies from the United States served as the justification of their remaining.

From June to November, 1942, the supply program served this useful purpose, although, as Hull complained, the program was continually obstructed by the Board of Economic Warfare. The experts in the lower echelons of the BEW, and even the office of the State Department's Economic Adviser, not being in the secret of the plans for TORCH (code name for the North African invasion), were obsessed by the danger that a trickle of supplies admitted to North Africa might find their way into Axis possession. Even the intervention of Vice President Wallace, chairman of BEW, who was privy to the TORCH plans, did not wholly remove the obstructions.[41]

The State Department had no part in the military planning for TORCH. It performed useful service in keeping the lines open to French North Africa, in the manner just described. It had also the responsibility of doing what diplomacy could do to safeguard the TORCH operation against a flank attack by Spain or by Germany through Spain.

From the time of the French surrender in June, 1940, the principal objective of the United States and Great Britain, as far as Spain was concerned, had been to dissuade Generalissimo Franco from abandoning nonbelligerency for belligerency as Mussolini had done. Franco's pro-Axis sympathies were undisguised. They were surpassed by those of his brother-in-law, Serrano Suñer, who became his Foreign Minister in October, 1940. In that same month at

Hendaye in southern France, the Caudillo, as Franco was called, spent a day in conference with Hitler and there made a tentative promise to enter the war as a member of the Axis and to co-operate with the Germans in seizing Gibraltar. Franco, however, persisted in postponing the date of Spain's entry and in raising his price until Hitler in disgust abandoned his plan against Gibraltar and turned instead to the Balkans and eventually to his invasion of the Soviet Union. Franco's contributions to the war effort were limited to the sale of tungsten ore and other strategic materials, some aid in supplying German submarines from Spanish ports, and the dispatch of the Spanish "Blue Division" to fight with Hitler's armies on the Russian front. As the war turned against the Germans, Franco's position shifted from nonbelligerency to true neutrality, which before the end of the war actually became benevolent toward the Western Allies. He was the opportunist supreme.[42]

Franco's waverings could not be foreseen in London and Washington. Indeed, his policy might have taken a more pronounced pro-Axis turn if London and Washington had not devised a program calculated to prevent him from falling completely into Hitler's arms. This program, first proposed by the British, was to take advantage of Spain's economic weakness by supplying just enough food and raw materials, especially petroleum, to meet her day-to-day requirements, but no surplus for stockpiling or for supplying her Axis friends. Mr. Hull and the State Department went along with the British policy, in spite of strong popular feeling against any dealings with Franco. Thus Spain was made to feel dependent on the Anglo-Saxon powers for satisfaction of her daily needs, but was given no opportunity to build up her resources for possible war.[43]

As the time approached for the North African landings, changes in personnel facilitated the improvement of Spanish-American relations. Ambassador Alexander W. Weddell, who had not been on good terms with Serrano Suñer, was replaced by Columbia University history professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, and Serrano himself gave way to the more friendly Count Gomez Jordana as Foreign Minister. Hayes and Jordana were soon on excellent terms.

Shortly before the TORCH landings, whose imminence was apparently well known in Spanish official circles, Jordana asked for assurance—such as had already been given by the British—that the United States would, in the event of such landings, respect Spanish sovereignty. Under Secretary Welles, in reply, authorized Hayes, in the name of the President, to assure the Foreign Minister and the Caudillo that the United States would "take no action of any sort which would in any way violate Spanish territory."[44]

This assurance Hayes gave to Jordana, and through him to General Franco, November 3. On the following day Secretary Hull, who seems up to this point to have left the handling of this matter to Welles, authorized the Ambassador to reassure the Spanish Government that it was the purpose of the United States "to do everything possible to prevent Spain from being brought into the war." He was to add that the United States would be prepared to increase its economic assistance to Spain if Spain remained out of the conflict and refused to permit infringement of her territory by the Axis powers. Should there be truth in current reports that Germany had demanded or was about to demand permission to move troops into Spain, the United States was confident that any such demands would be resisted by the Spanish Government. In that event, should Spain so desire, the United States "would at the earliest possible moment offer all support to Spain which would be practicable."[45]

Hayes had a long conference with Jordana November 6, two days before the landings. Jordana denied emphatically that Germany had requested permission for the passage of German troops through Spain, but he went on to warn that invasion of French Morocco or Oran by United Nations troops would constitute such a threat to Spanish Morocco that Spain "might not be in a position to refuse assistance from Germany." Hayes warned in turn that such action "would involve Spain in war with the United Nations." In reporting the conversation to the Secretary, he expressed the opinion that Jordana's warning might be bluff, but that nevertheless it was necessary to consider the possibility that Spain would oppose by force any attempt to invade French Morocco or Oran.[46]

Since the TORCH plan of campaign included Anglo-American landings at both Casablanca in

French Morocco and Oran in Algeria, this last-minute warning must have caused some anxiety in Allied circles. The outcome justified Hayes's speculation that Jordana was perhaps bluffing, for General Franco accepted without demur President Roosevelt's explanation of the purposes of the expedition and his assurance that it was "in no shape, manner, or form directed against the Government or people of Spain or Spanish territory, metropolitan or overseas." The Caudillo in his reply reciprocated the President's expression of friendship and gave assurance of his intention "of avoiding anything which might disturb our relations in any of their aspects."[47] There was no interference by or through Spain with the campaign in North Africa.

De Gaulle and the French were not given advance information of the Allied landings, though De Gaulle, through contacts in both North Africa and Vichy, undoubtedly knew what was afoot. General Eisenhower had two objections to giving the Free French any part in TORCH. He was convinced that De Gaulle's participation would antagonize French army officers whose co-operation he hoped to secure, since French officers in general condemned De Gaulle as a disloyal soldier; and he feared leaks of secret information from De Gaulle's entourage, such as were believed to have frustrated an earlier Anglo-Free French attempt to seize Dakar in West Africa. Those fears were shared by Roosevelt. The President's distrust of De Gaulle was no doubt fortified by the advice of Admiral Leahy, who after his recall from

Vichy became Chief of Staff to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Leahy returned from France with the conviction that De Gaulle's following in France was insignificant, and his distaste for the Free French leader is voiced repeatedly in his narrative. Now the President even vetoed Churchill's proposal to inform De Gaulle of the plan on "D-Day minus one"—November 7, the day before the landings.[48]

As for Hull, the St. Pierre-Miquelon imbroglio had infuriated him against the Free French leader, and De Gaulle's continued efforts to give political significance to his military enterprise added to the distrust that the Secretary already felt on that score.[49] In the preceding September De Gaulle had instituted in London a French National Committee which, in his conception, "would be the government." As he described his self-imposed mission in his *Memoirs,*

> it was no longer to be a question of sending a few troops into battle, rousing the allegiance of an occasional strip of territory, singing to France the ballad of her greatness. It was the entire French people, as it stood, that I would have to rally around me. Against the enemy, despite the Allies, regardless of terrible dissensions, I would have to constitute around myself the unity of lacerated France.[50]

This was, of course, exactly what Hull feared and disliked. "It was," he wrote, "De Gaulle's constant insistence on political recognition . . . that excited so much suspicion against him." If he had stuck to his military role and led French troops against the enemy instead of spending his time in London in political promotion, the Secretary believed, he could have had more support from his compatriots and from the United Nations.[51] No two points of view could have been more antagonistic.

Nevertheless, there was increasing American co-operation with the Free French. In November, 1941, the President had declared their organization eligible for lend-lease assistance. In February and April, 1942, the United States recognized as representing French resistance to the Axis, Free French agents who had established their authority in New Caledonia and at Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa. In the latter instance, Sumner Welles defended American policy warmly, not to say vitriolically, against protests from the Vichy Government.[52]

Welles in May, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that the Free French movement "was rapidly falling to pieces," and Hull at about the same time was suggesting to the British Ambassador the possibility of setting up "a political committee to work co-ordinately with the De Gaulle military committee," the former perhaps to be headed by some eminent Frenchman such as De Gaulle had been unable to attract.[53] These ideas got a cool reception in London, and the State Department finally yielded to British suasion. On July 9, 1942, it issued a statement whose substance had been for several weeks under negotation between the Department, the British Foreign

Office, and General de Gaulle. It declared that the United States "recognizes the contribution of General de Gaulle and the work of the French National Committee in keeping alive the spirit of French traditions and institutions," and expressed the intention of the United States to lend "all possible military assistance and support to the French National Committee as a symbol of French resistance in general against the Axis powers." The United States accepted as the view of the Committee, as well as of the British and American Governments, that the destiny and the future political institutions of France must be determined by the free expression of the French people themselves. Finally, the statement announced that the United States Government was about to appoint military and naval representatives in London to consult with the French National Committee on matters relating to the prosecution of the war.[54]

This was far from being recognition of the Committee as a provisional government, which De Gaulle desired, and Hull turned a deaf ear to intimations that De Gaulle would now like to increase the Committee's prestige by signing the Declaration by United Nations.[55] Nevertheless, the statement of July 9 was a significant step toward *de facto* recognition. The contention, repeatedly advanced by Hull, that De Gaulle and his Committee had no significant following in France, was becoming highly questionable. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) held a meeting in London in September, 1942, with delegates of the resistance movement within France who had been smuggled out to attend the meeting. After talking with the resistance spokesmen, the OSS reported that all the resistance movements within France had accepted De Gaulle as their leader and were ready to work unitedly under his direction, and that at least ninety per cent of the population were supporting him.[56]

This report, however, seems to have made little impression on the State Department. Neither did a long letter which De Gaulle in October addressed to President Roosevelt. In this interesting communication, De Gaulle elaborated his view that "the essential problem" was "to put France, as an entity, again into the war." He justified his assumption of leadership in that enterprise on the ground that none of France's recognized political or military leaders had shown a disposition to undertake it, and he denied indignantly that he or his associates had any wish to impose their will upon the French people. Finally, he appealed to the President "to agree to undertake a general and direct examination of the relations between the United States and the Fighting French."[57]

Of this letter Ray Atherton, of the State Department's Division of European Affairs, remarked that if it "had been written on the outset of the de Gaulle movement it would have been a great asset in our relations with them but it is two years too late." There is no record of an answer from the President, but it is probable that he had this letter in mind on November 20, when he said to two of De Gaulle's representatives that "he believed it would be useful for him and General de Gaulle to sit down and talk together," and that he would be happy to welcome the General in Washington at the latter's convenience. Nothing came of this cordial but informal invitation.[58]

Before this last conversation took place, TORCH had been successfully executed, and Anglo-American forces had established beachheads in North Africa from Casablanca to Algiers. Prior to the invasion, the State Department had prepared messages from the President to the chiefs of state and certain other high officials in the area affected. That addressed to General Franco was mentioned above. Most important was the message to Marshal Pétain. In this the President justified the invasion as necessitated by Axis plans for occupation of French North Africa, which would constitute a menace to the United States and all the American republics. He announced that he was calling upon the French authorities in North Africa for their co-operation in repelling Axis threats. To support these authorities was the immediate aim of the American forces. "I need not tell you," the President continued, "that the ultimate and greater aim is the liberation of France and its Empire from the Axis yoke. In so doing we provide automatically for the security of the Americas."

Marshal Pétain's response, presumably dictated by Laval, was to break off diplomatic relations with the United States. His rather pathetic reply to the President's communication concluded with the words:

"France and her honor are at stake. We are attacked; we shall defend ourselves; this is the order I am giving."[59]

The severance of relations with the Vichy Government might have been expected to result in improvement of those with the Free French. Such expectations were encouraged when De Gaulle, though chagrined as he must have been by his exclusion from TORCH, issued an approving and co-operative statement on the day of the landings.[60] Unfortunately, as will appear in a later chapter, complications immediately arose which made relations with the testy general even more difficult than before.

For over two years Secretary Hull had endured merciless criticism of his "Vichy policy," especially from liberal quarters in both the United States and England. He had been attacked, if not as an "appeaser" himself, then as the victim of "appeasers" among his subordinates in the State Department. He had been particularly galled by his belief that British officials, some of them in the Foreign Office, abetted such criticism, though privately Churchill and Eden looked with favor upon his keeping the channels open to Pétain's Government, and he resented the failure of the President, who was ultimately responsible for the policy, to speak out publicly in his defense.[61]

The success of the TORCH landings gave the Secretary an occasion to vindicate his policy in public. In a special press conference of November 8, as one reporter noted, "the Secretary took a keen pleasure in replying to the many critics of Administration policy in this field over the last two years." He remarked that the North African invasion was a vital step in the program for the liberation of France, and went on to explain how the Vichy policy had contributed in specific ways to that end. It had, he argued, provided sources of important information from both France and North Africa. It had enabled the United States to maintain close relations with the French people and to encourage opposition to Hitlerism. It had helped to keep alive French concepts of freedom. It had strengthened the resistance of the Vichy regime to German demands for more than the armistice called for, such as bases in French Africa and use of the French fleet. Finally and most important, it had laid the groundwork for the invasion of North Africa and the eventual control of the Mediterranean.[62] In his *Memoirs* Hull includes with these points the fact that his policy had had the President's and Churchill's support, and sometimes Eden's, and his own conviction that there had been no outstanding Frenchman to whom the United States could have turned had it severed relations with Vichy. Certainly not De Gaulle, as Hull saw it.[63]

Some of these claims are questionable. No one can be sure of the degree of influence wielded by the United States Embassy in Vichy in encouraging the French to say No to the Germans or in keeping French liberal ideals alive. Not all the information obtained through these contacts was trustworthy. It seems clear that both State Department and President were tardy in realizing the importance of De Gaulle and the extent of his following within France. Recognition of his National Committee as a provisional government was not yet due, but recognition could have been withheld more graciously, even in dealing with so difficult a temperament as De Gaulle's.

But if all Hull's other claims were rejected, the Vichy policy would stand justified by having prepared the way for TORCH. As D. C. McKay has written:

> It is difficult to see how we could have executed this complicated and dangerous operation without the essential groundwork accomplished by American consular officers and others, whose presence was made possible by the North African supply program.[64]

And the North African supply program was inseparable from the Vichy policy as a whole.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

HULL FIGHTS A LOSING BATTLE

CORDELL Hull's day of jubilation over his critics, celebrated in his press conference of November 8, 1942, was fated to be brief.[1] Within a few days after the North African landings the Secretary and his Department were again the targets of savage criticism by liberal opinion in England and America.

An unfortunate deficiency in the intelligence work of Robert Murphy and his subordinates in North Africa was their failure to gauge correctly French official and military opinion in that area. The situation was concisely and feelingly stated by General Eisenhower in a telegram of November 14 for the President: "Existing French sentiment in North Africa does not even remotely resemble prior calculations."[2] The occasion for this observation was the utterly cold reception accorded by French North African officialdom to the French four-star general who accompanied Eisenhower, Henri Honoré Giraud. A distinguished veteran of both World Wars, who in both had escaped from German prison camps, Giraud had been picked by Murphy and his French confidants in North Africa as the man who could rally the French forces there to co-operation with the Allies. He had been spirited out of Vichy France in a submarine and had joined Eisenhower at Gibraltar on the night before "D-day." After being painfully disabused of the illusion that he was to command the entire expedition, Giraud consented to serve under Eisenhower as commander of the French forces that were expected to join the Allies, but it became apparent at once that the French commanders in North Africa would not take orders from General Giraud or pay any heed to his proclamations. As General Eisenhower explained in the telegram previously mentioned, they felt inviolably bound by their oath of loyalty to Marshal Pétain, and the Marshal, under German pressure, had ordered them to resist the invasion. To them, General Giraud was, like De Gaulle, a disloyal soldier.[3]

Since the plans for TORCH had taken for granted the co-operation of the North African French, Eisenhower found himself in a precarious situation, which was relieved only by the accidental presence in Algiers of Admiral Jean François Darlan. A former Premier in Pétain's Government, and now commander-in-chief, under Pétain, of all the Vichy Government's armed forces, Admiral Darlan had been brought to Algiers by the critical illness of his son in an Algiers hospital. Though identified in American and British eyes with the strongly anti-British and pro-German collaborators at Vichy, he had in October let Murphy know that he could be persuaded to come over to the Allied side.[4] This suggestion had been ignored in the plans for the invasion, and Darlan's presence in Algiers seems to have been due entirely to his son's illness. Now, however, in an agreement made initially with American General Mark W. Clark and approved by Eisenhower, he undertook to halt French resistance to the American invasion and to co-operate with the Allies in their occupation of North Africa in preparation for the liberation of France from the German conqueror. Since he professed to speak with the secret approval of Marshal Pétain, most French commanders obeyed his instructions.[5] Their consciences were further cleared when German troops, in violation of the armistice, marched into unoccupied France, making Pétain even more their prisoner than before. Darlan could command the obedience of Frenchmen in North Africa as spokesman for the powerless Marshal and as the legitimate representative of French sovereignty.

The practical necessity under these circumstances of dealing with Darlan was adequately explained by Eisenhower in his telegram of November 14. It was a military decision, made by the officers in the field and approved by the President, without consulting the State Department. Hull was told of it, and of the arrangement by which General Giraud accepted from Darlan command of French military and naval forces in the area, in a telephone conversation with the President on the afternoon of November 14. Though Hull came to believe that the "Darlan deal" was entirely justified on military grounds, his immediate reaction to the President's revelation was to express regret that the agreement had already been made and concern over the complications certain to arise from the association with Admiral Darlan. The State Department had, in fact, wished to warn Robert Murphy against retaining in office in Africa any Vichy officials "to whom well founded objection might be taken," but this warning was held up by General Marshall, since, as he wrote, it appeared "to be directed at Darlan, the man to whom General Eisenhower had to look for immediate results in the Tunisian operation and in the matter of the French fleet."[6]

Neither Hull nor his Department, therefore, had any responsibility for the deal with Darlan. Yet public criticism of the transaction was, in the main, aimed not at Generals Eisenhower and Clark, but at the whipping-boy who had been so long chastised for the Vichy policy. As Robert Sherwood has written,

> Because Hull had been so importunate in claiming a substantial share of the credit for the success in North Africa, he and the State Department were given a huge and unfair share of the blame for a deal which seemed a sordid nullification of the principles for which the United Nations were supposed to be fighting.[7]

Criticism was even more bitter in England than in the United States, for Darlan's former anti-British sentiments and actions were notorious. Churchill found with regret that the success of the landing operations and the contemporary British victory at El Alamein were "overshadowed in the minds of many of our best friends by what seemed to them a base and squalid deal with one of our most bitter enemies." He cabled Eisenhower, November 14:

"Anything for the battle, but the politics will have to be sorted out later." Three days later, disturbed, he says, by "the rising tide of opinion around me," and fearing that President Roosevelt was not "sufficiently impressed with the surge of feeling, and certainly not of British feeling," he sent the President a strong telegram. Reminding Mr. Roosevelt that "Darlan has an odious record," the Prime Minister warned: "A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan Government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people, whose simple loyalties are our strength."[8]

Roosevelt replied promptly, next day (November 18). Saying that he too had "encountered the deep current of feeling about Darlan," he included a statement which he had given out at his press conference. Pointing to the important military advantages gained by the agreement with Darlan, the President gave assurance that he understood and approved the conviction in the United States, Great Britain, and elsewhere that "no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan." No doubt alluding to De Gaulle as well as Darlan, Mr. Roosevelt announced that the postwar French Government would be established "not by any individual in Metropolitan France or overseas but by the French people themselves after they have been set free by the victory of the United Nations." But the key sentence of the presidential statement read: "The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle."[9]

Churchill assured the President that his statement had "settled the matter in the best possible way," and Hull thought it had done much to allay resentment, but criticism continued. Churchill thought it necessary to defend the arrangement in a speech before a secret session of the House of Commons.[10] Inevitably De Gaulle and the Free French became parties to the controversy. De Gaulle, immediately after the landings, had expressed a willingness to work with Giraud. Churchill reminded Roosevelt, November 11, that the British Government was "under quite definite and solemn obligations to de Gaulle and his Movement" and "must see they have a fair deal." He urged that he and the President "avoid at all costs the creation of rival French émigré Governments."[11]

But the substitution of Darlan for Giraud as the associate of the Allies in North Africa destroyed all hope of agreement with De Gaulle. On November 14 two Gaullist representatives, Adrien Tixier and André Philip, called to inform the Secretary of State that the French people would never regard Admiral Darlan "as other than a Vichy tool of Germany." They were not impressed by the Secretary's plea that Frenchmen sink their differences as Americans had done after their Revolution. Two days later Tixier told Assistant Secretary Berle that "if there was anything certain in life, it was that the Free French could not strike hands with Darlan." De Gaulle himself, Tixier remarked, "could not forget the fact that it was Darlan who, as Prime Minister, had had General de Gaulle tried and had condemned him to death as a traitor for supporting the Allies."[12]

The Free French were not satisfied by the President's statement of November 17 that the appointment of Darlan was a "temporary expedient." Under instructions from De Gaulle, Philip and Tixier on November 20 held a long conversation with Mr. Roosevelt, which brought out clearly the contrast between his point of view and theirs. Mr. Roosevelt made it plain that he regarded North Africa as occupied territory rather than as the country of an ally—a mistake in which Eisenhower was to attempt to correct him at Casablanca a month later—and that "so long as the United States was the occupying power," it would make all the decisions. Furthermore, said the President, until all of France was liberated, "the sole decision as to what, if any, Frenchmen would administer the liberated territory was a matter solely for this Government to determine."

It is not surprising that this rather highhanded assertion on the part of the President called forth a strong rejoinder, but the vehemence exhibited by the two Frenchmen and their failure throughout the interview to say a word of appreciation of the liberation of North Africa by American forces, did De Gaulle's cause no good. As the conversation was recorded by Sumner Welles:

> M. Philip and M. Tixier both immediately and categorically stated that this was not at all the

> policy upon which the De Gaulle Committee would agree. They said that they had made quite different plans and that their plans envisaged the creation of a provisional French Government which, while recognizing the military supremacy of the occupying forces, nevertheless, would conduct with complete autonomy the administration of every part of liberated France whether in North Africa or Metropolitan France. They went on to assert that they would never "permit" any liberated French town, village, or farmhouse to be administered by foreign powers and that their decision in this regard was final.[13]

André Philip, the more excitable of the two visitors, was reported to have "ranted and railed, condemning the White House, the State Department, and the American Army, brandishing an accusing finger under Roosevelt's nose like an avenging preacher." Roosevelt seems to have kept his temper during this amazing exhibition, and ended it as he had begun, by expressing a willingness to meet General de Gaulle and try to reach an understanding with him.[14]

De Gaulle was, in fact, preparing to visit Washington when the assassination of Admiral Darlan on Christmas Eve gave the kaleidoscope another turn. In Washington there was suspicion, apparently quite unfounded, that an agent of De Gaulle in Algiers might have instigated the crime. In London, Churchill viewed the removal of Darlan as opening the way for a union of De Gaulle with Giraud. The latter succeeded Darlan as High Commissioner in French North Africa and Commander-in-Chief of French forces in that area. Churchill sent Roosevelt a copy of a message from De Gaulle to Giraud, in which the Free French leader suggested a meeting for the purpose of grouping all French forces under "a provisional central authority." The British endorsed this suggestion, proposing that the authority so constituted should be recognized merely as a *de facto* administration, provisionally exercising French sovereignty over parts of France (*i.e.,* the Department of Algeria) and over all the French Empire except Indochina. "It would be treated as an Allied power and be formally admitted to the ranks of the United Nations." With this possibility in view, Churchill deemed a meeting of De Gaulle and Giraud more urgent than a meeting of De Gaulle and Roosevelt.[15]

For the time being, however, nothing came of these plans. The insistence of De Gaulle and his National Committee upon their own political supremacy in any arrangement with Giraud was unacceptable to the United States as well as to General Giraud.[16]

The Secretary of State, meanwhile, was wincing under the continuing attacks from what he described in his *Memoirs* as "De Gaulle's propaganda machine in England, with its offshoots here," but branded at the time as "the de Gaulle Polecats." Upon Darlan's death, he issued a statement which, while not an encomium, hailed the Admiral's services as "of incalculable aid to the Allied armies," and denounced the assassination as "an odious and cowardly act."[17] This did not endear the Secretary to the Gaullists; neither did his handling of an uncomfortable legacy left him by the murdered man.

Some time before his death, Darlan had persuaded Eisenhower and Robert Murphy (now attached to Eisenhower's staff as Civil Affairs Officer) to recommend that Marcel Peyrouton, formerly Minister of the Interior in the Vichy Government, be brought back from Argentina to serve as Governor-General of Algeria. A reluctant State Department consented upon being assured by Murphy and Eisenhower that Peyrouton had been an opponent of Laval at Vichy, had resigned as Ambassador to Argentina when Laval returned to power, and held anti-Axis sympathies. Upon Darlan's death, however, Sumner Welles proposed to cancel the arrangements for Peyrouton's transportation to Algiers. Hull overruled him, taking the position that the State Department ought not to interfere with an appointment held desirable by Murphy and Eisenhower. The appointment, as Eisenhower later acknowledged, was a mistake. Peyrouton's assumption of his new position was preceded and followed by a storm of protests from the Free French and their sympathizers—a storm that assailed the State Department as well as the former Vichy Minister. After six months in office Peyrouton was forced out by the steadily growing influence of the Free French.[18]

With Darlan removed, Giraud's policies in North

Africa, as well as the naming of Peyrouton, became objects of Gaullist attack. Hull complained that on January 2, 1943, De Gaulle in a radio broadcast made "a wholly unjustified attack on the United States."[19] On this and other occasions, Hull engaged in heated discussions with British Ambassador Lord Halifax and Minister Sir Ronald Campbell, complaining that the British appeared to encourage attacks upon the United States by the Gaullist organs and their own newspapers. It was reported, he alleged, that after De Gaulle's recent broadcast, "the entire British press and radio and many British leaders of public thought devoted the better part of . . . two days . . . to shouting their approval." The impression was growing in the United States "that Britain was supporting De Gaulle in his movement for political preferment at the expense of the prosecution of the African battle." This situation, the Secretary warned, threatened to create dangerous differences between the two great Allies.

When Minister Campbell brought in a memorandum in which Churchill and Eden explained that only drastic interference with freedom of Parliament and the press could silence expression of the loathing felt by Britishers for "anything that savored of intrigues with Darlan and Vichy," Hull denied that he was urging any rigid censorship. He observed, however, that when he attended the World Economic Conference in London in 1933, "the British Government had only to indicate to the press the line of attack it desired made on some of the issues raised and the press promptly complied."[20]

Now, however, the President and the Prime Minister were about to meet at Casablanca (January 14-26, 1943). If they could there bring De Gaulle and Giraud together in some kind of harmonious relationship, many problems would be solved.

The primary purpose of the meeting at Casablanca was to reach agreement on military plans for 1943. Efforts to include Stalin failed; the Russian Premier maintained that it was impossible for him to leave the Soviet Union. Hull had no part in the Conference or in preparing for it. Roosevelt cabled Churchill, December 3, the suggestion that each of them be accompanied by his top Army, Air, and Naval Chiefs of Staff, and added: "I should bring Harry [Hopkins] and Averell [Harriman], but no State Department representative, although I believe we should arrive at tentative procedures to be adopted in event of a German collapse."[21] Exclusion of Hull from conferences primarily military was becoming standard procedure. In this instance it would seem that his presence would have been appropriate. Relations with De Gaulle and Giraud surely lay partly in the diplomatic sphere. Furthermore, the President had asked Hull to relieve Eisenhower of responsibility for economic and civil affairs in North Africa, and Hull had organized a team for that purpose, headed by Robert Murphy as a representative of the Department of State, though still serving on Eisenhower's staff. It might have been desirable to give Hull an opportunity to see this group at work. Churchill would normally have brought Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the Conference, but at Roosevelt's request Eden too was left at home.[22]

With the important military plans agreed upon at Casablanca Hull had no direct concern. On Roosevelt's controversial formula of "unconditional surrender" for the Axis powers, announced at the press conference of January 24, he had not been consulted in advance. In his *Memoirs* he recorded his disapproval of it for two reasons: first, because of the danger that it might prolong the war by solidifying enemy resistance; second, because "the principle logically required the victor nations to be ready to take over every phase of the national and local Governments of the conquered countries, and to operate all governmental activities and properties"—a task for which he felt the United States and its Allies were quite unprepared.[23]

The one item of Conference business about which he was rather casually consulted was the French situation. The President cabled him January 16, asking his opinion about appointing Jean Monnet, an eminent Frenchman then in the United States, to a high position in the North African administration. He explained that the appointment of a civilian seemed necessary because Giraud lacked administrative ability and French officers would not recognize De Gaulle's authority. But Hull objected on the ground that Monnet had indirect ties with De Gaulle's organization and hence that his appointment "would clearly create doubt in a great many

French minds." The proposal was therefore dropped, but a month later Harry Hopkins, who had suggested it to Roosevelt, arranged to have Monnet named to assist Giraud in handling the re-equipment of the French armies through lend-lease.[24]

The attempt of Roosevelt and Churchill to establish harmony between De Gaulle and Giraud got no further than producing a handshake for the photographers—a "shot-gun wedding" Roosevelt called it—at the concluding press conference. De Gaulle, miffed at not having been given advance notice of the Conference and annoyed at Giraud's failure to respond to his advances, at first refused to come to Casablanca. He arrived almost at the last moment, under threat from Churchill that the British Government might otherwise be forced to drop him. It then turned out that he and Giraud were quite willing to work with each other, but neither would accept second place. De Gaulle's proposal that their respective roles should be similar to those of Premier Clemenceau and Marshal Foch in the First World War was not acceptable to Giraud or to Roosevelt. Hopkins, speaking for the latter, remarked that he "might agree to a joint leadership of the two of them—with Giraud running Africa and de Gaulle the rest of the show."[25] The Conference over, De Gaulle returned to London while Giraud maintained his position in North Africa.

The Casablanca Conference had done nothing to alleviate Hull's difficulties with the Free French. He now had, indeed, the additional problem of making clear to Giraud that the United States held any claims he might have to represent the French people no higher than De Gaulle's.[26]

It was, however, the claims, the ambitions, and the suspected machinations of De Gaulle and the Free French that became an obsession in Hull's mind in the months after the Casablanca Conference. The divergence between the American and British attitudes to De Gaulle, furthermore, continued to be a matter of controversy until after Allied armies landed in Normandy in June, 1944. The British were impressed by the growth of De Gaulle's following and prestige in the resistance movement in France and showed an increasing willingness to deal with him and his Committee as representing the French people. Hull and Roosevelt maintained the position that they must not, by recognizing any single spokesman, prejudice the right of the French people to choose their own leaders and determine their form of government after liberation. They disliked and distrusted De Gaulle. Though willing to deal with him or his representatives in places that acknowledged his authority (such as Equatorial Africa and New Caledonia), they preferred in North and West Africa and prospectively in continental France, to support General Giraud, the simple military man who would take orders from the Supreme Commander without prating of French sovereignty. Acceptance of De Gaulle and his pretensions, furthermore, would present an obstacle to certain ideas of the President's about the future of France's colonial empire. He had misgivings about the restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina, and he had in mind the utilization of such bases as Dakar and Bizerte in French colonial territory for postwar policing activities by American and British forces.[27] In such plans De Gaulle would certainly never acquiesce.

It would be tedious to describe all the arguments in which the Secretary—and the President too—engaged over the De Gaulle issue in a year and a half, but the main points should be touched upon. They were, it may be observed, fighting a losing battle. It ended with complete victory for that arrogant but patriotic and extraordinarily able Frenchman, General Charles de Gaulle.

In the spring of 1943, both Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the Prime Minister visited Washington, Eden in March, Churchill in May. An enforced change in Eden's schedule brought him to Washington when Hull had just begun a vacation in Florida. Though assured that the President and Sumner Welles could take care of everything, the Secretary cut short his rest period and rushed back to the capital to be sure that he got his word in. The discussions with Eden and Ambassador Halifax went over much old ground, with Hull again defending his Vichy policy and complaining that the British Government had rarely, if ever, publicized its support of that policy, or of the Darlan deal.

As for De Gaulle and Giraud and the prospect of their uniting, Eden pointed to the advantages of having a single authority that could deal with French questions anywhere. Hull warned, presciently as it turned out, that in any union with Giraud, De Gaulle would be aiming at supremacy, and he contended that even a committee uniting the two factions should not be permitted to assume political power. No agreement was reached on this subject. Eden told Harry Hopkins later that he and Hull saw "eye to eye on the major world problems," though he had found the Secretary of State "a little difficult to talk to and obsessed with the problems of the Free French."[28]

Prior to Churchill"s visit in May (the "Trident" Conference), Hull handed the President a memorandum suggesting the line the latter might take in his talks with the Prime Minister. The Gaullists, he warned, were assuming that they would control liberated France. This prospect was the more alarming now that the Gaullists were attaching to themselves "all the most radical elements in France," including the Communists. The real French contribution to the Allied victory in North Africa was that of the French forces under Giraud, while De Gaulle, through political agitation from London, "caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders." The remedy, Hull suggested, should be an early Anglo-American agreement on the future of France and the manner in which the French people should freely express their wishes as to their postwar government. Failing that, let the President tell the Prime Minister frankly that the United States intended to support Giraud "in every way as military head of the French Allied forces. . . ."[29]

It is not probable that Roosevelt, in his conversations with Churchill, went so far as the Secretary suggested. Churchill does say, however, that "a very stern mood developed in Washington about de Gaulle," and relates that the President brought the matter up daily, supported by complaints against Gaullist activities furnished by the State Department or the F.B.I. Churchill was at this time "most indignant with de Gaulle," and was considering breaking finally "with this most difficult man." The President, nevertheless, was unable to win material concessions on this subject, and finally arranged that Churchill should talk to Hull, who fared no better. The Conference ended with both parties as they were when it began.[30]

Meanwhile, De Gaulle and Giraud were at length getting together. Giraud, under Jean Monnet's influence, had been making conciliatory gestures. At the end of May De Gaulle came to Algiers, and on June 3, 1943, the two generals formed the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) with a membership of seven and themselves as co-presidents. The new Committee replaced De Gaulle's French National Committee. Its founders proclaimed it the central power, which would direct the entire French war effort and exercise French sovereignty over all French territories beyond enemy control. The Committee promised to turn over its powers to a temporary government to be constituted in conformity with the laws of the Third Republic after liberation.[31]

Although officially Hull "warmly welcomed . . . the spirit in which the French National Council of Liberation had been formed,"[32] he found the situation disturbing. His fears, expressed to Eden in March, that De Gaulle would dominate any alliance with Giraud, were strengthened within a few days after the new Committee had been formed. Word from Robert Murphy, he told Secretary Stimson, June 17, indicated that plans were afoot to isolate Giraud "and for de Gaulle to get the position that we have been afraid he would take." Stimson found Hull "very pessimistic and worried about it," complaining that Jean Monnet, a member of the new Committee, "had proved a traitor"—a charge which Stimson was "not ready to believe."[33]

At Cabinet meeting that afternoon, the President was "thoroughly alarmed about the situation which would occur if de Gaulle got possession of the French troops," Stimson recorded. "He says that must not happen and he has authorized Eisenhower to take full steps to prevent it; also that he must not get Dakar; also that our line of communications must be protected." The President "had himself sent off some red hot telegrams to Eisenhower and to Winston Churchill."[34]

Speaking with the authority of both Governments, Eisenhower called De Gaulle and Giraud to a conference on June 19 and made known the President's position. De Gaulle came to the conference, announcing himself "as President of the French Government," remained an hour, and then "walked out." He had refused Eisenhower's request for a promise that he would not interfere with Giraud's command of the French troops, though agreeing that the request might be submitted to the Committee. He then stated his position in an interview with an American newspaper correspondent. Eisenhower followed with a press conference, in which he made it clear that in insisting on Giraud's retention of command he spoke for the Prime Minister as well as the President.[35]

In the face of the President's "adamant" opposition to any recognition of De Gaulle or the FCNL, Eisenhower's Naval Aide observed that De Gaulle was "rapidly gaining popularity with the public in North Africa," almost to the blacking out of Giraud. Eisenhower, being a realist, joined with Robert Murphy and Harold Macmillan, the British civil representative, in informing the President that recognition of the Committee "would facilitate our operations."[36] Churchill, too, found that British official opinion was moving toward some form of recognition. He cabled the President on July 21 that it might be necessary to take this step on Great Britain's part. Roosevelt replied with a restatement of the well known American position and the suggestion of a formula employing the term "co-operation" instead of "recognition." So stood the semantic controversy when the First Quebec Conference ("Quadrant") met in August, 1943.[37]

On the practical side, however, the United States was continuing to bow to necessity, as it had done from the beginning. When Pierre Boisson, the cooperative though Vichy-appointed Governor of French West Africa, resigned, the United States consented to the naming of Gaullist civil and military officials to serve in the strategic post of Dakar, the seat of government. Likewise, when Admiral Robert, Governor of the French West Indies, resigned, the State Department agreed that Henri Hoppenot, a Free French representative in Washington, should take over the post at Martinique. Thus virtually all of France's colonial empire except Indochina had fallen under FCNL authority, and the United States was recognizing that authority locally, in fact if not yet in name.[38]

The First Quebec Conference, August 11 to 24, 1943, was concerned primarily with the conduct of the war and reached important military decisions. Hull arrived August 20 and went into conference with Foreign Secretary Eden on relations with the French. Two days later the Prime Minister reported to London:

> Eden and Hull are locked in lengthy discussions. Hull remains completely obdurate about using the word "recognition" in respect to the French Committee.[39]

Eden was telling Hull that the Prime Minister would accept no formula that excluded "recognition." Hull rejoined that "recognition" was granted only to governments, and that neither Britain nor the United States considered the French Committee a government.[40]

The President and the Prime Minister tried their hands with no better success. Churchill told Roosevelt, according to Hull's record, "that all the liberal elements in the world, including the Governments-in-exile and the Soviet Government, were demanding an immediate decision granting full recognition to the committee." The President replied that "we had to think of the future of France herself." He did not, he said, "want to give De Gaulle a white horse on which he could ride into France and make himself the master of a government there." When Churchill warned Roosevelt that he would have a bad press if he persisted in withholding recognition from the Committee, the President retorted that he was more interested in having "a sheet anchor out against the machinations of de Gaulle."[41]

In the end, it was decided that each Government should issue its own statement. Both, indeed, used the word "recognition," the American formula in a more guarded and restricted sense than the British. The American statement, issued August 26, 1943, declared that the Government of the United States welcomed "the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation." Relations with the Committee would "continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders," and the extent to which it might be possible to give effect to the Committee's desire to be regarded as the body qualified to speak for French interests "must be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises."

> On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.
>
> This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States.
>
> It does constitute a recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own officials to administer it.[42]

The British statement, though not constituting recognition of the Committee as a government, was much less negative than the American. Each delegation seems to have blamed chiefly the Foreign Minister of the opposite camp for the failure to agree. Mr. Roosevelt, says Hull, "thought he could have made much further headway with Churchill on the matter if it had not been for Eden." Churchill, on the other hand, reported to the War Cabinet that on the French matter "we all had an awful time with Hull, who has at last gone off in a pretty sulky mood, especially with the Foreign Secretary who bore the brunt."[43]

Churchill thought it expedient to advise Macmillan in Algiers that Roosevelt and Hull had gone far to meet British desires and that it would be in the best interests of the Committee and of France "to welcome the American declaration in most cordial terms." Whether or not because of this advice, the American representatives at Algiers found, to their surprise, that the French Committee received the tender of limited recognition "with enthusiasm and gratification."[44]

The "sulky mood" in which the Secretary had left Quebec, as a consequence of his partial defeat in the matter of recognition, apparently persisted for some time. His friendly colleague, Secretary Stimson, found on September 7 that it was "difficult to talk with him because he continually harks back to the iniquities of de Gaulle and the Free French and to the criticisms which are being made of his Vichy policy."[45]

It was at this time, nevertheless, that he was offering to go a second mile by proposing that the FCNL adhere to the principles of the Declaration by United Nations. With the President's consent, Hull sounded out the British, Russians, and Chinese on the subject. The Chinese and Russians raised no objection, but the London Foreign Office warned that the Committee would not be content with adhering to the principles of the Declaration but would wish to become a signatory of the Declaration itself, under the paragraph opening it for signature by "other nations." The British forecast proved correct. The Committee inquired whether the proposed adherence would make it a "'member" of the United Nations. When Hull replied in the negative, the Committee declined the invitation.[46]

Friction with the FCNL continued with little abatement. De Gaulle's power in the Committee steadily grew, at the expense of Giraud's. After July 31, 1943, De Gaulle alone presided at meetings of the Committee, though Giraud remained nominally a co-president until October, when the Committee, with his consent, abolished the dual presidency. This action it followed by authorizing De Gaulle, as president, to make any changes he saw fit in the Committee's composition.[47]

If Hull and Roosevelt viewed with apprehension the growing power of the object of their dislike, De Gaulle was resentful because the Allies, while counting on the use of French troops in the Italian campaign, failed to consult the French Committee about the terms of the Italian surrender or plans for the administration of occupied Italian territory. This subject was much on his mind at his first meeting with Hull, when the Secretary passed through Algiers on his way to Moscow in October, 1943. Eisenhower's Naval Aide, Lieutenant Commander Butcher, had fortified the Secretary for the interview with "a glass of bourbon and 'branch water.'" He attributed to this (and to a second "snifter" taken without the doctor's knowledge) the fact that Hull's voice rose to a point that alarmed his physician, waiting in the anteroom. Hull described his conversation with the French leader as long and "reasonably frank," and De Gaulle himself as "more friendly than I thought would be the case." De Gaulle makes it appear that in a formally polite but typically stiff manner he told the Secretary not to count on French troops for Italy unless his Committee shared in determining Italy's future.[48]

Until early in 1944 it is almost impossible to ascertain whether Hull or Roosevelt was more determined in refusing to recognize De Gaulle and the FCNL as in effect a provisional government of France. Though Churchill appears to have regarded Hull as the principal obstacle to agreement at Quebec, there is no real proof that the President showed more flexibility than his Secretary of State.

At any rate, beginning in January, 1944, Hull began to weaken in his resistance to De Gaulle's claims, though not in his detestation of the man, and from then until the invasion of Normandy in June, it was Roosevelt who was least open to compromise. The change in Hull was brought about by the arguments of Secretary of War Stimson, who in turn was influenced by the ideas of General Eisenhower. As the time drew near for the invasion of France, Eisenhower grew increasingly aware of the importance of having a central French authority which could be counted on to co-ordinate the activities of resistance elements with one another and with the liberating armies, as well as relieving the military command of the burden of civil administration in the liberated areas. He had come to believe that De Gaulle and the Committee of National Liberation could perform these functions, and he also reported to Stimson that De Gaulle had become more amenable to reason and actually easier to deal with than General Giraud. All these ideas and arguments Stimson passed on to Hull in conferences in the first half of January, 1944. They were strongly seconded by Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson, who had been named as American representative to the French Committee. In a memo to the Secretary of January 21, 1944, Wilson argued that De Gaulle, with all his faults, was the only figure around whom the French would rally, and that failure of the Allies to accept him would leave them with no central authority to deal with.[49]

Stimson found that Hull, though "he clung to his old aversions against de Gaulle," was favorably impressed by the new line of reasoning, but he preferred to leave to Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy the task of convincing the President. The President was found to be less open to argument than Hull.

Rival plans for the administration of liberated France had been drawn up during the fall of 1943. The French Committee had produced one which conceded to the Allied Supreme Commander control of areas of strategic importance but claimed for its own representatives rights of civil administration elsewhere. The French proposal had been pigeonholed in Washington, where quite a different approach had received the President's tentative approval. The latter provided for civil administration through a French official appointed by the Supreme Commander, and directed the latter "to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause." This stipulation plainly would reduce the FCNL to the level of such other pro-Allied groups as the invasion might bring to light. Finally, however, on November 27, the President, en route to the Teheran Conference, cabled Hull from Cairo "that he was convinced no final decisions or plans concerning civil affairs for France should be made at this time." He was, he said, increasingly inclined to the idea that the occupation "should be wholly military." This Cairo telegram, Stimson complained to Hull, prevented all discussion with the French Committee either of getting in touch with the internal resistance movement or of setting up local governments in the areas vital to Allied communications. Only the President could lift the ban on such discussions.[50]

Stimson's showdown with the President did not come until March 3, 1944. He then succeeded in persuading Mr. Roosevelt to modify a proposed directive to Eisenhower to the extent of allowing the latter discretion as to whether, in the matter of civil administration, he should deal only with De Gaulle's Committee or with other groups as well. This directive was signed by the President March 15. Apparently it satisfied Stimson, but it did not go far enough to suit De Gaulle or the British Government. Anthony Eden, in particular, wished that dealing exclusively with the FCNL should be made mandatory instead of optional. The directive to the Allied Commander, therefore, reposed on the Prime Minister's desk, unsigned by him and undelivered.[51]

While this divergence of views remained unresolved, Secretary Hull on April 9 delivered an important address on foreign policy. Particularly significant was the section on France, which went far toward meeting the Gaullist and British view. It was important, he said, "that civil authority in France should be exercised by Frenchmen" and "should be swiftly established, . . . We are disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied commander in chief." Repeating for the nth time that the Committee was not the government of France and could not be recognized as such, the Secretary promised, nevertheless, that it "would have every opportunity to undertake civil administration and would have our co-operation and help in every practicable way in making it successful." The Committee, he added, with unusual warmth, "had been a symbol of the spirit of France and of French resistance."[52]

Hull had sent a draft of his speech to the President a week before its delivery, requesting especially Mr. Roosevelt's judgment on the section dealing with France. Having read and (according to Hull) approved it, the President told his press conference on the seventh that he could say nothing about broadening the recognition of the French Committee. The question of recognition of the FCNL as a provisional government, he said, "was essentially one involving a definition of 'self-determination,' and he was not prepared to say whether anybody outside of France knew what the French people wanted."[53] The President's statement seemed to contradict in advance the Secretary's speech. "This," Walter Lippmann commented, "is incoherence in the conduct of diplomacy."[54]

That the contradiction was real was soon realized by Hull. The President, he remarks, "backed away" from the Secretary's statement that the United States was disposed to see the Committee exercise leadership in establishing law and order in France. When Hull sent him a suggestion from Eden that the word "may" in the directive to Eisenhower be changed to "should," so as to make dealings with the Committee mandatory, Roosevelt refused to make the change.[55]

Thus the deadlock continued. The President refused a second time to modify his directive when asked to do so by the Prime Minister. When Ambassador Winant undertook to intervene in behalf of De Gaulle, Roosevelt told him "that if anyone could give him a certificate proving that de Gaulle was a representative of the French people he would deal with him, but that otherwise he had no idea of changing his mind."[56]

There was division of opinion in the British Cabinet. "Apparently the Foreign Office is playing with de Gaulle as far as Eden dares," wrote Harry Butcher, "while the PM is following the 'hands-off' policy of Roosevelt." Under Secretary of State Stettinius reported from London that the British, who had warmly approved Hull's speech, were preparing to use it as a basis for a formula of their own. Hull had to warn Lord Halifax that in thus going over the President's head the British would run the risk of impairing the cordial relations between President and Prime Minister.[57]

De Gaulle, meanwhile, was making compromise more difficult. Early in April he ousted Giraud as commander of all French armed forces and assumed the command himself. In an address on March 26 he had referred to the Committee as the "Provisional Government of the French Republic." On May 15, a Consultative Assembly, made up of representatives of the resistance movement and other entities in France and North Africa, voted to make that title official, effective June 3. At the same time it declared that the Clark-Darlan agreement of November, 1942, was no longer binding upon the "Provisional Government."[58] Thus De Gaulle's Committee was defiantly assuming the status and prerogatives of a government, a status which the United States had repeatedly refused to accord it.

Contrary to the hopes of Eisenhower and Stimson, therefore, D-Day (June 6, 1944) came without any agreement having been reached on the degree of recognition to be extended to the FCNL (or "Provisional Government") in the civil administration of liberated French territory. De Gaulle reacted, as might have been foreseen, by resorting to minor obstructionist tactics; for example, in publicly denouncing the invasion currency which the Allies had prepared for circulation in France. So exasperating was his behavior that Stimson temporarily favored drastic measures, denouncing De Gaulle's interference with the currency as "a stab in the back." He quickly came around, however, to the view that Roosevelt's continued refusal to recognize De Gaulle was unrealistic. His appeal to Hull for support was not successful. The Secretary of State, Stimson recorded, "hates de Gaulle with such fierce feeling that he rambles into almost incoherence whenever we talk about him, but tonight he was quite hopeless about taking any decisive position. . . ." The President, Stimson found, "was adamant in his refusal to depart from his position taken in the directive, that is now waiting in London . . ." He had given "scant attention" to an urgent telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urging agreement with the British on De Gaulle.[59]

Then, of a sudden, the situation began to clear. As soon as De Gaulle set foot upon French soil, he was received with such popular acclaim that Hull, whatever his feelings at the time, acknowledges in his *Memoirs* that it soon became evident that the French people "were willing to accept the committee as a provisional authority until they could, through popular vote, express their wishes with regard to their future government." Arrangements were made for De Gaulle to visit Washington, where he was accorded the treatment of a distinguished visitor from July 6 to 11. He had long conferences with Roosevelt and was entertained at luncheon at the White House and at dinner by Secretaries Hull and Stimson. On his talks with Hull, the visitor commented rather cryptically that the Secretary "acquitted himself of his crushing task with great conscientiousness and distinction of spirit, somewhat hampered as well he might have been by his summary understanding of what was not American and by Roosevelt's interference in his domain." Hull, on his side, found De Gaulle in a more reasonable frame of mind than he had expected.

> . . . At any rate [the Secretary added], he went out of his way to make himself agreeable to the President, to me, and to other members of the Government, and to assure us emphatically and repeatedly that he had no intention of forcing himself or his committee upon France as her future government.[60]

De Gaulle had given such assurances before without thereby winning the recognition that he coveted. Now circumstances, and his own persistence, had brought the goal within his reach. The President at long last bowed to the realities of the situation and the urging of his military advisers. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, he told his press conference on July 11, 1944, that the United States had granted the French Committee of National Liberation "the status of a working 'de facto authority' in French civil affairs in liberated areas" until an election could be held.[61]

"If the President had given us these words a couple of months earlier, much agony would have been saved," remarked William Phillips, at this time representing the State Department as Political Adviser to Eisenhower. It was Stimson's opinion that Roosevelt and Hull, through their "long memory" for annoyances inflicted by De Gaulle, had been blinded "to the generally evident fact that de Gaulle *had* made himself the leader of all France," and that their blindness had had unfortunate consequences for the subsequent relations of the American and French Governments.[62] The error was shared more or less equally by Hull and Roosevelt, but rather surprisingly, it was the ordinarily more flexible Roosevelt who in this matter held out to the bitter end.

The informal announcement of recognition of July 11 was followed on August 25 (the day that Paris fell to the Allies) by a more formal statement authorizing General Eisenhower to deal with the French authorities at Algiers "as the *de facto* authority in France so long as they continue to receive the support of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France." Not until October 23, 1944 (after Hull had left the Department but before his resignation), did Acting Secretary of State Stettinius make the following announcement: "The Government of the United States has today recognized the French *de facto* authority established in Paris under the leadership of General de Gaulle as the Provisional Government of the French

Republic." Regular diplomatic relations were thereupon established.[63] The patriotic one-star general, who had assumed the role of spokesman for all of loyal France, had at last compelled the world to accept him in that role.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE SECRETARY AND THE SOVIETS

THIS narrative has touched at several points upon American relations with the Soviet Union during Hull's Secretaryship—diplomatic exchanges occasioned by the Russo-Finnish War, warnings of Hitler's plan for attacking the Soviets, the furnishing of lend-lease aid to Russia after the attack came. Before pursuing further the wartime relations with the U.S.S.R. as an ally it is necessary to fill in some gaps in the story of the prewar years.

Recognition of the Soviet Government, withheld from its assumption of power in 1917, was finally accorded by President Roosevelt in November, 1933. The principal reasons for this reversal of policy appear to have been two: pressure from certain business groups in the United States who hoped that recognition, accompanied by loans or credits to the Soviet Government, would provide an improved market for their exports; and the belief that rapprochement of the United States and the U.S.S.R. would tend to check Japan's aggressive designs in the Far East.[1]

Cordell Hull played little part in the discussions and negotiations that preceded recognition. He was on his way to the Montevideo Conference when the negotiations were concluded, but long before his departure the President had entrusted negotiations with the Russians to Wiliam C. Bullitt, a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who in November became Acting Secretary of the Treasury during the illness that soon thereafter removed Secretary William Woodin from the scene.

Hull's attitude toward recognition is difficult to determine. He asserts in his *Memoirs* that from the time he took office he favored recognition, and when the announcement of its achievement reached him on shipboard, he hailed it as "a natural and timely action." On the other hand, Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt found later that State Department tradition labeled Hull as an opponent, and Morgenthau alleges, as one reason for Roosevelt's using him in the negotiation, that Hull opposed recognition of the Communist Soviet regime on religious grounds.[2] Two things, however, seem fairly clear: first, that if Hull had controlled the negotiations, he would have made a definite agreement on the payment of claims a precondition of recognition; second, that once recognition was accorded, he never ceased to hope for co-operation of the Soviet Union with the United States for the preservation, or restoration, of international peace and security.

Recognition was accomplished through an exchange of letters, November 16, 1933, between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who had been sent to Washington at the President's invitation.[3] By other notes of the same date, Litvinov assured the President that Americans residing in Russia should enjoy full freedom of religion and such rights of legal protection as were enjoyed by "nationals of the nation most favored in this respect," and that the Soviet Union would not harbor within its territory any group or organization which had as its aim the overthrow of, or forcible change in, "the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions."[4]

These assurances, so far as they could be relied upon, disposed of what had been two of the principal objections to recognizing the Soviet Union—the denial of religious and civil rights to Americans in Russia, and sponsorship by the Soviet regime of communist propaganda aimed at the overthrow of the governments of "capitalist" countries, including that of the United States. On a third and a fourth point, the settlement of claims and the grant of loans or credits to Russia, the agreement was less satisfactory.

A memorandum prepared in July, 1933, by Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the State Department, estimated losses suffered by the United States and its nationals, "as the result of the Soviet policies of repudiation and confiscation," at $628,000,000. Of this total, $436,000,000 represented losses of American citizens through repudiation of obligations and confiscation of property rights and interests. The remaining $192,000,000 represented repudiated obligations held by the United States Government, the great bulk of it being the result of cash advances to the Kerensky Government in 1917.[5] It was urged by Kelley, with the seconding of Hull and Bullitt, that definite agreement be reached on the discharge of these obligations, as well as on other matters in dispute, before the according of recognition or the granting of loans or credits, Bullitt predicting: "Before recognition and before loans, we shall find the Soviet Government relatively amenable. After recognition or loans, we shall find the Soviet Government adamant."[6]

Evidently, in view of the recognized incapacity of the Soviet Government to pay all the large and varied outstanding claims against it, President Roosevelt and his advisers agreed to drop all American claims except that for the advances to the Kerensky Government and to reduce that to $150,000,000, the smallest sum that Roosevelt believed Congress could be induced to accept. Litvinov was prepared to offer $50,000,000, but was finally persuaded to raise his bid to $75,000,000. A memorandum of November 15, 1933, initialed by Litvinov and Roosevelt, recorded a "gentleman's agreement" by the former that the Soviet Government would pay "not less than $75,000,000 in the form of a percentage above the ordinary rate of interest on a loan to be granted it by the Government of the United States or its nationals," all other claims being thereby eliminated. Mr. Litvinov further expressed an inclination to advise his Government to raise its offer to $100,000,000, while the President, on his part, restated his belief that Congress would not accept less than $150,000,000. Mr. Litvinov, it was further agreed, would remain in Washington after the resumption of diplomatic relations to attempt to reach an agreement with Messrs. Bullitt and Morgenthau on the exact sum between $75,000,000 and $150,000,000 which the Soviet Government would pay and the United States accept.[7]

This memorandum, which antedated by one day the official recognition of the Soviet Government, thus left undetermined the amount that the latter was to pay in satisfaction of American claims. It also omitted entirely the question of interest on those claims, which the Russians preferred to ignore, the Americans to include. No agreement was ever reached on either point. The Soviet Government, in fact, declared that it could not openly recognize the Kerensky debt (as plainly contemplated in the memorandum) on the ground that it would thereby subject itself to claims of impossible size by other governments. The United States could not accept a concealed acknowledgment for the reason that all the facts about any settlement would have to be aired in Congress. William C. Bullitt, who became the first United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, concluded as early as May, 1934, that the Soviet Government had been willing, in 1933, to pay a substantial price for recognition by the United States because at that time it feared an attack from Japan; that as pressure from Japan relaxed, the Soviets reneged on the promised price. He had soon lost all faith in Litvinov's intention to reach a settlement on claims or to establish "really frank and friendly relations between our two Governments."[8]

The United States, on its side, indulged in some quibbling about the distinction between loans and credits. The Litvinov-Roosevelt memorandum had expressly mentioned a "loan." The Export-Import Bank, set up in February, 1934, for the purpose of financing trade with Russia, was willing to talk only of credits, whereas the Russians insisted on a loan. In April, 1934, the President signed the Johnson Act, prohibiting loans by persons or corporations in the United States to governments in default on their obligations to the United States. The Attorney General ruled it applicable to the Soviet Union. The Export-Import Bank was allowed certain discretion under the Johnson Act, but chose not to exercise it in Russia's favor. It made available no loans and no credits to the Soviet Government.[9]

To add to the resulting ill will and charges of bad faith on both sides, the Soviets, Mr. Hull complained, violated Litvinov's promise that they would not countenance subversive propaganda aimed at the Government of the United States. When a World Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) met in Moscow in July, 1935, American Communists attended and engaged in discussion of their subversive plans and activities. Hull was not impressed when his complaint on this score was met by the Soviet Government with a denial of responsibility for the activities of the Comintern.[10]

On the other hand, Hull does not appear to have taken as seriously as it deserved the analysis of Soviet policy submitted by Ambassador Bullitt after a year and a half in Moscow. Inasmuch as Bullitt had been sympathetic to the U.S.S.R. since his brief visit there in 1919, and had worked enthusiastically for recognition, his disillusionment had special significance. In a long letter to Hull, dated in Moscow, July 19, 1935, Bullitt voiced his conviction

> that there has been no decrease in the determination of the Soviet Government to produce world revolution. Diplomatic relations with friendly states are not regarded by the Soviet Government as normal friendly relations but "armistice" relations and it is the conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union that this "armistice" can not possibly be ended by a definitive peace but only by a renewal of battle. The Soviet Union genuinely desires peace on all fronts at the present time but this peace is looked upon merely as a happy respite in which future wars may be prepared.

Bullitt had discovered the "cold war" a dozen years before the term became current. Turning to American and Soviet relations with Japan, he prophesied with considerable accuracy:

> To think of the Soviet Union as a possible ally of the United States in case of war with Japan is to allow the wish to be father to the thought. The Soviet Union would certainly attempt to avoid becoming an ally until Japan had been thoroughly defeated and would then merely use the opportu-

nity to acquire Manchuria and Sovietize China.[11]

Both Hull and Roosevelt were probably more influenced—with an assist from wishful thinking—by a very different diagnosis furnished by Bullitt's successor as Ambassador, Joseph E. Davies (1937-1938). In two reports to the Secretary in June, 1938, Davies declared that he expected to see the Soviet Government, "while professing devotion to Communism, move constantly more to the Right, in practice, just as it has for the past eight years." There was no doubt, he believed, "of the sincerity and the friendliness of the U.S.S.R. toward the Government of the United States," and a common ground between the two, which he believed would continue for a long period of time, lay "in the fact that both are sincere advocates of World Peace."[12]

Recognition produced small results in trade and none in the making of common cause against Japan. Despite Davies' optimism, it brought no real cordiality but, on the other hand, much friction, not only over debts and loans, but over Russian attempts to purchase military and naval equipment in the United States, over alleged interference with the functioning of the American Embassy in Moscow, and over a variety of minor matters. "Try as I might," Hull recorded in his *Memoirs*, "I could not establish the sound relationship I deemed so necessary not only for the two countries but also as a counterweight for peace in the scales tipping more sharply toward war." Yet his difficulty with Russia Hull seems to have attributed less to the Soviets' determination to produce world revolution, emphasized by Bullitt, than to Russian suspicion of the West induced by old wrongs. After all, the Allies had given aid to anti-Bolshevik counterrevolutionaries like Admiral Kolchak and sponsored incursions into Russian territory in the closing days of World War I. "Long isolated in her northern snows," Hull wrote, Russia "did not have the knack of dealing with other nations on a basis of understanding, friendliness, and freedom from suspicion." What Hull saw was not an armistice in a cold war, but a nation and Government still a little barbarous and justifiably suspicious, which needed only to be civilized and assured of the good will of the "peace-loving nations" of the West.

> As long as I was in the State Department [he wrote] . . . I was never to relinquish efforts to promote two-way friendly relations with Russia. I did not abandon my original idea that Russia and the United States, . . . working together and in harmony with other countries opposed to war, could have a beneficial influence on the world.[13]

Such was the story in brief from recognition in 1933 to the outbreak of World War II six years later. The reaction of the Secretary of State and the President to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet invasion of Poland, the occupation of the Baltic States, and the Russo-Finnish War was described in earlier chapters.[14] Always believing that the force of circumstances would eventually drive the Soviet Union into the anti-Axis camp, President and Secretary took advantage of the technicality that there had been no declaration of war, to refrain from subjecting trade with the Soviets to the restrictions of the Neutrality Acts. Only a "moral embargo" on the sale of planes had been imposed when the Soviet Air Force bombed Finnish cities. The State Department had passed on to the Kremlin evidence of Hitler's hostile preparations. When Hitler struck, June 22, 1941, President and Secretary had agreed that all possible aid must be furnished to armies resisting Hitler, and in November the Soviet Union was declared eligible for lend-lease assistance.[15] The signing of the Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942, made the United States and the U.S.S.R. allies in the war against the Axis.

More accurately, the Soviet Union was an ally against one end of the Axis only, for, as Bullitt had predicted, not until Japan was thoroughly beaten did Russia enter the war in the Far East. Just after Pearl Harbor, Hull proposed to Litvinov, now Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that Russia make available to the United States bases in the Vladivostok area and in Kamchatka for air attacks on Japan. The Russian response was that while the Soviet Union was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany in Europe, it could not risk provoking an attack from Japan in Asia. This reply was accepted by the United States Government as reasonable, though it did not entirely satisfy American public opinion.[16]

The first serious friction with the new ally arose over the issue of Russia's western frontier. Foreign Secretary Eden, during a visit to Moscow in December, 1941, was confronted with a demand from Premier Stalin for recognition of the Russian boundary as established prior to the German attack in 1941. This meant the inclusion in the Soviet Union of eastern Poland and part of Rumania; but Stalin laid special emphasis upon the former Baltic States, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, and the territory exacted from Finland in the peace settlement of 1940. Unless Great Britain was prepared to sign a treaty recognizing Russian incorporation of those areas, said Stalin, he would make no agreement with her on other matters. Eden could only reply that he would submit Stalin's proposals to his Government for its consideration and for transmission to the United States.

Eden's report of his conversations in Moscow reached Churchill during his December voyage to Washington. The Prime Minister, as he records, "reacted violently against the absorption of the Baltic States." He sent word to Eden at once that Stalin's demands were contrary to three articles of the Atlantic Charter, that no such agreement could be made without the prior consent of the United States, and that frontier questions could be settled only at the Peace Conference after the war was won.[17]

The position initially taken by Churchill was in entire accord with that of the United States. That questions of postwar boundaries should be reserved for settlement at the Peace Conference had been suggested to Eden through a State Department memorandum to Ambassador Winant on the eve of Eden's departure for Moscow. His report, through Churchill and Winant, of Stalin's demands led to the preparation of a still more emphatic memorandum, which Hull sent to the President, February 4, 1942. This stressed the danger that any attempt at boundary settlements at this time would create mutual suspicion and jealousy among the United Nations, and that the particular agreements proposed would alarm small countries everywhere, as well as others "especially opposed to the spread of Communism," and would call in question the devotion of the United States to the principles of the Good Neighbor policy and of the Atlantic Charter. In a letter to the President accompanying the memorandum, Hull reiterated the position taken in an earlier telegram to Ambassador Winant:

> that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree to the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, but rather the degree of determination which we show loyally to carry out our promises to aid the Soviet Government with equipment and supplies.[18]

It was at this point that Hull was forced by ill health to leave the Department for two and a half months. When he returned on April 20, he found, as he wrote, "that events had moved in the wrong direction." To begin with, Churchill, hard pressed by mighty burdens of war, had been brought almost to the point of yielding to Stalin's demands. He did not feel, the Prime Minister records, that the moral position taken in Washington in December "could be physically maintained. In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can bear." Consequently, he cabled Roosevelt, March 7, 1942:

> The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her. This was the basis on which Russia acceded to the Charter . . .[19]

Churchill was supplementing pressure that was already being exerted at lower levels. Ambassador Halifax had approached Acting Secretary Sumner Welles on February 18, urging that the United States consent to Britain's approval of Stalin's demands. Welles saw the President and reported back to Halifax on the twentieth that Roosevelt could not approve such an agreement.[20] Pierrepont Moffat, visiting Washington from his post at Ottawa, early in March, was told that Ivan M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, had convinced Ambassador Winant of the rightness of the Soviet position, and that Winant had "sold Stalin's ideas to Harry Hopkins." Winant was on his way home to present the Russian case, and

Government opinion in Washington was badly divided, with the State Department, Ambassador Bullitt, and some others opposed to approving any commitment on Russian boundaries.[21]

British pressure continued, with the argument that the Kremlin was making acceptance of Russia's frontiers a test of Britain's loyalty to the alliance with Russia. President Roosevelt came up with a compromise proposal, which Welles passed on to Halifax, April 1. At least, he suggested, permit the inhabitants of the Baltic Republics to emigrate if they chose, with the right to take their property.[22] Hull returned to the Department while the Soviet reaction to this suggestion was still awaited. He states that he and most of his associates in the Department, Welles excepted, opposed the compromise as inhumane and as signifying American acquiescence in Russia's absorption of the Baltic States. The suggestion that Welles approved it is hardly just. Welles, in reply to a criticism along these lines from Assistant Secretary Berle, explained that the British Government had finally determined to conclude the treaty the Russians demanded, and that the President's suggestion was intended as a slight palliative to an indefensible treaty to which he was utterly opposed. He would not directly or indirectly indicate approval of the treaty, and Welles did not see how the United States could be held responsible for the treaty or charged, as Berle had warned, with a "Baltic Munich."[23]

In London, Maisky's reaction to the President's suggestion was not unfavorable, but on May 7 Winant reported that Molotov had postponed an impending visit to London and Washington and that Eden attributed the postponement to dislike of the suggested compromise. When the Commissar for Foreign Affairs finally arrived in London, May 20, he was so obdurate in his demands, not only as to the Baltic States but also as to acquisitions from Poland, Finland, and Rumania, that any agreement seemed improbable. At this point, Hull relates, he sent the President still another memorandum. It expressed the conviction of the State Department that signature of An Anglo-Russian treaty such as that proposed by Molotov "would be a terrible blow to the whole cause of the United Nations," and indicated that if such a treaty were signed, the United States might have to make public its disapproval. Contrary to State Department fears, the President approved the memorandum, and its substance was promptly cabled to Winant.[24]

Meantime, Eden had proposed a simple Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance with no mention of territorial frontiers. Winant talked with Molotov and Maisky on May 24. He enlarged upon American interest in a second front and plans for improvement of trade relations with Russia and for relief and rehabilitation. At the same time he re-emphasized the unwillingness of Roosevelt and Hull to countenance a treaty sanctifying the extinction of the independent Baltic Republics. For whatever reason, the Russians gave way. Molotov, with Stalin's consent, accepted Eden's proposed twenty-year treaty of alliance, with minor amendments. Free from all mention of territorial frontiers, the treaty, signed May 26, 1942, pledged both parties to "act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States."[25]

The treaty, however, by no means signified that Stalin was abandoning his claim upon the territories in question. He told Roosevelt at Teheran some eighteen months later that Russia's acquisition of the Baltic States was not discussible. The treaty did mean that the Russians dropped for the time being their insistence upon British recognition of that acquisition and that British and American consciences were spared the embarrassment of publicly condoning a wrong that they could not prevent. The question was not raised when Molotov visited Washington early in June, or when Churchill, accompanied by Averell Harriman, conferred with Stalin and Molotov in the Kremlin in August.

These meetings in June and August, 1942, in Washington and Moscow, were concerned chiefly with military matters, especially Stalin's demand for an early Anglo-American second front in Europe. Hull, as has been said before, did not participate in conferences on matters military. He presumably had no part in phrasing the unfortunate White House communiqué of June 11, which Stalin interpreted as a promise of a second front in Europe in 1942. The resulting misunderstanding gave rise to Stalin's bitter recriminations against Churchill and Harriman in

August, when they told him plainly that this was impossible and informed him of the plan for TORCH as a substitute.[26]

Hull talked at length with Molotov in Washington on June 3, 1942. He recorded his impression of the Foreign Commissar as "a quiet-mannered, very agreeable man who confined his talk strictly to the serious emergency matters pending," and who gave evidence of his "ability, shrewdness, and resourcefulness." Reserved and not easy to approach at this first meeting, he was to strike the Secretary as more affable when they met again in Moscow in 1943. Their talk in Washington was inconsequential. Hull, who had passed on to the Kremlin as early as March, 1941, warnings of Hitler's attack, now learned that the Soviet Government had become convinced of the Führer's intentions in April or May. Hull's attempt to elicit some intimation of what the Soviets might do to alleviate a very depressing military situation in China produced only a promise that Molotov would consider whether the Kremlin, unable to furnish material aid, might not extend some "verbal assurances" to the Chinese Government.[27]

From his first meeting with Molotov in June, 1942, until the summer of 1943, relations with the Soviet Union occupied little of Hull's attention. He, like Roosevelt, was careful to avoid giving the impression that the United States was arriving at any secret understandings with Great Britain. Thus, at the conclusion of Eden's visit in Washington in March, 1943, Hull gave Litvinov, and cabled to Ambassador William H. Standley in Moscow, full accounts of the discussions with the British Foreign Secretary. When Churchill followed Eden in May, Hull attempted to impress upon the Prime Minister the importance of drawing Stalin "out of his shell," curing him of his suspicions and secretiveness, and winning him to the acceptance of "a more practical international co-operation in the future."[28]

It was during Churchill's visit (May 22, 1943) that the Soviet Government announced the impending dissolution of the Comintern. This action followed repeated representations by the United States to the effect that the subversive activities practiced and promoted by the Comintern were incompatible with the kind of international co-operation envisaged by the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations. Hull greeted the dissolution with gratification mingled with a healthy degree of skepticism.[29]

Frictions continued in spite of the most earnest efforts by the Secretary of State and the President. A worsening of Russo-Polish relations cast a new shadow over the relations of the Kremlin with the American and British Governments. In April, 1943, the Kremlin broke off relations with the Polish Government-in-exile in London. The Nazis had exposed mass graves in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, containing the bodies of several thousand Polish officers, whom they charged the Russians with having murdered. The Russians blamed the Germans for the gigantic crime. The Poles invited the International Red Cross to investigate. Thereupon Stalin, in real or simulated indignation at the implied suspicion by his Polish allies, severed all relations with their London Government. American and British efforts to heal the breach were rebuffed in Moscow. Stalin, in fact, utilized the occasion to promote the ambitions of a group of Polish Communists in Russia, calling themselves the Union of Polish Patriots, who were later to become the nucleus of a Soviet-supported government at Lublin.[30]

Stalin was deeply displeased at the decision, reached by Churchill and Roosevelt in May, to push on with the campaign against Italy at the cost of postponing the cross-Channel invasion of France until 1944. One of his communications to Churchill in effect accused the British of breaking their promises of a second front in 1943. Churchill replied with a "scorching cable" which he had not, as was his usual custom, submitted in advance to the President. Not long thereafter, Stalin recalled Ambassador Maisky from London and informed the United States that Litvinov, who had been in Russia since May, would not return to Washington. Both Embassies were left under the direction of Chargés d'Affaires. Though Stalin's explanation was that he needed these well informed diplomats in Moscow for their advice, there was widespread opinion that their recall signified the Kremlin's displeasure at the attitude of its Western Allies. To observers like Robert Sherwood the situation seemed uncomfortably like that on the eve of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August, 1939. William C. Bullitt warned Hull and the President that

Stalin was isolating himself from contacts with the Allies in order to avoid having to answer their questions as to his intentions. He was, Bullitt believed, planning to take over all Eastern Europe, using the term "democratic" in reverse. The only preventive Bullitt saw, short of a new war, was to anticipate the Russians by entering Eastern Europe through the Balkans and by proclaiming a regime of democracy and social reform which would destroy the appeal of communism.[31] Though there was little to support press rumors of a possible Russo-German armistice, mid-summer, 1943, marked a low point in the relations of the three great Allies.[32]

The situation in the Mediterranean added other elements to the atmosphere of misunderstanding. Stalin resented what he thought the tardiness and inadequacy of the information given him about the proposed armistice terms for Italy when, after Mussolini's fall, the Government of Marshal Badoglio offered to surrender. He sent an angry cable to Churchill and Roosevelt, August 22, during their "Quadrant" Conference in Quebec.[33]

More troublesome to Hull, though in itself a minor matter, was Russian anger at the refusal to admit a Russian diplomat to North Africa during the height of the military campaign in the summer of 1943. Late in June Ambassador Maisky in London proposed that Ambassador Bogomolov, who was the Russian representative to the Governments-in-exile, pay a ten-day visit to North Africa in order to report on the situation there to his Government. The Free French were willing, the British Foreign Office in doubt; but Eden told Winant that the question should be treated on the basis of military security and that the British Government would accept joint responsibility for any decision that Washington thought wise. The State Department thereupon instructed Winant (June 29) that if Eden agreed, he should explain to Maisky that at the proper time diplomatic representatives would be admitted to North Africa, but that at the moment any action which seemed to emphasize nonmilitary factors might be detrimental to the campaign then in progress. More frankly, Hull explained to Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, that the United States feared the effect just then of the presence in North Africa of a diplomat whose Government had shown itself particularly friendly to De Gaulle. In the delicate balance then existing between De Gaulle and Giraud, such a presence might be disruptive of the French military effort.[34]

Though Molotov had spoken angrily on the subject to Ambassador Standley, he apparently accepted Hull's explanation without further demur. Gromyko informed Hull, July 13, that Molotov left the decision to the judgment of the United States, and was assured in turn that Bogomolov would be welcome as soon as the military exigency was ended. The question was not again raised by the Soviet Government, but on August 14 the State Department informed Gromyko that because of the favorable progress of Allied arms, the United States would now be glad to facilitate Mr. Bogomolov's visit. The incident has significance only because after the objection to the Bogomolov visit had been withdrawn, stories originating in the Soviet press and enlarged upon in England, made the exclusion of the Russian appear a wholly American affair.[35] These stories, in turn, led certain American columnists to make charges that the Secretary of State was anti-Russian and that his prejudice against the Soviet Union was responsible for the low state of Russo-American relations and was thus endangering the unity and the war effort of the United Nations.

The leader in this assault upon the Secretary was the Washington columnist, Drew Pearson, whose feud with Mr. Hull was of some years' standing. Pearson was particularly aroused at this time by authentic reports of the imminent resignation of Under Secretary Sumner Welles, of whom the columnist had long been a friend and admirer. The long unpleasantness between Hull and Welles, often referred to in this narrative, had reached a point where the two could no longer work together. As Arthur Krock of the *New York Times* wrote, Hull had reached the conclusion that Welles "had become, and would remain a disorganizing force" in the Department. Krock placed much of the blame for this situation upon the President, who preferred Welles's conciseness to Hull's prolixity, and had often dealt with Welles (an old friend, incidentally) in matters that should have come before the Secretary. Foreign representatives had followed his example, and the result had been, in Krock's words, "a witch's brew of maladministration." Mr. Hull had therefore asked the President to replace Welles as Under Secretary "if he desired the State Department to function properly under its present direction."[36]

What had led Hull to present his ultimatum to the President at this particular time is not entirely clear. Paul Mallon, in his column in the *Nashville Tennessean,* attributed the decision to "a purely personal development," which rendered the situation "unbearable to Mr. Hull," and Krock, in a later article, said that "an incident he [Hull] will not discuss brought him to the conclusion that Mr. Welles had become a liability to the Department in its dealings with Congress."[37] At any rate, the President had to choose, and whatever his personal feelings, he could not sacrifice the great prestige which the Secretary enjoyed on Capitol Hill and in the country at large. Though Welles's resignation was not officially announced until September 25, Welles broke the news to personal friends upon leaving the Department August 21, for what was to be a terminal vacation.

The story soon leaked to Washington newsmen and produced a series of articles by Drew Pearson attacking Hull and other officers in the State Department as anti-Russian—witness the withholding of information on the Italian armistice and the Bogomolov affair—and charging in effect that Welles was being supplanted because he was "liberal in his attitude toward Russia." The columnist went still further in his radio broadcast of Sunday night, August 29, in which he was reported to have declared that Welles's forced resignation left the State Department "with no important executive friendly to Russia," that Mr. Hull and his chief assistants "would really like to see Russia bled white," that this was known to the Russians and accounted for Stalin's suspicion.[38]

Hull, without mentioning names, denounced the earlier Pearson stories in regard to his attitude to Russia as "absolutely untrue" and as having the effect of "lending aid and comfort to the enemy" and arousing wholly unjustified suspicions among the Allies. But after the "bled white" charge he threw off all restraint. With "his Tennessee blood boiling," as one reporter wrote, and naming Drew Pearson by name, he denounced charges that he and other high State Department officials were anti-Soviet "as monstrous and diabolical falsehoods." The President followed suit, characterizing the columnist whom Hull had accused of falsehood as "a chronic liar in his columns," whose comments "were detrimental not only to the foreign relations of the United States but to unity of the United Nations and, in effect, the winning of the war."[39]

Hull emerged apparently unscathed from these attacks. The charge of anti-Russianism, of course, worried him, and he called in the Soviet Chargé, Andrei Gromyko, to assure him of its falsity. He expressed confidence that officials of both the United States and Soviet Governments would watch every opportunity to suppress or expose "all publicity of a false and fraudulent nature." Gromyko, Hull recorded, understood the situation and thoroughly agreed.[40]

The announcement of Welles's resignation, September 25, was accompanied by the naming as his successor as Under Secretary, of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., formerly Lend-Lease Administrator. From London Hull's friend, Admiral Harold R. Stark, wrote him sympathetically of the change in the Department:

> I know much of what you have been through. . . . You can imagine my pleasure when I learned of Ed Stettinius' appointment, knowing that it would mean one hundred percent loyalty to you and fairness and squareness in every way, every day, and that you now have one in whom you can put implicit thrust.[41]

Hull, in his *Memoirs*, spoke of Stettinius with similar enthusiasm, as one for whom he had a high regard because of "his extensive business experience, his fine character, and his belief in the principles and policies President Roosevelt and I were supporting. He made a splendid showing as Under Secretary," Hull added.[42]

There is no doubt that Welles's resignation left the State Department more harmonious and the Secretary a happier man. At the same time, however, the Department had lost an officer of great experience and ability, a man whose qualities in many useful ways complemented those of the Secretary. Had Welles been able, or seen fit, to exercise more of his recognized diplomatic skill in his relations with Hull, the Department and the nation would have been the gainers. The end of his career, encompassed partly by his enemies but partly also by his own mistakes and those of the President, was, in the words of Adolf Berle, "a top rank personal tragedy of Greek proportions."[43]

CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND AFTER

THE SUBSTITUTION of Stettinius for Welles as Under Secretary relieved a serious state of tension in Hull's Department. The tension with Russia was alleviated at the same time. From the Quebec Conference Roosevelt and Churchill sent Stalin definite assurances that their armies would invade France in the following spring. They also informed him of the proposed armistice terms for Italy and received both his assent and his authorization for Eisenhower to sign the armistice agreement in behalf of Russia.[1] It was in this improved atmosphere that plans were made for Hull's attendance at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, certainly one of the high points in his career as Secretary of State.

If Hull had been greatly concerned about the Russian chill during the summer months of 1943, he does not reveal that concern in his *Memoirs* as a reason for the Moscow meeting. He introduces the subject by referring to several vital questions about Russia's postwar policy, to which "Stalin the Sphinx" had as yet given no answers. Would Russia, he asked, "co-operate with the Western nations and with China" in the postwar world? "Would she join in an international organization to maintain the peace? Would she insist on territorial expansion at the expense of her smaller neighbors? Would she go to the opposite extreme, give up all ambitions and retire to strict isolation within her old borders?"[2]

It is surprising not to find among these questions the one that would later seem to underlie all the others: would Russia continue to promote communist world revolution? Hull was aware of it. He had not been convinced by the dissolution of the Comintern. He was to say to Molotov in Moscow that one obstacle to better relations between their peoples "had come from the efforts to promote Communism in the United States from abroad."[3] But Hull had never made a study of Marxism-Leninism, and he did not realize that a state dedicated to the dogmas of that religion could never be a co-operative member of a world community. Neither, for that matter, did Roosevelt, nor, apparently, most of his and Hull's advisers. There were exceptions. William C. Bullitt had quite accurately appraised the Kremlin's long-range purposes. Assistant Secretary Berle was deeply impressed by reports of Stalin's intention to tolerate only "friendly" governments in Eastern Europe and to fish in troubled waters in France and Spain. He noted also the evidences of communist activity in such vulnerable New World spots as Cuba, Mexico, Chile and Peru. The attitude of Moscow, he thought, was "not unlike the great ambition of the Tsar Alexander after the Napoleonic wars." It "certainly set up a program for a first-class bid for domination of a fair proportion of the world."[4] But with Roosevelt, Hull, and most of the American people, wishful thinking prevailed over such gloomy apprehensions.

The questions that Hull listed required answers if his and Roosevelt's hopes for a better world order were to be realized. Since early in the war, Roosevelt had been anxious to see Stalin in person, counting on his own personal charm and persuasiveness, and the power he commanded, to win the dictator's co-operation. Stalin had repeatedly rejected the President's proposals for a meeting, but in the late summer of 1943 there were hints in the Moscow press that the Kremlin would welcome a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level. Official inquiries confirmed the suggestion, and it was finally determined that a meeting of the Russian, British, and American Foreign Ministers should take place in Moscow—Stalin would consider no other locale—in the latter part of October.[5]

Sumner Welles's withdrawal from the State Department had already been agreed upon. It was Roosevelt's wish to afford him a graceful and dignified exit by sending him to the Moscow meeting instead of the aging Secretary. It appears that Hull at first accepted this arrangement, but then, as he later told the story, Welles angered him anew by carrying on an epistolary campaign against the Secretary from his vacation spot in Maine. Hull thereupon told the President that he "would strenuously oppose Welles's going to Moscow," that "wherever the conference might be held—anywhere between here and Chungking—I would be there myself."[6]

Hence, at his own insistence, the frail, seventy-two-year-old Secretary of State, who had never flown, and whose secret affliction of claustrophobia made confinement in an airplane cabin particularly painful, was to make the long journey to Moscow. From San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Casablanca, the trip was by ship—the U. S. cruiser *Phoenix*—but from Washington to San Juan and from Casablanca via Algiers, Cairo, and Teheran to Moscow, the Secretary and his party traveled by plane. Apparently he was none the worse for it.

Before leaving Washington, however, the Secretary spent much time in consultation with his advisers and with the President on the agenda for the Conference, and there were numerous exchanges of ideas with London and Moscow. Of special importance in the Secretary's view was a proposed Four-Nation Declaration which he hoped to see adopted by the three major Allies and China. Committees of the State Department had worked on this for months. With the President's approval, Hull had taken it to Quebec in August, where it received the further endorsement of Eden and Churchill. It was then cabled to Moscow and later transmitted to Chungking. Hull hoped to make it item number one on the Conference agenda.

Essentially the proposed Declaration was a pledge that the four Allies would continue their wartime co-operation into the postwar period "for the organization and maintenance of peace and security." The heart of it was the fourth paragraph, which declared:

> That they recognize the necessity of establishing

> at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.[7]

This proposal for a new and more effective substitute for the League of Nations, and for American participation therein, was a following-through from an address which the Secretary had delivered on July 23, 1942. On the American side he now received heartening encouragement. In September, a few weeks before his departure for Moscow, the House of Representatives passed the Fulbright Resolution, favoring American participation in a postwar organization to keep the peace, and a group of Republican leaders, meeting at Mackinac Island, Michigan, took similar action.[8] From Moscow, however, came a disappointing message. Molotov opposed the listing of the Declaration in the agenda, his principal avowed objection being the inclusion of China among the signatories. He viewed the Conference as one concerned with European affairs in which China had no interest.

Hull did not abandon hope for adoption of the Declaration, with China among the signers. He and the President thought it of the greatest importance that China be accorded great power status. They had already taken effective action to remove the stigmata of inferiority that had long marked China in the international community,[9] and they felt that now to exclude China, with its huge area and population, from the circle of the great powers would have deplorable psychological effects. Of particular interest are Hull's hopes, as expressed in his *Memoirs*, for the future relations of China and Russia.

> These relations [he wrote] would be better if Russia and China were on an equal footing in a four-nation arrangement. I was convinced that Russian co-operation would be of great assistance to us in rehabilitating and unifying China after the war. Russia would have moral influence on the Chinese Communists, even though their type of Communism was not exactly the same as the Russians. We did not put any specific proposal to Russia on this score during my period of service; but we repeatedly talked with her, as we did with other countries, to emphasize the interest of all nations in China's rehabilitation, and hence the need of their active aid for this purpose.[10]

Hull left the question in abeyance until he could talk with Molotov face to face in Moscow. Even with the Four-Nation Declaration excluded, there would be plenty of business for the three Foreign Ministers and their staffs. Topics to be considered included the postwar treatment of Germany, Italy, and Austria; Mediterranean problems; attitude to the French Committee of National Liberation, to the Yugoslav resistance movement, to Turkey and Iran; Russian-Polish relations; and a variety of economic matters. Emphasis throughout was to be on postwar relations. The military problems of the war were not the concern of the Foreign Ministers, though at Molotov's insistence they did receive some consideration.

Hull left Washington October 7, 1943, on his journey by plane and cruiser. At Algiers he conferred with Generals Eisenhower and De Gaulle. At Cairo he was waited upon by three Kings (two of them in exile)—Farouk of Egypt, George of Greece, and youthful Peter of Yugoslavia. At Teheran he met Anthony Eden, likewise Moscow-bound. Eden had proposed a preliminary conference of the two at Cairo. Hull had objected that such a conference might arouse Russian suspicions. The meeting at Teheran was by chance and confined, Hull records, to the exchange of "a few greetings and casual observations without entering into any real discussion." In the same spirit he told Molotov, after reaching Moscow, that he "envisaged co-operation among the three countries on an entirely equal footing and that there should therefore be no secrets between any two of us. Molotov," Hull added, "heartily agreed."[11]

Hull and Eden arrived in Moscow late on October 18, and formal sessions of the Conference began next day. By a wholesome preliminary decision, there was no speechmaking. The meetings took place in Spiridonovka Palace, described by Hull as "a fine old Czarist mansion tiled with marble and heavily ornamented in gold." Midway through each session there was the equivalent of a "coffee break," the delegations being regaled with a "seemingly infinite variety of delicacies and wines in addition to the usual tea." The autumn weather was fine, and during these recesses the delegates often strolled in the palace garden. Here Hull on several occasions had opportunities for informal talks with Molotov, and it was perhaps in such tête-à-têtes that he argued most persuasively for the Four-Nation Declaration and the inclusion of China among the signers. Rejection of China now, he argued, would probably give rise to "the most terrific repercussions, both political and military, in the Pacific area," perhaps necessitating "all sorts of readjustments" by the United States in order "to keep the political and military situation in the Pacific properly stabilized." Did Molotov see in this language an intimation that aid to Russia might be reduced? Public opinion in the United States might be "hopelessly rent," Hull added, by action that would be interpreted as joining with Russia to throw China out of the war picture.[12]

Molotov gradually yielded. First he agreed to restore the Declaration to the agenda and to discuss its clauses, leaving open the question of China's adherence. Then he was willing, he said, to admit China in principle; the trouble was that the time required to get China's assent would delay unduly the signing of the document. When Hull assured him that that detail could be taken care of, he finally gave in. The Declaration, very slightly amended, was signed at the last session of the Conference, October 30, 1943, by Molotov, Eden, Hull, and Foo

Ping-sheung, Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.[13]

It is not surprising that Hull was, as he wrote, "truly thrilled" as he watched the signing. "Now," he rejoiced, "there was no longer any doubt that an international organization to keep the peace, by force if necessary, would be set up after the war." Recalling his long struggle in behalf of the League of Nations, he reflected that both the United States and the U.S.S.R., and China also, thanks to him, would be charter members of the new organization, and that China's claim to permanent membership in the future Security Council would be firmly based. As Soviet photographers took motion pictures of the signing, Hull remembered, "I could not help feeling that they were recording an historic event."[14]

For Hull, the signing of the Four-Nation Declaration was undoubtedly the high point in the Moscow Conference. Another incident that gave him satisfaction arose during a discussion of the treatment of war criminals. The President had forwarded to Hull a proposed statement drafted by Churchill, dealing specifically with the trials and punishment to be meted out to German officers and soldiers and members of the Nazi Party responsible for the commission of atrocities in the invaded lands. With the Russians demanding "stern, swift justice," while "Eden argued that all the legal forms should be observed," it came time for Hull to speak. "If I had my way," he observed, "I would take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their archaccomplices and bring them before a drumhead court-martial. And at sunrise on the following day there would occur an historic incident."

This outburst brought "loud exclamations of approval" from the Soviet delegation, "and for a minute the calm of the conference was shattered."[15] The Declaration on German Atrocities as written by Churchill was adopted with a few minor verbal changes and was issued over the names of the three Heads of Government. German war criminals, it promised, would be apprehended and sent for trial to the countries where their crimes had been committed. "The major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization," would "be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies."[16]

The thought that Hull had expressed in such vivid fashion—the idea, as he phrased it elsewhere, "not only that these savage men should be executed, but also that they should be executed summarily"—he had already presented from time to time to the President, Churchill, and Eden, only to find that they preferred a more formal trial in accord with the supposed principles of international law. But since no decision had been reached, he felt free at Moscow to express his personal opinion. He adds that so long as he remained in the State Department his proposal of a drumhead court-martial for the major criminals was not rejected. When the more formal procedure followed at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials was later decided upon, he gave it his hearty support.[17]

Hull had brought to Moscow the text of a declaration concerning policy toward dependent peoples, which embodied the anticolonialist views which he shared with the President. Though Molotov remarked that the Soviet Government thought the question very important, Eden's opposition prevented formal action. On Eden's initiative, the Conference provided for creation of a European Advisory Commission and an Advisory Council for Italy. To the former, sitting in London and representing the three major powers, was referred, among other things, the question of postwar treatment of Germany. The Advisory Council for Italy gave to the Soviets, and also to the French Committee, the right to give advice upon policy toward defeated Italy. A Declaration Regarding Italy accepted suggestions from Molotov for the eradication of Fascism and for bringing into power representatives of anti-Fascist elements. A Declaration on Austria promised independence and an opportunity to achieve "political and economic security" to this first victim of Nazi aggression.[18]

Molotov, at the beginning of the Conference, had asked for three things: reassurance that there would be a second front in France in the spring of 1944; pressure on Turkey to enter the war; a proposal by the three powers to Sweden that she make available air bases for the war against Germany. Later he asked that one-third of Italy's Navy and merchant marine be assigned to the Soviet Union. It was necessary to refer these proposals to Washington and London. As to Sweden, the reply was, for the present, negative. With some reluctance President Roosevelt agreed to join the British—who had an alliance with Turkey—in urging the Turkish Government to enter the war. Their inability to promise adequate military support, however, delayed the entry of the hesitant Turks until the spring of 1945. In answer to his request for a share of Italy's ships, Molotov was finally assured that Russia might have the use of such ships as it could actually utilize for war purposes; their final disposition should await the end of the war. On the question of the cross-Channel invasion in 1944, not only was Molotov reassured by Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay of the American and British delegations; General Ismay and Eden also talked at length with Stalin on invasion plans.[19]

Hull had two conversations with Stalin during his sojourn in Moscow. On the night of October 25 he was received in the dictator's quarters in the Kremlin. After Hull had voiced his appreciation of the Soviets' generous hospitality and had related something of his early experiences in growing wheat in Tennessee and logging on the rivers of that State, he got down to the purpose of his call. Stalin had at last expressed a desire to meet with Roosevelt and Churchill, but insisted that he must remain constantly in touch with the battle front and hence could not go farther afield than Teheran, the capital of Iran. It was Hull's task to try to persuade him to accept a meeting place that would be more accessible to Roosevelt. The latter had suggested Basra in Iraq, near the head of the Persian Gulf, which could be connected by a special telephone line with Teheran and thence with Moscow. Stalin was cordial but gave little hope of accepting the American suggestion, and Hull withdrew after an hour, with nothing definite accomplished.[20]

The second meeting was at the official banquet that celebrated the conclusion of the Conference on the night of October 30. On this occasion the Secretary departed from his general rule of avoiding social functions, and found himself seated on Stalin's right in the Kremlin's Catherine the Great Hall. He and Stalin, he recalled, drank the innumerable toasts in red wine only. When General Deane proposed a toast to the day when American, British, and Russian troops should meet in Berlin, Stalin showed his enthusiasm by walking around the table to clink glasses with the American officer.

In his efforts to persuade Stalin to go beyond Teheran Hull fared no better than before, but he enjoyed one of the big thrills of the Conference when out of a clear sky the Russian dictator vouchsafed the information that after Germany had been defeated, "the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan. . . . The Marshal's statement of his decision was forthright," Hull wrote. "He made it emphatically, it was entirely unsolicited, and he asked nothing in return."

So highly important and so secret did the Secretary consider this bit of news that he split his report of it for transmission to the President, sending half in Army, half in Navy code. Having reservations about the security provisions of the British Foreign

Office, he "left to the President the matter of passing this information on to Churchill."[21]

Stalin's parting gesture at the close of the banquet was impressively friendly. As described by the Secretary,

> After the usual expressions of leave-taking, he shook hands with me and said "Goodbye" in Russian. Then after walking three or four steps away from me, he suddenly turned and walked back and shook hands a second time to a rather protracted extent, but without saying a word. Then, with serious demeanor, he turned and walked away.[22]

There was no doubt of the excellent impression that Hull had made upon the Russians. Charles E. Bohlen, who acted as interpreter for the American delegation, was told by an Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs that no foreign official who had come to Moscow had commanded the respect and admiration that the Soviet Government felt for Hull. The official added that certain American journalists had misled his Government as to Hull's attitude toward Russia, but "that any doubts which the Soviet Government might have had on that score had been dispelled by the attitude of the Secretary of State during his stay in Moscow.[23]

Ambassador Averell Harriman was equally enthusiastic in reporting on the Secretary's performance.

> His dignity and determination and sincerity in

> presenting our attitude toward the preservation of world peace and world conditions compatible with it profoundly impressed the Soviet officials [Harriman telegraphed the President, November 4]. I cannot overemphasize the important contribution his presence made toward the favorable outcome of the Conference.

Harriman saw difficulties ahead in the Soviets' policy toward Poland and the former Baltic States, but he thought that Molotov's attitude had become increasingly friendly and co-operative as he discovered that the Americans and British "had not come with a united front against him and were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts . . ."[24]

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt had yielded to Stalin's obduracy and agreed to meet with him and Churchill at Teheran at the end of November. He wished a personal report from Hull before confronting Stalin. Hull at first offered to wait in North or West Africa until the President's arrival there, but on further reflection decided that this would be unwise for reasons of health. He had come to Moscow without vaccinations or immunizations of any kind. While waiting in Africa he would be exposed to such ailments as malaria and dysentery. Four members of his plane crew, he reported, had contracted "malignant malaria" and would be unable to return with him. He asked if the President could not arrange to remain in Washington until about November 11, in which case Hull could report to him there.[25]

The President consented. Hull's departure from Moscow was delayed by bad weather until November 3. Making the return trip wholly by plane, by way of Dakar, Brazil, and Puerto Rico, he arrived at the Washington airport on November 10, to be met by the President and a delegation from Congress. Already fully informed by cable of the proceedings at Moscow, Mr. Roosevelt was especially interested in getting the Secretary's personal impressions of Stalin. Within a few hours he was off for Cairo, where he was to meet with Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek before proceeding to Teheran.[26]

Mr. Hull now had the distinction of being the first Secretary of State who had ever been invited to address a joint session of the two houses of Congress. His address of November 18 was full of enthusiasm for his contacts in Moscow and the achievements of the Conference. He had high praise for Molotov and Eden and described Marshal Stalin as "a remarkable personality, one of the great statesmen and leaders of this age." Supremely important, he said, was the fact that "at the conference the whole spirit of international co-operation, now and after the war, was revitalized and given practical expression." He rejoiced that both House and Senate, in the Fulbright and the later Connally Resolutions, had put themselves on record as favoring American participation in a world organization. With this assurance now backed internationally by the Four-Nation Declaration, he felt confident of the future of world peace.

> As the provisions of the Four-Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.[27]

Robert E. Sherwood of the Office of War Information (OWI) wrote Hull on the day of the address that before night the text would have been broadcast in twenty languages, not counting those of the Far East, on which the San Francisco station had not yet reported. The Four-Nation Declaration and the Senate's Connally Resolution, he said, had provided "the most powerful ammunition of this war for countering enemy propaganda and building support for our own cause in Europe . . ."[28]

The invitation to address Congress was indicative of the admiration felt for Hull's achievement at the Conference and for the courage and devotion that had impelled him to go to Moscow. Winston Churchill, speaking in London, November 9, referred to "that gallant old eagle Mr. Hull, who flew far on strong wings." Herbert Hoover, gratified that Hull had himself gone to Moscow "although we all knew it was a great personal risk," declared: "Mr. Hull has certainly consummated one of the most vital steps toward peace in all the years." Hull's warm personal friend, "Jim" Farley, praised him as "the most unselfish public servant I have ever known," possessing "the humility of Abraham Lincoln and the courage of Andrew Jackson." General George Marshall, who had accompanied Roosevelt to Teheran, made one of the most significant comments:

> The conference at Teheran [Marshall wrote] furnished convincing evidence of the favorable situation which you had created at Moscow some weeks earlier. The establishment of this situation is one of the greatest of the many successes which have characterized your long career of public service.[29]

In the Teheran Conference and that preceding it at Cairo Hull had no part. Though Eden and Molotov both attended the former, Roosevelt apparently had no thought of including Hull, for whom, indeed, such an additional assignment would have been burdensome and risky. But, as usual on such occasions, Harry Hopkins was present and, as Robert Sherwood has written, "acted, in effect, as Secretary of State in relationship to the two Foreign Ministers."[30] Although the principal business transacted at Teheran was military, important political questions also were discussed—the postwar treatment of Germany, the boundaries of Poland, the choice of factions to be supported in Yugoslavia, the guarantee of Iran's independence. Yet there is no indication that the Secretary of State was consulted, or even kept informed, about the discussion of any of these topics. Indeed, when Secretary Stimson, well informed of the progress of the Conference through the contemporary transmission to him of the minutes, tried to discuss the proceedings with Hull, he found the Secretary of State without information. The President had cabled him, December 3: "I will bring you the minutes of all that was said and done." So the Secretary of State must await detailed information on the conferences until the President's return.[31]

During the year, more or less, that remained of Hull's term of office after the Moscow Conference, he was periodically engaged in what proved to be futile attempts to re-establish good relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government-in-exile in London. Hull at Moscow and Roosevelt at Teheran raised the Polish question with Molotov and Stalin, and the United States made repeated offers to act as mediator between the two Governments. Their failure to accomplish anything was explained by Hull to Jan Ciechanowski, the persistent Polish Ambassador in Washington, on the ground that the Soviets, because of the successes of their armies in Eastern Europe, were in an invincibly strong bargaining position. The Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, furthermore, were so thoroughly convinced of the need of continued Russian military collaboration that they opposed any steps that might antagonize the Russian leaders. Such pressure as was exerted to bring the quarreling parties together was exerted upon Poland, not Russia.[32]

The men in the Kremlin insisted upon two concessions as prerequisites to the renewal of diplomatic relations with the London Government: acceptance by the Poles as their eastern frontier of the so-called Curzon Line, and elimination from their government of allegedly anti-Soviet personalities. Acceptance of the Curzon Line would transfer to Russia a wide strip of eastern Poland in which, so the Russians claimed, the population was predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian. For this surrender the Russians proposed to compensate Poland with accessions of German territory to the west. The demand for reconstruction of the Polish Government the Soviets based upon the principle that out of regard for their own security, they must have only "friendly" governments along their frontiers.

Both these demands the Poles steadfastly refused as violative of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and they made repeated appeals for support to the Secretary of State and the President. Both President and Secretary refused to commit themselves on the merits of the questions in dispute but urged Poles and Russians to meet and reach a settlement. What this position amounted to, however, was a discreet counseling of the Poles to yield to the Russian demands. The United States, the Poles were told, did not oppose boundary settlements during the war, if they were voluntarily entered into by both parties. When Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk visited Washington in June, 1944, Hull defended as quite natural the desire of the Soviet Union to have only friendly neighbors. The President had previously suggested that Mikolajczyk might make the necessary changes in his Government "without any evidence that a foreign country was pressing or dictating them."[33]

Nothing came of these suggestions, except that Roosevelt and Churchill persuaded Mikolajczyk to go to Moscow, and Stalin to receive him. The Polish Premier made two such visits, one in August and one in October 1944. Upon returning to London after the second, he attempted to persuade the fellow-members of his Government to accept the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern boundary. Upon their refusal, he resigned as Premier, his resignation almost coinciding in time with Hull's resignation as Secretary of State. In the meantime, the Soviet Government had partly revealed its purpose by handing over the administration of the liberated parts of Poland (west of the Curzon Line) to a group of communist or procommunist Poles calling themselves the Committee of Liberation. This group traced its descent from the procommunist Union of Polish Patriots and was to develop into the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Committee. It was beginning to be apparent that the only neighbor government which the Soviets would recognize as "friendly" would be a puppet government.[34]

One other tragic episode in the Polish story had occurred before Hull left office. Early in August, 1944, as victorious Russian armies approached Warsaw, the Polish underground in the city rose against the German occupation forces, in response to an appeal from a Polish radio station in Moscow. Stalin, however, had discovered that "the movement in Warsaw was inspired by men antagonistic to the Soviet Union," and refused to assist it in any way. The advance of the Russian armies toward the city was deliberately postponed while the Germans wiped out the Polish resistance. The Soviet Government even refused landing privileges in Soviet-controlled territory for American bomber planes which might thus have been able to drop arms to the beleaguered Poles.

This refusal impelled Hull to send a strong memorandum to the President, August 16, 1944, in which he said:

> I believe for a number of considerations that it is impossible for us or the British to abandon to their fate the Polish underground forces which are actively fighting the Nazi invaders of their country simply because such action might not accord with Soviet political aims.[35]

A joint appeal to Stalin by Roosevelt and Churchill finally extorted landing privileges for two shuttle flights of which only one was carried out. It succeeded in dropping some supplies to the Poles in Warsaw, but this assistance was too little and too late, and on October 2 the remnant of the Warsaw underground surrendered to the Germans.

The whole episode, on the part of the Soviet Union, had the look of a deliberate plot to destroy Polish forces that might stand in the way of Soviet purposes. Hull must have remembered with some chagrin advice that he had given the President in the preceding November. It had been his opinion then that if Polish-Soviet relations had not been resumed by the time the Red Army entered Polish territory, the United States should exert all its influence "to persuade the Polish Government to instruct its underground army to launch a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines at the opportune moment and assist the Red Army in its battle." Such action, he then believed, would make it easier for the British and Americans to convince the Soviets of the Polish Government's desire to contribute to the winning of the war and to participate in an organization for the maintenance of peace.[36] This naïve prognosis, it should be said, was written in the heyday of optimism on the morrow of the Moscow Conference.

While the Russian determination to dominate Poland was gradually becoming apparent, Russian and British interests in the Balkans were beginning to clash, with resulting proposals to compose the rivalry by the ancient expedient of marking off spheres of influence. On May 30, 1944, the British Ambassador inquired of Hull how the United States would feel about an arrangement giving controlling influence to Russia in Rumania (already entered by the Red Army) and to Britain in Greece. The arrangement would terminate with the end of the war. Hull had a strong dislike for spheres of influence, and now in particular he saw a conflict between such arrangements and the proposed United Nations

Organization. While he was deliberating on a reply to Halifax, Churchill addressed two urgent messages, one to Roosevelt and one to Halifax for Hull. In the latter he pointed out that Britain generally followed the lead of the United States in South America, "as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton," and suggested that the United States might reciprocate in the Balkans.

The State Department's reply, sent by the President to the Prime Minister June 10, proposed tripartite consultative machinery for the Balkans rather than spheres of influence. Churchill came back next day, emphasizing the difficulties of consultation and the need for quick action in crises. He proposed that the arrangement with Russia be given a three months trial. In Hull's absence, the President consented without even notifying the State Department. Not until after several weeks and considerable embarrassment did the Secretary learn just what had been done. Eventually the State Department confirmed the acceptance of the arrangement by the United States, with appropriate warnings that it not be allowed to develop into a permanent division, to interfere with the operations of the proposed United Nations Organization, or affect adversely the interests of other governments.[37]

During Hull's last year in office, sereval aspects of Russian behavior gave him serious moments of doubt about the future relations of the Soviet Union with the United States and with the proposed world organization. Included among these disturbing incidents were Russia's policy in Poland, her unilateral armistice negotiations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, her recognition of the Badoglio Government in Italy without consulting Britain or America, controversies over unauthorized uses of lend-lease material, and the Soviets' sudden demand, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on world organization, that each constituent republic of the U.S.S.R. have a vote in the UNO.

The doubts naturally raised by these incidents led the Secretary to ask Ambassador Averell Harriman in Moscow for an analysis of Russia's attitude as he saw it and an explanation of what appeared to have been a change in that attitude since the Moscow Conference. In a detailed reply, Harriman assured the Secretary that the Russian people craved peace and had been led to believe that peace would be guaranteed by a continuation of the wartime association with Great Britain and the United States. Stalin and his advisers also attached great importance to this tripartite association. They expected to be strong enough, politically and militarily, to have their way in it, but they were unwilling to give up the right of independent action where Russia's interests were concerned. If the world organization were set up with a great power veto, "the Soviet Government would ruthlessly block consideration by the Council of any question that it considered affected its interests."

As to the apparent change in the Russian attitude, Harriman believed "that when the Russians saw victory in sight they began to put into practice the policies they intended to follow in peace." But he counseled that the United States make allowance for the Soviets' awareness of the world's antagonism, their suspicion and sensitiveness, that it meet them more than halfway, encourage and support them where it could, "and yet oppose them promptly with the greatest of firmness when we saw them going wrong." Harriman felt sure that a vast majority of the Russian people desired friendship with the United States, "and he felt that the principal men in the Government held the same view."[38]

Harriman's qualified optimism fitted Hull's mood —certainly the mood in which he later wrote his *Memoirs* and probably that of 1944. In the *Memoirs* he gives several pages to a general view of his—and President Roosevelt's—policy toward Russia and the reasons for it. Russia's activities in the League of Nations from 1934 to 1939, he thought, gave evidence of her interest in promoting peace through appropriate international organization, and this impression was reinforced by Stalin's acceptance of the Four-Nation Declaration. There would be difficulties in working with the Soviets, of course, but these could be overcome, Hull believed, by patience, by a friendly policy of education, and by setting a good example.

> Patience was the keynote of my attitude toward Russia [he wrote], but it was a patience fortified and surrounded by principles we were determined

> to uphold, and activated by a constant effort to understand the Russians and induce them to try to understand us.

Along with patience, the United States should pursue constant, friendly discussion with the Russians, engage in no "cussin' matches," explain to them the principles which we considered essential to durable peace. They should be informed about our Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America and the importance in it of the principle of nonintervention. They should be shown that if this policy could be transplanted to Europe, "Russia could have the friendliest political relations and the liveliest economic exchanges with her neighbors while refraining from interference in their internal affairs."

Finally, the United States should set the Soviets a good example. On this score Hull opposed the wish of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States should annex the former mandated islands in the Pacific which American arms had wrested from Japan. These islands, he argued, like all other colonial territory taken from the Axis powers, should be placed under international trusteeship. If an exception were made, the Soviets would be tempted to seize upon it to justify annexations of their own. For the same reason Hull found fault with the Act of Chapultepec, adopted by the American Republics in March, 1945 (months after his resignation), because it authorized intervention under certain circumstances. This might be an embarrassment in the effort to reform the practices of the Soviet Union.[39]

Hull concluded the treatment of Russian relations in his *Memoirs* on a note of optimism:

> As 1944 approached its close, it was easily apparent that many difficulties would inevitably rise between Russia and ourselves in the future. But it was also apparent that, with good will and understanding on both sides, and with the support of other nations, these difficulties could be solved and an era of fruitful working together come to pass.[40]

CHAPTER TWENTY

CHINA AS AN ALLY

Refusal by the United States to acquiesce in Japan's aggression in China had been the principal cause of Japan's attack at Pearl Harbor and the consequent involvement of the United States in the war. Secretary Hull often dwelt upon this fact when Chinese spokesmen found fault with the share of American aid apportioned to China, under lend-lease or otherwise. He and his Department did what they could to increase and expedite such aid. Aside from the exigent claims of other war theaters, the supplying of material aid to China was made extremely difficult by the early success of the Japanese in closing the Burma Road. Attempts by the State Department to open alternative ground routes through Russia and through Tibet were unsuccessful, and there remained only the precarious air lift from Assam over the Himalayas to southwest China. Determination of what equipment and supplies should reach China by this route was for the most part in the hands of the War Department and the President himself, with Harry Hopkins and Admiral Leahy (the President's Chief of Staff) as his principal advisers. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was addicted to by-passing the State Department and the American Embassy in Chungking. Large segments of America's wartime relations with China, consequently, were not only outside the control of the

State Department but often actually beyond its ken.[1]

Hull was able, nevertheless, to pursue successfully his policy of securing for China recognition of her status as a great power and, as part of the same program, of liberating her from marks of inferiority embodied in treaties and legislation of long standing. His purpose, and that of Roosevelt, was to enable China to emerge from the war as a powerful stabilizing force in the Far East. The President told Anthony Eden, with Hull's concurrence, in March, 1943, that "he thought that China might become a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan and that he wanted to strengthen China in every possible way." The President also felt, if we may credit Harry Hopkins, that China, "in any serious conflict of policy with Russia, would undoubtedly line up on our side."[2]

Hull did not speak in such crude, realistic terms. In his view, the Moscow Four-Nation Declaration and the United Nations Organization which it promised, would obviate the need for alliances and balances of power in years to come, but both he and Roosevelt considered that a strong China must be one of the four main pillars of that Organization. An earlier chapter has described Hull's persistence in bringing Molotov and Stalin to accept China as one of the four signatories of the Declaration. Hull also saw to it that China took a prominent part in such international conferences as the Atlantic City Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation, the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, and the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on International Organization.[3]

For China the year of the Four-Nation Declaration, 1943, was marked by two other important steps toward equality among the powers. These were the signing by the United States and Great Britain of treaties with China relinquishing the extraterritorial privileges conferred by earlier treaties, and the repeal by the United States of its laws barring Chinese from immigration and naturalization.

The right of Americans and Europeans in China to be subject to their own laws and to be tried in their own courts—the right of extraterritoriality—originated in the earliest treaties with China in the 1840's. The Chinese had always resented these "unequal treaties." The Soviet Union, Germany, and some minor powers had relinquished their extraterritorial rights after World War I. At the Washington Conference in 1922, the United States, Great Britain, and the other participants had agreed to have a study made of the Chinese judicial system with a view to recommending reforms which would assure foreigners of justice in Chinese courts and so end the theoretical justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the early part of 1937 it appeared to the State Department that China had attained a degree of political stability and judicial competence that would ensure proper protection of foreigners and their interests. The Secretary had begun an exchange of views with the British Government looking to joint action in relinquishing extraterritorial rights, when Japan's launching of the "China Incident" made such action at that time seem inappropriate.[4]

In July, 1940, however, both Prime Minister Churchill and Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles declared the readiness of their Governments to negotiate with China for the relinquishment of extraterritoriality and other "special rights" upon the restoration of peace in China, and Secretary Hull gave similar assurance to the Chinese Foreign Minister-designate a few months later.[5] There the matter rested until the spring of 1942, when an exchange of views within the State Department led to the setting up of a small committee to study the advisability of opening negotiations on the subject with China and Great Britain without waiting for the return of peace.[6]

Perhaps aware that such a study was being made, the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, called upon the Secretary on April 25, 1942, to leave an *aide mémoire* stating the British position. The British too had been giving thought to the matter in recent weeks and had reached the conclusion that to offer the contemplated concession to China at that time would be construed as the fruit of a sense of weakness rather than serving to encourage and stimulate China's war effort. His Majesty's Government, therefore, thought it best to defer the negotiations until the return of peace, though if the Chinese should raise the issue, the British would respond sympathetically. Meanwhile, they hoped that Great Britain and the United States could follow parallel courses.

Lord Halifax found Mr. Hull in a mood of irritation. The Secretary recalled that the United States had repeatedly stated its intention to give up its special rights in China as soon as circumstances permitted, but complained that it got no credit for such intentions in some high Chinese quarters. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, for example, in recent articles, "virtually state papers," in American periodicals, had strongly condemned extraterritoriality—she had in fact referred to it as a "vicious legal device"—without mentioning the American promise of its early abolition. Hull's official answer to the British *aide mémoire*, presented a few days later, expressed agreement with the British view on all points. The time for action was not yet; the United States would, however, be receptive to a Chinese initiative and would keep in touch with the British with a view to parallel action.[7]

Further discussions with the British in both London and Washington during May and June to all appearances confirmed both Governments in the view that negotiations for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China should be deferred, perhaps until the end of the war.[8] Then, on August 27, 1942, in a note to Ambassador Winant in London, Hull asserted that further study had led the State Department to conclude that it might be advantageous to approach China on the subject without further delay. He suggested that the American and British Governments might submit confidentially to the Chinese similar draft treaties, and that these be brief, covering a few main headings, since the negotiation of comprehensive treaties of friendship and commerce would require many months, with danger of leakage that might prove harmful to the cause.

In reply to natural British curiosity as to reasons for the American about-face, Hull on September 5 cited trends in both American and Chinese opinion, official and unofficial, an improved military situation in the Pacific and in China, and a desire to dispose of as many troublesome issues as possible. He hoped to accomplish three things by taking prompt affirmative action: a psychological and political lift to the United Nations and to China in their war effort; the final wiping out of an anomaly in United States relations with China; and "the achievement of agreement in principle to regularize in China the usual rights normally accruing to American and British nationals in friendly foreign countries."[9]

The British quickly agreed, though asking time out to consult the Dominions, and voicing a wish to provide in the treaty for participation by foreign advisers in what would become the Chinese municipal government of Shanghai. Thus they hoped "to enable the development of the port to continue with the co-operation of foreign commercial interests." This suggestion Hull discouraged, reasserting the desire of the United States to wipe out all special rights of foreigners in China. The British yielded. Mr. Hull also overrode the objections of Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss in Chungking. Gauss warned that the quality of Chinese courts and police had deteriorated under wartime conditions and furthermore that the brief treaty proposed would not adequately protect American interests in postwar China. He predicted an anti-foreign trend in Chinese attitudes, accompanied by nationalization of foreign property, and advised taking time for the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty that might hold such tendencies in check.[10]

By October 9, 1942, the State Department and the British Foreign Office were so far in agreement that on that date they were able to inform the Chinese Ambassadors in Washington and London that they proposed to submit treaties abolishing all American and British extraterritorial rights in China. In Washington the honors were done by Sumner Welles, since the Secretary was vacationing at Staunton, Virginia. The timing of the notification made possible its public announcement on October 10, the "double ten" anniversary of the Chinese revolution of 1911. Ambassador Gauss reported that the announcement was enthusiastically received in Chungking.[11]

There followed two weeks of exchanges between the State Department and the British Foreign Office on the exact terms of the treaties to be proposed. All differences were ironed out, and on October 24 Secretary Hull handed a draft treaty to the Chinese Ambassador, remarking that this was action that the United States had long wished to take and that "it represented a practical manifestation of this country's foreign policy."[12]

The Chinese, though pleased, were not altogether satisfied with the draft. Ambassador Wei Tao-ming, accompanied by Minister Liu Chieh, called on Hull on November 10. They proposed among other things the insertion in the treaty of a new first article, to read: "The relation between the Republic of China and the United States of America shall be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity." The Chinese explained this proposal as a matter of "face." Hull and some of his advisers suspected that it was designed to lay a basis for demanding the removal of discrimination in the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States—a subject on which the Secretary seemed at the moment very sensitive.[13] The Chinese were persuaded to accept instead a reference in the preamble to the signatories as "equal and sovereign States." A Chinese wish to make it plain that the Americans and British were relinquishing not only extraterritoriality but also the special privileges enjoyed by their shipping in Chinese coastal and inland waters and trade was taken care of by notes to be exchanged at the time of the signing of the treaty.[14]

These discussions were carried on in close collaboration with the British Foreign Office, and the two treaties, Sino-American and Sino-British, were ready for signature on January 11, 1943, the former in Washington, the latter in Chungking. Both the United States and Great Britain relinquished their rights of extraterritoriality conferred by the treaties of a hundred years before, and also the right to maintain railway guards and the like granted by the Boxer

Protocol of 1901. They also surrendered their jurisdictional rights in the Legation Quarter in Peiping and in the International Settlements in Shanghai and Amoy. They promised to assist China in persuading other privileged governments to make similar renunciations. The British surrendered also their concessions in Tientsin and Canton, rights of which the United States had no equivalent. In return for these concessions, the Chinese undertook to respect existing property rights of American citizens and British subjects, corporations included.

Warmly recommended by Hull and the President, the American treaty was approved by the Senate without dissent, February 11, 1943. Ratifications were exchanged May 20, and the treaty thereupon became effective.[15] It was proclaimed May 24.

To Cordell Hull the relinquishment of extraterritoriality in China appeared an extension of the Good Neighbor policy from the Americas to Asia. He remarked upon this to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong a few weeks after signing the treaty. The United States Government, he said, had planned the action "for the past two or three years, as a part and parcel of the good neighbor policy launched at Montevideo . . . The Foreign Minister," Hull added, "seemed greatly interested in this information."[16]

The relinquishment of extraterritoriality and other special privileges—which had become rights through their regularization in treaties—restored China to an equality with other sovereign powers with respect to control over her own territory By the United States, however, China was still not treated as an equal of the nations, great and small, of Europe. Europeans could enter the United States as immigrants under quotas assigned to their respective nationalities and could attain American citizenship through naturalization. Chinese, like other Asiatics, were ineligible for naturalization and could enter the country only as officials, students, tourists, and the like, for temporary residence.

The Chinese exclusion laws were, in fact, soon to follow extraterritoriality into oblivion, but for this aspect of reform Mr. Hull and his Department were cautious rather than bold, followers rather than leaders. In part, at least, this attitude derived from a fear that opposition in Congress might touch off an acrimonious debate and perhaps even defeat a proposal to end exclusion. Such a result would obviously be harmful rather than beneficial to American-Chinese relations.[17]

Mr. Hull's reaction when the subject was first officially alluded to by the Chinese was not only unfavorable but emotional. When the Chinese Ambassador called, November 10, 1942, to suggest changes in the extraterritoriality treaty, the Ambassador ventured the observation that his Government would be interested in the question of liberalizing the restrictions on immigration. This led the Secretary to launch forth upon a lecture summarized in his own memorandum, upon the importance of perfect confidence and trust among the great Allies and the iniquitous conduct of individuals who sowed distrust among them.

> I stated [Hull recorded] that there are today numerous trouble-making persons who travel from one world capital to another and speak recklessly and too often wilfully along the lines calculated to create misunderstanding or suspicion in regard to the motives of friendship and the spirit of teamwork existing among these great governments today.

The United States, he continued, had suffered in this way "from such loose mischievous lines of talk by persons who make their living in this manner and who seek at all times to get themselves in the press." The Secretary went on to say that he thought it inconceivable that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek could be prejudiced by such talk against the head of any one of the principal United Nations, least of all the United States, in view of its having repeatedly risked and eventually entered war for the protection of Chinese interests.[18]

If any names were mentioned in this outburst, they were not recorded in Hull's memorandum. The conversation, however, followed by a few weeks a round-the-world tour by Wendell L. Willkie, Roosevelt's Republican opponent in the presidential election of 1940. On his own initiative but with authorization from Roosevelt, Willkie had visited Ankara, Moscow, and Chungking all but ignored the American Ambassadors in the last two capitals, courted the press, and voiced outspoken criticism of Anglo-American policy toward Russia and China. More aid, he declared, must be provided for the heroic Russian and Chinese armies, a second front must be opened in Europe, and all vestiges of colonialism must be swept from Asia.[19]

It seems beyond question that Willkie was the target of Hull's tirade, though Willkie did not fit the description of "persons who make their living in this manner" and did not deserve Hull's imputation of unworthy motive. Other parts of the description fit him and no one else at the time and though the reports of Willkie's speeches show no reference to the exclusion laws, it seems clear that Hull sensed a connection between the Ambassador's allusion to that subject and Willkie's freewheeling criticisms of American policy. The Ambassador certainly got no specific reply to his suggestion, but Hull recorded in his memorandum that the Chinese Ambassador "listened intently and said he understood everything I was bringing out and that it was important to avoid the interference of trouble-making persons whose activities I had correctly described."

The initiative that the State Department declined to take was assumed by private individuals and organizations desirous of removing the injustice of the exclusion laws and promoting better relations with China. A New York group headed by Richard Walsh, editor of the magazine *Asia and the Americas*, advanced the cause through the publication of magazine articles, through lobbying in Congress, and through successful efforts to overcome West Coast opposition to Chinese immigration of merely token magnitude. In May, 1943, they formed a Citizens Committee to Repeal Exclusion.

The introduction of several repeal bills in Congress and discreet inquiries by Foreign Minister Soong—who spent much time in Washington—and by other highly placed Chinese soon required the attention of the State Department. Mr. Hull assigned to Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long the responsibility of keeping in touch with Congress on the subject and making known the Department's position. Long conferred several times with Speaker Rayburn and House Majority Leader McCormack and met at least once with the Democratic members of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. The Department, Long explained, was "not unsympathetic" to any proposal that Congress might make for removal or liberalization of the exclusion laws, but would regard it as very unfortunate if a bill for that purpose should lead to acrimonious debate on the floor of the House, especially if it should then meet defeat. The Department advised against bringing any bill to the House floor until a survey of the membership had given assurance that it would pass.[20]

This cautious attitude of the Department persisted through the summer, but not without intramural dissent. Political adviser Hornbeck, after an informal talk with the Chinese Ambassador, was convinced that the repeal issue had very important psychological implications to the Chinese in the depressing war situation, and consequent importance to the Allied war effort. In a memorandum of June 9, 1943, he argued that it was the responsibility of the State Department to take the lead and guide Congress toward the passage of a suitable bill.[21] Two days later, however, Secretary Hull spoke to the Chinese Ambassador in the same language that Long had used earlier with the House leaders. The Government, he said, was sympathetic to any repeal bill that had a chance of passing, but did not wish to risk misleading the Chinese and creating serious disappointment by publicly supporting such a proposal and giving a false impression of its prospects. "Therefore," he concluded, "as true friends of China, we are keeping in the closest touch with Congress in the hope that some measure might be developed and passed which will be a step forward in removing the Exclusion Act."[22]

Meanwhile, considerable opposition had developed in the House Immigration Committee. After holding public hearings it voted, 9 to 8, to report a bill repealing the exclusion laws but making no provision for admission of Chinese under a quota. Since even this emasculated measure appeared to have little chance of passage, the matter was laid aside until after the summer recess of Congress. After Congress reconvened in September, Hull reported to the President, September 25, sketching what had been done in the spring and early summer and promising that the subject would now be taken up again with the hope that the situation might have become more favorable. His letter, however, was far from optimistic. It expressed the same concern noted earlier for untoward developments in Congress.[23]

Apparently unknown to the Secretary, opposition to repeal in Congress had greatly diminished. The argument that repeal would stimulate China's war effort had gained increasing weight. Eleven days after Hull's letter, Speaker Rayburn told Assistant Secretary Long that the bill introduced by Congressman Magnuson of Washington was about to be taken up by the Immigration Committee with excellent prospects of being favorably reported. There was still some opposition, he said, and a letter from the Secretary for use on the floor would be very helpful. Since the Secretary was on the point of departing for the Moscow Conference, the requested letter to Speaker Rayburn, October 14, 1943, was signed by Under Secretary Stettinius.

> The Department [he wrote] cannot urge too strongly that it is the part of sound practical policy to eliminate discriminations which, unless removed, tend to impede this country in its relations with China during the war period and afterwards in the development of trade and cultural intercourse.[24]

The President had already (October 11) sent a message to Congress urging passage of the bill. Thereby, he said, "we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda"—propaganda that was telling the Chinese that the United States would never treat Orientals as equals. Fears, voiced in Congress and elsewhere, of a flood of Oriental immigrants, the President undertook to silence by pointing out that Chinese immigration under the quota system would amount to not more than about 100 immigrants a year. "Action by the Congress now," he concluded, "will be an earnest of our purpose to apply the policy of the good neighbor to our relations with other peoples."[25]

Under such persuasions and pressures the House passed the repeal bill by voice vote on October 21, 1943; the Senate followed suit November 26, and the President signed it into law December 17, after his return from Cairo and Teheran. The Act, applicable to Chinese only, wiped out the exclusion provisions of previous laws, permitted the immigration of Chinese on the quota basis—the number was later determined as 105 annually—and made Chinese eligible for naturalization.[26]

If one may trust the published documentary record, the credit that Hull, in his *Memoirs,* claimed for the repeal of Chinese exclusion appears exaggerated. He described the Act as passed "at the suggestion of the Administration," asserted that its substance "had been one of my projects for a number of years," and says further: "When the matter came before Congress, I repeatedly conferred with members of both Houses to urge their support of repeal."[27] No one of these assertions is entirely borne out by the available record. There is no reason to doubt Hull's sympathy with the cause of repeal, but, his *Memoirs* aside, all the indications are that his attitude toward it was decidedly, if not excessively, cautious.

The abrogation of the unequal treaties and agreements and the repeal of the exclusion laws were the principal aspects of America's wartime relations with China in which Hull and the State Department were directly and primarily concerned. Hull was not consulted by the President in regard to the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, which assured China of the return to her of "all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese." Neither was he consulted upon complicated military matters, though these often had significant political implications.

Hull was present when Secretary Stimson asked and received the President's approval of the naming of General Joseph W. Stilwell to serve as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to command American ground forces in China, but his opinion was not asked.[28] He took only a tangential part in attempts to settle the later quarrels and disagreements that arose between Stilwell and Chiang and between Stilwell and General Claire L. Chennault, commander of the Fourteenth Air Force (formerly the American Volunteer Group or "Flying Tigers"). These matters were handled by the War Department or by the President, sometimes directly, sometimes through special representatives such as Vice President Henry A. Wallace and General Patrick J. Hurley, who went to Chungking in that capacity in June and September, 1944, respectively. In these affairs the State Department was largely by-passed.[29]

Though left very much on the side lines, Hull and his Department never lost interest in the problem of keeping China satisfied—as far as that was possible—and in the war. The Department often took a more indulgent view of China's demands and China's performance than did the Treasury or the War Department. Thus in January, 1942, when Chiang Kai-shek had asked a loan of $500,000,000, Hull joined forces with Stimson to overcome the reluctance of Secretary Morgenthau, who had at first insisted on strings to guarantee that the funds would be used effectively to increase China's war effort.[30]

Five months later, at the Secretary's request, the State Department prepared a memorandum for him to use in his meeting with Secretaries Stimson and Knox, June 30, 1942. This deplored indications of a prevalent feeling among U. S. Army and Navy personnel in Chungking and Washington that the Kuomintang Government faced imminent collapse. Such pessimism, however little justified, tended to reduce shipments of material to China and thus to increase any danger of collapse that might exist. The best way to avoid collapse of the Far Eastern Ally, the memorandum argued, was to increase material aid to China, especially planes, and to establish effective air transport to China.[31]

One other instance of the State Department's intervention on behalf of China occurred in December, 1943, and January, 1944. Chiang Kai-shek at this time had good cause for annoyance at his Western Allies. At Cairo, in November, 1943, Roosevelt, with Churchill's reluctant consent, had promised Chiang an amphibious assault on the Japanese in Burma in the following spring, which should reopen the Burma Road and bring substantial aid to beleaguered China. But on second thoughts and after conferring with Stalin at Teheran, Roosevelt had the embarrassing task of informing Chiang that the spring's campaign in Europe would require all available landing craft, and that Burma would have to be attacked from the land side alone, with the chief burden falling on Chinese armies.[32]

The Generalissimo thereupon asked a loan of one billion dollars, "as balm for breach of promise," in Herbert Feis's words. He also insisted that the United States finance the construction of certain airfields in China by supplying dollars at the rate of one American to 20 Chinese at a time when inflation had carried the open market rate well above 200 to one. These demands struck the War Department and the Treasury as so beyond reason—at a time when naval and military progress across the Pacific was lessening China's importance in the war—that a reply was prepared so harsh that it might have produced a complete break with Chungking. The President acquiesced, but subject to Hull's approval. Hull advised the President "not to risk a complete rupture in working relations at this critical time, and the

President took heed of the caution." The billion dollar loan was not granted, but in the matter of construction costs and rates of exchange compromise agreements were worked out.[33]

An observation of Herbert Feis, referring to an earlier period of the war, might be applicable throughout. Though the State Department had little influence in matters of strategy or of the assignment of material aid to China, he remarks, "even so its sympathetic temper, exemplified by Hull, helped to soften differences and sustain friendship."[34]

The desire of the United States to assist China, and to count upon one hundred per cent Chinese co-operation in winning the war, was complicated by a deep rift within the Chinese nation—a "cold war" between the Nationalist or Kuomintang Government and the Chinese Communists. Expelled from the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, in 1927, the Communists had maintained a base in southeast China until 1934. They had then broken through an encirclement of hostile Nationalist armies and executed the famous "long march," which terminated the next year far to the northwest in Shensi Province. There they established their headquarters at Yenan and instituted a program of moderate land reform and ostensibly democratic local government, which induced the widespread belief that they were not true Communists but only "agrarian reformers." State Department documents frequently put the term "Communists" in quotation marks in speaking of them, and Stalin encouraged the impression by telling Ambassador Harriman that they were "margarine Communists."[35]

Chiang Kai-shek was not taken in by these subterfuges, but in 1937 he did reach an agreement with the Communist leaders, Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai, for common action against the Japanese enemy. The agreement soon broke down, however, and by the time of General Stilwell's arrival in China in 1942, Chiang was using many of his best troops to contain the Communists in their northwestern domain. To Stilwell, who was all soldier, this was a deplorable waste of manpower. As he saw it, Nationalists and Communists should all have been fighting Japanese, not threatening to fight each other.

Stilwell, furthermore, grew more and more outraged by what appeared to him the corruption, inefficiency, and reactionary character centering in the Kuomintang Government in Chungking, which he contrasted with what he thought to be the frugality, honesty, and progressiveness of the Yenan regime. Similar impressions were formed by a group of young Foreign Service Officers, specialists on China, whom the State Department had assigned as advisers and liaison personnel to Stilwell's headquarters. These men, like Stilwell, were highly critical of the Kuomintang Government. Unless it could be drastically reformed by elimination of the extreme reactionaries and elevation of liberal elements—T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung were mentioned among the latter—they felt it was bound to lose in the contest with the more dynamic Communists.[36]

How much of this analysis was accepted by the State Department in general and the Secretary in particular it is impossible to say. There was realization of the deficiencies of the National Government. The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs wrote the Secretary early in September, 1943, that "an increasingly reactionary type of nationalism" had been apparent in China in recent months. This "virus of nationalism," he warned, was "capable of becoming a cancer," but he saw nothing to do about it for the time being.[37] Certainly there was no serious thought in Washington, then or later, of switching support from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists. What chiefly troubled the State Department in the summer of 1943 was the persistence of rumors that the Chinese Government was preparing to launch a new military campaign in an effort to wipe out the Communists while the Soviet Union, their potential champion, was otherwise engaged. Such diversion of effort from the war against Japan would manifestly be detrimental to Allied war plans; specifically, it would interfere with Chinese participation in a proposed campaign to reopen the Burma Road. There was the additional danger that Russia might come to the aid of the Communists, thereby opening a serious rift in the United Nations. This situation raised the delicate issue of whether the United States could properly advise the Chinese Government on a matter of internal policy. It also illustrated the confusion produced by the multiple channels of communication with Chungking.

On July 21, 1943, Chargé d'Affaires George Atcheson reported from Chungking the substance of a message which T. V. Soong had telegraphed to his Government from Washington. Officials of the American Government, Soong disclosed, had inquired about Kuomintang-Communist relations "and had expressed to him the opinion that an open clash would be seriously regarded in the United States and should be avoided." Three days later Stanley Hornbeck reported to the Secretary that no one in the Far Eastern division of the Department had spoken with Dr. Soong recently on that subject or any other, nor had the Department received information "regarding any discussion with Soong of this subject by any officer of the Government."[38]

Secretary Hull mentioned to the Chinese Ambassador the report that an American official "had spoken in a rather officious manner" to Dr. Soong about China's policies toward the Communists. The friendly inquiries that he and other American officials occasionally made about conditions in China, the Secretary said, had "not the remotest resemblance to what Dr. Soong is said to have reported to Chungking." Ambassador Wei had not heard of the report and found it as "incomprehensible" as did the Secretary.[39]

The mystery was not cleared up until Dr. Soong returned from England, whither he had gone a few days after his report to Chungking. In a conversation with Hornbeck, August 18, he revealed that the advice in question had been given him by "a highly placed American military authority," who had been alarmed by reports of an imminent Nationalist attack upon the Communists. Soong assured Hornbeck that the National Government had "no present intention of forcing the issue with the Communists," and he wondered whether such false rumors originated from Russian sources. Hornbeck told Soong that the State Department had not been apprehensive of an armed Kuomintang-Communist clash in the near future. The Department, he said, had never concealed its hope that civil strife in China would be avoided; "but," he added, "we have scrupulously refrained from urging upon the Chinese Government any particular course of action in connection with or in regard to matters of Chinese international [internal?] politics."[40] Soong may have wondered about the rather fine distinction between expressing hope and giving advice.

In spite of Dr. Soong's assurances, there seems no doubt that a powerful element in the Kuomintang was intending at this time to press for a showdown with the Communists. The plans of these leaders were foiled when Chiang Kai-shek stated to the party's Central Executive Committee, September 13, 1943, that "the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."[41]

Renewal of civil war was for the time being prevented, but tensions continued, and they were not lessened by General Stilwell's growing insistence that he be allowed to use the Communist armed forces jointly with those of the National Government against the Japanese. On the political side, the United States evolved a three-point program to be pressed upon China—a program, it should be said, based upon the assumption that the Communists constituted a political party which could work in harness with other political parties in the manner familiar in the West. The Chinese were to be urged, first, to avoid civil war and to settle all disputes by peaceful political means, as Chiang Kai-shek had in effect promised. Such procedure called, in the second place, for the formation of some coalition government or governmental organ which would give a voice to all parties, and eventually for democratic government under a constitution making all parties equal under the law. Finally, in the words of Herbert Feis, "the Kuomintang must qualify itself to keep power and popular support by self-improvement and social and economic reforms."[42]

The State Department's efforts to propel China along this threefold path were interrupted by another of those special missions to which Roosevelt was addicted: Vice President Wallace's visit to Chungking in June, 1944. This was apparently the President's brainchild, though Hull attributed its origin to Wallace himself and made a futile effort to forestall it, believing, as he said, "that a special mission of this nature might harm instead of help the situation."[43]

Wallace was accompanied to China by Foreign

Service Officer John Carter Vincent, at the time Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs in the State Department. The Vice President held a series of lengthy talks with the Generalissimo, June 21-24, 1944. At the beginning he informed Chiang that President Roosevelt, in talking of the Chinese Communists, "had assumed that, in as much as the Communists and the members of the Kuomintang were all Chinese, they were basically friends and that 'nothing should be final between friends.'" He intimated that the President might be willing to act as mediator if the parties could not get together.

Wallace found the Generalissimo unimpressed by these naïve views. Chiang kept insisting that the Communists were basically hostile, that their word could not be trusted, that the Chinese people did not regard them as Chinese but as internationalists. Roosevelt and the American people, Chiang observed, did not understand the Chinese Communists. He wanted "the President to know that the conflict between the Communists and the Central Government is not like that between capitalism and labor in the United States—the situations are not analogous."

Chiang did consent that an American military observation team should be allowed to visit the Communist area; and he expressed a strong desire for an understanding with the Soviet Union; he would meet the Russians more than half way, he said. But in its main purpose Wallace's mission was a failure. On the proper relationship between Kuomintang and

Communists neither he nor Chiang had made any progress in convincing the other. "So far as I could see," Hull dourly recorded, "Wallace's trip was without beneficial effect."

During the remaining months of Hull's Secretaryship, the State Department continued to support General Stilwell and the War Department in urging that all Chinese military forces, including the Communists, be used against the Japanese. Instructions in that sense were sent to Ambassador Gauss June 15, but were put in Wallace's hands and merged in his conferences with Chiang. On August 30, Chiang called in Ambassador Gauss and again enlarged upon the Communist threat and the American disposition, as he saw it, to put all pressure for compromise upon the Central Government:

> The request that China meet Communist demands [he complained] is equivalent to asking China's unconditional surrender to a party known to be under a foreign power's influence (the Soviet Union). The Communists are growing arrogant and refuse to continue negotiations since our [U. S.] observer group arrived in Yenan. The United States should tell the Communists to reconcile their differences with and submit to the national government of China.[44]

Gauss's report of this conversation, dated August 31, 1944, was answered by Hull on September 9, in a telegram drafted in the State Department and approved by the President. It may be taken as virtually Hull's last word on China's internal troubles. Comparing the Generalissimo's remarks to Gauss with those to Wallace in June, the Secretary remarked that they "would indicate a discouraging lack of progress in the Generalissimo's thinking." Taking cognizance of Chiang's complaint that the United States exerted all its pressure on one side, the Secretary suggested that Gauss offer, if a meeting could be arranged with a Communist representative in Chungking, to urge unity upon him with the same arguments and energy that had been used with Chiang. The note commended Gauss's suggestion of a coalition council to unite the efforts of all elements in China for the winning of the war and the establishing of "a lasting democratic peace." "It is our belief," Hull wrote, speaking for himself and the President, "that a most effective means to achieve this end would be a council or some body which represents all influential elements in China, with full powers, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek."[45]

One can imagine that Chiang Kai-shek, when confronted with these suggestions, reflected that they "would indicate a discouraging lack of progress" in the State Department's thinking. In any event, the direction of Sino-American relations was about to pass into other hands. Already another personal representative of the President, General Patrick J. Hurley, had arrived in Chungking. Within a few weeks he would replace Gauss as Ambassador. In

October the gadfly Stilwell was recalled, at the peremptory demand of Chiang Kai-shek; and in November Hull, already absent from his post for weeks because of illness, prevailed upon the President to accept his resignation. The relatively inexperienced Stettinius replaced him.

But the ill-starred attempt to bring about peace and co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists was to continue disastrously under Stettinius and his successor in the State Department. Like the policy toward Russia, it was based on a fatal misconception of the nature of Communism. That Hull shared this misconception with so many others, including Roosevelt, while in no way surprising, undoubtedly detracts from his stature as a statesman.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

GOOD NEIGHBORS IN WARTIME

THE COMING of war in Europe and the period of uneasiness that preceded it, the growing friction with Japan, and the final precipitation of the United States into World War II, had wrought a significant change in the Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt Administration.[1] That policy had never been considered one of unrequited generosity on the part of the United States. It was meant, on the other hand, to be a two-way street; some form of reciprocity was anticipated. The original expectation was that the Latin American states would reciprocate with "fair" treatment of the persons and property of citizens of the United States within their borders. "Fair" treatment meant, among other things, respect for property rights, with prompt and adequate compensation if private property were expropriated for public purposes. In return for its adherence to the Good Neighbor policy, wrote Sumner Welles in 1938, the United States was "entitled to expect . . . respect for the obligations due it under international law, which, of course, include respect for obligations due its citizens. . . ."[2] If adequate compensation were not voluntarily provided in such instances, then the United States had the right to ask that the claims be submitted to international arbitration under the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty of 1929. In other words, in return for giving up the right of armed intervention in

Latin America, the United States was under the impression that it could expect, when occasion arose, arbitral or judicial determination, through an international body, of unpaid claims of its citizens against Latin American governments.

Had the international atmosphere remained as calm as it was in 1933, the United States might have insisted upon this conception of the Good Neighbors' two-way street, and thereby almost certainly have wrecked the Good Neighbor policy. International arbitration of property claims, notably claims for compensation for expropriated property, had become anathema to states which, like Mexico, were engaged in expropriation. An obligation to pay for expropriated property they recognized, but the amount of compensation and the method of payment they considered "domestic questions" and therefore exempt from arbitration under the 1929 treaty. Continued insistence by the United States upon arbitration of such questions would have led only to an impasse and the impairment of cordial relations.

But with Nazi and Fascist influence making headway in the Western Hemisphere, and with war threatening, the United States could not afford the luxury of a quarrel with its neighbors over the exact amount of compensation due its citizens. More important was reciprocity of a different kind—a willingness on the part of the Latin American states to stand with the United States against the perils that threatened the Americas from overseas, to exclude Axis agents, to permit the establishment of military, naval or air bases in their territory and the utilization of their air space, and finally actual collaboration in war. The national interest overrode private interest. The United States dropped its insistence upon arbitration as a means of settling claims of its citizens and accepted negotiated settlement very largely upon the terms offered by the debtor governments. As Bryce Wood has written: "The transition from juridical to political modes of settlement of disputes involving the status of North American business enterprise in Latin America was a major development of the period between 1936 and 1943."[3] This was but one of the ways by which, just before and during the war, the United States broadened the Good Neighbor policy in an effort to induce a response favorable to the national interest.

In this transformation of the Good Neighbor policy, Cordell Hull appears to have been a passive rather than an active agent. His *Memoirs* give scarcely a hint of the retreat involved.[4] He went along with the change reluctantly, propelled by Josephus Daniels in Mexico, Laurence Duggan in the State Department, and to some extent by President Roosevelt. How he narrowly escaped antagonizing Mexico on the eve of the Lima Conference was related in an earlier chapter.[5] Since Mexico played the principal part in changing Hull's conception of the Good Neighbor, it will be well to examine Mexican relations in some detail.

Josephus Daniels, North Carolina journalist and Secretary of the Navy under Wilson, had been active in promoting the nomination and election of his former Assistant Secretary, Franklin Roosevelt. As a reward, he would have liked to return to his old cabinet post, and when that proved impossible, asked to be sent to Mexico as Ambassador. Through Hull thought him "a little too radical at times," and though Roosevelt had already promised the Mexican post to a friend of Vice President Garner, Daniels' request could not well be refused. The choice turned out a happy one.[6]

Daniels' initial reception in Mexico City was cool. Mexicans had not forgotten that as Secretary of the Navy he had sent the marines to Vera Cruz in 1914. But his genial friendliness and his unconcealed sympathy with the aims of the still continuing Mexican Revolution quickly overcame that handicap, and during most of the eight-and-one-half years that he remained in Mexico he enjoyed a degree of popularity with the Mexican Government and people very unusual for an Ambassador of the United States.

The new Ambassador's attitude to the recurrent controversies between his own country and Mexico was apparent in his handling of the first important negotiation which engaged his attention. This dealt with claims of American citizens for losses suffered in Mexico during the turbulent revolutionary years, 1910-1920. A commission established in 1923 to adjudicate these claims had failed to make progress, and Daniels was authorized to negotiate with the Mexican Government for a lump sum settlement. When that Government made an offer, based upon the average terms of settlement with six European governments, but which the State Department thought too low, Daniels counseled that the United States apply the Golden Rule. In a private letter to Secretary Hull, he urged that the State Department forgo a "strictly technical approach" and adopt an attitude which would show that the United States was actually practicing "the generous good neighbor policy." The State Department at length yielded, and on April 24, 1934 (exactly one year after presenting his credentials), Daniels signed a convention settling that category of claims at 2.65 percent of their face value. Of this settlement a keen student of Daniels' diplomatic career remarks that "the Good Neighbor Policy had been put to work, and Josephus Daniels had shown himself to be perhaps its most dedicated and persistent advocate."[7]

But Daniels was soon in trouble with the Roman Catholic Church both in Mexico and in the United States. The Mexican Government was at this time going to extremes in its anticlerical policy, including the complete secularization of the schools. A speech by the Ambassador, in which he praised the Mexican effort for universal schooling, was interpreted as an endorsement of the anti-Catholic policy. It led to bitter attacks and demands for his recall by Catholics in the United States and to the introduction by Senator William E. Borah of a resolution calling for an investigation of religious conditions in Mexico. Both Roosevelt and Hull supported Daniels, and Borah's resolution died in committee. The resolution, however, gave rise to an important statement by the

Secretary of State. In a letter to Senator Pittman, dated February 12, 1935, Mr. Hull stated:

> It is fundamental that sovereign States have the right to control the internal order of their affairs in such manner as they deem to be to their best interests, free from unwarranted interference by other powers. While we should always be ready to protect American citizens in the enjoyment in foreign territory of rights which they may have under the laws of a foreign State, under treaties or under the law of nations, it is not permissible for us to undertake to dictate to foreign governments their national policies on matters conceded to be within their domestic jurisdiction, although this Government, adhering as it does to the broad principle of freedom of thought and religious belief, is naturally desirous of seeing its citizens enjoy in other countries freedom from restrictions or disabilities in this respect.

The letter went on to cite numerous precedents for the attitude of noninterference with the religious systems of foreign countries, and denied that the State Department, within the last year, had received complaints of violations of rights of American citizens to which they were entitled under Mexican law or United States treaties with Mexico. While desiring that American citizens should enjoy full religious freedom everywhere, said the Secretary, "We cannot on general grounds undertake to change or regulate the domestic policy of a foreign State to conform to our Constitution or our conceptions of religious freedom. Such action would only meet with resentment in the foreign country."[8]

But the issues that caused most friction between Mexico and the United States in the years of Daniels' ambassadorship were two that had been more or less chronic since adoption of the Mexican Constitution of 1917—land reform and the rights of foreign oil companies. The common lands, or *ejidos*, that had once been appurtenances of Mexican villages, had to a large extent been absorbed in large landed estates, some owned by Mexicans, many by foreigners. It became a major object of the Revolution to restore the former *ejidos* to the peasantry. This process went on slowly between 1920 and 1934 but at a much faster pace under radical President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). Mexico professed an intention to pay for all lands expropriated as a part of this program, but Mexico was a poor country, and arrangements for payment were dilatory and inadequate. In this, as in other matters, Daniels urged patience with Mexico and it was presumably his appeal to President Roosevelt which induced Secretary Hull to waive his demand for arbitration and accept settlement on Mexico's terms in November, 1938.[9]

The oil controversy, which had been quiescent since Dwight Morrow's ambassadorship in 1927-1930, appeared in a new form under President Cárdenas. With his encouragement, the Mexican employees of the foreign oil companies were brought together in a single union and in 1936 presented to the companies a drastic group of demands, including substantial wage increases and fringe benefits, some of which would have encroached upon the domain of management. The companies were willing to grant much but not all of the union's demands. A strike ensued, followed by submission of the controversy to compulsory arbitration under Mexican law. The Board of Arbitration, a purely Mexican agency, backed the union, and the Mexican Supreme Court upheld the Board. When the companies refused compliance, President Cárdenas, in a decree of March 18, 1938, ordered their properties nationalized.[10]

Hull's response to this "bolt from the blue," as Daniels called it, was to dispatch to Daniels a long note, dated March 26, 1938, to be presented to the Mexican Minister next day. The note characterized the Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt administration and remarked that "this policy must of its very essence have a reciprocal character if the peoples of the New World are to progress steadily toward a higher level of international relationships." Reviewing the long controversy over payment for expropriated agrarian lands, the Secretary remarked that the insistence by the United States on payment of just compensation for such lands applied equally to the expropriated oil properties. "This does not mean," he said, "that the [Mexican] Government may later pay as and when it may suit its convenience." Mr. Hull therefore asked to be informed "what specific action with respect to payment for the properties in question is contemplated by the Mexican Government, what assurances will be given that payment will be made, and when such payment may be expected." The Ambassador was to request "a prompt reply" and to say that in the opinion of the United States the time had arrived "for a similar understanding" regarding the payment for expropriated agrarian lands.[11]

This was the peremptory note which Daniels, after showing it to Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay, agreed to regard as not having been delivered.[12] He felt that Cordell Hull had "let his Tennessee temper lead him into undue sharpness" and that the note paid insufficient attention to Cárdenas' oral assurances that the properties would be paid for. Daniels' failure to inform Hull that he was not officially delivering the note led to later embarrassment and to Hull's "Tennessee temper" being momentarily excited against the Ambassador. This was no doubt one of the occasions when Hull considered Daniels "a little too radical."

In fact, Hull, in his efforts to be stern with Mexico, was beset by "radicalism" above as well as below. President Roosevelt, in a press conference at Warm Springs on April 1, indicated that his sympathies were with "those Americans who had invested meager savings in small ranches and farms" in Mexico. The United States, he said, "had insisted and would continue to insist on full and fair indemnification of the small ranch owners. . . . As for the American oil companies, whose properties were taken over when they failed to abide by a Mexican court decree . . . they were entitled to damages equivalent only to actual investment, less depreciation."[13] The last point was crucial, since the companies claimed damages of hundreds of millions of dollars for loss of oil still in the ground.

It is not surprising that Hull, with his lawyer's approach to the subject, was complaining in July to Secretary Morgenthau: "Well, we are having lots of trouble in Mexico and you know the President and Daniels have given the Mexicans the impression that they can go right ahead and flaunt everything in our face. . . . Daniels is down there taking sides with the Mexican Government and I have to deal with those Communists down there and have to carry out international law." Hull accused Daniels of going over his head to the President—as Daniels undoubtedly did—"and, by implication, of hamstringing all efforts at a reasonable settlement of the controversy."[14]

At any rate, the crisis in Mexican-American relations that the oil expropriation might have produced was averted. In the three years that followed, the State Department made every effort to promote a settlement by direct negotiation between the Mexican Government and the oil companies, but at first holding in reserve the assumption that arbitration should be invoked if negotiation failed. In the spring of 1940 Hull was still insisting that arbitration of justiciable questions which diplomacy failed to settle was upheld by "a complete solidarity on the part of all the American republics." "I think," he wrote, "that the questions here involved fall within this category." Mexican Foreign Minister Hay, in reply, listed nine American States, including Mexico, which expressly excluded domestic questions from arbitration—and of course Mexico held that the oil question was domestic. To this note Hull did not reply, thereby, it would seem, actually surrendering the American case for arbitration.[15]

Other events were pointing toward a settlement by commissioners, as Mexico had proposed. The Sinclair Oil Company broke the united front of the oil interests and in May, 1940, agreed to accept $8,500,000 and a favorable arrangement for purchasing oil in payment for its former properties. Standard of New Jersey remained the only important American holdout. War had begun in Europe, and in June, 1940, the fall of France magnified the Axis threat to the New World. The United States needed the friendly co-operation of Mexico in a variety of ways. National security demanded a settlement of the oil controversy. This was clearly seen by Daniels, Duggan, and now Sumner Welles in the State Department, as well as by the President. On the other hand, Herbert Feis, the Department's Economic Adviser, and Max W. Thornburg, special adviser on petroleum, opposed yielding to Mexico. Despite their opposition, a tentative agreement was reached in August, 1941, but Hull was still reluctant to make a settlement without the concurrence of Standard Oil, and delayed signing the agreement in the hope of winning the company over. He met the oil company representatives in his office on September 27 and explained the proposed agreement. "I sought," he recorded, "to place it on a broader basis by outlining to them the situation and the important role Mexico could play in co-operation with us. I stressed the Axis activities being conducted in Latin America and the help Mexico had already given us in preventing strategic materials from going to Japan."[16]

The company representatives were not impressed with these arguments. Complaining that the agreement would sacrifice "the principle of property rights," they "said they would rather see the question remain unsettled, even with the result of losing the property, than see this principle sacrificed." Here was a clear confrontation of private versus national interest, the latter now intensified by the precarious state of relations with Japan. Hull still hesitated, but a visit from Daniels, who was on the point of resigning his post in Mexico, was apparently decisive. On November 19, 1941, three weeks before Pearl Harbor, the accord with Mexico was signed.[17]

The amount of compensation to be paid the oil companies was submitted to two experts, one named by each government. Working on the basis of actual investment, and eliminating claims for oil still underground, they awarded the companies just under $24,000,000, of which a third was to be paid in cash, the balance over a five-year period, with interest. Including the Sinclair settlement and payments to a few small independent companies which agreed to sell their properties, Mexico paid the American oil companies approximately $42,000,000, principal and interest, as compared with the $260,000,000 which the companies had demanded in 1939. As a part of the same settlement, Mexico agreed to pay a total of $40,000,000 for the agrarian claims and certain other long-standing claims of American citizens. These payments were made easier by provisions for a long-term loan by the Export-Import Bank, for continuation of the purchase of Mexican silver, for aid in stabilizing the peso, and for the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement.[18]

The United States had accepted the Mexican conception of the Good Neighbor policy and was to enjoy reciprocity in the form of willing and friendly Mexican co-operation in its war with the Axis powers. If legitimate interests of oil companies and landowners had been sacrificed in the process, these could but be viewed as a minor part of the national sacrifice entailed by war. A somewhat similar controversy with Bolivia, which had expropriated Standard Oil properties, was likewise settled by a lump-sum payment after various forms of pressure had failed to induce Bolivia to accept arbitration. In Venezuela, the State Department acted to forestall possible expropriation by putting pressure on the oil companies operating there to accept a basis for their holdings much more favorable to Venezuela than that of their original contracts. These arrangements, which Hull apparently left entirely in the hands of Sumner Welles, meant carrying the Good Neighbor policy a step beyond that seen in the settlement with Mexico. Its purpose was similar—the assurance of Venezuela's co-operation in the defense of the hemisphere.[19]

Before the settlement with Mexico in November, 1941, the process of consultation provided for at Buenos Aires in 1936 and more specifically at Lima in 1938 had twice been invoked. Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics were held in Panama, September 23 to October 3, 1939, and in Havana, July 21-30, 1940.

Immediately upon the British and French Declarations of war, September 3, 1939, the United States secured the agreement of other American governments to the calling of a conference of American Foreign Ministers, and formal invitations were issued by the President of Panama on September 5. The purpose of the meeting, as conceived by President Roosevelt, was "to establish united action for the preservation of neutrality; to take such measures as might be necessary and feasible for keeping the hemisphere, excepting for Canada, free of conflict; and to provide for economic stability and co-operation."[20] The President had worked out with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Navy Secretary Edison a plan for excluding belligerent naval action from the Western Hemisphere, if war should come in Europe. He would draw a north-south line somewhere in the mid-Atlantic and direct the Navy to warn belligerent ships of war against crossing the line. Hull was and remained skeptical about the plan, for which he could find no warrant in international law, but Welles, who went to Panama in place of the Secretary, carried with him a draft declaration embodying the President's idea.[21]

Welles records that in his meetings with other delegations before the formal opening of the Conference he was "immediately impressed by the extraordinary feeling of inter-American unity displayed by all of them," and that even the Argentine delegation, headed this time by Dr. Leopoldo Melo, rendered "altogether co-operative, helpful, and able services" throughout the meeting.[22]

The Conference apparently had no difficulty in agreeing upon its most spectacular product, known as the Declaration of Panama. This document declared it to be the right of the American Republics, as long as they maintained their neutrality, to have the waters adjacent to the American continents kept free from any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation. It proceeded to define those "adjacent" waters as extending on an average three hundred miles from the shores of the Western Hemisphere south of Canada.[23]

The Conference also adopted a General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics. This document set forth rules of neutral conduct which, like the legislation about to be enacted in the United States, were designed to be helpful to the European democracies. The Conference established an Inter-American Neutrality Committee to deal with problems of neutrality as they might arise, and an Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory

Committee to study economic problems arising from the war in Europe. It made provision for co-ordinating measures to repress unlawful activities in aid of a belligerent nation; and, anticipating possible German victories in Europe, it provided for consultation if an enforced change of sovereignty in any American region should present a danger to American security.[24]

Prominent in the thinking of delegates at Panama were the economic dislocations that were certain to develop in Latin America in consequence of the war in Europe. President Roosevelt was aware that maintenance of the political solidarity of the hemisphere would be possible only through massive economic aid from the United States to its southern neighbors. But since no adequate arrangements had yet been provided for such aid, Welles could give little more at Panama than general assurances of assistance in the development of resources and the promotion of trade.[25] Of importance in this connection was the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, composed of an economic expert from each of the twenty-one republics. In its meetings in Washington the committee was able to work out a system of economic co-operation designed, in Hull's words, "to increase commerce and transportation among the American Republics and to take up the slack and dislocation caused by the war in Europe."[26]

About the Declaration of Panama, with its conception of a broad neutral zone in the waters adjacent to American coasts. Hull was so unhappy that he thought of going on record "in a formal protest to the President," after which, as he remarked to Adolf Berle, "They can tell me to do what they like." Apparently he made no such protest, but his skepticism proved largely justified. The belligerents declined to recognize it, and the American Republics made no attempt to enforce it. Though President Roosevelt directed the Navy to "commission 80 destroyers at once and block out the general outlines of the patrol," he permitted Mr. Hull to announce, October 4, that the patrolling would be for purposes of information only. Existence of the Declaration did facilitate arrangements with the states bordering on the Caribbean whereby the United States could patrol their littorals to guard against possible attack on the Panama Canal. Later, it furnished a theoretical basis for the patrolling of the North Atlantic to restrict the operations of German submarines. In this latter activity Secretary Hull found vindication of the position he had taken at the time the Declaration was adopted. He had argued then, he records in his *Memoirs*, for a flexible rather than a fixed line, holding that the United States had "the right to patrol out to sea whatever distance might be necessary to protect our shore line and territorial waters," and that this distance might vary from time to time. When the President decided, in April, 1941, to extend the patrolled area to the line of twenty-five degrees west longitude (though the purpose was to protect British convoys rather than "our shore line and territorial waters"), Hull felt that Mr. Roosevelt had come around to his view.[27]

The Foreign Ministers or their deputies at Panama, had agreed that another meeting should be held at Havana on October 1, 1940, if such a meeting then seemed desirable. German victories in April, May, and June, 1940, made a meeting at an earlier date than October seem imperative. The German successes, as Hull analyzed the situation, presented two dangers to the Americas. Having defeated France and the Netherlands, Germany might lay claim to their possessions in the Caribbean and northern South America. German occupation of such possessions would be in plain contravention of the No-Transfer principle, long associated with the Monroe Doctrine. On the practical level, it would be a threat to the Panama Canal, and hence to the security of the United States and its neighbors. It must be prevented at whatever cost.

The second danger, as Hull saw it, lay in the psychological advantage which Germany's victories might give her for economic and political penetration in Latin America. Already German businessmen, working hand-in-glove with Nazi agents, were active throughout the area. "They were using every method possible in the line of subversive activities," Hull recalled. "They were invading universities. They were insinuating themselves into every kind of official and individual activity that would give them influence or control in their respective orbits." Exulting in the early German successes and assuming that the war was as good as won, German salesmen and commercial attachés in South America were taking orders for German goods at bargain prices, with guarantees of September or October delivery. Latin American governments that interfered with such activities, as when Uruguay arrested a dozen Nazi agents, were threatened with postwar economic retaliation. Germany plainly expected to reduce the Latin American countries to the status of satellites.[28]

On June 17, 1940, the French Government, newly headed by Marshal Pétain as Premier, asked Germany for armistice terms. On the same day the Senate passed unanimously a joint resolution prepared in the State Department, declaring "that the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of this hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." The probability of such an attempt, the resolution added, would lead the United States to consult with the other American Republics upon steps to be taken "to safeguard their common interests." The House of Representatives passed the resolution the next day, with only eight dissenting votes.[29] Secretary Hull, meanwhile, had formally notified the German and Italian Governments that the United States would not recognize such a transfer. On June 17, also, the Secretary suggested to the other American governments that the Foreign Ministers meet for consultation in Havana "at the first possible moment."[30] The other governments agreed, and the meeting took place at Havana, July 21-30, 1940.

Secretary Hull again headed the United States delegation, which included also Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr., and other State Department officers, as well as representatives of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture Departments. It was the Secretary's first visit to Cuba since his military service in 1898.

Three categories of problems faced the Conference: the possibility of transfer of American possessions from other European powers to Germany or Italy; the subversive activities of Axis agents in Latin America; and the war-induced economic problems which had been only touched upon at Panama.

On the first, Congress and the State Department had already announced their veto; but what disposition was to be made of colonies or possessions that might be threatened with transfer? President Roosevelt and Sumner Welles had reacted emphatically to a suggestion that the United States might itself acquire the three Guianas, French, Dutch, and British. Mr. Roosevelt had expressed serious doubt as to whether the United States should alone assume such responsibility and had commented that he was "considering the broad thought of creating a form of Pan American trusteeship for situations of this kind." Welles, to whom the President had referred the correspondence, had endorsed the trusteeship idea as "the only possible solution" if some steps should be necessary to prevent such a transfer as was feared. For the United States to acquire territory in South America, Welles told the President, might "rapidly and completely destroy the relationship" which the latter had built up with the other American Republics.[31]

Secretary Hull had rejected another possible method of keeping "orphaned" possessions out of Axis hands when, upon the German occupation of the Netherlands in April, British and French troops had been landed in the Dutch possessions of Curaçao and Aruba. Fearing that the Japanese might seize upon this action as a precedent for occupying the Dutch East Indies, Hull secured from the British Foreign Office an assurance that the British troops would be withdrawn from Curaçao as soon as safety permitted. He later dissuaded the British from landing troops on Aruba when the French withdrew, promising that the Havana Conference would take care of such situations.[32]

The State Department had evolved a formula embodying the President's trusteeship idea, coupled with a multilateral reaffirmation of the No-Transfer principle and a disclaimer on the part of the American Republics of any design of acquiring for themselves any of the "orphaned" possessions. Mr. Hull had circulated in advance to the principal American governments a convention and a resolution, both setting forth the plan, the resolution to cover emergencies that might arise before the convention could be ratified.[33]

But again Argentina, so co-operative at Panama, opposed the plan of the United States, arguing that it was needless to lay down any general rule in advance, that each case (if any arose) should be handled on its merits, and that, anyway, the American Republics might better set about eliminating all European holdings in the Americas rather than undertake their protection against mere change of ownership.[34]

Argentina had evidenced her coolness to the United States program by omitting to send her Foreign Minister to Havana. She was represented, as at Panama, by Dr. Leopoldo Melo, who was personally sympathetic to Hull's plan but was held on a tight rein by Foreign Minister Cantilo and Acting President Ramón S. Castillo. Hull finally resorted to the tactics he had used successfully at the Lima Conference of 1938. An appeal to ailing President Ortiz, over the heads of the Acting President and Foreign Minister, brought instructions to Dr. Melo to accept the American proposal.[35]

With Argentine approval thus assured, the Foreign Ministers at Havana unanimously agreed upon the resolution and convention, substantially as proposed by the United States. The resolution was officially christened the "Act of Havana" in deference to the desire of Batista, now President-elect of Cuba, to "give Havana a place in History," as Adolf Berle commented. It provided that an "emergency committee" consisting of one member from each republic might set up a "provisional administration" for any European colony in the American area that might be threatened with a change of sovereignty. In urgent cases a single American republic might act without waiting for a meeting of the committee—a gratifying manifestation of confidence in the United States, the only power likely to take advantage of this provision. Upon the ending of the danger, the colony under such "provisional administration" should either become independent or be returned to its former status, depending upon circumstances. The Act of Havana would terminate upon the coming into force of the Convention, signed July 30, 1940, which embodied the same principles in permanent form and in more detail. It was proclaimed February 12, 1942, after having been ratified by the required two-thirds (fourteen) of the signatories.[36]

The signing of the Act and Convention of Havana by representatives of all the American republics, further strengthening as it did the principle of hemispheric solidarity, was, at least on the surface, a significant diplomatic achievement for the United States and for Secretary Hull. Privately, however, the Secretary admitted that the appearance of unanimity was deceptive and that the future attitude of much of South America was at best problematical if Hitler should defeat Great Britain.[37] At any rate, the Act of Havana provided machinery that could be used, if necessary, to enforce the No-Transfer principle. Actually, no occasion arose for invoking either the Act or the Convention. When United States troops were landed in Greenland and Iceland in 1941, the action was taken with the consent of the Danish Minister in Washington in one case and the Iceland Government in the other. By arrangement with the Netherlands Government-in-exile in London, United States and Brazilian troops aided in the protection of the important bauxite mines in Surinam. There was no attempt by Germany to take control of French, Dutch, or Danish possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and hence no need to set up such "provisional administration" as the diplomats at Havana had made ready.

In addition to the Act and Convention of Havana, the Foreign Ministers adopted a Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance stating: "That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration." Should such an act occur or be thought to be in preparation, the signatories agreed to consult as to what action should be taken. The declaration provided, further, for consultations upon mutual assistance for purposes of defense, out of which there grew eventually mutual assistance or lend-lease agreements between the United States and all but two of the other American republics.[38]

The Havana Conference also took significant action for the control of subversive activities and the relief of economies suffering from the loss of normal European markets. Resolutions were adopted providing for common action in the suppression of subversive movements, for exchange of information about such activities, and for restricting the political activities of diplomatic and consular officers.[39] In the economic sphere, the Conference strengthened the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, but the committee could accomplish little without substantial co-operation from the United States, and this was promptly forthcoming. The State Department, in conjunction with the Treasury, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, and other Federal agencies, had begun in the spring to study the problem of finding markets for South American staples that normally were sold in Europe. Several plans for centralized control of hemisphere trade, including control of production, had been carried to the White House, discussed and discarded. American farm groups were opposed to such controls, and it is probable that the Secretary of State threw his influence against a plan so contrary to his liberal economic philosophy. Instead, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized, June 25, to create subsidiary corporations, primarily for the purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials. It promptly set up a Rubber Reserve Company and a Metal Reserve Company, which began purchases of Latin American surplus stocks. Then, on the eve of the Havana meeting, President Roosevelt gave the Conference a psychological "lift" by requesting Congress, July 22, to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank from two hundred to seven hundred million dollars, for the express purpose of helping to sustain the trade of American neighbors. Congress acted upon this suggestion in September. Before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor the Bank had authorized loans of more than $225,000,000 to sixteen Latin American nations.[40]

Following the Havana Conference, the United States set up new agencies to bring more order and efficiency into inter-American economic and cultural relations. In August, 1940, an Office for Co-ordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics was created (later renamed Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs), and Nelson A. Rockefeller was named Co-ordinator. At the same time an Interdepartment Committee on Inter-American Affairs was set up, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, the Export-Import Bank, and other agencies. All in all, in Mr. Hull's words, "one of the most important projects in history of international economic co-operation among neutrals went into effect. During succeeding months and years, with some modifications, it served to prevent the American Republics from succumbing to the blandishments and threats of the Axis, it kept them from virtual bankruptcy, and it helped mobilize the resources of the New World in defense of Britain and ourselves."[41]

The Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, was an act of aggression against an American state, of the kind which the Foreign Ministers at Havana had agreed should be considered an act of aggression against all. Within a few days after the attack, the five Central American states, and also Panama, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had declared war. On January 1, 1942, they joined in signing the Declaration by United Nations. Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela had broken off diplomatic relations with the Axis governments. The other American republics, without exception, sent messages of sympathy to the United States and, in accordance with the principle of hemispheric solidarity, announced that the United States and the other American republics at war would be treated as nonbelligerents.[42]

Meanwhile the United States had moved quickly to bring about a third meeting of Foreign Ministers to consult upon common action, as provided in the Havana Declaration. Rio de Janeiro was selected as the place and January 15, 1942, as the opening date. Since press of business at the Department seemed to require Hull's presence in Washington, he and the President agreed that Under Secretary Welles should represent the United States. While the Conference would have many matters to attend to, it was understood between Hull, Welles, and the President that chief emphasis should be placed upon persuading all the delegates to sign a joint declaration breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Out of the ensuing proceedings at Rio—officially the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics (January 15-28, 1942)—came what was probably the most acrimonious of many intense disagreements between Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles.[43]

The source of trouble was the attitude of the Argentine Government, which almost alone disturbed the harmony of the Conference. (Chile was under a provisional government between the death of a President and the election of his successor and was therefore not in a position to make crucial decisions.) Aside from its traditional orientation toward Europe, Argentina under Acting President Castillo was falling increasingly under the influence of a military clique whose outlook was antidemocratic and if not pro-Axis, at least sympathetic to that friend of the Axis, Spanish Dictator Francisco Franco. In early 1942, furthermore, the Axis powers had enjoyed almost a monopoly of military successes, culminating in the amazing American disaster at Pearl Harbor. It is not surprising, then, that the Argentine Government should hesitate to take a step that might mean war with the Axis powers at a time when their victory in the war seemed highly probable. It is perhaps more remarkable that, after Pearl Harbor, so many men of influence in Latin America, and in Argentina itself, stood ready to back the United States.

The Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela had prepared a resolution of which the crucial sentence declared that "the American Republics . . . cannot continue their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy since Japan has attacked and the others have declared war upon a nation of the Continent." This was a clear declaration of a break with the Axis on the part of all the American governments. Hull distrusted the qualifying expression, "in the exercise of their sovereignty and in conformity with their constitutional institutions and powers, provided the latter are in agreement," but Welles was gratified when on January 21, the Argentine delegate, Foreign Minister Dr. Ruíz Guiñazú, agreed after long argument to accept that formula, thus apparently assuring unanimity.

Next morning, however, Ruíz Guiñazú reported that Acting President Castillo had rejected the declaration. Further consultations revealed that the Argentine Government, and the Chilean as well, would agree to a formula which merely "recommended," instead of declaring, that each American Government break relations with the Axis powers. Since, as Welles reasoned, a government subscribing to this formula would be recommending action to itself as well as to others, it seemed "inconceivable" that a government joining in such a recommendation "could do other than sever all relations with the Axis, as soon as its own constitutional procedure made it possible."[44] He, therefore, on his own responsibility and without reporting to Hull, accepted the formula, thereby preserving hemispheric unity.

It was regrettable that Hull learned of the acceptance of the watered-down declaration from a radio broadcast and news dispatches in terms suggesting that the United States had suffered a diplomatic defeat. He quickly got Welles on the telephone and, as Hull recorded, "spoke to him more sharply than I had ever spoken to anyone in the Department." This implies strong language indeed, for a year earlier Welles had told Drew Pearson "that he had never been castigated by anyone in his life as he had been by Hull."[45] Adolf Berle, who was sitting at the Secretary's elbow, described the interchange as "a violent conversation." The Secretary, he reported, "said, in substance, that neither he nor anyone else had given Sumner carte blanche to go to Rio and give away the whole thing; that the result was that we had taken a terrific diplomatic beating, with incalculable loss to our future position."

When Welles's defense of his course made no impression on Mr. Hull, the President was cut in on the conversation, and Secretary and Under Secretary argued their cases before him. The Secretary, Berle reported, argued "that the effect of the revised resolution was to permit each nation to act individually; that if this was all that anyone was to get, there had been no need of a Rio meeting at all." He suggested giving immediate instructions to re-introduce the original resolution. If Argentina refused to go along, she should be treated as an "outlaw."[46]

Welles, for his part (according to his own later version of the conversation), maintained that the signatures of Brazil and several of her neighbors depended upon securing that of Argentina. "I said," he remembered, "I was convinced that the safety of the hemisphere during our own struggle with the Axis was at stake and I itemized the dangers that were bound to arise if inter-American unity were destroyed."

The President supported Welles, but here again the participants differ as to his reasons. Hull relates: "Without going into the merits of the resolution agreed to at Rio, he [the President] said, a decision had already been reached, the conference was in the act of adjournment, and it would not be feasible to reconsider the action Welles had taken." Welles states that Roosevelt, after hearing his argument, said "without hesitation": "'I am sorry, Cordell, but in this case I am going to take the judgment of the man on the spot.' Talking to me, he said, 'Sumner, I approve what you have done. I authorize you to follow the lines you have recommended.'" Berle—who of course could not hear either Roosevelt or Welles—recorded that the President "seemed to think that the best thing to do was to let well enough alone and make what we could out of it."

It is difficult to judge of the merits of this controversy. Welles in his apologia, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History,* put up a strong argument for the course he had followed at Rio. According to this version, Welles was informed by Brazilian President Getulio Vargas that although Brazil was anxious to go along with the United States in breaking with the Axis powers, she could not risk doing so unless a formula could be found which Argentina could accept. It was Welles's understanding, furthermore, as reported in the same account, that upon Brazil's decision would depend the decisions of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. In other words, unless Argentina could be appeased, the meeting of Foreign Ministers might break up over the crucial issue of breaking relations with the Axis.[47]

Unfortunately this account, published in 1950, is not borne out by Welles's official reports from Rio in January, 1942. On January 22, after receipt of the veto from Acting President Castillo, Welles reported to the Secretary that all the Foreign Ministers, except those of Argentina and possibly Chile, had decided upon a plenary session the following day, at which all of them would sign the declaration for breaking relations. "If Argentina is not prepared to go along the others at that time will go along without her."[48] Two days later, after the violent altercation with Hull, Welles sent a long defensive telegram to the President. In this he asserted that the Argentine veto had thrown the Conference "into a state verging upon chaos." The Brazilian President and Foreign Minister, he said, had told him "of their tremendous concern at the possibility of a rupture between Brazil and Argentina." Far from saying that Brazil would not sign without Argentina, however, "they reaffirmed their decision to go one hundred per cent with the United States, but they urged that if possible Brazil should not be forced to take an open attitude of antagonism to Argentina." Similar pleas were made by the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Uruguay. All three governments feared that "if a rupture took place in the American family of nations, Argentina and Chile would become the *foci* of Axis agents and of subversive activities directed primarily against neighboring countries."

Under these circumstances, Welles told the President, he felt fully justified in accepting the modified resolution and thus preserving hemispheric unity. In fact, he defended the revised formula as actually more satisfactory than the original, and assured the President that this opinion was shared by many of the principal statesmen at the Conference.[49]

On the other side of the argument, it may be pointed out that the hemispheric unity preserved was only nominal, that Chile postponed breaking with the Axis for a year, Argentina for two years, and that activities of Axis agents in those countries continued to flourish. Contrary to Welles's report of general satisfaction in Rio at the compromise, United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery informed the Secretary by telephone "that the other nations lined up for the original, or strong, resolution were angry and hurt and felt that they had been let down, in favor of Argentina, who had been the least co-operative of the lot." Several months later, the Counselor of the Argentine Embassy in Washington remarked to Adolf Berle that the United States had "made a desperate mistake at Rio; that we ought to have declined to accept the Argentine formula; that by accepting it we gave a tremendous political fillip to President Castillo and Ruíz Guiñazú. Otherwise," he believed, "normal political evolution would have upset them."[50] This last opinion is, of course, entirely speculative.

All things considered, it is difficult to agree with Welles that his compromise was a great achievement, or with Hull that it was a disaster. The declaration *recommending* that the American governments break with the Axis was signed by all twenty-one delegations on January 28, 1942. Before the Conference adjourned, all but two of the American Republics had broken diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Argentina and Chile went their separate ways, probably much as they would have done if their signatures had not been wheedled by compromise. There seems no reason to believe that the "appeasement" of Argentina permanently impaired American prestige with the other republics. The one unquestionable result was a serious worsening of the relations between Hull and Welles.

Because of the other important work accomplished at the Conference, and to counteract rumors of a split in the State Department, Hull cabled Welles, January 29, "heartiest congratulations on his part in the overall success of the conference." Welles's subsequent assertion that upon his return to Washington the Secretary refused to see him is contradicted by Hull's desk diaries, which show a fifty-minute appointment with Welles on February 3 and two brief appointments on the fourth, and by Berle's statement that on Monday, February 2, Welles, after lunching with Berle, went "to talk to Mr. Hull at his apartment."[51] We have no record of those conversations, which can hardly have been cordial. They occurred on the very eve of the Secretary's long absence from his office, two weeks in his apartment, followed by two months in Florida. The near-breakdown in health that necessitated this long rest Hull attributed partly to the strain of the long negotiations with Japan and the opening weeks of the war, but partly also to his "deep disappointment at our partial failure at Rio," and for the latter he unquestionably held Welles responsible.

Before leaving the subject of the Rio meeting it should be said that the controversial recommendation for breaking off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers was one of forty-one recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Foreign Ministers. Among the others were a resolution condemning Japan for her attack upon the United States; an endorsement of the principles of the Atlantic Charter; a recommendation for the creation of an inter-American defense board; several recommendations for the more effective control of subversive activities and for more effective use of hemisphere resources; and a recommendation for the severance of all financial and commercial relations with the Axis powers. Sumner Welles summarized the achievements of the Conference optimistically: "The conference at Rio de Janeiro brought to life a real unity between twenty-one sovereign nations confronted by a common danger. It established the effective means by which they could co-operate for their mutual protection in the face of that danger."[52] As far as Argentina was concerned, the unity was nominal only, and even that soon vanished. Chile's position, too, remained for some time ambiguous. For the other nineteen republics, Welles's estimate seems fair.

The subject of military co-operation in World War II is only tangential to a study of the diplomacy of Cordell Hull, but it may be mentioned here that in general the United States obtained such co-operation as it desired from its neighbors to the south. All of the American Republics eventually declared war upon Germany or Japan, or both—Argentina not until March 27, 1945. Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, and Panama permitted the United States to establish military bases within their territory. Otherwise, except in the furnishing of raw materials at good prices, their positive contributions to the war effort were not great. But the assurance that enemy agents would not find harborage in neighboring territory was an advantage of no small consequence to the United States. This was the pay-off of the Good Neighbor policy.[53]

In this united front, however, there was one conspicuous gap. Argentina remained almost completely unco-operative until the very end of the war, though belatedly and under pressure breaking relations with Germany and Japan (January 26, 1944) and declaring war (March 27, 1945).

Hull's handling of relations with Argentina after the Rio Conference must be termed the least successful and probably the least judicious aspect of his Latin American policy. His frustration at its failure is suggested by his devoting four full chapters of his *Memoirs* to the subject and by the titles—"The

Bad Neighbor," "An Unworthy Member"—which he gave to two of those chapters. In another, "Britain and Argentina," he took Great Britain to task for its refusal to join the United States in putting economic pressure on Argentina, since the British, as the *Manchester Guardian* put it, while disliking Argentine Fascism, preferred "Argentine beef to American pork."[54] The story must be very briefly summarized here.

Though Sumner Welles is by no means an impartial witness on this subject, he probably was not far wrong in his assertion that by the time of the Rio meeting Mr. Hull's anti-Argentine bias "had already become almost psychopathic."[55] The events that followed had no curative value. Ailing President Ortiz finally resigned in June, 1942, leaving Ramón Castillo, nationalist and isolationist, in full command of the Argentine Government. Despite proddings and pressures from Washington, he refused to cut diplomatic and commercial ties with the Axis and connived at the activities of Nazi agents within Argentina. An army revolt in June, 1943, replaced Castillo with General Pedro Ramírez, but contrary to promises of co-operation with the sister republics, his regime showed an increasingly anti-United States and pro-Nazi leaning. Not until January 26, 1944, did he sever Argentina's Axis ties, and then, apparently, only to avoid exposure by the United States of Argentina's complicity in overthrowing the Bolivian Government in December and of Ramírez' secret dickering for arms with the Nazi Government of Germany.[56]

Even this belated carrying out of the Rio recommendations was resented by the more nationalistic of the officers who had placed Ramírez in office. On February 15, 1944, a group of colonels, among whom Juan D. Péron was the rising star, seized control of the Foreign Office and a few days later replaced Ramírez in the presidency with Perón's friend, General Edelmiro Farrell. The new government did not restore diplomatic relations with the Axis, but neither did it take effective action against the activities of Axis agents.

Cordell Hull was indignant at what he considered Argentina's bad faith in repudiating her Pan American obligations. He was alarmed at the harm which the Argentine neutralist or pro-Nazi attitude might do to the Allied cause. He was firmly convinced that the Argentine people, unlike the controlling clique, were democratic, anti-Axis, and desirous of co-operating with the other American Republics and the United Nations. He assumed that pressure, properly applied, would force the Argentine Government into compliance with the supposed popular will. Beginning with the denial to Argentina of lend-lease aid, which other American Republics, notably Brazil, were receiving, he went on to harsher measures. After waiting four months for the Farrell regime to implement the break with the Axis, Hull recalled Ambassador Norman Armour from Buenos Aires. At the same time on June 22, 1944, he sent to the other American Republics and to Great Britain a confidential memorandum condemning the Argentine Government in strong terms and urging that the other governments join the United States in recalling their representatives. This most of them, including Great Britain, did, thereby almost isolating Argentina politically.[57] As one measure of economic pressure, Argentine funds in the United States were "frozen"—a step which Secretary Morgenthau had proposed early in the controversy, but which Hull had then rejected as reverting from the Good Neighbor policy to the "big stick".[58] American ships, furthermore, were forbidden to carry cargoes from Argentine ports, and the British Government was urged, without success, to join in the boycott.

The program failed. The British would not give up Argentine beef. The Argentine people, nationalistic and much more sympathetic to the Government's neutralist policy than Hull supposed, resented "Yankee interference," and showed no disposition to throw Farrell out at foreign bidding or to compel him to change his policy. Of the other republics, although Hull says that they "expressed unqualified agreement" with his memorandum of June 22, 1944, a number, including Mexico and several of Argentina's nearest neighbors, were distinctly unhappy over the ostracism of a sister Latin state at the insistence of the United States. Nonrecognition, as a weapon of coercion, might in the future be turned against other targets than Argentina.[59]

Some persons in the United States, including Sumner Welles, who had resigned as Under Secretary of State in August, 1943, were deploring the effort of the State Department, in Welles's words, "to oblige all of the other American governments to follow our lead" and "to use the act of recognition as a diplomatic weapon." This policy, wrote Welles in 1944, had "been catastrophic in its effect upon Argentine public opinion, and [had] created in other American republics open sympathy for a reactionary and dictatorial regime which had hitherto been regarded with aversion. . . ."[60]

When Hull left office in November, 1944, there was on hand, as he later recorded,

> an incipient, quietly conducted movement on the part of a few business interests, politicians, and marplots in this and other countries of the hemisphere to restore Argentina to full fellowship and diplomatic relations with the other American Republics, regardless of whether the Argentine Government changed its pro-Axis course sufficiently to justify such a step, even while the war was still being fought.[61]

It was no doubt inevitable that Hull should take this antagonistic view of the trend of events that was to reverse his policy toward Argentina. Reversed it was under his successor, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Assistant Secretary Nelson A. Rockefeller, through the instrumentality of the Chapultepec Conference in February and March, 1945, which ended the experiment in nonrecognition with only superficial concessions on the part of Argentina. Later, under Secretary James F. Byrnes and Spruille Braden, first as Ambassador to Argentina, then as Assistant Secretary of State, another attempt to sway Argentine policy through diplomatic interference was to fare no better than Hull's.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

PLANNING FOR THE POSTWAR WORLD

THE EVENTS of World War II demonstrated convincingly the futility of American isolationism. Both the President and the Secretary of State sought to impress this fact upon the American people. Mr. Roosevelt in an address of September 3, 1939, immediately upon the outbreak of war in Europe, spoke for both himself and the State Department in saying "that the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between nations."[1] Mr. Hull, who had been more consistent than his chief in his dedication to the concept of collective security, expressed his thought on the subject in a public statement of January 1, 1940. Upon the restoration of peace, he said, it would be necessary for the United States to use its moral and material influence "in the direction of creating a stable and enduring world order under law." From this time on, the Secretary later recorded, he did everything he could to convince the American people that they must assume a share of responsibility for the maintenance of world peace.[2]

A week later, January 8, 1940, Hull announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Policy, the first of a series of committees and subcommittees which undertook to plan the shape of things to come in the postwar world. A few weeks before Pearl Harbor, Hull and Under Secretary Welles secured the President's approval for the creation of a larger committee to be known as the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, with the Secretary and Under Secretary as chairman and vice chairman respectively. This committee would supervise and co-ordinate the planning activities of divisions of the State Department, such as the newly created Division of Special Research, of other departments, and of certain co-operating nongovernmental agencies, such as the Council on Foreign Relations. Studies and memoranda coming up from these groups would be digested by the Advisory Committee, which would then make recommendations to the President through its chairman. "Basically," Hull wrote, "this was a proposal to draw together the resources of the whole Government and of interested outside organizations toward one end."[3]

Not until late in December, 1941, were the final steps taken toward the creation of the Committee. The President then approved the list of names which Hull submitted for membership. The list included, in addition to State Department personnel, the names of Norman H. Davis, Myron C. Taylor, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of *Foreign Affairs,* Isaiah Bowman, prominent geographer and president of Johns Hopkins University, and Anne O'Hare McCormick, distinguished foreign correspondent of the *New York Times.* The Committee was soon expanded to include spokesmen for the Army and Navy, the Senate and

House of Representatives, the White House, and other interested entities. Hull, always mindful of Woodrow Wilson's tragic experience with a Republican Senate, was especially careful to avoid any appearance of partisanship. The Senators and Representatives brought into the Committee were chosen from both Democratic and Republican members of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs.[4]

Hull, it will be recalled, found it necessary to leave the Department early in 1942 for a two-months period of rest and recuperation in Florida The Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, in consequence, held its first meeting (February 12, 1942) in the office of the vice chairman, Under Secretary Welles. The Committee agreed to set up a number of subcommittees to deal with different aspects of its work. The work of the subcommittees was co-ordinated by Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, who became Executive Officer of the Advisory Committee and its Director of Research. While the original plan contemplated that the Advisory Committee should evaluate the studies of the subcommittees and submit recommendations to the Secretary, the Committee had evidently grown too large and unwieldy to perform this function. Having set up a program, therefore, it ceased to meet as a whole, and the responsibility for reviewing the work of the subcommittees devolved upon the Subcommittee on Political Problems. The chairman of this subcommittee, therefore, occupied a particularly influential position. Sumner Welles held the chairmanship until January 30, 1943, when Hull himself took it over. Hull later explained this shift by the statement: "The whole war and possible postwar situation appeared to me such that a stage had been reached where we should begin to arrive at definite decisions, and that I should therefore take charge." It seems probable that a more important reason was the growing friction between Hull and Welles, and particularly a divergence of their views as to the structure of the future security organization.[5]

Welles was also chairman of a Special Subcommittee on International Organization, which began its work in June, 1942, and by the following March had agreed on a document captioned "A Draft Constitution of an International Organization." Possibly influenced by the known ideas of Winston Churchill, Welles and his co-workers concluded that a regional plan of organization would best reconcile the sovereign equality of all states with the demand of the great powers for such freedom of action as would assure their security—"a foundation of regional organizations, each subordinate to the ultimate control of the world organization." Such regional systems as that of the American Republics would assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace in their areas, calling in the central organization only in emergencies. The plan envisaged a supreme executive agency of eleven members, seven representing regional bodies and four representing the great powers —the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China. These four would have permanent seats. In the matter of voting—which was to cause much difficulty later—the Welles draft proposed that decisions to use armed force should require nine affirmative votes out of the eleven, the nine to include at least three of the four permanent members. Thus no single great power would have a right to veto. "We could not permit," Welles wrote later, "the right of any power, great or small, to veto action against itself if it undertook to pursue policies of aggression."[6]

That Welles could believe that the Soviet Union —or the United States Senate—would accept a vetoless charter suggests that his thinking was not always realistic. It was not, however, the lack of a veto so much as the regional structure which Hull found objectionable and which presumably led him to take the whole matter out of Welles's hands. There was, in Hull's view, a proper place for such regional bodies as the Inter-American organization and the Arab League, but he was opposed to what he feared would become a set of regional groups, each consisting of one great power surrounded by satellites. Just where the President stood on this issue is not clear. According to Hull's account, he had been inclined toward the regional type of organization but by the spring of 1943 was coming around to the Secretary's view. In what purported to be an authoritative article by Forrest Davis, he was portrayed as contemplating an over-all central organization with regional subsidiary commissions to police different geographical areas. Welles gave him a copy of his subcommittee's plan in June and related that he was attracted by the idea of regional elections to the executive body, but had some doubts as to its immediate practicability.[7]

At any rate the Secretary, in July, 1943, suspended the deliberations of the Subcommittees on Political Problems and on International Organization. Officially he neither approved nor disapproved the "Draft Constitution," but directed that a new start be made. A drafting group in the State Department, headed by Leo Pasvolsky and aided by the Department's research staff, produced in August, 1943, a new document, bearing the title "Charter of the United Nations." This was later placed in the hands of a group of senior advisers, the so-called Informal Political Agenda Group, for further working over. It was to become the basis of the proposals submitted by the United States at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944.[8]

It was in August, 1943, as related elsewhere, that Sumner Welles resigned. After that there was no strong voice in the Department to defend the regional approach. When Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec approved his proposed Four-Power Declaration, Hull interpreted their action as a victory for his ideas over those of Welles. "The emphasis," he wrote later, "was now on a general international organization. Nothing was said of regional security organizations in the declaration, and in the discussions at Moscow I argued strongly against them."[9]

The Secretary returned from Moscow greatly encouraged by Stalin's acceptance of the Four-Power

Declaration, with its commitment to the creation of a "general international organization," and by the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions, by which the House and Senate respectively had gone on record as favoring American participation in such an organization. The situation now seemed to justify the faith with which Hull and his associates had set to work a year and a half before. Describing the spirit in which they had begun their deliberations, Hull wrote in his *Memoirs:*

> We sought to plan an ideal settlement which we should try to attain with other nations as fully as possible. Our discussions were based upon our belief in absolute victory by the United Nations and in co-operation by the United Nations after the war. Although we considered international security our supreme objective, we also maintained that its attainment must dovetail with principles of justice so that it would last. We believed that the American people would support whatever American participation was needed to maintain international peace and security. We further believed that Russian co-operation on the principal international problems was essential and could be obtained.[10]

A draft of the proposed Charter was submitted to the President at the end of December and approved by him a month later. An exchange of ideas with London and Moscow was then initiated—Moscow accepting the American and British documents but not as yet revealing its hand. The fourth "great power," China, was informed in a general way of the proceedings but, at the President's suggestion, not as yet brought into the discussions because of the recognized danger of leaks from that source. The program, as it developed in the spring of 1944, contemplated initial agreement on a Charter by the Big Four, followed by its submission to the other United Nations and such other governments as might be agreed upon.[11]

In the meantime, a reorganization of the State Department, instituted by the new Under Secretary, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., had produced a new Committee on Postwar Programs, with Hull as chairman and Stettinius as vice chairman, and this Committee became the official sponsor of still another draft of the proposed Charter, labeled this time "Possible Plan for a General International Organization" and dated April 29, 1944.[12] The crucial feature of this plan was an Executive Council of eight members, representing the four major powers and four others to be elected annually by a General Assembly. Decisions on four categories of questions were to be taken by majority vote, including the concurring votes of the four permanent members. Whether a member should have the right to vote on a question to which it was a party was left undecided.

In his major foreign policy speech of April 9, 1944, mentioned elsewhere,[13] Hull sketched some of the features of the proposed international organization. He emphasized two points: that the organization must be prepared to use force, if necessary, to suppress aggression; and that it could not hope to maintain enduring peace unless the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China could agree to act together. "This," he said, "is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international organization must be built."[14]

The Secretary now turned to the task of assuring support for his plans in a vital quarter. The Senate in the Connally Resolution had approved the general idea of American participation in "a general international organization." Now that the State Department's proposals for the organization had reached semifinal form, Hull sought advance assurance that the Senate would accept that specific plan. Meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 22 he gave some account of the planning that had gone on in his Department and suggested that the Committee name two or three Democrats and an equal number of Republicans as a group with whom he could hold informal and confidential discussions. In order, at Senator Vandenberg's suggestion, to include Progressive Senator La Follette of Wisconsin, Chairman Connally enlarged the number to eight, four Democrats, three Republicans, and one Progressive, and this group (really a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations) became known as the Committee of Eight.[15]

Of the eight Senators named to confer with Hull, the most interesting was Arthur H. Vandenberg of

Michigan. A prewar Republican isolationist, Vandenberg had undergone a substantial conversion since Pearl Harbor. He was now heartily in favor of American participation in an organization to keep the peace—with the reservation that the peace should be worthy of American support. In the previous year he had co-operated with Hull in steering the Senate away from action that might have given offense to Russia and toward what became the Connally Resolution. It was due chiefly to his influence that a Republican Advisory Council, meeting at Mackinac Island in September, 1943, went on record as favoring "responsible participation by the United States in postwar co-operative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression."[16]

Now, as a member of the Committee of Eight, he had nothing but praise for the draft "Possible Plan" as such. He was impressed by what he thought its conservatism "from a nationalist standpoint." It was "based virtually on a four-power alliance," Hull's whole theory being "that there must be continued agreement between the Big Four or the post-war world will smash anyway." The Senator approved the great-power veto and Hull's suggestion, as he understood it, that a use of force amounting to war would still require an Act of Congress. "This is anything but a wild-eyed internationalist dream of a world State," he wrote. "On the contrary, it is a framework (without passing upon details) to which I can and do heartily subscribe."[17]

But the Senator had one important reservation. He wished to see Hull proceed with his negotiations with the British and Russians on the form of the organization to keep the peace, but he would not commit the United States to joining the organization until the terms of that peace were clarified. He would not have the United States obligated to uphold an unjust peace. On this point Senator La Follette stood with him, and on this they engaged in a friendly argument with Hull through a large part of their four meetings with him, April 25 to May 29, 1944. In vain Hull argued that the organization would itself be conducive to the making of a proper peace. In vain he inquired whether their contention was that the United States should decline membership because it disliked some features of the peace settlement. The two Senators stood their ground.[18]

Vandenberg's and La Follette's objection to giving Hull a "blank check" was fortified by the publication in the *Saturday Evening Post* in May of two articles by Forrest Davis, followed by one by Demaree Bess. Davis, apparently with Roosevelt's approval, purported to tell "What Really Happened at Teheran." Beyond giving some intimate details, which could have come only from some one very near the President, or the President himself, he emphasized the fact that Roosevelt (like Hull) was building his hopes for the future upon the expectation of Russian collaboration and that at Teheran he had consistently refrained from antagonizing Stalin by challenging his pretensions in Eastern Europe and on the Baltic. Demaree Bess, writing on "The Cost of Roosevelt's Great Design," was critical where Davis had been friendly. For a dubious "three-power world," he charged, "plus China as a sort of 'courtesy' great power," Roosevelt had tacitly, by default, accepted Stalin's claims to Eastern Europe and had undertaken to support the British and Western European colonial systems.[19] As Woodrow Wilson had compromised his Fourteen Points to get the League of Nations, Roosevelt had compromised the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms to get his "three-power world."

When the Senators, at their meeting with the Secretary on May 29, questioned him about the Bess article, he could only answer that, *so far as he knew*, there had been no such agreements at Teheran as Bess described. Vandenberg and La Follette, therefore, refused to sign a letter commending the "Possible Plan" to the American people. Vandenberg emphasized in his diary that he and La Follette were not opposed to postwar collaboration or to the Administration's exploring the subject with the Allies. Their position was simply "that there can be no Senate commitments until the full plan is perfected; and that there can be no final obligation on the part of the United States until we know whether we are to get a peace which *justifies* our obligation to sustain it."[20]

Refused the desired letter from the eight Senators, Hull read to them a statement which he proposed to issue to the press, and to which they did not take exception. The conversations, he said, had been "frank and fruitful." He was "definitely encouraged and . . . ready to proceed, with the approval of the President, with informal discussions on this subject with Great Britain, Russia, and China and then with governments of other United Nations." He expected to have further discussions with these Senators and other leaders of both parties in the Senate and the House. "The door of non-partisanship," he added, "will continue to be wide open here at the Department of State, especially when any phase of the planning for a post-war security organization is under consideration."[21]

Preparations now went forward for a conference of the four powers, which it was hoped would agree upon the State Department's "Possible Plan," with such amendments as might be necessary. Before the end of July the Secretary was able to announce that the meeting would take place in August—August 21 was the date finally fixed upon—and that the place would be the Harvard-owned estate of Dumbarton Oaks in Washington. Since for some obscure reason the Russians felt that meeting with the Chinese would compromise their neutrality toward Japan though meeting with Americans and British would not, there were to be two separate phases of the Conference: an American-British-Russian phase followed by an American-British-Chinese phase. On July 18, Hull handed the British and Russian chargés d'affaires a new draft of the proposed Charter, making copies available also to the Chinese. It differed from the plan of April 29 chiefly in increasing the membership of the Executive Council to eleven and providing for the eventual addition of France as a fifth permanent member. The British and Russians sent drafts that in many respects paralleled that of the State Department.[22]

The Secretary of State opened the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on August 21, 1944, using a gavel made from a bit of wood from the U.S.S. *Constitution.* In his opening address he laid stress upon the obligation of all "peace-loving" states to join in establishing machinery embracing all the means necessary to prevent or punish aggression. To quiet the concern of persons or states who disliked the prospect of three or four great powers determining the world's future, he gave assurance that the conclusions reached at the Conference would be "communicated to the governments of all the United Nations and of other peace-loving nations." They would then be "made available to the peoples of our countries and of all countries for public study and debate."[23]

Hull did not participate directly in the deliberations of the Conference. The "American Group," as the delegation was called, was headed by Under Secretary Stettinius. It included high-ranking State Department officials, several former ambassadors, high Army and Navy officers, and President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins University. Its membership was largely the same as that of the Informal Political Agenda Group. Secretary Morgenthau's proposal that the Treasury be represented by an observer was overruled by the President. Hull had daily contacts with Stettinius, and singly or together the two had a number of consultations with the President. Both the Secretary and the President, therefore, followed the proceedings of the Conference step by step.[24]

The most troublesome questions at Dumbarton Oaks proved to be on voting in the proposed General Assembly and Security Council—the latter name substituted for the Executive Council of earlier drafts. Ambassador Gromyko, chairman of the Soviet Group, startled the American and British chairmen, August 28, by announcing that the Soviet Union would expect sixteen seats and sixteen votes in the General Assembly—one for each of the constituent Soviet Socialists Republics. The proposal was thought to be so explosive that Gromyko was prevailed upon to keep it quiet during the Conference. But Hull urged in vain that he withdraw it, while the State Department prepared a telegram on the subject which the President sent to Stalin. The Russians did not yield; nor did Hull at this time hear any suggestion of the compromise plan later agreed to at the Yalta Conference, by which the two Soviet Republics of White Russia and the Ukraine received independent membership. He would have opposed such a concession if suggested while he was Secretary.[25]

More ominous for the future was the question of the great-power veto in the Security Council. It should be made plain, however, that all three delegations accepted the general principle of requiring unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in votes on substantive matters. The only issue was whether a permanent member might exercise a veto on questions to which it was a party, or whether it must abstain from voting on such questions, as had been the rule in the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. The Committee working under Sumner Welles, as noted above, had adopted the principle that a party to a dispute should not vote, but Hull had overridden this decision and in his discussions with the eight Senators had vigorously defended the veto without suggesting (so far as his record shows) that the United States would lose the veto in a controversy involving itself. He did say to the Senators, however, that in the thinking of the State Department "the main focus of the veto would be military and other means of exercising force, such as economic sanctions, and not the numerous other issues that were certain to come before the Council."[26]

This language suggests the compromise proposal that was finally devised in the American Group and the State Department, where opinions differed widely. This was, in effect, that parties to a dispute should refrain from voting—and so surrender the power of veto—so long as the question was one of merely recommending peaceful modes of settlement, but should resume the right to vote, and hence the veto, if the issue were determination that a threat to the peace existed or the application of sanctions. This formula was acceptable to the British but was rejected by the Russians, who would accept no such limitation upon their veto power.[27] Later, at Yalta, Stalin was to agree to almost this same formula, but at Dumbarton Oaks the dispute temporarily deadlocked the Conference.

At this point a difference of opinion arose within the American Group. The military men and one Assistant Secretary recommended that if a further attempt to reach agreement failed, the United States should accept the Russian position. They warned that failure to conciliate the Soviet Union might lead to Russia's nonparticipation in the war with Japan and to Russian military domination in Europe, and might also injure the prospect of United States entry into the world organization. The other faction recommended adjournment and reference of the veto question to the heads of government. They feared that a quick compromise now on Russian terms would be rejected by the British Dominions and the states of Latin America. They felt that the military men overemphasized the importance of reaching full agreement before adjourning.[28]

The Secretary conferred with the entire American Group on September 19. He urged the need for unity in the American delegation and for patience and a friendly attitude toward the Soviets. He held to the faith, inspired by his Moscow experience, that the Soviet Union had adopted the course of international co-operation which its true interests demanded, but time and patience would be required, he pointed out, to explain to the Russians things that they did not understand. They should be educated, not surrendered to. When Hull and Stettinius laid the situation before the President, September 21, Mr. Roosevelt said decisively that the only proper course was to recess the Conference, leaving the voting question to be settled later.[29]

Accordingly, the Russian phase of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference ended on September 28. The delegates had not agreed upon the Soviets' claim to multiple membership or upon whether the veto in the Security Council should be limited or unlimited. Less troublesome questions left undetermined were the time, place, and membership of the United Nations conference which was expected to endorse or amend the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and the character of the trusteeship system which was to succeed the system of mandates under the League of Nations.[30] Solutions for all were devised at either the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, or the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

The Chinese phase of the Conference at Dumbarton Oaks began September 29 and ended October 7. With minor changes the Chinese accepted the decisions previously reached. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were issued simultaneously by the four Governments on October 9, 1944. In the United States they were prefaced by statements by the Secretary of State and the President. Mr. Hull emphasized the nonpartisan spirit which had characterized the entire procedure in the United States and his hope that the discussions to come would be carried on in the same spirit. "These proposals," he said, "are now available for full study and discussion by the peoples of all countries." The President expressed his feeling of

> extreme satisfaction, and even surprise, that so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time. This achievement [he added] was largely due to the long and thorough preparations which were made by the Governments represented, and in our case, was the result of the untiring devotion and care which the Secretary of State has personally given to this work for more than two and a half years —indeed for many years.[31]

Especially gratifying to Hull was his success in preventing the proposals for international organization from becoming an issue in the political campaign of 1944. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, the Republican candidate for the Presidency against Roosevelt, had expressed fear that the Dumbarton Oaks Conference presaged a subjection of the nations of the world to four-power domination. When Hull, in a public statement, offered reassurance on that point and added that he would welcome a conference with the Governor, the latter offered to send his adviser on foreign policy, John Foster Dulles, to confer with Hull, with a view to assuring bipartisan support for an international organization to keep the peace. Hull gladly accepted the offer and in three days of intensive conferences with Dulles persuaded both him and Dewey that they could safely support the State Department's plans. Hull took the greatest of pains in preparing for and conducting the conferences with Dulles. Always haunted by the memory of Woodrow Wilson's failure, he was convinced, he wrote, "that, if I did not reach a satisfactory agreement with him, successful American participation in an international security organization might be seriously jeopardized." Dulles and Dewey greeted the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, with certain reservations, as an acceptable start in the right direction, and the issue was safely shielded from partisan politics.[32]

Limitation of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to four powers—effectively in fact to three—inevitably created some resentment on the part of the excluded majority. Though the limitation was insisted upon by the Soviet Union, Secretary Hull has been criticized in particular for not consulting more fully with the other American Republics and perhaps reaching a preliminary understanding with them before the Conference convened. Hull did, in fact, consult with those Governments frequently before, during, and after the Conference, made every effort to inform them of how things were moving, sent them advance copies of the Proposals, and invited their comments and suggestions. He was probably right in maintaining that there was little more that he could have done, and one may doubt whether a more deferential approach to Latin America and a united Western Hemisphere front would have enabled the United States delegation at San Francisco to realize its hopes more fully in the final United Nations Charter. Stalin was to yield on some important points anyway. It is not likely that strong words from Latin America would have frightened him into yielding more.[33]

The successful outcome of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, paving the way as it did to the permanent organization of the United Nations at San Francisco a few months later, was to Cordell Hull one of the highest peaks in his career as Secretary of State. While the Conference was in its final phase illness drove him to bed, first at home, then in the hospital. His resignation followed on November 21. But before following him into retirement it is necessary to consider two other aspects of the American planning for the postwar world: the Secretary's and the President's growing distaste for colonialism, and the plans for treatment of the defeated enemy nations.

Perhaps on no subject were President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State in closer agreement than on the right of dependent peoples to self-government and eventual independence. In a speech on March 15, 1941, the President declared:

> There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men. . . . We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood.[34]

Roosevelt's remarks on this occasion were directed more at European and Asiatic nationalities under Axis domination than at colonial populations, but his dislike of the colonial system was notorious, and Hull, speaking on July 23, 1942, was plainly referring to peoples held under colonial rule.

> We have always believed—and we believe today [he said]—that all peoples, without distinction of race, color, or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment. . . . It has been our purpose in the past—and will remain our purpose in the future—to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.[35]

But Hull was no advocate of the precipitate granting of independence to peoples inadequately prepared for self-government. In the speech just quoted, he stressed preparation as a prerequisite for attaining independence, and here and elsewhere he repeatedly held up American policy in the Philippines as a model which other colonial powers might properly emulate. The Filipinos had been required to practice gradually increasing degrees of self-government under American tutelage for thirty years before they were explicitly promised independence; it would be twelve more before they actually attained it. This was presumably the kind of preparation that the Secretary had in mind for British, French, and Dutch colonial peoples. He deplored wartime speeches by Vice President Wallace and Wendell Willkie, who seemed to be advocating immediate independence for all colonies regardless of their degree of preparation.[36] If the mother countries were not willing or not qualified to provide the requisite induction into the arts of self-government, an international trusteeship should undertake the task.

The American anticolonial position inevitably led to friction with Great Britain, where Churchill, as he informed the House of Commons, had "not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."[37] The American and British Governments disagreed over the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter. Point 3 of that document declared: "they [the President and the Prime Minister] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live . . ." Within a few weeks after publication of the Charter, Churchill explicitly denied that Point 3 was applicable to India, Burma, or other British dependencies; it referred, he explained, only to those European countries under Nazi domination.[38]

Hull and Roosevelt, on the other hand, understood the Charter as applicable "to all peoples alike seeking independence in every part of the world," and this difference in view entered frequently into correspondence and conversations between the two Governments. In an exchange of messages between the President and the Prime Minister on the first anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1942, Roosevelt, at Foreign Minister Eden's request, did not raise the question of interpretation. But a few days later, Hull stated the American position plainly to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador. He himself, Hull remarked, believed in the Charter's "universal application to all nations and peoples—to all peoples whatsoever their condition and whatsoever shade of independence and freedom that they might aspire to." Halifax conceded that this was "a very impressive view" and promised to bring it to the attention of certain British officials who were then working on an interpretation of the Charter in its application to the British Empire.[39] There seems to be no record of the emergence of such a British interpretation. Certainly Churchill—who once told Roosevelt "that the Atlantic Charter was not a law, but a star"—did not during the war accept the American interpretation.[40]

It was the situation in India which produced the most serious disagreement on the colonial question between the two great Allies. Upon Japanese entry into the war, India became a crucial strategic area for both Great Britain and the United States, and much seemed to depend upon the degree of co-operation that could be expected from the Indian people and their leaders. The most popular of those leaders, Mahatma Gandhi, adhered to a strictly pacifist position, advocating no aid to either British or Japanese. The Congress Party, constituting the organized independence movement among the Hindus, undertook to make complete independence from British rule the price of India's co-operation in the war—a price that England was unwilling to pay, and in fact could not pay without antagonizing the Indian Moslems, from whom came most of the native troops essential to India's defense against Japan.[41]

Since India was becoming a base for the war against Japan in China, both the Chinese and American Governments were concerned at the prospect of an open break between the British Raj and its Indian subjects. Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February, 1942, and passed on to Roosevelt his conviction that the British should at all costs find a solution for the controversy.[42] Roosevelt had already approached Churchill on the subject during Churchill's visit to Washington in December, 1941, but Churchill, as he himself relates, "reacted so strongly and at such length that he never raised it verbally again."[43]

During Secretary Hull's long absence from the State Department early in 1942, however, Acting Secretary Welles was the recipient of urgent memoranda on India from Assistant Secretaries Berle and Long. Berle, citing the opinions of Hull and Roosevelt, of Ambassador Winant and the Near Eastern Division of the Department, suggested that Churchill might be induced to announce his intention to make India a full partner in the United Nations, whereupon the United States would officially welcome that step. Long described a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at which numerous Senators had revealed strong criticism of British policy in India and a feeling that, in view of our aid to Britain, we had the right to demand a grant of autonomy to India. Otherwise, the Senators felt, we would be fighting to preserve the British Empire—a war aim that they could only deplore.[44]

Presumably influenced by these memoranda and by the urgings of the Chinese Generalissimo, Roosevelt tried his hand at a long telegram to Churchill, March 10, 1942, suggesting that the Indians be encouraged to form a provisional government analogous to the American Articles of Confederation. As the Articles had led to the Constitution, he argued, a provisional Indian government might lead to one more solid and substantial, and in the meantime Great Britain would have won the friendship and co-operation of the Indian people. In his memoirs Churchill vents some of his choice sarcasm upon such American attempts to intervene in matters "on which they had strong opinions and little experience." To the President he was of necessity polite. Writing him a few weeks later, after Roosevelt had again urged his solution to the problem, Churchill replied that he did not feel that he "could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything had again to be thrown into the melting-pot at this critical juncture. . . . Anything like a serious difference between you and me," he added, "would break my heart, and would surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle."[45]

In the meantime, a British mission under Sir Stafford Cripps had tried and failed to reach agreement with the Congress Party. At the same time an American Technical Mission, headed by Henry F. Grady, was in India with a view to speeding up war production and transport. Former Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, at first slated to head the Mission, accompanied it as personal representative of the President. Johnson's attempts to assist Cripps in his negotiations with the Congress Party created the impression that he was seeking to mediate on behalf of President Roosevelt. This angered the British Viceroy and led Churchill to ask an explanation from Harry Hopkins, who had just arrived in London. Hopkins expressly disclaimed any desire of the President to be drawn into the controversy, except at the voluntary invitation of both parties. Johnson and the Technical Mission returned from India in May, 1942.[46]

Hull returned to the Department in April. He fully shared the President's views on the desirability of Indian independence, but realized the importance of avoiding public expressions offensive to the British. Privately, he says, "we were saying everything that the most enthusiastic supporter of India's freedom could have expected."[47]

Such private remonstrances had no effect on British policy, and in August, 1942, the Indian situation grew worse with the launching by the Congress Party of a campaign of civil disobedience, followed by the arrest of several thousand Party leaders, including Gandhi. For the time being the United

States could do little more than try to make it plain to the Indian people that American troops were in India only to fight the Japanese, not to support the British in their Indian policy.

In the fall of 1942 the President accepted Hull's suggestion that William Phillips go to India as the President's personal representative. Hull's instruction to Phillips, November 20, 1942, reminded him that American official policy earnestly favored "freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest date practicable." The American course in the Philippines, the Secretary observed, offered "a perfect example of how a nation should treat a colony or a dependency in co-operating with it . . . in making all necessary preparations for freedom." Phillips was warned that he was not expected to bring "objectionable" pressure on the British, although, as the Secretary pointed out, the relation of the problem to the war "would give us a probable opportunity to speak more freely and more earnestly than we otherwise could."

> With your great experience and fine common sense [Mr. Hull wrote], you will well understand how to preserve thoroughly agreeable relations with both countries and how to say or do anything, in a tactful way, that might encourage both sides or either side in the way of a practicable settlement.[48]

In India, Phillips encountered a stone wall. The Viceroy entertained him cordially, took him on a tiger hunt, and permitted him to travel much as he wished, but refused any relaxation in British repressive measures. When Gandhi, in February, 1943, entered upon a hunger strike which for a time seemed likely to be fatal, the British determination to sit it out was not shaken by the protests of Phillips in Delhi or Roosevelt in Washington. Nor would the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, consent to Phillips' repeated requests to be permitted to talk with the Mahatma after the hunger strike was ended. The State Department, Phillips thought, showed excessive caution in instructing him, contrary to his suggestion, to make his final application to see Gandhi a personal one rather than in the name of the Department.[49]

Phillips returned to Washington in May, 1943. He reported to the President in person and by letter. His gloomy conclusion was that no one in India had much interest in fighting Japan, that the British were so dedicated to repressing the independence movement in India that the United States could expect only token assistance from them in the war in China. His letter, "leaked" to a Washington columnist and published in July, 1944, caused great embarrassment to Phillips and to his Government. Hull advised the President against a disavowal of the letter, as the British requested, since, as he said, the State Department shared most of the views Phillips had expressed. The President finally made amends by joining with Churchill at Quebec in September in a statement that all the nations engaged in the Far Eastern War were "ardent" to oppose the Japanese in combat.[50]

Other colonial areas in Asia bore no such relation to the conduct of the war as did India, and hence American interest in promoting their independence was based upon theoretical or idealistic grounds rather than on wartime needs. The French and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia had fallen under Japanese domination—French Indochina with the connivance of the Vichy Government, the Netherlands Indies by conquest. The question, therefore, was what disposition should be made of them once the Japanese were expelled.

On Indochina, Roosevelt held pronounced views. He was almost violently opposed to its return to France. He resented the policy of Vichy, which had permitted Indochina to become a Japanese base in the invasion of Malaya, the Philippines, and the Netherlands Indies; and he argued, too, that France, by neglect of native welfare, had forfeited the right to rule. "France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants—for nearly one hundred years," he told Hull, "and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning. . . . France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that."[51]

Hull, on the other hand, preferred to see such colonial areas returned to their parent countries, but with pledges from the latter to grant eventual independence—always on the pattern of United States policy in the Philippines. If France was prepared to introduce popular institutions in Indochina and to promise independence after suitable preparation, he would return the colony to France. Otherwise, a trusteeship might be necessary, though Hull did not, he says, "underestimate the terrific undertaking that administration by a trusteeship would represent, both in service and in money."[52]

By early 1944, it appeared that the Netherlands Indies would soon be reconquered by Allied forces, perhaps chiefly American. In a letter to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, February 28, 1944, the State Department suggested that in restoring Dutch sovereignty in the islands, nothing should be said that would preclude the United States from later proposing their eventual independence. To the President Hull wrote a few months later, suggesting that the nations with colonies in Southeast Asia might make "early, dramatic, and concerted announcements" as to the future of their colonies. Such announcements might well include specific dates for independence or complete self-government, specific steps to be taken in preparation, and pledges of "economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment toward other nations." The President approved these suggestions and directed that the British, French, and Dutch Governments be informed "that the United States expected to be consulted on any arrangements as to the future of Southeast Asia." Evidently he was now willing to acquiesce in a temporary restoration of French rule in Indochina.[53]

For this seemingly "presumptuous" policy of advising the British, French, and Dutch Governments what they should do with their Pacific possessions, Hull cited two justifications over and above his general anticolonial philosophy: first, the essential part played by the United States in liberating these possessions from the Japanese; secondly, the belief, shared by the President, that the indefinite continuance of those colonial regimes would provide "a number of foci for future trouble and perhaps war. Permanent peace could not be assured unless these possessions were started on the road to independence, after the example [Hull could not resist adding] of the Philippines."[54]

Korea, since 1910 a Japanese dependency, was clearly in a different category. A self-styled "Provisional Government of Korea" had been set up by exiles in Shanghai in 1919 and after 1937 had been harbored, though without recognition, by the Chinese Government at Chungking. When the Chinese, early in 1942, were contemplating recognition of this group as a government-in-exile, the State Department discouraged such action, partly on the ground that the Soviet Union might desire to support a rival group. In the next year, when an agent representing the Chungking Koreans in the United States was pressing a convention of the American Legion to pass a resolution calling for recognition, Stanley Hornbeck delivered the State Department's opinion. Such a resolution, he wrote, "would be ill-advised and not helpful to the interests of the United States."[55]

The Cairo Declaration, issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, December 1, 1943, announced that Korean independence would be restored "in due course." Hull, who was not consulted on this pronouncement, considered it a mistake: first, because the Koreans wished their independence immediately and were alarmed by the phrase "in due course"; secondly, because he thought Russia, having an interest in Korea, should have been consulted in advance.[56]

Hull's personal attitude to subsequent developments is not clear, but by the time of the Yalta Conference, some two months after his resignation, the State Department was suggesting a temporary trusteeship for Korea, either under the proposed United Nations Organization or jointly under the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union—the last even if it should not have entered the war against Japan.[57] The deference shown to the Soviet Union on the whole subject is noteworthy.

If this narrative has dealt with the problem of dependent peoples in a piecemeal fashion, it should not be inferred that Secretary Hull's thinking or planning was of such a character. He was, in fact, continually thinking of the problem as a whole, and early in the war set a State Department subcommittee to work on it under his supervision. The initial result was a draft "Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence," dated March 9, 1943. Taking the Declaration by United Nations and the Atlantic Charter as its points of departure, this document pronounced it

> the duty and the purpose of those of the United Nations which have . . . become charged with responsibilities for the future of colonial areas to co-operate fully with the peoples of such areas toward their becoming qualified for independent national status.

It outlined a set of procedures to be followed and declared it to be "incumbent upon all peoples who aspire to independence to exert themselves in every feasible way to prepare and equip themselves for independence." It suggested that in the existing world emergency such peoples could best demonstrate their qualifications for freedom "by their contribution now toward the defeat of the Axis foes of all freedom and independence."

Finally, it proposed that the United Nations establish an International Trusteeship Administration which, it was suggested, should operate through regional councils to assist in preparing the way for independence for the peoples of the respective regions.[58]

The President approved the draft, subject to a few minor changes, and Hull took it up with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, in Washington in March and in Quebec in August, 1943. Eden stuck at the word "independence." The British Dominions and some colonies, he pointed out, were fully self-governing already, while other colonies would probably never be qualified for independence. He was not convinced by Hull's assurance that complete independence "tomorrow or next week" was not contemplated, or by his citing—as usual—the example of the Philippines. When Hull brought the matter up again at Moscow, Eden refused to discuss it, saying frankly that his Government was not in agreement with the principles of the proposed Declaration. Molotov, on the other hand, assured Hull that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the subject and suggested that it receive further study.[59]

Eventually the British were won over by the inclusion of "self-government" as an alternative to "independence" as a goal for all dependent peoples, and by limiting the compulsory application of the Trusteeship system to territories under mandate from the League of Nations and others that might be detached from enemy states in the existing war. Other colonies (*e.g.*, British, French, or Dutch) might be placed under the system at the desire of the parent states.[60] After his resignation, therefore, Hull had the satisfaction of seeing the greater part of his program for the treatment of dependent peoples incorporated in Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter.

In planning for the treatment of enemy countries after their defeat, it was necessary to distinguish between the treatment of each nation or national group as a whole, and the treatment of "war criminals," enemy personnel who might be adjudged guilty of having committed atrocities against the population of Allied countries. Before the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had issued on the same day (October 25, 1941) statements strongly condemning the German practice of executing innocent hostages. On January 13, 1942, representatives of nine European countries occupied by German armies issued from London a declaration in which they took note of the statements by the President and the Prime Minister and placed "amongst their principal war aims punishment through the channel of organized justice of those guilty and responsible for these crimes."[61] Later in the year the President released a statement, drafted by the State Department, which declared the United States ready to join with the British and other Governments in establishing a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The President himself had inserted an assurance that the United Nations would not, like the Nazis, resort to "mass reprisals." It was their intention, he said, to mete out "just and sure punishment . . . to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons . . ."[62]

Not until June, 1943, did the President name the American member of what came to be called the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and the

Commission did not hold its first official meeting until January, 1944. Having no investigatory or prosecuting authority, it could only compile lists of alleged criminals and evidence against them from data furnished by the participatory governments. By the time Hull left office, it had prepared cases against about one thousand offenders, but it was torn by dissension among the representatives of the fifteen member Governments. The Soviet Government was not a participant.[63]

The Declaration on German Atrocities which Hull and his colleagues at Moscow issued on behalf of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, was noted in an earlier chapter, as was Hull's declared preference for drumhead courts-martial and shooting at sunrise for the major criminals.[64] The Secretary had occasion to refer to the Moscow Declaration in September, 1944, when some persons were disturbed by omission of Hitler's name from a list published by the War Crimes Commission. It had been announced in Moscow, he recalled, that "major criminals" whose offenses had no specific geographical locale would be punished "by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies." No one need fear that Hitler or other high Nazis would be forgotten.[65]

On the same day, September 28, the Secretary issued another statement on a related topic. He reminded neutral governments that some of them had made no response to a warning from President Roosevelt against giving asylum or protection to possible criminal refugees from the Axis countries. The

State Department, said the Secretary, wished to impress upon such governments the importance which it attached "to the taking of adequate measures to insure that Axis war criminals do not find asylum in their countries."[66] This was presumably Hull's last official pronouncement on the subject of war criminals. Within a few days he left his office for the last time.

Hull's disapproval of Roosevelt's demand for the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers, announced at Casablanca, January 24, 1943, was mentioned in an earlier chapter.[67] The Secretary devoted many pages of his *Memoirs* to describing the efforts of Molotov, Eden, Eisenhower, and himself—backed, as he wrote, by "various of my associates"—to persuade the President to modify, or at least define, that demand, since it was being skilfully used by German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels to bolster Axis resistance. But Roosevelt evidently felt a pride in having revived this formula of General Grant's. He was fond of remarking—erroneously—that Grant had confronted Lee with it at Appomattox. Then, after Lee had surrendered, said the President, Grant had given him generous terms. Let the German people and the people of the satellite nations draw conclusions from such incidents as that, and from his own statement on Christmas Eve, 1943, that he did not wish to destroy the German people or nation. Mr. Roosevelt finally yielded only to the extent of consenting to a joint Anglo-Russian-American declaration regarding the four

Axis satellites, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. Issued May 12, 1944, this declaration informed the satellite countries that by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany they could "diminish their own ultimate sacrifices."[68] Hull's matured conclusion about the consequences of the "unconditional surrender" formula was that there was no way of knowing whether —as several writers have contended—it actually prolonged the war. He conceded one point in its favor.

> In any event [he wrote], the continued application of unconditional surrender to Germany did have this effect, that no future propaganda machine in Germany could ever claim, as did the Nazis during the twenties and thirties, that the German armies had not been defeated and that Germany surrendered because of the weakness of the civilian government and people behind the lines.[69]

For the treatment of Germany after surrender the State Department, at the President's suggestion and in consultation with the War Department, had prepared a plan, which Hull submitted to Eden and Molotov at Moscow in October, 1943. This called for control of Germany by the three powers and occupation by their armed forces during an armistice period. The Nazi Party should be dissolved and all vestiges of its control destroyed. Germany should be and remain completely disarmed. Government decentralization should be encouraged, but compulsory dismemberment was proposed only in the case of East Prussia, which should be detached from Germany. Beyond this, Hull objected to dismemberment. Germany should, however, return to her pre-1938 boundaries. For the future success of democracy, which the State Department considered the form of government to be encouraged in postwar Germany, the draft envisaged three prerequisites: "a tolerable standard of living," limitation of Allied controls to the minimum essential for general security, and harmony among the three great Allies.[70]

Though Eden, for the British, would have preferred to see Germany broken up, the State Department draft plan received general approval at Moscow and was referred for detailed study to the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London.

Nearly a year later, disagreement over a policy for postwar Germany gave rise to one of the most intense internal controversies in the history of the Roosevelt Administration. Near the end of August, 1944, Secretary Morgenthau called the President's attention to the proof sheets of a handbook that was being prepared for the guidance of American military officers in Germany once the occupation began. Roosevelt agreed with Morgenthau that the treatment proposed for the Germans was much too lenient. "It gives the impression," Roosevelt wrote Stimson, sending a copy of his letter to Hull, "that Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium, and the people of Germany brought back as quickly as possible to their prewar estate." Denouncing as false the view that "the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place," the President declared: "The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization." The German people would be lucky, he thought, "to be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens."[71]

The President appointed a Cabinet committee to draw up a more acceptable plan. Hull was chairman; his colleagues were Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau and Presidential Assistant Harry Hopkins. Hull brought into their meeting a new draft prepared in the State Department. State Department officers had conferred with Morgenthau's subordinates, and the new plan reflected something of the Treasury's view. It differed from the Moscow draft chiefly in its economic proposals. Instead of the "tolerable standard of living" envisaged at Moscow, the German people were now to be "held down to subsistence levels," Germany's "economic position of power in Europe" was to be eliminated, and Germany's economy was to be so adjusted as to make it dependent on imports and exports, to avoid the possibility of its being again converted to war production.

Stimson was shocked at the harshness of the State

Department's economic proposals, but the plan which Morgenthau brought to the meeting was much more drastic. He and his Treasury assistant, Harry Dexter White, proposed not only the dismemberment of Germany, but the virtually complete destruction of German industry and the reduction of the German people to a dependence upon agriculture. Hull, too, was dismayed at the extreme measures advocated by Morgenthau and was soon joining forces with Stimson to combat them. The President was subjected to a shower of memoranda from his three Secretaries and to two meetings with the three. Nothing had been settled when he left Washington to meet Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference (September 11-16, 1944). Hull did not go to Quebec. The President's invitation was so perfunctory that, being in poor health, he declined.

Then, to everyone's surprise, the President invited Morgenthau to join him at the Conference. There, in the absence of Secretaries Hull and Stimson, Morgenthau "sold" his plan not only to the President but to Mr. Churchill as well. Churchill at first opposed the plan, but was led to accept it when Morgenthau convinced the Prime Minister's scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell, that removal of German competition would be the salvation of British industry in the postwar world. On September 15 the two Heads of Government, in the absence of their best informed and more levelheaded advisers, initialed their "O.K." on a statement embodying the Morgenthau Plan, and closing with the Churchillian sentence: "This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character."[72]

This development at Quebec, Hull wrote later, "angered me as much as anything that had happened during my career as Secretary of State." His anger was aroused not so much by the features of the Morgenthau plan itself as by what he described as "Morgenthau's high-handed procedure in conducting negotiations at Quebec on a matter of primary concern to the State and War Departments, without consultation with us." Hull felt aggrieved, too, at Morgenthau's offer to Churchill of a postwar loan of 6½ billion dollars, which he assumed had been in some degree a consideration for the Prime Minister's acquiescence in Morgenthau's project. Hull would have made postwar aid to Britain conditional upon British acceptance of liberalized commercial principles, perhaps the abandonment of what remained of Empire preference. To Morgenthau upon his return to Washington, Hull stated, "without cushioning . . . words," that he was "acutely shocked at the way such vital matters had been settled without any consultation with the appropriate experts of our Government and without any regard for the policy we had been trying to pursue in the past."[73]

As to the Morgenthau Plan itself, the President soon retreated under the persuasion of Secretaries

Stimson and Hull. Hull saw him at the White House soon after his return from Quebec. Morgenthau's plan, he told Roosevelt,

> would wipe out everything in Germany except land, and the Germans would have to live on the land. This meant that only 60 per cent of the German population could support themselves on German land, and the other 40 per cent would die.

That Hull himself had conceded something to Morgenthau's ideas, however, is suggested by other items in this same conversation with the President. He proposed not only that Germany should be kept under military control for twenty-five or fifty years "until she experienced an absolute change of heart," but also that the standard of living of the German population "should be kept below the average of neighboring populations" and gradually raised as they gave evidence of their conversion from the Nazi philosophy to "ideas of human rights, individual liberty, freedom, and peace."

The State Department, meanwhile, in a memorandum to the President, was emphasizing the vital link between German industry and the European economy as a whole and combatting Roosevelt's notion that he could save the British economy by crippling the German. Hull had another interview with the President on October 1. Thereafter, he recorded, Mr. Roosevelt "ceased to embrace Morgenthau's ideas on Germany."[74] The idea of a Germany "primarily agricultural and pastoral" was abandoned, but the early directives to the occupying forces had something of the Morgenthau touch, embodying, as Hull complained, "a more drastic plan than what we had in mind at the State Department prior to my resignation." In writing his *Memoirs*, the Secretary found vindication in the fact that, in his words:

> The experience of several years' occupation of Germany, however, coupled with a realization of the validity of our argument that Germany's economy was interconnected with that of Europe, eventually required the American and British Governments to move away from Morgenthau's vengeful philosophy[75]

Hull's meeting with Roosevelt on October 1, 1944, was the occasion of his last official conversation with the President. He was already on the verge of the collapse that necessitated his resignation.

Hull was still to exercise an influence upon the issue of clarifying "unconditional surrender" for Japan. The State Department, in consultation with the War Department, had drafted a plan for the postwar treatment of Japan, as it had done for Germany. The details of the plan—many of which were carried out under the Occupation—need not be described here. On the question of the disposition to be made of the Emperor and the imperial dynasty there was division of opinion within the State Department. Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, became Under Secretary of State when Stettinius was promoted to Secretary, and was Acting Secretary during May and June, 1945, while Stettinius was at the San Francisco Conference. Unlike some others in the Department, Grew believed that a constitutional monarchy under the existing dynasty would best serve the interests of Japan and could be directed into peaceful courses. He believed also that if the Japanese people were told that they might retain monarchy and dynasty, their opposition to "unconditional surrender" could be overcome and a costly invasion of the Japanese islands made unnecessary. Grew convinced Secretary of War Stimson that such an approach was worth trying. Before President Truman and his top advisers left Washington in July for the Potsdam Conference, the document that became known as the Potsdam Declaration was prepared in the State and War Departments. The Declaration called for the unconditional surrender of Japan's armed forces. Under the influence of Grew and Stimson, however, the original draft included a statement that the Allies would not object to Japan's being governed as a constitutional monarchy under the existing dynasty, if such government could give convincing evidence of its peaceful purposes.

But when James F. Byrnes, who on July 3 replaced Stettinius as Secretary of State, consulted the ailing Hull on this point, the ex-Secretary strongly dissented. To him the statement "seemed too much like appeasement." It appeared, he thought, "to guarantee continuance not only of the Emperor but also of the feudal privileges of a ruling caste under the Emperor." After stating his objections to Byrnes verbally, Hull followed with a cable to the Secretary at Potsdam. Since it was impossible to foresee the results of the proposed statement, he asked whether it would not be better "first to await the climax of Allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war."

Hull's advice was taken on this point, and the statement on retention of the Emperor was deleted from the Potsdam Declaration. The Declaration was issued on July 26. Japan, after nearly three weeks of hesitation, accepted, August 14, the Potsdam terms as interpreted by the State Department. In the meantime, Russia had entered the war against Japan (August 8), and the United States Air Force had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and August 9). Since the future status of the Emperor was a crucial issue in the final presurrender exchanges between Tokyo and Washington, it is at least possible that Stimson's and Grew's proposal, which Hull successfully opposed, could have brought about a Japanese surrender before an atomic bomb exploded or the Soviet armies poured into Manchuria and Korea.[76]

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

RETIREMENT

BEFORE the end of September 1944 work, worry, and ill health had brought the seventy-three year old Secretary of State to a pitch of exhaustion which convinced him that he should no longer attempt to carry the exacting duties of his office. He had, incidentally, declined the offers of admiring friends who wished for a second time to groom him for the Presidency, and had likewise put aside President Roosevelt's repeated suggestion that he accept second place on the Democratic ticket. Students of the vagaries of American vice-presidential nominations may speculate on what the outcome would have been if a hospitalized Hull had inherited the Presidency at Roosevelt's death in April, 1945.

Hull had taken no part whatever in the campaign of 1944 when, on September 29, the President sent him a memorandum asking that he make two radio addresses and also that he have a speech on foreign policy drafted for the President himself to deliver. Hull's answer to this request was to notify the President of his determination to retire. He declined Roosevelt's urgent request that he postpone his resignation until the end of the third term in January, but finally agreed to withhold it until after the November election. In effect, however, he ceased to function as Secretary upon leaving his office for the last time on October 2, his seventy-third birthday.

How serious his condition had become is indicated by the fact that after spending eighteen days in bed in his apartment, he was moved to the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland, and remained there for seven months.[1]

From his hospital room Hull issued a statement, published October 26, which, without mention of parties or elections, was a strong endorsement of Roosevelt's candidacy. After reviewing the President's achievements in the fields of defense and foreign relations, and asserting that the human race was then and there "confronted by the gravest crisis in all its experience," Hull assured his countrymen: "President Roosevelt is a statesmen equipped by nature and by experience to meet these problems as few statesmen have been equipped throughout our history."[2]

Hull's official resignation was tendered in a letter of November 21 and was announced by the President November 27, to become effective November 30. Both Hull's letter and the President's reply contained expressions of deep regret and, on Roosevelt's side, of personal affection. The President also wrote:

> Incidentally, when the organization of the United Nations is set up, I shall continue to pray that you, as the father of the United Nations, may preside over its first session. That has nothing to do with whether you are Secretary of State or not at the time, but should go to you as the one person in all the world who has done the most to

> make this great plan for peace an effective fact. . . .[3]

Of the many letters and tokens of appreciation which came to Hull after his resignation was announced, one of the warmest was a longhand letter from his Cabinet colleague, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

> I cannot tell you adequately [he wrote] the shock of sorrow and regret which came to me last evening, when I first heard that you had resigned. It seemed as if one of the chief pillars of support upon which I had leaned during the past four years, had gone. . . . Please conserve your strength and get well! We need you terribly.[4]

Stimson's admiration and affection for Hull were unquestionably genuine; yet in the intimacy of his diary he made it plain that in some respects he found the new Secretary of State, E. R. Stettinius, Jr., a relief. Writing of his first organized meeting with the new Secretaries of State and the Navy, Stettinius and James V. Forrestal, Stimson noted that "we followed an organized program. Stettinius brought a list carefully prepared of the propositions that he thought we would be interested in . . ." Stimson found this method of procedure "a real refresher" after the "decadence" which had come over the former conferences of Stimson, Knox, and Hull in Hull's office.[5] Hull's growing habit of using these conferences to air his grievances has been noted elsewhere in these pages.

Secretary Stimson had written Hull, in the letter quoted above, "The whole post-war world will need the help of your sagacity and advice." His advice was asked occasionally, but perhaps not as often as he could have wished. President Roosevelt called to see him at the hospital before departing for the Yalta Conference of February 1945, but as had happened in earlier summit conferences, neither Roosevelt nor anyone else consulted him about the impending negotiations. He was not, indeed, forgotten at Yalta. The official record of the dinner meeting at the Vorontsov Villa, February 10, 1945, relates:

> Mr. Stettinius then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and a great statesman.

Next day Stettinius sent him a message signed "Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, Eden and Stettinius." "We have missed you at our Conference," it read, "and send you our affectionate greetings and wish for you a speedy recovery in order that we may all have the benefit of association with you again."[6]

Also from Yalta Roosevelt wrote Hull requesting him to accept a last official assignment. The statesmen at Yalta had agreed that the conference to complete the United Nations Charter should be held in San Francisco in April. Hull, the President wrote, was the first choice of himself and Stettinius for chairman of the United States delegation; but in view of his poor health they were asking him to be a member of the delegation and its senior adviser.

Hull accepted. There was no chance of his going to San Francisco, but he was kept in daily touch with the delegation and the course of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to voice his views on issues under discussion. These views were what might have been anticipated. He was, of course, strongly opposed to admitting Argentina to the Conference. He opposed moves toward regional organization. He warned of the danger of relying upon military preparation as an alternative to international organization. He favored pressing Russia to modify her stand on the veto, but at the same time counseled against doing anything that might lead Russia to seek security and protection of her interests outside the United Nations. He expressed himself as gratified at the decisions reached, with the exception of the concessions to Argentina, and he took pleasure in signing the Charter when it was brought to Washington, early in July.[7]

In the meantime Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, had found Hull's advice valuable. Late in May, 1945, when the Russian stand on the veto deadlocked the Conference at San Francisco, Truman proposed to send Harry Hopkins to Moscow in an effort to bring Stalin to reason. According to Truman's account, "the State Department" and James F. Byrnes, whom the President had picked to succeed Stettinius as Secretary, advised against sending Hopkins. The President then consulted Hull, and Hull, Truman relates, "told me Hopkins was an excellent choice for the mission."[8] Hopkins went to Moscow, and his mission proved successful.

Not long after this, Truman paid tribute to Hull in what was probably the ex-Secretary's first public appearance since his resignation. When Japan, on August 14, 1945, accepted the formula for surrender announced at Potsdam, the President broke the news to the White House correspondents at 7:00 P.M. Gathered in his office for the occasion were most of the Cabinet, as well as Mrs. Truman. But the President had thoughtfully invited Hull, and though the latter was still ill, he arrived at the meeting before it was over. "I was glad," Truman wrote, "that we could include him in the official picture. . . . He had done much to make this day possible."[9]

In April, 1947, while again hospitalized, Hull received further honors from Truman's hand. The President visited him in the hospital and conferred upon him the Medal for Merit, with oak leaf cluster in lieu of a second medal. This double distinction involved two citations, which were read to the recipient by the President himself. The first praised his "high order of statesmanship based on deep loyalty to his country" and hailed particularly his great contribution to the Good Neighbor policy. The second credited him with having made diplomacy "a powerful weapon in support of our armed strength" and also "a potent instrument in laying the foundations of a stable and peaceful world order in the postwar era. As a tribute to his effective work in bringing about the establishment of an international organization," the citation continued, "he is now known as the 'Father of the United Nations.' "[10]

A still greater honor had already come to Hull. In 1945 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His name had been urged for that distinction as early as 1934 and again in 1937, when he and President Roosevelt had engaged in a friendly competition, each seeking to promote the candidacy of the other. Roosevelt had nominated Hull again in 1938 and 1939, stressing his achievement of the Good Neighbor policy. Finally, in December, 1945, Hull was notified that the Prize was his. Unable to make the journey to Oslo to receive it, he sent his message of appreciation through the United States Ambassador to Norway.[11]

In November, 1945, Hull spent parts of three days in testifying before the Joint Committee of Congress investigating the Pearl Harbor attack. With the help of two of his former associates from the Far Eastern Division, he had prepared in advance a long exposition of American policy toward Japan before Pearl Harbor. Later he was requested to answer a long list of interrogatories submitted by a Republican member of the Committee. When the majority report of the Committee was issued some months later, Hull had the satisfaction of seeing his diplomacy toward Japan and his warnings to the Army and Navy fully vindicated.[12]

In the meantime the former Secretary's precarious health had shown sufficient improvement to enable him to begin work on his monumental *Memoirs*. In this task he had the capable assistance of Andrew H. Berding, former newspaperman and years later an Assistant Secretary of State. With virtually unlimited access to Hull's personal and official papers, they put together what amounted to a history of the foreign policy of three Roosevelt administrations. It is an official rather than a personal history, for although Hull, in looking backward, often expresses his opinions of men and events, he had kept no diary and had written, or at least preserved, very few personal letters. Hence the *Memoirs*, while rich as a source for official reactions, as embodied in diplomatic notes and conversations, are not always revealing as to the Secretary's intimate thoughts and emotions at the time. Whatever their merits and defects, the two volumes of the *Memoirs*, published in 1948, are an indispensable primary source for students of Roosevelt's foreign policy.

In a final chapter entitled "What of the Future?" the former Secretary of State remarked upon the momentous changes in the United States and its position in the world that had occurred during his lifetime, from the morrow of the Civil War to the morrow of World War II. The United States, he thought, had at last come to a realization that its own future well-being, and that of the world, would depend upon international co-operation, political and economic. Of his specific suggestions for the future conduct of the United States, only one is at all surprising to readers of this narrative—his advocacy of the approval of treaties by a majority rather than a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Others included avoidance of partisanship in foreign policy, maintenance of a liberal trade policy, wholehearted support of the United Nations, a general reduction of armaments with inspection under United Nations direction, self-restraint in the criticism of other nations and peoples, support of the progressive attainment of self-government and eventual independence by dependent peoples, acceptance of a due share of responsibility for the control and guidance of defeated Germany and Japan, development and expansion of the Good Neighbor policy, close co-operation with the nations of the British Commonwealth, patience with the Soviet Union and every effort to persuade the Russian leaders that a policy of co-operation and non-intervention is in Russia's interest.

His penultimate paragraph expressed his confidence that the nations of the world would make the right choice:

> I am firmly convinced that in the world of today all nations will be forced to the conclusion that co-operation for law, justice, and peace is the only alternative to a constant race in armaments—including atomic armaments—and to other disrup-

> tive practices that will bring the nations participating in them on either side to a common ruin, the equivalent of universal suicide.[13]

Mr. Hull had made a good recovery from the long illness that followed his resignation, but in 1951 he suffered a cerebral thrombosis which necessitated a further prolonged hospitalization. He returned to his apartment at the Sheraton Park Hotel, and despite further strokes and heart attacks, necessitating frequent returns to the hospital, he kept up his interest in world affairs, spent much time reading and seeing friends and following favorite radio and TV programs. The death of Mrs. Hull, March 26, 1954, evidently destroyed his zest for living. He reduced his activities and lived the life of a semi-invalid until March 26, 1955, when another stroke sent him for the last time to the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. There he remained until his own death, which occurred on July 23, 1955.[14]

President Eisenhower, then attending the Big Four Summit Conference in Geneva, interrupted the proceedings for a tribute to Hull's "long and fruitful labors in the cause of peace", and ordered that flags be displayed at half-mast on all public buildings in the United States and on all United States embassies, legations, and consulates abroad. Among the tributes to Hull appearing in the press were letters from three of his successors, General George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles.[15]

A simple ceremony, such as Hull had requested, took place in the National Cathedral on July 26, in the presence of an estimated two thousand persons, including the top-ranking diplomats of fifty countries. The casket was then placed in the crypt beneath the Cathedral, "reserved for those who have 'given service of an outstanding nature to God and mankind.' "[16]

The *New York Times* obituary on July 24 was headlined: " 'Father' of U.N. Won World Fame." Another article in the same paper quoted a close friend and associate of Mr. Hull as saying that the Secretary had often declared that he hoped to be remembered chiefly for four accomplishments: his part in the creation of the United Nations; his nonpartisan foreign policy during World War II; the Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America; and the Reciprocal Trade Program.